# HOWARD v. CINNAMINSON TWP. BOARD OF EDUCATION

> District Court, D. New Jersey · July 5, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10277179

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** July 5, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Z.H., WILLIAM HOWARD, and No. 1:22-cv-01700-NLH-SAK
LISA HOWARD,
OPINION
Plaintiffs,

V.

CINNAMINSON TOWNSHIP BOARD
OF EDUCATION and Y.A.L.E.
SCHOOL NJ,

Defendants.

RONALD DESIMONE
P.O. BOX 8379
TURNERSVILLE, NJ 08012-8379

Counsel for Plaintiffs.

ANNE ROBBINS MYERS
COMEGNO LAW GROUP, P.C.
521 PLEASANT VALLEY AVE
MOORESTOWN, NJ 08057

Counsel for Y.A.L.E. School NJ

ALYSSA K. WEINSTEIN
THE BUSCH LAW GROUP
450 MAIN STREET
THIRD FLOOR
METUCHEN, NJ 08840

Counsel for Cinnaminson Township Board of Education.

HILLMAN, District Judge
Currently before the Court are the Y.A.L.E. School, NJ’s
(“YALE”) and Cinnaminson Township Board of Education’s
(“Cinnaminson”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motions to Dismiss
Z.H., William Howard, and Lisa Howards’ (“Plaintiffs”) Second
Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (ECF 17, 19). For the reasons that
follow, the Court will dismiss the SAC.

BACKGROUND
I. The IDEA
Though Plaintiffs assert claims under laws other than the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400,
et seq. (the “IDEA”), the thrust of their complaint is an appeal
of a decision by a state Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
denying them relief under that statute. Congress enacted the
IDEA to, among other things, ensure “the rights of children with
disabilities and parents of such children are protected.” 20
U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B).
The IDEA requires that every child with a disability
receive a free appropriate public education (a “FAPE”) from

their public school if that school receives federal funding
under the IDEA. Id. at § 1412(a)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.101(a).
The term “free appropriate public education” means the provision
of “special education and related services” that meet certain
criteria. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). The IDEA also guarantees
parents of disabled children a right to participate in the
educational programming offered to their children.
To ensure that public schools adequately provide a FAPE and
that the rights of disabled students and their parents are not
infringed, Congress enacted various “procedural safeguards” that
participating public schools must comply with. Id. at §
1412(6)(A); id. at § 1415(a). One such procedural safeguard

provides standards for adjudicating disputes about whether a
school has adequately provided a FAPE. Per Congress’
requirements, these disputes begin with the filing of a “due
process petition” or “due process complaint.” Either the public
school or the child may file a due process complaint, and that
complaint may seek relief with respect to “any matter relating
to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of
the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public
education to such child.” Id. at § 1415(b)(6).
The IDEA contemplates that it is the State Educational
Agency that is responsible for making sure that there are fair
and impartial procedures in place to handle any due process

petition. Id. at §1415 (f)(1)(A) (“Whenever a complaint has
been received under subsection (b)(6) or (k), the parents or the
local educational agency involved in such complaint shall have
an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing, which shall
be conducted by the State educational agency or by the local
educational agency, as determined by State law or by the State
educational agency.”); id. at § 1415(e)(1) (“Any State
educational agency or local educational agency that receives
assistance under this subchapter shall ensure that procedures
are established and implemented to allow parties to disputes
involving any matter.”).
Once a due process complaint has been filed, Congress has

set strict deadlines by which certain events must occur. See
Id. at § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii) (referencing timelines “applicable
[to] a due process hearing”); 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a) (setting
forth a strict timeframe for due process petition resolution);
N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(j) (same). In New Jersey, “[a] due process
hearing is an administrative hearing conducted by an
administrative law judge” (an “ALJ”) in the Office of
Administrative Law (the “OAL”). N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(a).
JURISDICTION

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction because
Plaintiffs assert a claim under a federal statute, the IDEA.1
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It has supplemental jurisdiction over

1 Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint asserts federal question
jurisdiction under “20 U.S.C.S. § 1415 (2)” (ECF 16 at 2) as
well as the IDEA as a whole. Id. However, this appears to be a
typographical error as no such provision exists. Rather,
Plaintiffs appear to assert a cause of action under 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(2) which allows for a party aggrieved by findings or a
decision under the IDEA’s administrative procedures to file a
civil action “in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in
a district court of the United States, without regard to the
amount in controversy.” Id. While the Court ultimately
concludes that Plaintiffs do not have a cognizable federal claim
based on the IDEA this does not deprive the court of
jurisdiction as the Court always retains jurisdiction to
determine its jurisdiction. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S.
622, 628 (2002) (“it is familiar law that a federal court always
has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.”).
Plaintiffs’ common-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

For purposes of this motion to dismiss, the Court takes the
facts alleged in the complaint as true and will only recount
those salient to the instant motion. Z.H. was a child who was
receiving special education services from YALE. (ECF 16 at 3-
4). In 2017, Z.H.’s parents filed a due process petition
against Cinnaminson with the New Jersey Department of Education
(“NJDOE”) and unilaterally placed Z.H. at YALE where he attended
school from 9th through 12th grade. (ECF 16-1 at 4).
The due process petition was resolved by way of a
settlement agreement (the “2017 Agreement”) in which Z.H.’s
parents agreed to pay the first $10,000 of Z.H.’s annual tuition
at YALE and that Cinnaminson would reimburse them for the base
tuition expended in excess of the first $10,000. (Id.) The

2017 Agreement was approved by an ALJ and memorialized on an
administrative docket in December 2017 as a “Final Decision
Approving Settlement.” (Id.). The 2017 Agreement provided
that Cinnaminson’s reimbursement obligation would continue after
June 2021 “if and only if Z.H. is not eligible to, and does not,
graduate high school by June 30, 2021.” (ECF 16-5 at ¶ 4).
In addition, in the 2017 Agreement, Plaintiffs waived their
right to a FAPE and to hold Cinnaminson accountable for a FAPE
while Z.H. was a student at YALE. (See ECF 16-5 at ¶ 8 (“[I]t
is agreed and acknowledged that the Petitioners may challenge
the appropriateness of only the related services offered by the
District[.]”); see also id. at ¶¶ 16-17 (agreeing to indemnify

and hold harmless Cinnaminson related to any services that Z.H.
might receive from YALE); id. at ¶ 17 (“Under no circumstances
shall Z.H.’s attendance at [YALE]. . . be deemed an
acknowledgment that [Cinnaminson]. . . is required to provide
Z.H. with a FAPE.”)).
In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic hit the United States
and YALE modified its teaching procedures between March 2020 and
June 2021 such that it was impossible for Z.H. to complete his
Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) goals and thereby receive
a FAPE. (ECF 16 at 3-4). Specifically, Z.H.’s IEP contemplated
that he would receive “social skills training, community-based
instruction, transitional program training, mobility program

training, vocational program training, health and wellness
training, student-to-student contact, contact with non-disabled
peers or situational environmental learning.” (Id. at 6).
Instead, because of the pandemic, YALE switched to virtual and
semi-virtual instruction through June 2021 and Z.H. was
therefore unable to achieve many of his IEP goals. (Id. at 6-
12).
On June 2, 2021, Z.H. filed a due process petition and a
request for emergent relief with NJDOE. (See ECF 16-1 at 3).
Z.H. sought to have an ALJ at the OAL set aside the 2017
Agreement so that he could continue his placement at YALE with
reimbursement from Cinnaminson. (Id.) The emergent portion of

the application was addressed on June 11, 2021 and the remaining
due process portion of the matter proceeded onward. (Id.) In
connection with the merits of the due process proceedings, the
ALJ entertained motion practice.
Relevant to the case at bar, Cinnaminson moved to dismiss
the petition with prejudice and argued that the 2017 Agreement
was controlling in this matter and that there had been no
finding by YALE that Z.H. was ineligible to graduate in June
2021. (Id. at 10-11). Cinnaminson argued that it fulfilled its
responsibilities under the agreement and that the OAL was not
the appropriate tribunal to entertain voiding the 2017
Agreement. (Id. at 11).

The ALJ agreed with Cinnaminson and concluded that barring
an affirmative statement from YALE that Z.H. was not eligible to
graduate he was eligible to graduate for the purposes of
construing the 2017 Agreement. (Id. at 15). The ALJ also
concluded that the OAL did not have the jurisdiction to enforce
or set aside the 2017 Agreement. (Id. at 17). Finally, the ALJ
concluded that Z.H. had not met his burden to show that
Cinnaminson should be responsible for payment of extended
learning beyond June 30, 2021. (Id. at 19).
Following that decision by the ALJ, Plaintiffs filed the
instant matter in federal court. (ECF 1). The instant matter
contains seven counts. Count One is styled as an appeal of the

ALJ’s decision under the IDEA. (ECF 16 at 3–16). The next
three counts are against Cinnaminson for alleged violation of
the 2017 Agreement: breach of contract (Count Two), breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count
Three), and unjust enrichment (Count Four). (Id. at 14-21).
Counts Five through Seven are against YALE, not for breach of
the 2017 Agreement to which it was not a party, but for breach
of its separate contracts with the Plaintiff parents to provide
educational services to Z.H. in the 2019-2020 and the 2020-2021
school years: breach of contract (Count Five), breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count Six), and
unjust enrichment (Count Seven). (Id. at 21-29).

The Court will begin with Count One. As explained below,
this Court, as did the ALJ below, lacks the authority to
adjudicate the contractual dispute between the parties under the
IDEA. Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the
IDEA and the SAC will be dismissed. Consistent with the
reasoning behind that decision, the Court will decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law
claims.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court
must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as
true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005). It is well
settled that a pleading is sufficient if it contains “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do . . . .” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (first citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957); Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc.,
40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994); and then citing Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
To determine the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must
take three steps: (1) the court must take note of the elements a
plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) the court should
identify allegations that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and

(3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief. Malleus v.
George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664, 675, 679 (2009) (alterations,
quotations, and other citations omitted).
A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks
“not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416
U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (“Our
decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all

civil actions’ . . . .”); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Iqbal . . . provides the final nail in
the coffin for the ‘no set of facts’ standard that applied to
federal complaints before Twombly.”). “A motion to dismiss
should be granted if the plaintiff is unable to plead ‘enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Malleus, 641 F.3d at 563 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570).
A court in reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must only
consider the facts alleged in the pleadings, the documents
attached thereto as exhibits, and matters of judicial notice.
S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd.,

181 F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir. 1999). A court may consider,
however, “an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant
attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s
claims are based on the document.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.
v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.
1993). If any other matters outside the pleadings are presented
to the court, and the court does not exclude those matters, a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be treated as a summary judgment
motion pursuant to Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
I. Analysis

a. Plaintiffs’ Appeal of the ALJ’s Opinion

At the outset, the appeal of the ALJ’s decision is clearly
a contractual dispute cloaked in IDEA terms. This joins the
issue of the appropriate standard to apply to Cinnaminson’s
motion to dismiss the appeal of the ALJ’s decision. Although
Cinnaminson styles this portion of its motion as a motion under
Rule 12(b)(6), the body of its motion makes clear that it is
asking the Court decide the merits of the appeal by applying the
“modified de novo” review standard as defined by the Third
Circuit. (ECF 19 at 11).
A review of that standard bears repeating here. District
“Courts are to give due weight to the factual findings of the
ALJ in IDEA cases.” S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of City
of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2003). This is conceived
of as a “modified de novo review” in which “[f]actual findings

from the administrative proceedings are to be considered prima
facie correct.” Id. at 270. In practice, “this means that a
District Court must accept the state agency’s credibility
determinations unless the non-testimonial, extrinsic evidence in
the record would justify a contrary conclusion. In this context
the word ‘justify’ demands essentially the same standard of
review given to a trial court’s findings of fact by a federal
appellate court.” Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S. ex
rel. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Questions
of law, however, are reviewed de novo. N. Highlands Reg’l High

Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. C.E. on behalf of C.E., No. 18-08999, 2019
WL 5975548, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2019) (“For questions of law,
a district court applies a de novo standard to the review of
administrative decisions in IDEA cases.”).
One salient difference between district court review in
IDEA cases versus other agency appeals is the fact that the
district court is empowered to hear additional evidence at the
request of either party. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii) (stating
that the district court “shall hear additional evidence at the
request of a party”). The Third Circuit has stated that a
district court could properly exclude inappropriate proffered
evidence such as evidence that was “cumulative and an improper

embellishment of testimony previously given at an administrative
hearing” but that it “must evaluate a party’s proffered evidence
before deciding to exclude it.” Susan N. v. Wilson Sch. Dist.,
70 F.3d 751, 759 (3d Cir. 1995).
The Third Circuit has declined to devise a bright line rule
regarding what kind of evidence may be excluded but has advised
that a district court may approach the inquiry in a similar
manner to how to would decide to include or exclude evidence in
a civil proceeding. Id. “While a district court appropriately
may exclude additional evidence, a court must exercise
particularized discretion in its rulings so that it will
consider evidence relevant, non-cumulative and useful in

determining whether Congress’ goal has been reached for the
child involved.” Id. It is this framework that the Court
ordinarily uses in adjudicating an appeal from an ALJ’s
decision. In the mine-run IDEA case, such appeals most often
concern an ALJ’s decision on the scope of a FAPE owed by a
school district to a disabled child.
However, this matter is decidedly different. As previously
stated, though technically an appeal of a decision by an ALJ
adjudicating a due process petition, this matter is at its core
a contract dispute. While both parties frame this case as such
an appeal, Plaintiffs are not, through their denied due process
petition and appeal, seeking a renewed evaluation of the scope

of a FAPE determined by an ALJ. Rather, whether through the
procedural mechanism of a due process petition or, barring that,
a common law contract claim, the relief they truly seek is a
setting aside of the 2017 Agreement in which they waived the
right to challenge Cinnaminson on the basis that Z.H. did not
receive a FAPE. (See ECF 16-5 at ¶ 8).
The law is clear that parties in a due process proceeding
may resolve the dispute in a way that waives a claimant’s right
to a FAPE or other protections under the IDEA. Ballard ex rel.
Ballard v. Philadelphia Sch. Dist., 273 F. App’x 184, 188 (3d
Cir. 2008) (“A parent can waive her child’s right to a FAPE.”);
I.K. ex rel. B.K. v. Sch. Dist. of Haverford Twp., 961 F. Supp.

2d 674, 688 (E.D. Pa. 2013), aff’d sub nom. I.K. ex rel. B.K. v.
Haverford Sch. Dist., 567 F. App’x 135 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[H]ad
the hearing officer concluded that a valid settlement agreement
existed, this determination would have substituted for a
FAPE.”). Given this waiver, Plaintiffs filed the due process
petition in order to have the OAL void the 2017 Agreement.2 (See

2 To be clear, the ALJ notes in his decision that the Plaintiffs
argued in the alternative that the 2017 Agreement did not
obviate Cinnaminson’s requirement to provide a FAPE. (ECF 16-1
at 8-9). This argument, though, is an argument regarding
ECF 16-1 at 8).
Having been denied that relief below, the Plaintiff now
seeks this Court’s de novo review of the ALJ’s legal

determinations related to the 2017 Agreement. (See ECF 16 at 3-
4 (“The plaintiff now comes before this court for a de novo
review of that decision[.]”). Consistent with that position,
Plaintiffs make a general request that the Court hear
“additional testimony to determine whether the COVID-19
Governmental shutdowns created a substantial change of
circumstances as to negate the agreement[’]s termination of
benefits to the plaintiff as of June 30, 2021 and to provide
that which was not provide[d] to the plaintiff during the
pandemic.” (Id. at 12). As noted above, taking additional
evidence is a procedural remedy available under the IDEA for a
plaintiff asserting a viable IDEA claim.

In his decision, the ALJ made two principal determinations.
First, the ALJ determined that Plaintiffs’ argument that their
previous settlement agreement should be set aside was not
properly before him and that “the OAL does not have the
jurisdiction to either enforce or set aside an enforceable
contract.” (ECF 16-1 at 17). He concluded that the issue of
the enforceability of the settlement agreement could only be

contract interpretation that, as explained below, is not
properly before this Court.
addressed outside the administrative context in a court of
competent jurisdiction. (Id. at 19).
Despite that holding, the ALJ continued on to make factual

determinations and then applied those findings in a process that
can only be described as interpreting the rights and obligations
of the parties under the contract between the two. In his
second principal determination, the ALJ held that “barring an
affirmative statement from YALE that Z.H. is not eligible to
graduate, he is eligible to graduate from the high-school
program anticipated in the 2017 Agreement.” (Id. at 15).
Because Z.H. was eligible to graduate, the ALJ reasoned,
Cinnaminson was not required to continue paying for Z.H.’s
education per the 2017 Agreement. (Id.) Despite the ALJ’s two-
step process, it is this Court’s view that the only question
properly before it on this appeal pursuant to the IDEA is the

ALJ’s determination as to whether he had the power to set aside
the 2017 Agreement. That is a question of law, and the Court
considers it de novo. N. Highlands Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of
Educ., 2019 WL 5975548 at *4.
One ALJ of New Jersey’s OAL has previously held that it is
“without authority or jurisdiction to either enforce or set
aside an enforceable contract. Such enforcement (or set aside)
is within the purview and jurisdiction of our State’s Superior
Court or the United States District Court, not the OAL.” A.P.
v. Dennis Township Board of Education, 1998 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 346,
*14-15. This interpretation of the IDEA is consistent with the
statutory language. By the very terms of the IDEA, a settlement

agreement that is entered into to resolve a due process
proceeding is “enforceable in any State court of competent
jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States.” 20
U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(F)(3).
It is also consistent with the law in this Circuit. The
Third Circuit has noted that a settlement agreement dealing with
rights under the IDEA is a binding contract just as any other
contract and where voluntarily entered, it should be enforced as
written. D.R. by M.R. v. E. Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 109 F.3d
896, 898 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he settlement agreement was
voluntarily and willingly entered by the parties. It is
therefore a binding contract between the parties and should have

been enforced as written.”). Thus the Court finds no error in
the ALJ’s determination that the OAL simply did not have the
power to void, enforce or otherwise interpret the 2017
Agreement.
Accordingly, the Court declines to hear the additional
evidence that Plaintiffs propose to proffer because it is not
relevant to the purely legal issue of whether the ALJ had the
power to adjudicate the parties contractual dispute. Plaintiffs
state that they want to offer testimony “to determine whether
the COVID-19 Governmental shutdowns created a substantial change
of circumstances as to negate the agreement[’]s termination of
benefits to the plaintiff as of June 30, 2021 and to provide

that which was not provide[d] to the plaintiff during the
pandemic.” (ECF 16 at 12). By the very terms of the request,
Plaintiffs seek to introduce evidence for an improper purpose,
to negate the terms of the 2017 Agreement by engrafting a force
majeure provision. This proposed evidence simply would not be
useful to the Court in determining the issue before it — whether
the ALJ erred in determining that he did not have the power to
set aside the 2017 Agreement. Susan N., 70 F.3d at 759. The
Court concludes that the ALJ did not err in making that
determination. The ALJ correctly determined that it lacked the
authority under the IDEA to adjudicate the parties purely
contractual dispute.

Unlike the ALJ, however, this Court will not opine on
whether the conditions of the 2017 Agreement were satisfied in
connection with Z.H.’s eligibility for graduation in June 2021.
Once the ALJ determined that he did not have jurisdiction over
the contractual dispute under the IDEA, it is the view of this
Court that he should not have proceeded to construe the terms of
the 2017 Agreement. See G. W. v. Ringwood Bd. of Educ., 28
F.4th 465, 473 (3d Cir. 2022) (“To the extent that the remainder
of Appellants’ claims address the validity of the settlement
agreement on the basis of New Jersey contract law, we leave it
to the District Court in the exercise of its discretion to
consider in the first instance whether supplemental jurisdiction

is appropriately taken to resolve that matter pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367.”).
The ALJ’s factual determination as to whether a condition
precedent had been satisfied which would have triggered
additional payments by Cinnaminson amounted to an advisory
opinion which, for its part, this Court may not issue. This
Court will not compound the ALJ’s error by expressing an opinion
about the scope and enforceability of an agreement over which it
has no jurisdiction. Hamilton v. Bromley, 862 F.3d 329, 337 (3d
Cir. 2017) (“Since we lack Article III jurisdiction over this
case, we cannot resolve whether [] abstention is appropriate
because a judicial decision rendered in the absence of a case or

controversy is advisory, and federal courts lack power to render
advisory opinions.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, the Court notes that the Third Circuit clarified
in G.W. v. Ringwood Board of Education, 28 F.4th 465 (3d. Cir.
2022) that a district court has jurisdiction over an appeal of a
Decision Approving Settlement entered by an ALJ even where the
settlement terms were negotiated outside of the OAL’s mediation
process. The key distinction between G.W. and the instant case
is that Plaintiffs are not seeking to appeal a Decision
Approving Settlement, rather they have filed a new due process
petition seeking to set aside their previous settlement that had
been in place for approximately four years. (ECF 16-1 at 3).

The ALJ determined that the settlement agreement controls, and
the question of whether petitioner has been provided with FAPE
“is a false premise” where the real question presented in the
petition is “who will pay for this additional year at YALE?”
(ECF 16-1 at 14). The ALJ explained that this question “was
dealt with in the Settlement Agreement from 2017.” (Id.).
As discussed above, this Court may review the ALJ’s
determination under the IDEA. This Court has done so, and
determines that the ALJ did not err in finding that the
settlement agreement controls, and the real issue is one of
contract interpretation. (See ECF 16-1 at 15). To the extent
Plaintiffs seek this Court’s substantive review of the

settlement agreement, the appropriate mechanism would have been
an appeal of the ALJ’s Decision Approving Settlement back in
2017. An appeal of such decision at this time would be time-
barred by the ninety-day statute of limitations. K.S. v.
Hackensack Bd. of Educ., No. 16-2155, 2017 WL 788207, at *4
(D.N.J. Mar. 1, 2017) (“The aggrieved party ‘shall have 90 days
from the date of the decision of the hearing officer to bring
such an action, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation
... in such time as the State law allows.’ 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(2)(B). New Jersey’s time limit is also ninety days. See
N.J.A.C. 6A:14–2.7(v)”).
Thus, this Court will affirm the ALJ’s decision that the

prior settlement agreement governs and “the OAL does not have
jurisdiction to either enforce or set aside an enforceable
contract.” (ECF 16-1 at 17). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ IDEA claim
must be dismissed.
b. Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims

Having resolved the appeal of the ALJ’s decision, the Court
will decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
state law claims.3 Robert W. Mauthe, M.D., P.C. v. Optum Inc.,
925 F.3d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[A] court does not err if it
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims
after it dismisses a federal claim on which its jurisdiction is
based in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.”); G. W.,
28 F.4th at 473 (“To the extent that the remainder of
Appellants’ claims address the validity of the settlement
agreement on the basis of New Jersey contract law, we leave it
to the District Court in the exercise of its discretion to

3 In light of this Court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiffs’ IDEA
claim for failure to state a claim and to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims, it
need not reach Defendants’ contentions for dismissal of those
claims on the basis of Rule 12(b)(1), the New Jersey Emergency
Health Powers Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:13-1, et seq., Beukas v.
Bd. of Trustees of Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 605 A.2d 776 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991), or any other related arguments.
consider in the first instance whether supplemental jurisdiction
is appropriately taken to resolve that matter pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367.”).

CONCLUSION
As stated above, the essence of this matter is a
contractual dispute. If Plaintiffs wish to void the 2017
Agreement, they may go to state court to seek that relief in the
absence of diversity jurisdiction. G.W., 28 F.4th at 473
(holding that it is up to “the District Court in the exercise of
its discretion to consider in the first instance whether
supplemental jurisdiction is appropriately taken to resolve that
matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.”). Therefore, Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss the SAC (ECF 17, 19) will be granted.
An appropriate Order will be entered.

Date: July 5, 2023 s/ Noel L. Hillman
At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10277179. Public record. Not legal advice.