# LANE v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY

> District Court, D. New Jersey · December 21, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10274428

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** December 21, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10274428

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- acknowledging that excusable neglect is a somewhat “elastic concept,” that calls for an “equitable” determination that “tak[es] account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission,” including “the danger of prejudice” and “the length of delay,” among others
- stating that probable cause is a “complete defense” to plaintiff's false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims
- finding that the defendant police officers were entitled to qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage

## Opinion text

Not for Publication

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

COREY LANE,

Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 22-4239
v.
OPINION
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, TOWNSHIP OF
TEANECK POLICE DEPARTMENT,
ZACHARY J. REED, in his individual capacity,
JACQUELINE CHOI, in his individual capacity,

Defendants.

John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.
This action arises out of allegations that Defendants falsely arrested and maliciously
prosecuted Plaintiff. Currently pending before the Court are three motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint. D.E. 5, 17, 18. The Court reviewed the parties’ submissions,1 and decided the motion
without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) and L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons
set forth below, the motions are GRANTED.

1 Defendant State of New Jersey’s brief in support of its motion will be referred to as “Def. NJ
Br.” (D.E. 5-2); Plaintiff’s opposition will be referred to as “Plf. NJ Opp.” (D.E. 16-1); and
Defendant’s reply will be referred to as “Def. NJ Reply” (D.E. 16). Defendant Choi’s brief in
support of its motion will be referred to as “Def. Choi Br.” (D.E. 17-3); Plaintiff’s opposition will
be referred to as “Plf. Choi Opp.” (D.E. 22-1); and Defendant’s reply brief will be referred to as
“Def. Choi Reply” (D.E. 20). Defendants’ Township of Teaneck Police Department and Zachary
J. Reed (collectively, “Teaneck Defendants”) brief in support of their motion will be referred to as
“Teaneck Defs. Br.” (D.E. 18-3); Plaintiff’s opposition will be referred to as “Plf. Teaneck Opp.”
(D.E. 23-1); and Defendants’ reply brief will be referred to as “Teaneck Defs. Reply” (D.E. 24).
I. BACKGROUND2
Pro se Plaintiff, Corey Lane, was married to Angela Wade (“Wade”) until their divorce
was finalized on April 15, 2014. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 16. Plaintiff and Wade have four children together,
and they agreed on joint custody of their children. Compl. ¶ 16. After the divorce, Plaintiff had
an encounter with the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (“DCPP”,

formerly known as “DYFS”), which led to “years of unsuccessful court battles with DYFS.” Id.
¶ 17.3 On April 25, 2019, Wade obtained an amended final restraining order (the “Restraining
Order” or the “Order”) against Plaintiff, signed by New Jersey Superior Court Judge Bishop-
Thompson. Id. ¶ 18; see also Ex. A, Order at 14-17 (D.E. 17-2).4
The Order bars Plaintiff from Wade’s residences and places of employment, prohibits any
“unsupervised contact with [Plaintiff’s] minor children,” and proscribes any contact with Wade
“without permission of the court.” Ex. A, Order at 14, 17. It also requires that any “contact or
communication,” including “contact regarding the health, welfare, and well-being of their

2 The factual background is taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint, D.E. 1 (“Compl.), as well Exhibit A
to Defendant Choi’s Brief, D.E. 17-2, which is a copy of a final restraining order and its
amendments issued against Plaintiff in a related state court action. When reviewing a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the Complaint.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). A court may also consider any
document integral to or relied upon in the Complaint and take judicial notice of matters of public
record, such as court orders and docket entries. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114
F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997); Khan v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs, No. 12-7837, 2014 WL
295069, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2014) (citation omitted).

3 Plaintiff filed a separate civil rights lawsuit before this Court for claims against the New Jersey
Division of Child Protection and Permanency for allegations arising out of actions taken around
this time. See Lane v. New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency, No. 22-cv-04238.

4 The Court’s citations to “Ex. A” correspond to Exhibit A to the Declaration of Dag Barkha Patel
(D.E. 17-1) and the page numbers cited correspond with those in the ECF header.
children” be made through the “Family Wizard.”5 Id. The Order continues that its terms “may
only be changed or dismissed by the Family Court” and that a violation of the Order may
“constitute criminal contempt . . . and may also constitute violations of other state and federal laws
which can result in [Plaintiff’s] arrest and/or criminal prosecution.” Id. at 17.
On May 25, 2020, Plaintiff was informed by Wade’s brother that his “oldest daughter was

in a psychiatric hospital for attempting suicide and that [his] children needed to see [him].” Id. ¶
19. Wade’s brother also provided Plaintiff “directions and a house description as to the
whereabouts of [Plaintiff’s] children’s residence with their mother.” Id. Plaintiff “proceeded to
search” for his children and found a house that appeared to match the description that Wade’s
brother provided. Id. ¶ 21. Before reaching the doorbell of the house, Plaintiff noticed Teaneck
Police Officer Reed’s patrol car and approached Defendant Reed to “give him the details of [his]
unfortunate predicament.” Id. After Defendant Reed learned of Plaintiff’s restraining order,
Plaintiff was arrested and charged with violating the restraining order and with harassing
Defendant Reed. Id. ¶¶ 23, 27.

On September 16, 2020, during a second case management conference, Prosecutor
Jacqueline Choi made Plaintiff a plea offer to drop the harassment charge and to serve one year of
probation for violating the restraining order. Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiff rejected the plea offer and the
matter was listed for trial. Id. ¶ 30. Plaintiff’s defense attorney filed a motion to dismiss pursuant
to N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11 (de minimis infractions), which was granted by Bergen County Superior Court
Judge Mizdol on October 30, 2020. Id. ¶¶ 34-35. Plaintiff then began to “search [for]
Defendants[’] possible motive behind their cruel and malicious prosecution.” Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiff

5 The Restraining Order makes numerous references to the “Family Wizard,” but the parties do
not indicate what the “Family Wizard” is. See Ex. A, Order at 14, 17.
learned of the Attorney General Office’s “Bias Crime Report Reward Program,” which Plaintiff
describes as offering up to a $25,000 reward for tips leading to a bias crime conviction. Id. ¶¶ 36,
42. Plaintiff alleges that this program “puts an unjust bounty on the freedom and liberty of all
people,” and “motivates corruptible prosecutors and corruptible police officers through greed to
battle against justice so that injustice can reward their self[-]interests.” Id. ¶ 40. Plaintiff adds

that “[i]t’s evident” that Defendant Reed and Defendant Choi were “too busy focusing on cashing
out on their opportunity to increase their yearly gross income” when they decided to prosecute
him. Id. ¶ 41. In sum, Plaintiff alleges that the Bias Crime Reporting Rewards Program corrupted
Defendant Reed and Defendant Choi, and that Defendants prosecuted him in an effort to obtain a
monetary reward under the program. Id. ¶¶ 38-42. Plaintiff also appears to allege that the State
of New Jersey and the Teaneck Police Department encourage such activity. Id.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 23, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint that appears to assert nine counts6: six
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, one pursuant to the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”), and

two for damages. The following parties filed motions to dismiss: (1) Defendant New Jersey (D.E.
5); (2) Defendant Choi, in her individual capacity (D.E. 17); and (3) Defendant Teaneck Police
Department and Defendant Reed, in his individual capacity (collectively, the “Teaneck
Defendants”) (D.E. 18).
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Rule 12(b)(1)

6 Counts One through Five are numbered in the Complaint. Plaintiff appears to indicate all
remaining counts with bold, capitalized, centered headers, followed by numbered paragraphs. See
Compl. at 10-25.
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, a court must first
determine whether the party presents a facial or factual attack because the distinction determines
how the pleading is reviewed. Elbeco Inc. v. Nat’l Ret. Fund, 128 F. Supp. 3d 849, 854 (E.D. Pa.
2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A facial attack “contests the sufficiency of
the complaint because of a defect on its face,” whereas a factual attack “asserts that the factual

underpinnings of the basis for jurisdiction fails to comport with the jurisdictional prerequisites.”
Id. Here, Defendant New Jersey asserts the defense of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment based on the pleadings, thereby raising a facial attack.7 See Perez v. New Jersey, No.
14-4610, 2015 WL 4394229, at *3 (D.N.J. July 15, 2015) (“[T]he State Defendants’ motion asserts
the defense of sovereign immunity based on the facts as pleaded in the Second Amended
Complaint and is thus a facial attack.”). Accordingly, “the Court must consider the allegations of
the complaint as true,” much like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Bd. of Trs. of Trucking Emps
of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Caliber Auto Transfer, Inc., No. 09-6447, 2010 WL 2521091,
at *8 (D.N.J. June 11, 2010) (quoting Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006)).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint that fails
“to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For a complaint to
survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), it must contain enough factual matter to state a claim that
is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads

7 While New Jersey raises its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity defense under Rule
12(b)(1), it recognizes that an Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity defense may be analyzed
under either Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6). See Def. NJ Br. at 4 (citing Carter v. City of
Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 1999)).
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Further, a plaintiff must “allege sufficient facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of her claims.” Connelly v. Lane Const.
Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, district
courts must separate the factual and legal elements. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,

210-211 (3d Cir. 2009). Restatements of the elements of a claim are legal conclusions, and
therefore, not entitled to a presumption of truth. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212,
224 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The Court, however, “must accept all of the complaint’s
well-pleaded facts as true.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. Even if plausibly pled, however, a complaint
will not withstand a motion to dismiss if the facts alleged do not state “a legally cognizable cause
of action.” Turner v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. 14-7148, 2015 WL 12826480, at *2 (D.N.J.
Jan. 23, 2015).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes the pleadings liberally and
holds them to a less stringent standard than papers filed by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519, 520 (1972). The Court, however, need not “credit a pro se plaintiff's ‘bald assertions’ or
‘legal conclusions.’” Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d 273, 282 (D.N.J. 2013) (quoting Morse
v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)).
IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the NJCRA. Section 1983, in relevant
part, provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]

Section 1983 does not provide substantive rights; rather, Section 1983 provides a vehicle for
vindicating violations of other federal rights. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989)
(citation omitted). To prove a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) a person
deprived her of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law; and (2) the person who deprived
her of that right acted under color of state law. Velez v. Fuentes, No. 15-6939, 2016 WL 4107689,
at *2 (D.N.J. July 29, 2016) (citation omitted).
The NJCRA provides a private cause of action to
[a]ny person who has been deprived of any substantive due process
or equal protection rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or any substantive rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this
State, or whose exercise or enjoyment of those substantive rights,
privileges or immunities has been interfered with or attempted to be
interfered with, by threats, intimidation or coercion by a person
acting under color of law, may bring a civil action for damages and
for injunctive or other appropriate relief.

N.J.S.A. 10:6-2. The “NJCRA was modeled after § 1983, [so] courts in New Jersey have
consistently looked at claims under the NJCRA through the lens of § 1983 and have repeatedly
construed the NJCRA in terms nearly identical to its federal counterpart.” Velez, 2016 WL
4107689, at *5 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Therefore, the Court considers
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 and NJCRA claims together.
A. Defendant New Jersey
New Jersey argues that it has sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment so that
all claims should be dismissed against it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Def. NJ Br. at
7-9. Plaintiff responds that Defendant is “wrong about me having lack of subject matter
jurisdiction,” and reasons that regardless of Defendant’s sovereign immunity arguments, the Court
retains subject matter jurisdiction based on Plaintiff’s alleged § 1983 violations. Plf. NJ Opp. at
2-3.
Under the Eleventh Amendment, “[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.

Const. amend. XL. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment as
affirming “the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity” as a limit on a federal court’s judicial
authority. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984). Due to sovereign
immunity, a federal court generally does not have jurisdiction over suits against “a state or state
agency from a suit brought in federal court by one of its own citizens regardless of the relief sought,
unless Congress specifically abrogates the state’s immunity or the state waives its own immunity.”
Thorpe v. New Jersey, 246 F. App’x 86, 87 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the
Eleventh Amendment bars all private suits against non-consenting States in federal court.
Lombardo v. Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 530 F.3d 190, 194 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation

omitted). While sovereign immunity is “subject to three exceptions: 1) congressional abrogation,
2) state waiver, and 3) suits against individual state officers for prospective relief to an ongoing
violation of federal law,”8 Plaintiff has not cited or analyzed any of these exceptions. Further, the
Court does not find a basis to potentially apply any of the three exceptions. Thus, the claims
against Defendant New Jersey are dismissed from this matter due to sovereign immunity.
Moreover, “[t]o state a claim under [4.2. U.S.C.] § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and must show that
the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.” West v.

8 See MC Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001).
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (emphasis added). A State does not qualify as a “person” under
Section 1983 or the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”). See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities
are ‘persons’ under §1983.”); New Jersey Chinese Cmty. Ctr. v. McAleer, No. 21-8320, 2022 WL
3403297, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2022) (citation omitted) (“[B]ecause a state is not a ‘person’

within the meaning of section 1983 . . . it follows that the State of New Jersey cannot be held liable
as a ‘person’ under any of these sections of the Civil Rights Act.”). Thus, Plaintiff’s Section 1983
and NJCRA claims against Defendant New Jersey are dismissed for this additional reason.
B. Defendant Choi
Choi moves to dismiss on the grounds that she is entitled to prosecutorial immunity or
qualified immunity; Choi also contends that Plaintiff fails to plausibly plead a malicious
prosecution claim. Def. Choi Br. at 6-16. “Under federal law, prosecutors have absolute immunity
from civil liability for their conduct in their role as prosecutors.” Newsome v. City of Newark, No.
13-6234, 2014 WL 4798783, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2014) (citation omitted). Thus, “decisions

regarding how to proceed with a prosecution serve a prosecutorial, rather than administrative
function and thus warrant absolute immunity.” Id. at *3. Specifically, “the decision whether to
bring a criminal suit” falls “squarely within a prosecutor's absolute immunity.” Davis v.
Grusemeyer, 996 F.2d 617, 629 (3d Cir. 1993). Immunity is conferred “‘even where [the
prosecutor] acts without a good faith belief that any wrongdoing occurred.’” Munchinski v.
Solomon, 618 F. App’x 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464
(3d Cir. 1992)). Immunity is also conferred whether the prosecutor is sued in their personal or
official capacity. See Langford v. Gloucester Twp. Police Dep’t., No. 16-1023, 2016 WL 7130912,
at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 7, 2016) (finding that absolute immunity barred the plaintiff from bringing a
Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim against defendant in her personal capacity).
Here, Plaintiff brings malicious prosecution and other constitutional claims against
Defendant Choi, in her individual capacity, alleging that Defendant Choi “maliciously
prosecut[d]” the case despite “knowing that [Plaintiff] was never physically in contact with Angela

Wade or verbally in contact with Ms. Wade.” Compl. ¶¶ 28, 29. Plaintiff also alleges that
Defendant Choi was motivated to do so to obtain a monetary reward under the Bias Crime
Reporting Rewards Program. See e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 36, 41-42, 81. But decisions regarding “whether
to bring a criminal suit” and “how to proceed with a prosecution” fall “squarely within a
prosecutor’s absolute immunity.” Davis, 996 F.2d at 629; Newsome, 2014 WL 4798783, at *3.
Therefore, Defendant is entitled to absolute immunity for Plaintiff’s Section 1983 and NJCRA
claims, as well as the damages claims that stem from those alleged violations.9
C. Teaneck Defendants10

9 Because Defendant Choi is entitled to absolute immunity, the Court does not reach the merits
of the parties’ qualified immunity and plausibility arguments. See Def. Choi Br. at 9-16; Plf.
Choi Opp. Br. at 1-3; Def. Choi Reply at 2.

10 Plaintiff’s opposition to Teaneck Defendants’ motion to dismiss argues that Teaneck Defendants
should not have been granted an extension of time to respond to the Complaint and requests that a
default judgment be entered against them. Plf. Teaneck Opp. at 2-4. The Court agrees with
Teaneck Defendants that Magistrate Judge Almonte properly granted their request for an extension
of time to answer because a court may, for good cause, extend the time to answer pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 6(b) if excusable neglect is shown. See Defs. Teaneck Reply at 2-3; see also Pioneer
Inv. Services Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. LP, 507 U.S. 380, 392-95 (1993) (acknowledging that
excusable neglect is a somewhat “elastic concept,” that calls for an “equitable” determination that
“tak[es] account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission,” including “the
danger of prejudice” and “the length of delay,” among others). The Court also declines to enter a
default judgment. See Doug Brady, Inc. v. New Jersey Bldg. Laborers Statewide Funds, 250
F.R.D. 171, 178 (D.N.J. 2008) (ruling against the plaintiff’s motion for default judgment where
the court had allowed the defendants to file a late answer, and accordingly, found no justifiable
reason to rush the extreme sanction of default, as the answer was only filed a few days late and
was not coupled with bad faith on the part of the defendants).
Defendant Teaneck Police Department contends that because it is an arm of the
municipality, it is not a proper defendant under the law. Teaneck Defs. Br. at 14. The Court
agrees. “[N]umerous courts [] have considered the question of whether a municipal police
department is a proper defendant in a § 1983 action [and] have unanimously reached the conclusion
that it is not.” PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Dept., 832 F.Supp. 808, 825-26 (D.N.J.

1993) (citations omitted); see also Castoran v. Pollak, No. 14-2531, 2017 WL 4805202, at *7
(D.N.J. Oct. 25, 2017) (dismissing Section 1983 and NJCRA claims asserted against local police
department). Consequently, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Teaneck Police Department are
dismissed with prejudice.
Defendant Reed moves to dismiss on two grounds: (1) that he is entitled to qualified
immunity; and (2) that the complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief. Teaneck Defs. Br.
at 4-13. “Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the
official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the
challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). In determining whether qualified immunity exists, a court must assess:
(1) “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged . . . make out a violation of a constitutional right”;
and (2) “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant's alleged
misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 201 (2001)). Courts are permitted “to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of
the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first[.]” Id. at 236. “If the
plaintiff fails to satisfy either prong, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding that the defendant police
officers were entitled to qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage) (citing Pearson, 555
U.S. at 232).
Here, the Court turns first to the prong that asks whether a plaintiff has sufficiently alleged
that the defendant violated a constitutional right because that question overlaps with the issue of
whether the plaintiff has sufficiently pled his claims under 12(b)(6). See Jones v. Walsh, No. 15-

2629, 2018 WL 1203472, at *4 n. 4 (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2018) (citation omitted) (“Because the first
step of a qualified-immunity analysis is to examine whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged
that the defendant violated a constitutional or statutory right, that question overlaps with the issue
of whether the plaintiff has stated a claim under § 1983.”). The Complaint alleges that Defendant
Reed violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights when he falsely arrested and maliciously prosecuted
him for violating his restraining order. See Compl. ¶¶ 43-87. The Court addresses each allegation
in turn.
“An arrest made without probable cause creates a cause of action for false arrest under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.” O'Connor v. City of Philadelphia, 233 F. App'x 161, 164 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing

Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988)). Therefore, the “proper inquiry
in a Section 1983 claim based on false arrest . . . is not whether the person arrested in fact
committed the offense but whether the arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person
arrested had committed the offense.” Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634-35 (3d
Cir. 1995) (quoting Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988)).11 Probable
cause exists if, at the time a suspect is arrested, “the facts and circumstances within [the officers’]

11 The inquiry into wrongful arrest under the New Jersey Constitution is the same. See, e.g.
Geissler v. City of Atlantic City, 198 F.Supp. 3d 389, 397 (D.N.J. 2016) (“Under federal and New
Jersey law, a plaintiff states a claim for false imprisonment by demonstrating that (1) she was
detained and (2) the detention was unlawful.”).
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a
prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” Wright
v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). “A police officer may be liable for civil damages for an arrest if ‘no reasonable
competent officer’ would conclude that probable cause exists.” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781,

789-90 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
Here, the facts and circumstances, as alleged by Plaintiff, are that Plaintiff arrived at a
house that met the description of Wade’s house. Compl. ¶ 21. Plaintiff then saw Defendant Reed
and approached him “to give him the details of [his] unfortunate predicament.” Id. While Plaintiff
expected that Defendant Reed would “help [him] locate and check on the wellness of [his]
children,” Defendant Reed arrested Plaintiff for violating the Restraining Order. Id. ¶¶ 22-23.
Plaintiff makes the conclusory allegation that this constitutes a false arrest but fails to plausibly
allege why Defendant Reed lacked probable cause for the arrest. Construing the pleadings
liberally, Plaintiff appears to argue that probable cause did not exist because he had “n[ot] even

see[n] Angela Wade, let alone ha[d] any contact with any of [his] children” at the time of his arrest.
Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff adds that Defendant Reed arrested and prosecuted him to obtain a monetary
award under the Bias Crime Reporting Rewards Program. Id. ¶¶ 36, 38-42, 81.
At the outset, Plaintiff’s allegations as to any purported motive that Defendant Reed had to
obtain a monetary reward under the Bias Crime Reporting Rewards Program are not plausible. In
addition to being conclusory,12 they appear to be based on Plaintiff’s misplaced understanding of
the Bias Crimes Reward Program. While Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Reed is corrupt because

12 See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 41, 42, 81.
he supposedly aimed to earn extra money by arresting and prosecuting him,13 the stated goal of
the Bias Crimes Reward Program is to “eliminate crimes motivated by prejudice against others
based on race, color, religion, sexual orientation, disability, ethnicity, gender identity or other
express, and national origin,” and the State of New Jersey’s website provides tip lines for the public
to report individuals who may be targets of bias crimes so that law enforcement may intervene.14

Here, the Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff was a target of a bias crime nor that Defendant
Reed “tipped” law enforcement for a reward. Moreover, because “[t]he qualified immunity
standard is one of ‘objective legal reasonableness,’” an arresting officer’s subjective motivation
for making an arrest is not a relevant inquiry. Blaylock v. City of Philadelphia, 504 F.3d 405, 411
(3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
Thus, the Court turns to whether Defendant Reed had probable cause to believe Plaintiff
had committed or was committing a crime. Defendant Reed contends that at the time of the arrest,
it was reasonable to believe that Plaintiff had violated the law because he had been dispatched to
the scene in response to a call from Wade and was aware of the restraining order against Plaintiff,

which prohibited Plaintiff’s presence at Wade’s residence, regardless of Plaintiff’s reason for being
there. Teaneck Defs. Br. at 12-13. The Court agrees that under the facts and circumstances pled
by Plaintiff, it was reasonable for Defendant Reed “to believe that an offense ha[d] been committed
or [was] being committed” by Plaintiff. Wright, 409 F.3d at 602. In fact, regardless of his
motivations, Plaintiff appears to have admitted to Defendant Reed that Plaintiff was violating the

13 See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 36-42, 78-81.

14 This information is set forth in the “Bias Crime Unit” section of the State of New Jersey’s
Department of Law & Public Society website. See Bias Crime Unit, State of New Jersey
Department of Law & Public Society (2022), https://www.njoag.gov/about/divisions-and-
offices/division-of-criminal-justice-home/bias-crime-unit/.
Restraining Order. The Order bars Plaintiff from the “[r]esidence(s) of [Wade]” and prohibits any
“unsupervised contact with [Plaintiff’s] minor children” and any contact with [Wade] without
permission of the court.” Ex. A, Order at 14, 17. It also requires that any “contact or
communication,” including “contact regarding the health, welfare, and well-being of their
children” be made through the “Family Wizard.” Id. Moreover, the Order states that its terms

“may only be changed or dismissed by the Family Court,” and that a violation of the Order may
“constitute criminal contempt . . . and may also constitute violations of other state and federal laws
which can result in [Plaintiff’s] arrest and/or criminal prosecution.” Id. at 17. Accordingly,
Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a lack of probable cause for the arrest. Thus, Defendant Reed is
entitled to qualified immunity for the false arrest claim, as well as any claims for damages that
stem from this claim.
Turning to malicious prosecution under Section 1983, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the
defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff’s favor;
(3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for

a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) plaintiff suffered from a “deprivation
of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” See Allen
v. N.J. State Police, 974 F.3d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81-
82 (3d Cir. 2007)). Likewise, under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) the
defendant instituted a criminal action against the plaintiff; (2) the action was actuated by malice;
(3) there was an absence of probable cause; and (4) the proceeding terminated in the plaintiff’s
favor. Brunson v. Affinity Fed. Credit Union, 199 N.J. 381, 393-94 (2009) (quoting Helmy v. City
of Jersey City, 178 N.J. 183, 190 (2003)).
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege the absence of probable
cause. This alone is a sufficient basis to dismiss Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim. See
Herman v. City of Millville, 66 F. App'x 363, 365 n.3 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that probable cause
is a “complete defense” to plaintiff's false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution
claims); Trabal v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 269 F.3d 243, 249 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting

that “lack of probable cause is a sine qua non of malicious prosecution.”). Moreover, Plaintiff’s
allegations as to malice—which are grounded in Plaintiff’s belief that Defendant Reed arrested
and prosecuted Plaintiff to obtain money from the Bias Crime Reporting Reward program—also
lack plausibility for the reasons stated above. Accordingly, because Plaintiff fails to plead a
malicious prosecution claim, Defendant Reed is entitled to qualified immunity for this claim and
the damages claims that stem from it.
V. Conclusion
When dismissing a case brought by a pro se plaintiff, a court must decide whether the
dismissal will be with prejudice or without prejudice, which affords a plaintiff with leave to amend.

Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 110–11 (3d Cir. 2002). The district court may
deny leave to amend only if (a) the moving party's delay in seeking amendment is undue, motivated
by bad faith, or prejudicial to the non-moving party; or (b) the amendment would be futile. Adams
v. Gould, Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 864 (3d Cir. 1984). Normally, no matter how tenuous the claims, the
Court would not dismiss with prejudice, particularly when a plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Here,
however, Defendants are entitled to immunity and any attempted amendment would be futile.
Defendants are therefore dismissed with prejudice.
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motions to dismiss, D.E. 5, 17, and 18, are
GRANTED with prejudice. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
Dated: December 21, 2022.
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Johiy Michael Vazquez, U.S(DJ. ' □

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10274428. Public record. Not legal advice.