# C.W. v. NEW PROVIDENCE BOARD OF EDUCATION

> District Court, D. New Jersey · January 27, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10274642

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** January 27, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10274642

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that a plaintiff “prevails” when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

C.W., individually and on behalf of
L.B.,

Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 22-02907 (KM) (JSA)
v.
OPINION
NEW PROVIDENCE BOARD OF
EDUCATION,

Defendant.

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:
C.W. (“Plaintiff”), individually and on behalf of her son, L.B., filed this
action against the New Providence Board of Education to recover attorney’s fees
pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA” or the
“Act”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415, in connection with an administrative proceeding
before the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law.
Now before the Court is the Board’s motion to dismiss C.W.’s complaint.
For the reasons expressed below, the Board’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
A. Facts
Plaintiff is the parent of L.B., a student with disabilities who at all
relevant times was eligible for special education and related services under the
IDEA. (Compl. ¶ 1.)1 The two reside in the area served by the New Providence

1 Certain citations to record are abbreviated as follows:
“DE” = Docket entry number in this case
“Compl.” = C.W.’s complaint (DE 1)
“Mot.” = Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of
Answer (DE 4-2)
“Reply” = Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Dismissal (DE 9)
Board of Education (the “Board”). (Id. ¶ 2.) On August 27, 2020, C.W. filed a
due process petition with the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law
(“NJOAL”) against the Board.2 (Id. ¶ 9.) In the petition, Plaintiff alleged that L.B.
had been deprived of a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) in violation
of the IDEA and sought equitable relief for L.B. in the form of compensatory
education.3 (Id. ¶ 9.) On April 25, 2022, Plaintiff, L.B., and the Board entered
into a Stipulation of Settlement, which provided for monetary payment to
Plaintiff for L.B.’s education and resolved the claims Plaintiff asserted in her
due process petition before the NJOAL. (Id. ¶ 10.) On April 29, 2022, the Hon.
Elissa Mizzone-Testa, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) presiding over
Plaintiff’s case, issued a decision approving the parties’ settlement, ordering the
parties to comply with the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement, and
concluding the proceedings. (Id. ¶ 11.)
Plaintiff asserts that she is a “prevailing party” as defined by the IDEA,
and as such, she seeks an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs
incurred for legal services in connection with the proceedings before the NJOAL
and this Court. (Compl. ¶ 14.)
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff initiated this action on May 18, 2022. (DE 1.) On June 21, 2022,
the Board moved to dismiss the complaint.4 (DE 4.) On June 30, 2022, Plaintiff
filed a brief in opposition to the Board’s motion. (DE 5.) On July 12, 2022, the
Board filed a reply brief in support of its motion to dismiss. (DE 9.) On July 29,
2022, Plaintiff filed a letter brief responding to a new argument the Board

2 This administrative proceeding before the NJOAL was captioned as C.W. o/b/o
L.B. v. New Providence Board of Education, Agency Ref. No. 2021-32004 and OAL Dkt.
No. EDS 09107-20. (Compl. ¶ 15.)
3 Plaintiff notes in her complaint that L.B. executed a limited power of attorney
on October 12, 2021, granting Plaintiff authority to, among other things, prosecute the
due process petition before the NJOAL. (Compl. ¶ 3.)
4 Although the Board’s motion does not specify as much, both parties appear to
treat it as a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim.
raised for the first time in its reply brief. (DE 12.) The motion to dismiss is thus
fully briefed and ripe for decision.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) does not require that a pleading
contain detailed factual allegations but “more than labels and conclusions.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The allegations must raise
a claimant’s right to relief above a speculative level, so that a claim is “plausible
on its face.” Id. at 570. That standard is met when “factual content [] allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rule 12(b)(6)
provides for the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a claim. The
defendant bears the burden to show that no claim has been stated. Davis v.
Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 349 (3d Cir. 2016). I accept facts in the complaint
as true and draw reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. Morrow v. Balaski,
719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc).
DISCUSSION
A prevailing party is entitled to seek attorney’s fees and costs pursuant
to the fee shifting provision of the IDEA:
In any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court,
in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of
the costs—

(i) to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a
disability....
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.517(a). In order to qualify as
a “prevailing party,” a party must “succeed on any significant issue in litigation
which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” John T.
v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 555 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).
The Third Circuit employs a two-part test to determine whether a plaintiff
qualifies as a “prevailing party”: 1) the plaintiff must have achieved relief, and
2) there must be a causal connection between the litigation and the relief
obtained. Wheeler v. Towanda Area Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 131 (3d Cir.
1991). Courts apply a liberal standard under the first prong, making a
“commonsense comparison between the relief sought and obtained.” Id. There
is no requirement that a prevailing party achieve all of the relief sought, just
“some of the benefit sought in a lawsuit, [and] even though the plaintiff does
not ultimately succeed in securing a favorable judgment, the plaintiff can be
considered the prevailing party for purposes of a fee award.” Id.
Under the second prong, which requires a causal connection between the
litigation and the relief obtained, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
litigation “changed the legal relations of the parties such that defendants were
legally compelled to grant relief” or that it was a “material contributing factor in
bringing about extrajudicial relief.” Wheeler, 950 F.2d at 132; see also Farrar v.
Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1992) (stating that a plaintiff “prevails” when
actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship
between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that
directly benefits the plaintiff). Where such a change has occurred, “the degree
of the plaintiff’s overall success goes to the reasonableness of the award . . . not
to the availability of a fee award vel non.” Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland
Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792–93 (1989).
The Board argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to “prevailing party” status
because 1) Plaintiff “failed to achieve a benefit on the significant issues in the
underlying Petition” and 2) “any nominal benefit achieved did not materially
alter the legal relationship of the parties.” (Mot. at 3.) Both of these arguments
fail.
Plaintiff clearly satisfies the first prong of the Wheeler test. The parties’
Stipulation of Settlement, as incorporated into the ALJ’s final order on May 4,
2022, provided for payment of up to $70,000 to Plaintiff for her use toward
preparing L.B. for further education, employment, or independent living. (Mot.
at 2.) According to the Board, this relief was de minimis, because Plaintiff’s
original petition claimed that L.B. was deprived of a FAPE over the course of
seven school years, whereas Plaintiff’s surviving claims following a defeat on
summary decision were limited to the 2018-2019 and 2019-2020 school years.
(Id.) The sum of $70,000, says the Board, is insignificant compared to the
scope of the relief she sought in her petition. (Id.) But Plaintiff does not need to
have succeeded on all or even most of her claims in order to qualify as a
prevailing party under the IDEA. Nor is she required to have attained some
minimum percentage of the relief sought in her petition. That Plaintiff achieved
“some of the benefit sought in a lawsuit” is enough to satisfy the first prong.
Wheeler, 950 F.2d at 131.
Plaintiff clearly satisfies the second prong of the Wheeler test as well. The
Board as much as concedes this. In its motion, the Board states that “the
monetary relief given to Plaintiff in effect severed the relationship between the
[Board] and the Plaintiff and replaced same with one consisting only of a
submission of receipts and nominal payment.” (Mot. at 3.) The Board doubles
down on this concession in its reply brief, stating that “[t]he agreed upon
monetary award terminates the Board’s obligation to L.B.” (Reply at 4.) While
arguing the contrary, the Board explicitly describes the ways in which the legal
relationship between the parties was, in fact, altered by the parties’ agreement.
The Board separately suggests that the parties’ Stipulation of Settlement
did not alter the parties’ legal relationship because there was no determination
on the merits. (Mot. at 3.) It is well-settled, however, that a party does not need
to win a merits-based decision in order to be entitled to “prevailing party”
status. The causal connection between the litigation and the relief Plaintiff
attained can still be established as long as there is a judicial imprimatur.
In Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health &
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001), the Supreme Court rejected the theory “that
a plaintiff is a prevailing party if it achieves the desired result because the
lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct.” Id. at
601. There, the Court explained that the “defendant's voluntary change in
conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve
by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change.”
Buckhannon announced four elements that must be present in order to
establish the requisite judicial imprimatur and award attorney’s fees in cases of
voluntary settlement agreements: 1) the agreement must contain mandatory
language, 2) the agreement must be entitled “Order”, 3) the agreement must
bear the judge's signature, and 4) the agreement must be judicially enforceable.
Id. Here, all four of the Buckhannon elements are satisfied. The parties’
Stipulation of Settlement with respect to L.B. required that the parties comply
with the terms of the agreement, the court endorsed the parties’ agreement,
which was appended to a more formal “Order” signed by the ALJ, and that
formal order indicated that it was a final order pursuant to the IDEA.5
Therefore, even though there was no merits-based decision in the case, the
Plaintiff may nevertheless qualify as a prevailing party.6
Because Plaintiff satisfies both prongs of the Wheeler test, she is a
prevailing party as defined by the IDEA and the Board’s motion must be
denied.7

5 I note that the Board does not “challeng[e] the judicial imprimatur attaching to
the Stipulation of Settlement by virtue of its adoption by Judge Testa.” (Reply at 3.)
6 In its reply brief, the Board asserts for the first time that the $70,000
settlement did not alter the legal relationship between the parties because “the relief is
forward-looking and provides only interim benefit.” (Reply at 9 (citing M.R. v. Ridley
Sch. Dist., 868 F.3d 218 (3d Cit. 2017).) Not only is the Board’s reliance on M.R.
misplaced—the Board cites to language in the case involving injunctive relief, which is
inapplicable here—but the Board’s argument is factually flawed as well. The relief
Plaintiff received, though in the form of reimbursement for future costs, is neither
“forward-looking” nor “interim.” As the Board itself points out, Plaintiff’s surviving
claims at the time the parties entered into the Stipulation of Settlement pertained to
school years past. (Reply at 2.) Moreover, as the Board also notes, the Stipulation of
Settlement was incorporated into the ALJ’s final order (Mot. at 2), not a temporary one
pending further proceedings. The Board’s additional argument regarding the nature of
the relief provided in the parties’ settlement agreement therefore fails.
7 In its motion, the Board argues in the alternative that even if Plaintiff is deemed
a prevailing party, any award of attorney’s fees must be reduced for various reasons.
(Mot. 3-5.) I decline to address these alternative arguments at this time, but they may
be asserted if and when the Court is called upon to fix the amount of an award of fees.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Board’s motion to dismiss is
DENIED.
An appropriate order follows.
Dated: January 27, 2023
/s/ Kevin McNulty
___________________________________
Hon. Kevin McNulty
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10274642. Public record. Not legal advice.