# HENDERSON v. LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLDINGS

> District Court, D. New Jersey · January 18, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10274783

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** January 18, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DESIREE HENDERSON,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 20-19988 (MAS) (RLS)
Vv.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
LABORATORY CORPORATION OF
AMERICA HOLDINGS,
Defendant.

SHIPP, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Laboratory Corporation of America
Holdings’s (“Labcorp”) Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 18.) Plaintiff Desiree
Henderson (“Henderson”) opposed (ECF No. 22), and Labcorp replied (ECF No. 23). The Court
has carefully considered the parties’ submissions and decides the matter without oral argument
pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Labcorp’s Motion
for Summary Judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court draws the following facts from the Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
(“SUMF”) (SUMF, ECF No. 18-2) and its Response (““RSUMF”) (RSUMF, ECF No. 22-2)
submitted pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1,' and from the materials Labcorp submitted in support

' The Court relies solely on the facts stated in the SUMF that are undisputed by the RSUMF. To
the extent that the Court cites to a fact where Henderson’s response states that the “document
speaks for itself, and any characterization of the text is disputed,” the Court cites the document
itself.

of its Motion. See Muskett v. Certegy Check Sves., Inc., No. 08-3975, 2010 WL 2710555, at *3
(D.N.J. July 6, 2010) @[A] [d]efendant’s statement of material facts not in dispute, as to which
[p]laintiffs have filed no objection and counter statement, are deemed undisputed.”).
In 2009, Henderson joined Labcorp and worked as a Patient Service Technician in
locations throughout New Jersey. (SUMF 3.) As part of Henderson’s employment, she executed
a Patient Service Technician Agreement which required notice for absences from scheduled work
hours. (/d. 9 4-5.) Henderson understood that it was her responsibility to provide sufficient notice
to either her supervisor or someone else at Labcorp in the event of an absence. (/d. 9 5.) In 2016,
Henderson joined the Accessioning Department at Labcorp and signed the Attendance Guidelines
(the “Guidelines”) for Labcorp’s Northeast Front End Systems. (fd. § 16.) The Guidelines
explicitly state that employees’ absences may only be deemed “scheduled” when requested at least
twenty-four hours in advance and after obtaining supervisor approval. (/d. § 17; see Barbatsuly
Decl., Ex. J.) Unscheduled absences are any absences without such notice or approval, or after an
employee fails to report to work at least four hours after the start of the employee’s shift. (SUMF
17; see Barbatsuly Decl., Ex. J.) Accruing five or more unscheduled absences warrants discipline,
including the possibility of termination after the seventh unscheduled absence. (SUMF {f 17-18;
see Barbatsuly Decl., Ex. J.) Like all Labcorp employees, Henderson received and was trained on
how to locate and access Labcorp’s Employment Policies Manual (“the Manual”) during
orientation. (id. { 6.) The Manual contains information regarding leaves of absence under the
Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) with details on the process by which employees may
request such leave. (fd. § 8.) Henderson was familiar with how the FMLA process worked at
Labcorp. Ud. { 10.)

Between July 2016 and January 2020, Henderson was diagnosed with major depressive
disorder and generalized anxiety disorder and received treatment. (Ud. §§ 40-41.) In 2019,
Henderson exhausted her protected sick time and accumulated six unscheduled absences, which
resulted in verbal discipline on December 4, 2019. (/d. §] 23-24; Barbatsuly Decl. Exs. J, M.) After
another unscheduled absence on December 13, 2019, Henderson was given a written warning.
(SUMF 4 26, Barbatsuly Decl., Ex. L.) On December 20, 2019, Henderson recorded yet another
unscheduled absence. (SUMF §] 27.) Henderson reported various reasons for her absences, none
of which related to her depressive or anxiety disorders. (id. J 29; Barbatsuly Decl., Exs. K, O
(reporting absences for flat tires, oversleeping, hair braiding appointments, various viruses and
infections, and vacating her building).)
On December 24, 2019, Jacqueline Lane (“Lane”), Henderson’s supervisor, e-mailed Judi
Ahrikenchikh (“Ahrikenchikh”), Labcorp’s Employee Relations Specialist, about Henderson’s
unscheduled absence on December 20, 2019, after Henderson had already received a written
warning for violating the Guidelines. (SUMF § 30; Barbatsuly Decl., Ex. N.) On January 2, 2020,
Lane and her supervisor, Atul Thaker, sought approval from Human Resources to terminate
Henderson due to exceeding the allowable number of unscheduled absences. (SUMF {| 31;
Barbatsuly Decl., Ex. N.) Ahrikenchikh checked to confirm that there were no open requests from
Henderson with Reed Group (Labcorp’s third-party benefits administrator), and then sent the
approval request to Human Resources. (SUMF { 32; Barbatsuly Decl., Exs. P, D.) Human
Resources provided approval to terminate Henderson at 1:34 P.M., after confirming that there were
no open FMLA leave requests associated with Henderson on file with Reed Group. (SUMF 4 32;
Barbatsuly Decl., Exs. P, D.) The termination was approved. (SUMF § 32; Barbatsuly Decl., Exs.
P, D.) On the same day, January 2, 2020, and prior to obtaining knowledge of her pending

termination, Henderson requested FMLA leave from the Reed Group. (SUMF 4f 33-34.) Notice
of this request was emailed to Labcorp at 4:15 P.M. Ud. {9 46-47; Barbatsuly Decl., Ex. Q.) This
was the only notice provided to Labcorp about Henderson’s FMLA request. (/d. § 46; Barbatsuly
Decl., Ex. Q.) After receiving notice, Labcorp conversed with its legal team to confirm that it could
proceed with Henderson’s termination. (SUMF { 35; Barbatsuly Decl., Ex. Q.) Although the
parties do not agree on the exact date, they agree that Henderson was ultimately terminated
sometime after filing her FMLA leave request, between January 3, 2020, and January 8, 2020.
(SUMF { 37; Compl. 4 31, ECF No. 1.)?
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A district court considers the facts drawn from the “materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits ... or other materials” and
must view the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A); Est. of Clements v. Apex Asset Memt.,
LLC, No. 18-0843, 2019 WL 1326885, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2019). “When the moving party has
the burden of proof at trial, that party must show affirmatively the absence of a genuine [dispute]
of material fact: it must show that, on all the essential elements of its case on which it bears the
burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.” Jn re Bressman,
327 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop.,

* The Court finds that there are sufficient facts to conclude that Henderson was terminated on
January 3, 2020. (See SUMF 4 37 (Henderson was terminated when she reported to work on the
evening of January 3, 2020); Barbatsuly Decl., Ex. R (‘Good morning Judi — Desiree Henderson
was terminated on Friday night as recommended.”).) The exact termination date, however, is not
dispositive for the Court’s evaluation of the present Motion.

941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir. 1991)). “[W]ith respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party
bears the burden of proof... the burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’—
that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
Il. DISCUSSION
Under the FMLA, “eligible employees are entitled to [twelve] workweeks of leave during
any [twelve]-month period due to an employee’s own serious health condition.” Ross v. Gilhuly,
755 F.3d 185, 191 (3d Cir. 2014). Henderson asserts that after she requested this leave, Labcorp
interfered with her request and retaliated against her. The Court reviews each of Henderson’s
claims below, and for the reasons stated, the Court grants summary judgment on each claim.?
A. Summary Judgment as to Henderson’s FMLA Interference Claim is
Warranted.
The FMLA states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain,
or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter.”
29 ULS.C. § 2615(a)(1). To establish a claim of FMLA interference, Henderson must show that:
(1) she was an eligible employee under the FMLA; (2) the defendant is an employer subject to the
requirements of the FMLA; (3) [she] was entitled to FMLA leave; (4) [she] gave notice to
[Labcorp] of [her] intention to take FMLA leave; and (5) [she] was denied benefits to which she
was entitled to under the FMLA. Capps v. Mondelez Glob., LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir, 2017)
(quoting Ross, 755 F.3d at 191-92). Henderson claims Labcorp interfered with her rights under the

Labcorp also moves for summary judgment on Henderson’s claims for punitive and emotional
distress damages. (Def.’s Moving Br. 22-23, ECF No. 18-1). Because this is conceded, the Court
grants summary judgment on damages. (Pl.’s Opp’n Br. 10, ECF No. 22-1.) (“{Henderson]
concedes that in an action for FMLA Interference and FMLA Retaliation, [Henderson] is not
entitled to Punitive Damages or Emotional Distress Damages.”).)

FMLA by terminating her before she took her requested FMLA leave. (PI.’s Opp’n Br. 6.) Labcorp
contends that Henderson fails to establish the fourth and fifth elements. (Def.’s Moving Br. 19.)4
1. Element Four: There is not a genuine dispute of fact regarding notice.
Henderson did not provide sufficient notice to Labcorp to meet the fourth element of an
FMLA interference claim. An employee seeking leave under § 2612(a)(1)(D) “shall provide the
employer with not less than 30 days’ notice, before the date the leave is to begin, of the employee’s
intention to take leave under such subparagraph, except that if the date of the treatment requires
leave to begin in less than 30 days, the employee shall provide such notice as is practicable.”
Sarnowski v. Air Brooke Limousine, Inc., 510 F.3d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 2007). An employee shall
provide at least verbal notice sufficient to make the employer aware that the employee needs
FMLA-qualifying leave, including the anticipated timing and duration of the leave. Jd. at 402. The
employee need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA or even mention the FMLA. Jd. at 402.
Accordingly, the “critical test” is not whether the employee gave every necessary detail to
determine if the FMLA applies, but “how the information conveyed to the employer is reasonably
interpreted.” Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 303 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citation omitted). Henderson, therefore, needed to provide Labcorp with at least verbal notice that
she needed leave, as well as some indication of the timing and length of the leave.
Here, it is undisputed that Labcorp only learned of Henderson’s request for FMLA leave
upon receiving the Reed Group paperwork which was sent via an e-mail message at 4:15 P.M. on
January 2, 2020. (SUMF { 46; Barbatsuly Decl., Ex. Q.) Approval to terminate Henderson was

* It is clear and undisputed that Henderson was an employee eligible under the FMLA, as she
suffered from a medical condition and was deemed eligible for leave under the FMLA by Reed
Group. (See Def.’s Moving Br. 15-19; Ex. Q, ECF No. 18-6.) Similarly, it is undisputed that
Labcorp is an employer defined under the FMLA. (PI.’s Opp’n Br. 6.) The only elements under
contention are elements four and five. (See Def.’s Moving Br. 19.)

given approximately three hours prior to this notice. (SUMF § 32; Barbatsuly Decl., Exs. P, D.)
Additionally, Henderson admitted her communications with her supervisor regarding absences,
written or oral, did not indicate that she had a serious health condition, nor did anyone at Labcorp
know she had a serious health condition or needed FMLA leave. (SUMF ff 43-44.) Henderson
confirmed she never spoke to her supervisor or anyone else at Labcorp about her request for FMLA
leave. (Ud. § 47.) As such, Henderson did not provide sufficient notice to Labcorp to convey that
her request to take FMLA leave for her PTSD rendered her unable to perform her job. There are
no facts that indicate that Labcorp possessed any knowledge suggesting that Henderson needed
FMLA leave prior to the January 2, 2020, decision to terminate her. (See generally SUMF.) In
fact, none of Henderson’s absences had anything to do with her reasons for FMLA leave. (SUMF
4 29; Barbatsuly Decl., Exs. K, O (reporting absences for flat tires, oversleeping, hair braiding
appointments, various viruses and infections, and vacating her building).) The Court, therefore,
finds that Henderson has not properly provided Labcorp with sufficient notice of her intention to
take FMLA leave, thus failing to satisfy the fourth element.
2. Element Five: Henderson fails to establish there was a denial of benefits.
Courts in this circuit have previously held that an employer cannot evade liability for
interfering with an employee’s FMLA rights by simply “establishing a legitimate business purpose
for its decision.” Sommer v. The Vanguard Grp., 461 F.3d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 2006). That is not to
say, however, that exercising one’s FMLA benefits shields an employee from any and all adverse
employment actions. The FMLA should not preclude an employer from terminating an employee
when termination would have occurred regardless of the employee’s FMLA status. See Weikel v.
Pyramid Healthcare, Inc., No. 18-4474, 2019 WL 7285798, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 2019)
(granting summary judgment in favor of an employer who terminated an employee prior to taking

FMLA leave because she lied to her supervisor about the reasons for her absences.); Conoshenti
v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 148 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Throneberry v. McGehee
Desha Cnty. Hosp., 403 F.3d 972, 978 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he FMLA’s plain language and
structure dictates that, if an employer were authorized to discharge an employee if the employee
were not on FMLA leave, the FMLA does not shield an employee on FMLA leave from the same,
lawful discharge.”).
Here, Labcorp decided to terminate Henderson based on her unexcused absences which
violated the Guidelines. (SSUMF 4 30-31.) Labcorp was not aware of Henderson’s FMLA request
until after its decision to terminate Henderson. (SUMF 32-34.) Labcorp, therefore, did not
interfere with Henderson’s FMLA’s rights—as its lack of knowledge precludes any suggested
interference——-and it did not deny her benefits.
B. Summary Judgment as to Henderson’s FMLA Retaliation Claim is
Warranted.
Henderson alleges that Labcorp’s decision to terminate her was an act of retaliation for her
filing for FMLA leave in violation of 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(2). The statute states that “[i]t shall be
unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual
for opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter.” 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(2). In FMLA
retaliation claims, courts generally apply the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework.
Ross, 755 F.3d at 193. First, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and
then, the employer must demonstrate “a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action.” Jd. Then, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate “by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the articulated reason was a mere pretext for discrimination.”
Id. More specifically, “the non-moving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered

legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy
of credence, and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory
reasons.” Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 Gd Cir.1994).
Beginning with Labcorp’s burden, as noted previously, Labcorp had a legitimate purpose
for termination after Henderson exceeded the allowable amount of unexcused absences in violation
of the Guidelines. (See supra at 7.) The burden, therefore, shifts to Henderson to demonstrate that
the adverse decision was causally related to the invocation of her FMLA benefits, not her
unexcused absences.
Henderson relies substantially on the temporal proximity between her request to take
FMLA leave and her absence-related termination to establish that Labcorp’s proffered purpose
was not legitimate. (PI.’s Opp’n Br. 9-10.) Specifically, Henderson alleges that the reasoning for
her termination was still ambiguous prior to notice of her FMLA claim. Ud.) In some
circumstances, timing can be indicative of causation. See Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 505 3d
Cir. 2000). Temporal proximity on its own, however, is rarely enough to establish motive. See
Shellenberger y. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 189 (3d Cir. 2003). Here, the facts clearly
demonstrate that Labcorp had already decided to terminate Henderson for reasons unrelated to her
FMLA leave request. (SUMF {ff 31-32; Barbatsuly Decl., Exs. P, D.) Labcorp terminated
Henderson not because Henderson filed for FMLA leave but because of her unexcused absences
in violation of the Guidelines. This reasoning remained constant both before and after Labcorp
received notice of Henderson’s FMLA leave request. (/d.) There is no indication that one event
(Henderson’s termination) was influenced by the other (Henderson’s FMLA leave request) purely
because the two events occurred near each other, The facts presented by Henderson do nothing to
indicate that Labcorp’s proffered legitimate reason is at all implausible, inconsistent, or incoherent

and, thus, does not demonstrate by preponderance of the evidence that Henderson’s termination
was directly correlated with her filing for FMLA leave. The Court finds that there can be no
inference of a causal link drawn between Henderson’s FMLA request and her termination and,
therefore, grants summary judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants Labcorp’s Motion. An order consistent
with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered.
phlbdty
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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