# REEVES v. HEMSLEY

> District Court, D. New Jersey · September 8, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10273796

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** September 8, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10273796

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that “a municipality and its officials are considered a single entity which cannot conspire with itself”
- noting that the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine, which bars allegations of conspiracy between employees and within the same organization, “has also been carried over to alleged conspiracies involving governmental entities”
- holding that “a corporation or public entity generally cannot conspire with its employees or agents as all are considered a single entity”

## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

:
MICHAEL REEVES, :
: Civil Action No.
: 18-14061 (JMV) (ESK)
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : OPINION
:
COUNTY OF BERGEN, :
:
Defendant. :
:

John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.
Before the Court is Defendant1 Bergen County’s motion to dismiss the Complaint for
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (D.E. 58.) Plaintiff filed
an Opposition, (D.E. 61), and the County filed a Reply, (D.E. 62). For the following reasons, the
Court will grant in part the County’s motion and dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under § 1985. The
Court will deny the remainder of the County’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND 2
As the parties are intimately familiar with the facts of this case, and because the Court has
already set forth the background of this case in a number of Opinions, (D.E. 16, 37), the Court will
only state those facts necessary to address the instant motion.

1 The County is the sole remaining Defendant. Although the Court had allowed Plaintiff’s claims
to proceed against some individual Defendants, in their individual capacity, (D.E. 37), Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint no longer asserts claims against those Defendants. (D.E. 57.)

2 The Court will accept as true the well-pled factual allegations in the Complaint for the purposes
of this Opinion only. The Court has made no findings as to the veracity of Plaintiff’s allegations.
On June 25, 2018, Plaintiff arrived at the Bergen County Jail, shortly following a surgery
for his dislocated right shoulder. (D.E. 57, at ¶ 21.) At the time of his admission, Plaintiff wore a
sling from the surgery, but staff took away the sling and admitted him “with an injured and still
healing shoulder.” (Id. at ¶ 22.) A medical staff member met with Plaintiff several times between
June 25 and June 29, 2018, where Plaintiff complained about the loss of his sling and that “he was

in excruciating pain from his shoulder due to the injury and the sling getting confiscated.” (Id. at
¶ 25.) The staff member refused to return the sling and advised that he could not examine the
shoulder because he was not an orthopedic doctor and that the jail’s insurance “was not going to
be responsible.” (Id. at ¶ 26.)
According to Plaintiff, it was the medical staff’s practice “not [to] treat Plaintiff” in order
“to avoid insurance liability” based on the arrangement the jail had to care for Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detainees. (Id. at ¶ 27.) On June 29, 2018, Plaintiff was locked in
a medical cell awaiting transport. (Id. at ¶ 29.) All of the medical staff had refused to touch
Plaintiff, and when he questioned another medical staff member, she said that she could not touch

his shoulder “due to insurance.” (Id.)
Later that day, Plaintiff underwent a second surgery at an outside facility. The facility’s
surgeon operated on Plaintiff’s shoulder and placed his arm back into a sling. (Id. at ¶ 30.) The
surgeon also “ordered that the Plaintiff be returned in a few days, that he begin[] professional
physical therapy and that he need[ed] further evaluation including a Magnetic Resonance Imaging
on suspicion of a fractured shoulder.” (Id.) The jail medical staff, however, ignored all of those
orders for approximately eighty-two days, despite Plaintiff’s numerous medical requests and
grievances. (Id. at ¶¶ 30–34) During this time, Plaintiff’s arm was left inside the sling in one
position, which ultimately aggravated his injuries, “causing his shoulder to improperly heal,
disfigurement[,] and a frozen shoulder.” (Id.) Additionally, during that time period, Dr. Michael
L. Hemsley, the jail’s medical director, told Plaintiff “that the contract between the facility and
ICE did not cover professional physical therapy,” and that it was “‘too expensive’ and so his
medical unit did not provide it.” (Id. at ¶ 37).
It was not until Plaintiff filed a civil complaint, eighty-two days later, that staff returned

Plaintiff for a follow-up. (Id. at ¶ 34.) At that point, it was too late for Plaintiff’s surgeon to
perform any treatment or analysis of the condition without an MRI and professional physical
therapy. (Id. at ¶ 38.) The MRI later revealed that “Plaintiff’s right shoulder was fractured, the
bicep was torn, and that there was a Hill-Sachs deformity and [that] the shoulder had already healed
improperly. It was also frozen.” (Id. at ¶ 39.)
The surgeon advised Plaintiff that “that the injuries had become aggravated due to the
delays caused by . . . Dr. Hemsley” and ignoring the surgeon’s “multiple orders for professional
therapy.” (Id. at ¶ 40.) The surgeon informed Plaintiff that he now had permanent injuries and that
he would need to have a third surgery on his shoulder. (Id. at ¶ 41). The procedure would require

breaking Plaintiff’s shoulder again, and the surgeon warned that “he could not do the surgery or
any additional treatments until the Plaintiff had professional physical therapy and was out of
detention.” (Id.) “These harms would have been avoided” if Dr. Hemsley had not “improperly
delayed . . . and interfered with medical treatment.” (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that the jail failed to intervene and refused to examine him as “part of a
custom and practice by the Jail, in conjunction with its agreement with DHS/ICE, to avoid treating
patients with certain injuries for insurance purposes and to keep costs as low as possible so as to
reap a greater profit from the arrangement with DHS/ICE.” (Id. at ¶ 28.) Further, Plaintiff
specifically alleges that “the medical staff’s actions were . . . initiated . . . with an ulterior motive
to avoid any insurance liability, as well as minimize[] any cost, even when such a policy would
guarantee harm for detainees.” (Id.) Further this “was part of a custom and practice with an ulterior
motive . . . so as to reap the fullest profit from Bergen County’s [Intergovernmental Service
Agreement] with DHS/ICE.” (Id. at ¶ 29.) In particular, Dr. Hemsley’s decision to delay and deny
treatment “was not based on medical reasons but a desire to avoid the treatment due to cost.” (Id.

at ¶ 44.)
Plaintiff also alleges that the jail had a policy of failing to discipline staff who violated the
rights of immigration detainees “because the understanding was that these people will be deported
soon.” (Id. at ¶ 52.) The jail set up these policies with “the understanding that most of the detainees
were likely going to get deported and so it was somehow permissible to mistreat them, and that
each detainee . . . would garner a certain per night dollar amount.” (Id. at ¶ 53.)
Ultimately, Plaintiff contends that the “County, through its arrangement with ICE,
developed, implemented, enforced, encouraged, and sanctioned a de facto policy, practice and/or
custom of not providing basic medical care” to ICE detainees. (Id. at ¶ 59.) Due to this policy,

practice, or custom, “the County received numerous complaints from detainees, family members
of detainees, as well as had multiple protests outside its facility for human rights abuses . . . as to
Bergen County’s arrangement with DHS/ICE to house detainees at the Jail.” (Id.) According to
Plaintiff, prior to his admission to the jail, there “were numerous incidents, complaints, and
lawsuits alleging human rights abuses just like Plaintiff’s injuries.” (Id. at ¶ 61.)
Additionally, Plaintiff contends that “ [t]he County and employees, contractors, and agents
of the Bergen County Jail, . . . engaged in a conspiracy to deprive detainees,” of various
constitutional rights. (Id. at ¶ 76.) Plaintiff alleges that the members of the conspiracy are
“[e]mployees, contractors, . . . agents of the County,” and the “Bergen County Board of
Commissioners.” (Id. at ¶¶ 76–78.)
Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on September 19, 2018, and ultimately filed a counseled
Fourth Amended Complaint (hereinafter “Complaint”) in February of 2022. (D.E. 57.) The
County filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), (D.E. 58), Plaintiff filed an

Opposition, (D.E. 61), and the County filed a Reply, (D.E. 62).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss an action for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When evaluating a motion to dismiss, “courts
accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may
be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). In other words, a complaint
survives a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
To make this determination, a court conducts a three-part analysis. Santiago v. Warminster
Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff
must plead to state a claim.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Second, the court should identify
allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of
truth.” Id. at 131 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680). Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give
rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id.
“When deciding a motion to dismiss, a court typically does not consider matters outside
the pleadings.” Bermudez v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of New Jersey, No. 19-21637, 2020 WL
4188159, at *2 (D.N.J. July 21, 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, a court may
consider documents that are ‘integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint’ or any
‘undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if

the plaintiff’s claims are based on the document.’” Mills v. Ethicon, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 3d 363, 372
(D.N.J. 2019) (quoting In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir.
1999)). “Reliance on these types of documents does not convert a motion to dismiss into a motion
for summary judgment,” since a “plaintiff obviously is on notice of the contents [of] the document,
and the need for a chance to refute evidence is greatly diminished.” Id. (quoting Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196–97 (3d Cir. 1993)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
The County argues that the Complaint fails to state a claim against a local government

entity under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. More specifically, the County contends (1) that it cannot
be held liable because the “County has no legal responsibility for the jail,” and (2) Plaintiff has
failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim under § 1983 and § 1985. (D.E. 5-2, at 4, 16–19.)
As to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two things: first, a violation of a right under
the Constitution, and second, that a “person” acting under color of state law committed the
violation. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Piecknick v. Com. of Pa., 36 F.3d 1250, 1255–
56 (3d. Cir. 1994)). The Supreme Court has established that § 1983’s definition of “person”
includes municipalities and other local government entities. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.,
436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). A plaintiff may not, however, hold a local government unit “liable for
the unconstitutional acts of its employees on a theory of respondeat superior.” Thomas v.
Cumberland Cty., 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014). Instead, to hold such an entity liable, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that a local government unit adopted a policy or custom and that such
policy or custom had been “the moving force” behind the deprivation of their constitutional rights.
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

Municipal policy generally requires that a local governing body’s officers officially adopt
and promulgate a “statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision.” Id. at 690. A municipal custom,
although lacking the formal approval of a policy, refers to those official practices which are “so
permanent and well settled as to constitute . . . the force of law.” Id. at 691. Under certain
circumstances, a municipality’s failure to properly train its employees and officers can amount to
a “custom” under § 1983. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). When a plaintiff
alleges that a policy “concerns a failure to train or supervise municipal employees, liability under
section 1983 requires a showing that the failure amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights
of persons with whom those employees will come into contact.” Thomas, 749 F.3d at 222 (quoting

Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999)). “A pattern of similar constitutional
violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference
for purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (quoting Bd. of Cty.
Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)).
A. Whether the County has “Legal Responsibility” for the County Jail
The County first argues that it has “no legal responsibility” for anything that transpires at
the Bergen County Jail. (D.E. 58-2, at 4–16.) The County appears to contend that it “has no
responsibility or control over the operation of the jail or the supervision of its employees,” and
therefore, cannot be held liable under for events that occurred at the jail. The County alleges that
the Bergen County Sheriff “operates [the] county jail and supervises its employees,” and maintains
that it is “separate and distinct” from the sheriff and that the “sheriff is not a county employee.”
(Id. at 10) As a result, the County suggests that the “legitimate parties” in this case, among others,
are the sheriff and the warden. (Id. at 9.) The Court disagrees.
The County’s liability is not dependent on whether the County or the sheriff was directly

in charge of the jail, or whether the sheriff and the County are distinct entities in some respects.
Section 1983 does not make such a distinction. See, e.g., R.M. v. Sainato, No. 11-1676, 2012 WL
1623860, at *3 (D.N.J. May 9, 2012); Medina v. Cumberland Cnty., No. 11-905, 2011 WL
1750738, at *2 (D.N.J. May 3, 2011); Crooks v. Passaic Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t/Jail, No. 07-92,
2007 WL 923330, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2007). Courts in this District have long held that a county
is the proper party for the purposes of § 1983 because a sheriff’s office is merely an administrative
arm, executive arm, or sub-unit of its county. E.g., Desposito v. New Jersey, No. 14-1641, 2015
WL 2131073, at *7 (D.N.J. May 5, 2015) (dismissing the Bergen County Sheriff’s Office because
it is not an entity separate and distinct from the County itself); Sainato, 2012 WL 1623860, at *3

(dismissing the claims against the Morris County Sheriff’s Office because it is “merely an
administrative arm of the municipality itself”); Franks v. Cape May Cnty., No. 07-6005, 2010 WL
3614193, at *7 (D.N.J. Sept. 8, 2010) (finding that “the Cape May County’s Sheriff’s Department
is not a [distinct] legal entity”); Jones v. Gloucester Cnty., No. 08-614, 2009 WL 10727989, at *6
(D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2009) (“[A] sheriff’s office cannot be sued in conjunction with the county it
serves, because it is not an entity separate from the county, but rather is merely an arm of the
county.”); Caldwell v. Atl. Cnty. Animal Shelter, No. 08-4101, 2009 WL 1173645, at *2 (D.N.J.
Apr. 28, 2009) (“[A] County Sheriff’s Department is not a legal entity distinct from the county.”);
McLaughlin v. Cnty. of Gloucester, No. 06-4494, 2008 WL 700125, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 12, 2008)
(“In this case, because Plaintiff has named the County as a Defendant in this action,
the Sheriff’s Department, a branch of the County, cannot be sued as an individual entity.”); see
also Hutchinson v. Bergen Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., No. 22-993, 2022 WL 1639153, at *3 (D.N.J. May
24, 2022); Pirrone v. Middlesex Cnty. Jail, No. 14-2833, 2015 WL 1609708, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr.
10, 2015); Araromi v. Middle Twp. Police Dep’t, No. 10-1048, 2014 WL 1301524, at *11 (D.N.J.

Mar. 31, 2014); DiPietro v. Gloucester Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 11-5878, 2012 WL 3578133, at
*1 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2012).
Nevertheless, the County relies on Cunningham v. Cnty. of Bergen, No. 19-6154, 2019 WL
6015478, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2019). In that case, the Court acknowledged that Bergen County
and the Bergen County Sheriff are legally distinct entities3 and that the “County does not operate
the Bergen County jail and [that] the County is not a custodian of prisoners there—the Sheriff is.”
Id. at *2. The Court emphasized that under New Jersey law, “the sheriff of every county shall
have the care, custody and control of the county jail or jails and all prisoners therein, and shall be
responsible for the conduct of any keeper appointed by him,” and that the “Sheriff, not the County,

selects the jail’s warden and . . . officers.” Id. (quoting N.J.S. § 30:8-17 and citing N.J.S. §§ 30:8-
17.1, 40A:9-117). The court concluded that state law did not vest “the county with any meaningful
policymaking authority over county jails.” Cunningham, 2019 WL 6015478, at *3. As a result,
the Court held that Bergen County cannot be held liable under Monell for events that had occurred
at the Bergen County Jail. Id. Contra Sainato, 2012 WL 1623860, at *3 (dismissing the claims
against the Morris County Sheriff’s Office because it is “merely an administrative arm of the
municipality itself”).

3 Compare N.J.S. § 40:18-1 (“The inhabitants of each of the several counties shall be a body politic
and corporate”), with New Jersey Const., Art. 7, § 2, ¶ 2 (“[S]heriffs shall be elected by the people
of their respective counties at general elections”).
The Court disagrees with Cunningham. Under McMillian v. Monroe Cty., Ala., 520 U.S.
781, 789 (1997), the Supreme Court indicated that courts must consider whether the official is
acting “on behalf of the State, rather than the county,” when acting in a particular area or capacity.
McMillian, 520 U.S. at 789. There are two guiding principles in this analysis. Id. at 785. First,
the question “is not whether [the] Sheriff . . . acts for” the State or the county “in some categorical,

‘all or nothing’ manner.” Id. Rather, courts “must ask whether governmental officials are final
policymakers for the local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue.” Id. Second,
the “inquiry is dependent on an analysis of state law.” Id. at 786. (“[O]ur understanding of the
actual function of a governmental official, in a particular area, will necessarily be dependent on
the definition of the official’s functions under relevant state law.”).
During its analysis of New Jersey law, the Cunningham court correctly noted that Bergen
County and its sheriff are distinct entities in some respects, and that the sheriff manages the county
jail and the hiring of the jail’s employees. Cunningham however, did not consider for whom the
sheriff undertake these duties—the state or the county. New Jersey law reveals that it is the county.

Starting first with the State Constitution, the “sheriff’s office is referred to by name in the
[New Jersey] Constitution only in connection with the manner of his election (by the people of the
county at general election) and the term of office (three years).” Application of Burlington Cnty.
Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 491 A.2d 631, 635 (N.J. 1985) (citing N.J. Const. of 1947, art. 7, § 2,
¶ 2). Yet, the constitutional provision does not mean that a county sheriff cannot, “for purposes
of the statute under review, be considered a part of the county structure, or that he must be looked
upon as a state employee exclusively. As with other officials, the sheriff may serve two masters,
depending on what function he is performing.” Id. After reviewing the enabling legislation4

4 As the Supreme Court of New Jersey observed:
pertaining to sheriffs, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that, as a general matter, “[t]he
legislature’s system of referring to the office of sheriff lends support to the conclusion that the
sheriff can indeed be . . . a part of the county government.” Id. at 636. See also Sullivan v.
McOsker, 86 A. 497, 498 (N.J. 1913) (ruling, under the pre-1947 New Jersey Constitution, that
the common jail of a county is not a private institution, but is . . . ‘a county institution, and the

burden of its maintenance has always rested upon the county.’”).
Additionally, other indicia support the notion that a sheriff is a county actor in this context:
His [minimum5] salary is fixed by the Legislature and paid by the
county. N.J.S.A. 40A:9-104. . . . Under N.J.S.A. 22A:4-17, all

The enabling legislation pertaining to sheriffs is found in Laws of
1971, chapter 200, the preamble of which identifies the enactment
as “[a]n Act covering county and municipal officers and employees
* * *.” Section B, entitled “Counties,” contains the statutes
concerning eligibility for the office of sheriff (codified at N.J.S.A.
40A:9–94); the sheriff’s oath (N.J.S.A. 40A:9–96); the effect of the
failure of the sheriff-elect to qualify (N.J.S.A. 40A:9–101); vacancy
in the office of sheriff (N.J.S.A. 40A:9–102); bond and oath of
appointee to fill vacancy in the office of sheriff (N.J.S.A. 40A:9–
103); salary of sheriff in certain counties (N.J.S.A. 40A:9–104);
expenses payable to sheriffs (N.J.S.A. 40A:9–105); uncollected fees
credited to account of former sheriff (N.J.S.A. 40A:9–106); sheriff
to deliver to his successor certain moneys and papers (N.J.S.A.
40A:9–107); prohibition on sheriff holding other civil office
(N.J.S.A. 40A:9–108); amercement of sheriff or acting sheriff
(N.J.S.A. 40A:9–109); court-designation of enforcement officer
when amercement occurs (N.J.S.A. 40A:9–110); and bonds taken
by the sheriff (N.J.S.A. 40A:9–111).

Burlington Cnty., 491 A.2d at 636.

5 The amended statute provides that:

The board of chosen freeholders in each county, by resolution, shall
fix the annual salary of the sheriff in an amount equal to not less
than sixty-five percent (65%) of the annual salary of a Judge of the
Superior Court. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require
that a sheriff whose annual salary exceeds the amount provided for
monies received by the sheriff for services ‘shall be for the sole use
of the county and shall be accounted for regularly to the county
treasurer.’ The quarters in which the sheriff operates are supplied by
the county and situate in the county. All of the funds necessary for
the operation of his office are supplied by the county. N.J.S.A.
40A:9-105, 117.

It is apparent that the sheriff’s office is part of a ‘local unit,’ the
county which that office serves.

Application of Burlington Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 457 A.2d 495, 499–500 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
Law. Div.), aff’d sub nom., 463 A.2d 351 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1983), aff’d sub nom., 491 A.2d
631 (N.J. 1985).
As a result, when managing a county jail, the Court finds that a county sheriff can act as
an actor and policymaker on behalf of the county. Similarly, the Court finds that the jail’s medical
staff, regardless of whether a county or a sheriff is their official employer, can be county actors for
the purpose of demonstrating the existence of a municipal policy, practice, or custom under § 1983.
Accordingly, the Court rejects the County’s argument that, as a general principle, it cannot be held
liable under § 1983 because “it has no legal responsibility for the jail.” (D.E. 58-2, at 9.) As a
result, the Court will deny the County’s motion as to Point One.
The County next contends that Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim under
§ 1983. However, the County only addressed one paragraph under the mistaken assumption that
the actions and statements of the jail’s employees could not demonstrate the existence of a

herein shall be reduced, or that a board of chosen freeholders may
not increase the salary of a sheriff in excess of the amount provided
for herein.

N.J. Stat. § 40A:9-104.
municipal policy, practice, or custom under § 1983.6 (D.E. 58-2, at 16–19.) Accordingly, the Court
will deny the County’s motion as to Point Two, as the County failed to address the majority of the
factual allegations relevant to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.
B. Civil Conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985
The County further argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. As mentioned above, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he County and employees,
contractors, and agents of the Bergen County Jail, . . . engaged in a conspiracy to deprive
detainees,” of various constitutional rights. (D.E. 57, at ¶ 76.)
To state a claim for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3), a plaintiff must establish the following:
(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving a person or class
of persons equal protection under the law or equal privileges and
immunities under the law; (3) an act in furtherance of
the conspiracy; and (4) injury to a plaintiff’s property or his person,
or deprivation of a right or privilege of a U.S. citizen.

McArdle v. Hufnagel, 588 F. App’x 118, 120 (3d Cir. 2014). Section 1985(3) actions are limited
to conspiracies predicated on “racial, or perhaps otherwise class based, invidiously discriminatory
animus.” Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1997); Falat v. County of Hunterdon, No. 12-
6804, 2014 WL 6611493, at *13 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2014) (“The conspiracy must be directed at the
plaintiff because he belongs to a given class.”). “Additionally, a claim for conspiracy “must
contain supportive factual allegations.” Harrold v. City of Jersey City, No. 19-9566, 2020 WL
1444923, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mere conclusory

6 The County correctly notes that it is not responsible for the actions of its employees or agents
under a theory of respondeat superior. Thomas, 749 F.3d at 222. It can, however, be held liable
for a municipal policy, custom, or practice, if it were “the moving force” behind the deprivation
of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. And a county’s employees or
agents can certainly provide relevant evidence as to a county’s policy, custom, or practice.
allegations that a conspiracy exists will not survive a motion to dismiss. Garlanger v. Verbeke,
223 F. Supp. 2d 596, 605 (D.N.J. 2002).
Even assuming that Plaintiff has otherwise pleaded a § 1985 claim, he fails to state a claim
because the only alleged members of the conspiracy are “[e]mployees, contractors, . . . agents of
the County,” and the “Bergen County Board of Commissioners.” (D.E. 57, at ¶¶ 76–78.) Under §

1985, “a plaintiff ‘cannot maintain a conspiracy claim against’ actors within the same municipal
entity.” Bell v. Twp. of Maplewood, No. 19-12980, 2021 WL 3260848, at *13 (D.N.J. July 30,
2021) (quoting Baldwin v. Gramiccioni, No. 16-1675, 2017 WL 120643, at *10 (D.N.J. Jan. 11,
2017) (collecting cases)). “Plaintiff cannot maintain a conspiracy claim against these actors
because they are considered a single entity that cannot conspire with itself.” Baldwin, 2017 WL
120643, at *10; see Heffernan v. Hunter, 189 F.3d 405, 412 n.5 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that the
intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine, which bars allegations of conspiracy between employees and
within the same organization, “has also been carried over to alleged conspiracies involving
governmental entities”); Suber v. Guinta, 902 F. Supp. 2d 591, 608 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (finding that

“a municipality and its officials are considered a single entity which cannot conspire with itself”);
Broich v. Inc. Vill. of Southampton, 650 F. Supp. 2d 234, 246–47 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that
“a corporation or public entity generally cannot conspire with its employees or agents as all are
considered a single entity”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion as to Point Three and dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims under § 1985.7

7 The Court is granting Plaintiff leave to cure the deficiencies as to his § 1985 claims. The Court
notes, however, that Plaintiff must plausibly plead the existence of a conspiracy and may not rely
on conclusory allegations. Similarly, Plaintiff must plausibly plead the protected class.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant in part the County’s motion to dismiss and
dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under § 1985. The Court will deny the remainder of the County’s
motion. An appropriate Order follows.

9/8/2022 Que WOON A K
Date: JOHN MICHAEL VAZQUEY.
United States District Judge

15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10273796. Public record. Not legal advice.