# WESLEY v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.

> District Court, D. New Jersey · May 17, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10276775

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** May 17, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Not for Publication

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

KATHY WESLEY, ALESIA CHARLES,
DANIELLE D’ANDREA, DAVID MARK
EDMONDSON, NIKILYN GRIMSLEY, PAUL
LIND, JO PEACOCK, and THERESA Civil Action No. 20-18629
SIMPSON, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated,
OPINION
Plaintiffs,
v.

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,

Defendant.

John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.

This case returns to the Court on Defendant Samsung Electronics America Inc.’s
(“Samsung”) motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint. D.E. 85. The Court
reviewed the submissions in support and in opposition,1 and considered the motions without oral
argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) and L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons stated below,
Samsung’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

1 Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, D.E. 76, will be referred to as “TAC”; Defendant’s brief
in support of its motion to dismiss, D.E. 85-1, will be referred to as “Def. Br.”; Plaintiffs’ brief in
opposition, D.E. 88, will be referred to as “Plfs. Opp.”; and Defendant’s reply brief, D.E. 89, will
be referred to as “Def. Reply.”
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
In this putative class action, Plaintiffs allege that they purchased Samsung gas and electric
ranges from various authorized resellers, such as BestBuy, Sears, Wayfair, Lowes, and Home
Depot. TAC ¶¶ 19, 29, 42, 53, 63, 73, 86, 96. Plaintiffs reviewed Samsung marketing materials
and were aware that their ranges were covered by a Samsung warranty, which was included in the

user manual that came with the range. Id. ¶¶ 20-21, 30-31, 42-43, 54-55, 64-65, 74-75, 87-88, 97-
98. This warranty covers manufacturing defects in materials and workmanship for one year. Id.
¶¶ 21, 31, 43, 55, 65, 75, 88, 98. After purchasing the ranges, Plaintiffs began to experience
problems with the temperature settings of the ovens, as the ovens would not maintain the set
temperature.3 Id. ¶¶ 23, 33, 46, 57, 67, 77, 90, 100. Plaintiffs attempted to contact Samsung to
have the ranges repaired, but the repairs were either unsuccessful or Plaintiffs were unable to obtain
repair services. Id. ¶¶ 25, 35-36, 48, 59, 69,78-80, 92, 102. Plaintiffs Wesley, Peacock, D’Andrea,
Lind, Simpson, Grimsley, and Edmondson have since used replacement appliances. Id. ¶¶ 39, 50,
60, 70, 83, 93, 103.

Plaintiffs allege that at least 87 Samsung gas and electric range models (the “Class
Ranges”) “fail to properly cook food on account of a defect in the Samsung oven temperature
sensor bearing component model number DG32-00002B and the Range’s control board.” ¶¶ 118,

2 The factual background is taken from Plaintiffs’ TAC, D.E. 76. When reviewing a motion to
dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint. Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).

3 Six of the named Plaintiffs allege that their ovens consistently underheat: for Plaintiff Simpson,
by approximately 50 degrees; for Plaintiff Charles and Plaintiff Wesley, by approximately 75
degrees; and for Plaintiff Peacock, Plaintiff D’Andrea, and Plaintiff Grimsley, by approximately
100 degrees. TAC ¶¶ 24, 34, 47, 58, 81, 91. Plaintiff Lind alleges that her oven consistently
overheats by at least 25 degrees, and Plaintiff Edmondson alleges that his oven both “underheat[s]
or overheat[s].” Id. ¶¶ 68, 101.
144. Plaintiffs define the alleged defect as a “distort[ion] of information received by the control
board, which in turn causes the oven to deviate from the user-selected temperature (the ‘Defect’).”
Id. ¶ 1. Plaintiffs explain that the temperature sensor “measures the internal oven temperature and
communicates it to the oven’s control board by varying the amount of resistance in the conducting
material.” Id. ¶ 121. Plaintiffs continue that “[r]esistance is a measurement of how easily the

electrical current can pass through the conducting material;” thus, “changes in resistance affect the
rate at which electrical current flows through the conducting material and into the oven’s control
board.” Id. ¶ 122. According to Plaintiffs, when the electrical current flows into the control board,
it is converted into voltage, and that voltage powers the control board’s switching relays, which
open and close the circuits that lead to the oven’s heat supply.4 Id. ¶ 124. In other words, the
“control board tells the[] [heating] elements when to turn on or off,” “by converting the current
that flows from the temperature sensor into voltage that powers the mechanical switching relays
that open and close the circuits leading to those heating elements.” Id.
Plaintiffs allege that when the Defect manifests, the temperature sensor fails to correctly

regulate resistance in the metal conducting material that connects to the control board. Id. ¶ 1. As
a result, the control board “receives inaccurate electrical information and does not deliver the
correct amount of voltage to the mechanical switches that regulate the oven’s heating supply.” Id.
In turn, the switching relays either (1) remain closed and fail to open the circuits that signal the
heating supply to turn on; or (2) remain open and fail to signal the heating supply to turn off. Id.
¶ 125. This causes the ovens to deviate from the user-selected temperature, becoming “either far
too hot, posing a safety risk, or barely warm at all.” Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiffs further allege that Samsung

4 In electric ranges, the heat supply consists of an electric heating coil; in gas ranges, the heat
supply consists of an oven burner, the gas valve, and the ignitor. TAC ¶ 120.
knew of, and failed to disclose the Defect, and continues to manufacture and sell ranges with the
defective sensor. Id. ¶¶ 133-38. Had Plaintiffs known of the Defect, they would not have
purchased their ranges or would have paid a significantly lower price. Id. ¶ 146.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs filed this putative class action on December 9, 2020, D.E. 1, and filed the First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on March 3, 2021. D.E. 15. Samsung moved to dismiss, D.E. 16,
and on December 3, 2021, the Court granted the motion in part and afforded Plaintiffs 30 days to
file an amended complaint. 5 D.E. 44, D.E. 45. On April 5, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the Second
Amended Complaint (“SAC”),6 and Samsung moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, moved to
strike the class allegations. D.E. 57, 57-1. Plaintiffs opposed and filed a cross-motion for leave
to file a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”). D.E. 58, 58-1, 59, 62. On October 28, 2022, the
Court granted in part and denied in part Samsung’s motion to dismiss and to strike (granting the
motion to dismiss without prejudice, and denying the motion to strike), and denied Plaintiffs’
cross-motion for leave to file an amended complaint. D.E. 72, 73. Nevertheless, because Plaintiffs

were granted leave to amend to cure the deficiencies in the SAC, the Court noted that, should
Plaintiffs file an amended pleading, they may add the new Plaintiffs that they sought to join in the
cross-motion. D.E. 72 at 2 n.2.

5 Based on an amended scheduling order, the deadline for the SAC was extended to April 5, 2022.
D.E. 47. One day before the deadline, the parties submitted a joint stipulation indicating that
Plaintiffs intended to file a motion for leave to amend their complaint to add new plaintiffs and
requesting that the Court extend Plaintiffs’ SAC deadline until after Plaintiffs could file, and the
Court could decide, Plaintiffs’ planned motion for leave to amend. D.E. 49. The Court did not
approve the stipulation. D.E. 50.

6 The SAC omitted a fraud claim, a warranty claim, most of the state consumer protection claims,
and some of the express and implied warranty claims that were raised in the FAC. D.E. 52. As a
result, those claims were dismissed with prejudice.
On November 28, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the TAC. D.E. 76. The TAC includes eight
Plaintiffs who bring allegations individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated: Kathy
Wesley (Florida), Alesia Charles (California), Danielle D’Andrea (New Jersey),7 David Mark
Edmondson (Washington), Nikilyn Grimsley (Virginia), Paula Lind (Illinois), Theresa Simpson
(Pennsylvania), and Jo Peacock (Florida). The TAC asserts claims for breach of express warranty

on behalf of the New Jersey, Illinois, Florida, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Washington subclasses
(Count I), breach of implied warranty of merchantability on behalf of the New Jersey, Florida,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Washington subclasses (Count II), and violations of the Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act and California Consumers Legal Remedies Act on behalf of the
California subclasses (Count III and Count IV, respectively).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(6) permits a motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For a complaint to survive dismissal under the rule, it
must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim
is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Further, a
plaintiff must “allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover
proof of her claims.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016).
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, district courts must separate the factual and
legal elements. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-211 (3d Cir. 2009). Restatements

7 Danielle D’Andrea, as Administrator of the Estate of Joseph D’Andrea, was substituted as a
Plaintiff in this action in place of Joseph D’Andrea on October 13, 2022, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 25(a). D.E. 69.
of the elements of a claim are legal conclusions, and therefore, not entitled to a presumption of
truth. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011). The Court, however,
“must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true[,]” and give the plaintiff the benefit
of all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. Even if plausibly pled,
however, a complaint will not withstand a motion to dismiss if the facts alleged do not state “a

legally cognizable cause of action.” Turner v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. 14-7148, 2015 WL
12826480, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 23, 2015).
IV. ANALYSIS
Samsung raises numerous grounds for dismissal, arguing first that dismissal is warranted
because Plaintiffs still fail to plausibly allege a “defect” in their ranges. Def. Br. at 10-14. The
Court agrees. In its October 28, 2022 Opinion, the Court observed that there appears to be a split
in authority as to the level of factual allegations necessary to plausibly plead a defect. D.E. 72 at
7-8. While some courts have found that alleging a defect, along with the effects of the defect, is
sufficient, others, like the DeCoteau court, take a more nuanced approach. See id. (collecting

cases). To briefly recap, the DeCoteau matter concerned allegations about defective transmissions
in certain vehicles. DeCoteau v. FCA US LLC , No. 15-00020, 2015 WL 6951296, at *1 (E.D.
Cal. Nov. 10, 2015). The plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed because while the FAC alleged the
effects of the defective transmission, it failed to indicate what was actually defective in the
transmission. Id. at *3. The DeCoteau court reasoned that the “level of specificity required” to
state a defect claim will “directly correlate to the complexity of the machinery in question,” and
that because the transmissions are “complicated systems,” they “demand more detailed factual
allegations in order to identify a plausible defect.” Id. (citations omitted). This Court found such
reasoning persuasive and determined that, given the complexity of the Range, Plaintiffs failed to
plausibly plead a defect.8 D.E. 72 at 9.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court addressed the shortcomings of Plaintiffs’ SAC. The
SAC named the alleged defective component (the oven temperature sensor), described the sensor’s
role (regulating the amount of resistance in the electrical circuits linked to the control board), and

explained that the Ranges contain a “latent defect” in the sensor, which
“causes the [] control boards to fail, which in turn causes the [] Range’s oven and burner
temperatures to deviate from the user-selected temperature settings.” D.E. 72 at 6-7 (quoting SAC
¶¶ 1-2, 69-70). But critically, the SAC “fail[]ed to allege specifically what is defective about the
[sensor].” Id. at 6. It also was ambiguous as to the severity of the temperature fluctuation for the
named Plaintiffs. Id. at 7. Critically, the Court also found that numerous factual allegations
undercut the Plaintiffs’ claim that it was the sensor that was defective because such allegations
attributed the Defect, in whole or in part, to the many other components responsible for measuring
and regulating oven temperature. Id. at 6-7. For example, the SAC alleged that certain technicians

indicated that the cause of the problem was attributable to both the sensors and control boards. Id.
The SAC also cited to online consumer complaints that attributed the problem to other components
such as the control board and the heating element. Id. at 7.

8 Notwithstanding the Court’s decision to follow the DeCoteau approach, Plaintiffs attempt to
relitigate the appropriate standard for the Court to apply, arguing that “[c]ourts have upheld similar
allegations in cases involving complex systems.” Plfs. Opp. at 7-8. In support, Plaintiffs cite many
of the cases relied on in Plaintiffs’ prior opposition brief to argue that alleging a defect, along with
the effects, is sufficient. Compare D.E. 58-1 at 7, 8 n.2; Plfs. Opp. at 7-8. But the Court already
considered this argument and determined that the approach set forth in DeCoteau is appropriate
given the factual allegations in this matter. D.E. 72 at 8-9. The Court’s conclusion is buttressed
by the fact that, as discussed, Plaintiffs appear to contribute other components to the heating
malfunction. At the same time, the Court can also envision circumstances in which the level of
pleading required by DeCoteau is not necessary, for example, in a case in which res ipsa loquitur
would apply.
The Court again finds that Plaintiffs fail to plausibly plead a defect even though the TAC
is much closer to meeting the requisite pleading threshold. The TAC provides greater context
about the role of the various components involved in the oven’s heating system. See, e.g., TAC
¶¶ 1, 120-130. For example, Plaintiffs explain that the oven’s heat regulation system consists of
the sensor, the control board, and the heat supply (which is an electric heating coil in an electric

oven or an oven burner, gas valve, and ignitor in a gas oven). Id. ¶ 120. Plaintiffs explain that the
sensor is responsible for measuring the internal oven temperature and communicating it to the
control board by varying the amount of resistance in the conducting material (a metal wire that
links the sensor to the control board). Id. ¶ 121. Plaintiffs continue that the amount of resistance
affects the rate at which the electrical current flows into the control board, and that the control
board then converts the electrical current into the voltage needed to power the control board’s
switching relays, which open and close the circuits that lead to the heating elements to signal to
them when to turn on and off. Id. ¶¶ 122, 124-26. Plaintiffs add that “[a]ll of these elements must
work correctly and in close coordination for an oven to properly heat and maintain the selected

temperature,” and that the Defect results from a “malfunction in the electrical interaction of the
sensor and the control board.” Id. ¶ 120.
As to the sensor-specific defect allegations, the TAC indicates the defective component—
the sensor. The TAC also alleges how the sensor is defective. It states that the sensor “fails to
correctly regulate resistance in the conducting material connected to the control board,” which
distorts the electrical current received by the control board. TAC ¶¶ 125-26.9 And the TAC

9 This allegation is stated similarly in other paragraphs of the TAC. See, e.g., TAC ¶ 123 (alleging
that the sensor is “unreliable and prone to erratic and incorrect regulation of resistance,” which
“causes an incorrect amount of current to flow to the control board.”).
continues, as the SAC did, that this causes “circuit failure mode” in the control board, meaning
that the control board is unable “to consistently open and close the [switching] relays,” and thus
“signal the heating supply to turn” on and off, id. ¶ 125, the cause of the defect.10 Finally, the TAC
indicates the result of the defect, that is, the heating temperatures are materially deficient—whether
it be too low a temperature or one that is too high.

But Plaintiffs’ other allegations cause the Court to question whether Plaintiffs allege that
only the sensor is defective—as opposed to some other component or combination or
components.11 At times, Plaintiffs appear to allege that both the sensor and the control board are
defective. See, e.g., id. ¶ 118 (“Plaintiffs’ Class Ranges fail to properly cook food on account of
the defect in the Samsung oven temperature sensor bearing component model number DG32-
00002B and the Range’s control board. Each Class Range contains this sensor and a control
board.” (emphases added); see also Plfs. Opp. at 9 (“[T]he defect is present in both the temperature
sensor and the Range’s control board as it is the result of a malfunction in the electrical interaction
between the sensor and the control board.”). And at other times, the alleged defect is amorphous,

“inher[ing] somewhere in the electrical and mechanical connections within the Range’s heating
system,” and “distort[ing] the information received by the control board.” TAC ¶ 1; see also Plfs.
Opp. at 11 (explaining that the range’s “failures result from a malfunction in the electrical
connection between” the sensor and the control board). Plaintiffs’ other allegations suggest that

10 The TAC describes how the sensor is defective but does not indicate why it is. While the Court
would have appreciated the why as well as the how, the Court does not find this omission to be
fatal.

11 The Court understands that to properly diagnose a defect in a range, counsel will most often
have to employ an expert in the area. Armed with such expert insight, counsel may well conclude
that more than one component of the range is defective and a contributing cause. However, this
precision is lacking in the TAC.
the switching relays may be failing (and in turn, not communicating properly with the heat supply)
not because of a sequence of upstream events involving the sensor and control board, but because
the relays’ contacts themselves have welded together or eroded. See, e.g., TAC ¶ 125 n.5 (“[A]
relay is said to have failed when its contacts fail to operate (often because they weld together) or
when contact material erosion results in an unacceptable high path resistance.”). Similarly,

Plaintiffs assert that the Defect is “difficult” to diagnose because the “unreliable operation of the
switching relays” results in “intermittent heating failures.” Plfs. Opp. at 4, 7; see also TAC ¶ 127.
This allegation is at odds with Plaintiffs’ allegations that suggest that the ovens “consistently” fail
to maintain a set temperature. TAC ¶¶ 24, 34, 39, 47, 58, 68, 81, 82.
The allegations further indicate that repair technicians continue to attribute the Defect, in
whole or in part, to other components. For example, unnamed technicians, at unnamed times, have
observed problems in the field with both “the sensors and control boards.” Id. ¶ 131. As to the
named Plaintiffs, technicians determined that the range’s ignitors were the cause of the problem
for Plaintiff Charles and Plaintiff Grimsley. TAC ¶¶ 26, 92. For Plaintiff Wesley, a technician

first replaced the range’s control board, and later, the temperature sensors. Id. ¶¶ 35, 38. And for
Plaintiff Simpson, the range’s control board was replaced twice. Id. ¶¶ 78-79. None of these
repairs cured the problem. Id. ¶¶ 26, 35, 80, 92. The TAC also cites to a handful of online customer
reviews that attribute the heating problem to other causes, further undermining Plaintiffs’
allegations. Id. ¶ 136. According to one consumer, whose lower oven would only heat when the
upper oven was also in use, the technician first replaced the “motherboard,” but when this resulted
in a different heating issue (the oven overheating), the technician concluded that the “sister board”
needed to be replaced. Id. For another consumer whose oven was not reaching the set temperature,
the technician replaced the control board twice, the fan, and the thermostat, none of which resolved
the problem. Id.
However, the TAC has addressed the technicians’ competing views. Plaintiffs contend that
the technicians are misdiagnosing the problem, therefore these allegations as to the technicians do
not undercut the plausibility of Plaintiffs’ claims. See, e.g., TAC ¶ 129 (“[I]f the ignitor is not

receiving a signal to ignite due to the circuit failure caused by the defective sensor, a technician
may conclude that the ignitor itself is faulty rather than correcting attributing the problem to the
control board’s circuit failure that the defective sensor caused.”).12 The TAC clarifies that while
technicians have attributed the Range’s problems to different causes, Plaintiffs do not do so.
In sum, the TAC adds more detail to the alleged defective sensor and also makes clear that
Plaintiffs are not adopting the technicians’ diagnoses as their own. Yet, the TAC still falls short
of plausibly pleading a defect in light of other specific allegations which appear to attribute the
defect to other components.13
In the SAC Opinion, the Court stated that it was “the last time that the Court will grant

Plaintiffs’ leave to amend.” D.E. 72 at 25. But because Plaintiffs’ allegations have improved
dramatically, the Court will provide one more opportunity to adequately plead a defect.

12 Plaintiffs also allege that when technicians do replace the temperature sensor, this does not fix
the problem because technicians use the same defective sensor as a replacement part. TAC ¶ 129
(“Even if a repair is performed, the Class Range remains substantially certain to fail because
Samsung and its authorized technicians use the same defective DG32-00002B sensor as a
replacement part, or replace the control board and leave the defective sensor in place.”).

13 Samsung also moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ express and implied warranty claims on additional
grounds, and to dismiss certain claims for lack of standing, but because Plaintiffs have not
adequately alleged a defect, the Court need not address these arguments. See Def. Br. at 15-25;
Plfs. Opp. at 18-28; Def. Reply at 10-15.
V. CONCLUSION
Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs have thirty (30) days to file
another amended complaint, if it so chooses, consistent with this Opinion. If Plaintiffs fail to file
a fourth amended complaint, the dismissal will be with prejudice. This is the last time that the
Court will grant Plaintiffs’ leave to amend. An appropriate Order accompanies this opinion.
Dated: May 17, 2023 ~ \he -
John Michael Vazquez, U.S.DJ. □

12

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10276775. Public record. Not legal advice.