# ELIZABETH CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION v. M.G.

> District Court, D. New Jersey · March 22, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10275016

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** March 22, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CHAMBERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING COURTHOUSE
SUSAN D. WIGENTON 50 WALNUT ST.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

NEW 97A 3R -6K 45, -N 5J 9 00 37 101
March 22, 2023

Philip T. Taylor, Esq.
P. Taylor Legal, PLLC
111 Northfield Avenue
Suite 208A
West Orange, NJ 07052
Counsel for Defendants

Richard P. Flaum, Esq.
DiFrancesco, Bateman, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer & Flaum
15 Mountain Boulevard
Warren, NJ 07059
Counsel for Plaintiff

LETTER OPINION FILED WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT

Re: Elizabeth City Board of Education v. M.G. on behalf of E.K., et al.
Civil Action No. 21-12891 (SDW) (AME)

Counsel:
Before this Court is Defendants’1 appeal2 of an October 17, 2022 Opinion and Order, (D.E.
31), issued by the Honorable André M. Espinosa, U.S.M.J. (“October 17th Decision”), which
granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Motion to Amend the Answer and Counterclaims
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 15(a)(2). This Court having considered the
parties’ submissions, and having reached its decision without oral argument pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 78, and for the reasons discussed below, DENIES the Motion.

1 Defendant M.G. brings this Motion on behalf of her child, E.K. This Court refers to M.G. and E.K. collectively as
“Defendants.”

2 The submission heading for D.E. 35 styled this Motion a “Motion for Reconsideration,” but it is an appeal. The
parties appropriately titled the motion an appeal in briefing, and it will be referred to as such throughout this
Opinion.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Local Civil Rule 72.1(c)(1)(A) provides that “[a]ny party may appeal from a Magistrate
Judge’s determination of a non-dispositive matter within 14 days after the party has been served
with a copy of the Magistrate Judge’s order . . . .” “The legal standard of review applicable to a
determination made by a Magistrate Judge depends upon whether the issue to be addressed is
dispositive or non-dispositive of the case.” Andrews v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 191 F.R.D.
59, 67 (D.N.J. 2000). “If a [M]agistrate [J]udge directly rules on a non-dispositive pretrial matter
and issues an order, a United States District Court Judge may reconsider the order only where it
has been shown that the [M]agistrate [J]udge’s order is ‘clearly erroneous or contrary to law.’” Id.
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1999)). Furthermore, “[a] [M]agistrate [J]udge’s finding is
clearly erroneous when, although there may be some evidence to support it, the reviewing court,
after considering the entirety of the evidence, ‘is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.’” Richardson v. Allied Interstate, Inc., No. 09–2265, 2010 WL
3404978, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 26. 2010) (quoting Dome Petroleum Ltd. v. Emp.’s Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co., 131 F.R.D. 63, 65 (D.N.J.1990)); see also L. CIV. R. 72.1(c)(1)(A) (providing that when
considering an appeal of a Magistrate Judge’s order, a District Court Judge must “set aside any
portion of the Magistrate Judge’s order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law”). The
appealing party bears “[t]he burden of demonstrating clear error.” U.S. v. Sensient Colors, Inc.,
649 F. Supp. 2d 309, 315 (D.N.J. 2009) (citing Kounelis v. Sherrer, 529 F. Supp. 2d 503, 518
(D.N.J.2008)).
B. The October 17th Decision Is Not Clearly Erroneous or Contrary to Law

The October 17th Decision identified and applied the proper legal standards for a motion to
amend—a non-dispositive motion—pursuant to Rule 15(a),3 and appropriately considered
Defendants’ proposed amendments. (See generally D.E. 31.) The Court found (1) that the
gravamen of the proposed amendments concerning the 2020-21 and 2021-22 school years were
denials of Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”) claims, pursuant to the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq., and (2) that the proposed
retaliation amendment also concerned a FAPE provision. (See id. at 6–8 (citing Fry v. Napoleon
Cmty. Sch., 580 U.S. 154, 157 (2017)).) Analyzing the amendments according to the inquiry set
forth in Fry, Judge Espinosa determined that because the allegations “are unique to the school
setting” and “a non-student could not have brought similar grievances,” and because an
administrative court did not previously rule on the claims at issue, the allegations concern FAPE
and are subject to administrative exhaustion. (Id. at 6–7 (citing Fry, 580 U.S. at 157; D.E. v. Cent.
Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 276 (3d Cir. 2014)).) Further, the retaliation allegations, which
“concern the provision of FAPE,” were broached at the administrative proceeding, but were not
presented as retaliation claims; thus, the retaliation allegations are subject to exhaustion, as well.
(Id. at 7.) The IDEA requires claimants to exhaust administrative remedies before going to federal

3 Rule 15(a) provides that “leave to amend should be freely given when justice requires.” (Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P.
15(a)(2)).
court, except when a claim relates to something other than FAPE. (See Id. at 4–5 (citing T.R. v.
Sch. Dist. of Phila., 4 F.4th 179, 184 (3d Cir. 2021); Fry, 580 U.S. at 157).)
While Defendants assert that no administrative exhaustion is required for the supplemental
allegations because Defendants only seek to enforce an administrative decision, and further the
retaliation claims do not seek relief for FAPE, these arguments are unable to withstand scrutiny.
Prior to Defendants’ Motion to Amend, the Administrative Law Judge, the Honorable Susana E.
Guerrero, filed a Final Decision (“Final Decision”) clarifying that the decision did not address the
issue of FAPE for the 2020-21 or 2021-22 school years. (See D.E. 17-1 at 1–5.) Judge Espinosa
took that decision into account when performing the Fry inquiry, which revealed that the
allegations at issue indubitably relate to the provision of FAPE, and were not previously decided
in an administrative proceeding, and thus are subject to administrative exhaustion.
In accordance with Rule 15(a), Judge Espinosa denied Defendants’ motion to amend the
allegations concerning provisions pertaining to the 2020-21 and 2021-22 school years and the
retaliation claim because the amendments are subject to exhaustion in the administrative process,
thus this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to consider those specific allegations. (See id. at
4–8.) The Court granted permission to amend certain other provisions that were not contested by
Plaintiff. (Id. at 7–8.)
Judge Espinosa’s decision thoughtfully considered the nuances pertaining to the proposed
amendments and comported with the law. This Court, therefore, finds that Judge Espinosa’s
decision to deny the amendments was appropriate. See Richardson v. Allied Interstate, Inc., No.
09–2265, 2010 WL 3404978, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 26. 2010) (quoting Dome Petroleum Ltd. v.
Emp.’s Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 131 F.R.D. 63, 65 (D.N.J.1990)). Consequently, this Court discerns
no clear error and denies Defendants’ appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ appeal of Judge Espinosa’s October 17, 2022
Opinion and Order is DENIED. An appropriate order follows.

___/s/ Susan D. Wigenton_____
SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.

Orig: Clerk
cc: Parties
André M. Espinosa, U.S.M.J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10275016. Public record. Not legal advice.