# M.N. v. SPARTA TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION

> District Court, D. New Jersey · August 23, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10273656

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** August 23, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Not for Publication

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

M.N., INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF
A.D., & A.D., Civil Action No. 21-19977
Plaintiffs,

v.
OPINION
SPARTA TOWNSHIP BOARD OF
EDUCATION, NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION, & ANGELICA ALLEN-
MCMILLAN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
EDUCATION, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY,
Defendants.

John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.

This matter returns to the Court on the motion of Defendants the New Jersey Department
of Education (“NJDOE”) and Acting Commissioner of Education Angelica Allen-McMillan
(collectively “the State Defendants”) to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), the relevant counts of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. D.E. 50. The Court has
reviewed the parties’ submissions1 and considered the motions without oral argument pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 and L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, the State Defendants’
motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

1 The State Defendants’ brief in support of the motion, D.E. 50-1, will be referred to as “S.D. Br.”
Plaintiffs’ brief in opposition, D.E. 57, will be referred to as “Plf. Opp’n.” The State Defendants’
reply, D.E. 60, will be referred to as “S.D. Rep.”
I. BACKGROUND2
Plaintiff A.D. is a nineteen-year-old young man who suffers from disabilities. D.E. 17
(“FAC”) ¶ 20. A.D. lives in Sparta, New Jersey. Id. ¶ 21. A.D. lives with Plaintiff M.N., his
mother, and his father, R.D., who is not a party. Id. ¶¶ 25, 50. A.D. enrolled in Sparta High School
in April 2019 and was the beneficiary of an individualized education program (“IEP”). Id. ¶ 51.

Sparta High School is under the purview of the Sparta Township Board of Education (“STBOE”).
See id. ¶ 26. Thereafter, A.D. disenrolled and reenrolled in Sparta High School several times.
E.g., id. ¶¶ 58-59. In April of 2021, the STBOE did not allow A.D. to reenroll in the high school
because he had already taken and passed the GED exam and been awarded a high school diploma.
See id. ¶¶ 59-60.
Both Plaintiffs and the STBOE sought administrative review. Id. ¶¶ 61, 74. The same
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) of the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law (“NJOAL”)
presided over both cases. Id. ¶ 65. In each case, the ALJ ruled in favor of the STBOE, finding
that A.D.’s entitlement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §

1400, et seq., to a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) was terminated by his receipt of the
diploma. Id. ¶¶ 79, 91. Allen-McMillan, as Acting Commissioner of Education, affirmed the
ALJ’s decision in the matter that was appealable to her. Id. ¶ 85. That decision is currently under
review by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey. Id. at 37 (certification
pursuant to L. Civ. R. 11.2).

2 The factual background is taken from Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. D.E. 17. When
reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). Additionally, the Court considers
the records of the administrative proceedings because they were referenced in the First Amended
Complaint and are public records. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); see also Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d
263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
Plaintiffs initiated the instant suit on November 12, 2021. D.E. 1. They moved for a
preliminary injunction on December 11, 2021. D.E. 11. The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion on
April 12, 2022. D.E. 61, 62. The Court has also denied motions filed by Plaintiffs to dismiss the
STBOE’s counterclaim and to sanction the STBOE under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
D.E. 23, 39, 69.

Plaintiffs filed the FAC on January 6, 2022. FAC. They indicate that “A.D. has transferred
the authority to make decisions regarding his education to his mother, plaintiff M.N.” and that
“A.D. brings this action by and through his mother, M.N.” Id. ¶¶ 23-24. The FAC raises three
claims against the State Defendants. First, it claims that the State Defendants have violated
Plaintiffs’ rights, granted by the IDEA and New Jersey regulations, to an impartial due process
hearing before the NJOAL. Id. ¶¶ 112-25 (Count III). Second, it claims that Allen-McMillan is
liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages caused by her violation of the IDEA. Id. ¶¶ 126-39
(Count IV). Third, it seeks a declaratory judgment that A.D. remains eligible to receive a FAPE,
that his GED is insufficient under the IDEA, and that he should have been eligible to reenroll in

Sparta High School. Id. ¶¶ 140-54 (Count V). The State Defendants responded with the instant
motion. D.E. 50.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court
must first determine whether the party presents a facial or factual attack because that distinction
determines how the pleading is reviewed. See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549
F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). “A facial attack concerns an alleged pleading deficiency whereas a
factual attack concerns the actual failure of a plaintiff’s claims to comport factually with the
jurisdictional prerequisites.” Young v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 3d 337, 345 (D.N.J. 2015).
When a defendant does “not challenge the validity of any of the Plaintiffs’ factual claims as part
of its motion, it has brought . . . a facial challenge.” In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach
Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 632 (3d Cir. 2017).
The State Defendants assert the defenses of lack of standing and sovereign immunity

through their motion to dismiss “before [they] filed any answer to the Complaint or otherwise
presented competing facts[,]” which renders it a facial attack. Const. Party v. Aichele, 757 F.3d
347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014). As a result, “the court must only consider the allegations of the complaint
and documents referenced therein . . . in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gould Elecs.
Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint that fails
“to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For a complaint to
survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), it must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim that

is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Further, a plaintiff must “allege sufficient facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of her claims.” Connelly v. Lane Constr.
Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, district
courts must separate the factual and legal elements. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-211. Restatements
of the elements of a claim are legal conclusions, and therefore, are not entitled to a presumption of
truth. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011). The Court, however,
“must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. Even if
plausibly pled, however, a complaint will not withstand a motion to dismiss if the facts alleged do
not state “a legally cognizable cause of action.” Turner v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. 14-7148,
2015 WL 12826480, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 23, 2015).
III. ANALYSIS

A. Article III Standing
The State Defendants first argue that M.N. lacks standing, which goes to the Court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. S.D. Br. at 8-11. The Constitution provides that “judicial Power” extends to
“Cases” and “Controversies[.]” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. To meet the case-or-controversy
requirement, a plaintiff must show that he has standing to sue. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,
818 (1997) (citation omitted). To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff “must demonstrate ‘(1)
an injury-in-fact, (2) a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”’ Finkelman v.
Nat’l Football League, 810 F.3d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am.,

LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 358-59 (3d Cir. 2015)). An injury-in-fact requires a plaintiff to show that she
suffered “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized[.]” Lujan
v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). A particularized injury means that it “must affect
the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Id. at 560 n.1. A concrete injury refers to one that
actually exists; one that is real and not abstract. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340 (2016).
In addition, “[t]he injury must be concrete in both a qualitative and temporal sense[.]” Kamal v.
J. Crew Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 110 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S.
149, 155 (1990)).
The State Defendants argue that M.N. lacks standing because Plaintiffs have not proven
that she is A.D.’s legal guardian and A.D. is an adult. S.D. Br. at 8. Plaintiffs disagree and also
argue that M.N. has suffered injuries herself by paying for A.D.’s education when he should have
been educated for free under the IDEA. Plf. Opp’n at 11. The State Defendants respond that no
allegations in the FAC support this argument. The Court does not reach either argument because

it finds Plaintiffs’ reliance on Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City School District, 550
U.S. 516 (2007), to be dispositive.
In Winkelman, the parents of a child covered by the IDEA could not agree with the child’s
school over his IEP. 550 U.S. at 519-20. The parents sought to appeal to a federal district court
the outcome of the administrative proceedings. Id. at 520. The issue before the Supreme Court
was whether the parents, “either on their own behalf or as representatives of the child,” could
proceed pro se. Id. The Winkelman Court considered whether the IDEA gives “to parents rights
of their own that can be vindicated in court proceedings, or alternatively, whether the Act allows
them, in their status as parents, to represent their child in court proceedings.” Id.

The Court in Winkelman found that the IDEA affords “parents independent, enforceable
rights[.]” Id. at 526. In doing so, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the IDEA
“contemplat[es] parental involvement only to the extent that parents represent their child’s
interests.” Id. at 527. The Winkelman Court found this position to be inconsistent with the statute,
which explicitly provides that one of its purposes is “to ensure that the rights of children with
disabilities and parents of such children are protected.” Id. at 528 (emphasis added) (quoting 20
U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B)). The Court read “the statute’s references to parents’ rights to mean what
they say: that IDEA includes provisions conveying rights to parents as well as to children.” Id. at
529. The IDEA, according to the Court in Winkelman, thus affords parents an actionable stake in
the substantive rights it affords their children. Id. at 531.
The Supreme Court further rejected the contention that a parent can sue to enforce the
IDEA only when he or she has incurred an expense educating a child who should have received a
free education. Id. at 532. The Court criticized this notion because it decentralizes the quality of

the education given to the child and would allow only the child to vindicate his or her IDEA rights
absent the parent’s financial injury. Id. at 532-33. The Court in Winkelman found that that
approach could lead to injustice and was contrary to the will of Congress. Id. at 533. The Supreme
Court concluded that the “IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights. These rights,
which are not limited to certain procedural and reimbursement-related matters, encompass the
entitlement to a free appropriate public education for the parents’ child.” Id.
In light of Winkleman, this Court agrees with Plaintiffs that M.N., as A.D.’s parent, has
standing to vindicate rights under the IDEA. In reply, the State Defendants assert that the case is
distinguishable because the Winkelmans paid the costs of their child’s private-school education

while the administrative and appellate process played out, S.D. Rep. at 3, but this requirement was
expressly rejected by the Supreme Court as a necessary prerequisite for parents to bring suit under
the IDEA.
Accordingly, the Court holds that M.N. has standing. The State Defendants’ motion is
denied on these grounds.
B. Abstention—Pullman & Burford
Next, the State Defendants argue that the abstention doctrines of Railroad Commission of
Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941), and Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), counsel
in favor of this Court declining jurisdiction. S.D. Br. at 11. The Court considers each in turn.
For Pullman abstention to apply, three “exceptional circumstances” must be present:
(1) “there must be uncertain issues of state law underlying the federal constitutional claims”;
(2) “the state law issues must be amenable to a state court interpretation which could obviate the
need to adjudicate or substantially narrow the scope of the federal constitutional claim”; and
(3) “an erroneous construction of state law by the federal court would disrupt important state

policies.” Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 149 (3d Cir. 2000) (cleaned
up).
The State Defendants claim that all three criteria are satisfied. S.D. Br. at 13. Plaintiffs
respond that the FAC does not raise a question of federal constitutional law. Plf. Opp’n at 13.
Instead, according to Plaintiffs, their claim is statutory. Id. The Court agrees. This matter turns
on the IDEA—a statute—and the applicable federal and state regulations. Id. The absence of a
federal constitutional issue makes abstention under Pullman inappropriate. Propper v. Clark, 337
U.S. 472, 489-90 (1949). In reply, the State Defendants highlight the portions of the FAC that cite
the Supremacy Clause, arguing that this raises a constitutional issue that can justify Pullman

abstention. S.D. Rep. at 3-4. But “Supremacy [C]lause claims essentially involve federal policy
and ‘the federal courts are particularly appropriate bodies for the application of preemption
principles.’” United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Muir, 792 F.2d 356, 363 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting
Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 1980)). This case does not raise a federal
constitutional issue that calls for Pullman abstention. See id. at 363-64 (explaining that a
preemption analysis is fundamentally a question of statutory interpretation).
Abstaining pursuant to “Burford . . . is proper when questions of state law in which the
state has expressed a desire to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial
public concern are presented.” Nat’l City Mortg. Co. v. Stephen, 647 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2011).
“Generally, Burford abstention is justified where a complex regulatory scheme is administered by
a specialized state tribunal having exclusive jurisdiction.” Muir, 792 F.2d at 364. In conducting
a Burford inquiry, the Third Circuit has found that a court must first consider “whether ‘timely and
adequate state-court review’ is available.” Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Tri Cnty. Neurology & Rehab.
LLC, 721 F. App’x 118, 121 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Riley v. Simmons, 45 F.3d 764, 771 (3d Cir.

1995)). If it is available, a court must then determine if the case
(1) implicates a regulatory scheme that “involves a matter of
substantial public concern;” (2) “whether it is the sort of complex,
technical regulatory scheme to which the Burford abstention
doctrine usually is applied;” and (3) “whether federal review of a
party’s claims would interfere with the state’s efforts to establish
and maintain a coherent regulatory policy.”

Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 721 F. App’x at 121-22 (quoting Chiropractic Am. v. LaVecchia, 180 F.3d
99, 105 (3d Cir. 1999)). “Importantly, to trigger Burford abstention, an action must challenge a
state’s regulatory scheme, rather than actions taken under color of the scheme.” Gov’t Emps. Ins.
Co., 721 F. App’x at 122.
The State Defendants posit that Plaintiff have adequate review in the New Jersey
administrative apparatus and courts. S.D. Br. at 14. They then argue that “New Jersey’s high
school diploma scheme” is a matter of substantial concern to the State of New Jersey. Id. at 15.
Plaintiffs counter that the IDEA itself grants Plaintiffs a right of review in federal court. Plf. Opp’n
at 12-13 (quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(i)(2)(A), 1415(i)(3)(A)). They argue that the proceedings in
the Appellate Division address a different issue than this case does and that New Jersey’s interest
in regulating high school diplomas is subordinate to the federal interests advanced by the IDEA.
Id. at 16-17.
Assuming for the sake of argument that adequate state court review is available, the Court
will not abstain under Burford. Of the factors discussed above, the Court finds the third
determinative: “whether federal review of a party’s claims would interfere with the state’s efforts
to establish and maintain a coherent regulatory policy.” Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 721 F. App’x at
122 (quoting LaVecchia, 180 F.3d at 105). As Plaintiffs point out, their ultimate claim is that a
state regulation was applied to A.D. in a way that deprived him of a federal statutory right.
Although the states are entrusted with administering the IDEA in the first instance, to receive

federal funding, they must “ensure that any State rules, regulations, and policies” are consistent
with the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1407(a)(1).
Further, there is no “specialized state tribunal having exclusive jurisdiction.” Muir, 792
F.2d at 364 (emphasis added). Rather, the IDEA itself opens the door to the federal courthouse
and invites in those unsatisfied with the results of the outcome of a due process hearing conducted
by state authorities. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A); see also id. § 1415(i)(3)(A). Congress, evidently,
did not believe that federal review of state action under color of the IDEA was an unwarranted
interference with the state educational system. The Court will not abstain under Burford.
C. Allen-McMillan’s Liability under the IDEA

The State Defendants argue that state actors cannot be individually liable under the IDEA.
S.D. Br. at 15-16 (citing, inter alia, Taylor v. Altoona Area Sch. Dist., 513 F. Supp. 2d 540, 553
(W.D. Pa. 2007)). Plaintiffs counter that the State Defendants are collaterally estopped from
arguing that Allen-McMillan should be dismissed in her official capacity because Judge Hillman,
in another IDEA case—M.D. v. Vineland City Board of Education, No. 19-cv-12154, 2022 WL
844423 (D.N.J. March 21, 2022)—denied a motion to dismiss that raised the same argument. Plf.
Opp’n at 17-19. The State Defendants counter that Judge Hillman’s decision was not a “final
judgment” as that phrase is used by courts applying collateral estoppel. S.D. Rep. at 6.
“Collateral estoppel prevents the re-litigation of a factual or legal issue that was litigated
in an earlier proceeding.” Doe v. Hesketh, 828 F.3d 159, 171 (3d Cir. 2016). That doctrine is
properly applied when
“(1) the identical issue was decided in a prior adjudication; (2) there
was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the
bar is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication; and (4) the party against whom the bar is asserted had
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question.”

Id. (quoting Del. River Port Auth. v. Fraternal Order of Police, 290 F.3d 567, 573 n.10 (3d Cir.
2002)). Although the State Defendants urge a strict reading of the second requirement, the Third
Circuit has explained that “‘[f]inality’ for purposes of issue preclusion is a more ‘pliant’ concept
than it would be in other contexts.” Dyndul v. Dyndul, 620 F.2d 409, 412 (3d Cir. 1980) (footnote
omitted). Entry of a final judgment is not necessary. In re Brown, 951 F.2d 564, 569 (3d Cir.
1991). Indeed, “[t]here is no bright-line rule regarding what constitutes a ‘final judgment’ for
issue preclusion.” Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 677 F.3d 519, 541 (3d Cir.
2012). Instead, all that is required is a “prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is
determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.” Brown, 951 F.2d at 569.
“Factors that courts consider when determining whether the prior determination was sufficiently
firm include: whether the parties were fully heard, whether a reasoned opinion was filed, and
whether that decision could have been, or actually was, appealed.” Free Speech Coalition, 677
F.3d at 541 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A denial of a motion to dismiss can
be sufficiently ‘final’ for purposes of issue preclusion.” In re Geo Specialty Chems. Ltd., 577 B.R.
142, 188 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2017).
The Court does not find Judge Hillman’s decision to be sufficiently firm to be afforded
preclusive effect. To be sure, the parties were fully heard, and a reasoned opinion was filed. But
Judge Hillman’s decision recognized that courts are split on this issue. M.D., 2022 WL 844423,
at *7. Additionally, the opinion contemplated that the claims against the interim commissioner of
the NJDOE “may . . . turn out to be duplicative in this matter,” leaving the door open to a possible
later dismissal. Id. As a result, Judge Hillman’s decision does not appear to be the kind that is
typically afforded preclusive effect.

But the Court does find Judge Hillman’s decision persuasive, although it is not binding
authority. As a result, the Court will not dismiss Allen-McMillan in her official capacity at this
stage. It is not apparent, before discovery is complete, that claims against Allen-McMillan (and
any resulting injunctive relief) would be duplicative vis-a-vis the NJDOE. The Court denies the
State Defendants’ motion on this ground.
D. Failure to State a Claim
The State Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs cannot state an IDEA claim because the
underlying administrative decisions correctly concluded that A.D.’s diploma is “a ‘regular high
school diploma’ under 34 C.F.R. § 300.102[.]” See S.D. Br. at 17. Plaintiffs criticize the State

Defendants for asserting “a legal conclusion that this Court has not yet reached at this pleading
stage.” Plf. Opp’n at 22.
The Court notes that the substance of this part of the motion is an attack on the merits of
the IDEA claim. In the preliminary injunction opinion,3 the Court found that Plaintiffs were likely
to succeed on the merits and that A.D.’s diploma, awarded solely on the basis of passing the GED
exam, is not a “regular high school diploma” as contemplated by the Code of Federal Regulations.
E.g., D.E. 61 at 19. At a minimum, Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim under the IDEA.

3 The State Defendants filed this motion before the Court issued its opinion regarding the
preliminary injunction. Compare D.E. 50, with D.E. 61.
E. Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim
Turning to Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim, the State Defendants assert that Allen-McMillan
is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and, independently, urge the Court to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ claim. S.D. Br. at 21-22. The Court considers each position in turn.
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not

be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.
Const. amend. XI; see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100
(1984). Further, that immunity extends to “entities that are considered arms of the state” such as
state agencies, state departments, and state officials acting in their official capacities. See MCI
Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985); Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 545 (3d Cir.
2007). There are three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity: “(1) abrogation by an Act
of Congress, (2) waiver by state consent to suit; and (3) suits against individual state officials for

prospective relief to remedy an ongoing violation of federal law.” M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. State-
Operated Sch. Dist., 344 F.3d 335, 345 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908). As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ 1983 claim must be dismissed against Allen-
McMillan in her official capacity except for potentially prospective injunctive relief.
The State Defendants next contend that Plaintiffs cannot state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against Allen-McMillan for an IDEA violation because IDEA rights cannot be vindicated
through Section 1983. S.D. Br. at 24-25. The State Defendants rely primarily on the Third
Circuit’s holding in A.W. v. Jersey City Public Schools, 486 F.3d 791 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). Id.
In A.W., the plaintiff sued two NJDOE officials under Section 1983 for violating his IDEA
rights. 486 F.3d at 793. The Third Circuit found that the claim was improper. Id. at 802-04. The
Third Circuit framed the inquiry as “whether there is an express, private means of redress in the
IDEA itself, which, absent some textual indication to the contrary, would indicate that Congress
did not intend to leave open a more expansive remedy under § 1983.” Id. at 802. Examining the

plain language of the statute, the A.W. court concluded that the statute does provide such an avenue
to obtain redress. Id. According to the Third Circuit, that “means that a § 1983 action is not
available to remedy violations of IDEA-created rights, absent some ‘textual indication, express or
implicit, that the [statutory] remedy is to complement, rather than supplant, § 1983.’” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 122 (2005)).
A.W. invoked 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)4 as containing such an indication, but the Third Circuit
was not persuaded. Id. at 803. Instead, the court in A.W. read that subsection as akin to a savings
clause that preserved preexisting civil rights claims from the otherwise broad reach of the IDEA’s
“comprehensive . . . remedial scheme.” Id. The Third Circuit added that the Supreme Court has

cited “the IDEA as an example of a statutory enforcement scheme that precludes a § 1983 remedy.”
Id. (citing Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. at 121; Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 347-48

4 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) provides as follows:

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the
rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution,
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, title V of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal laws protecting the
rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a
civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available
under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g)
shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the
action been brought under this subchapter.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
(1997); Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423-24, 427(1987)).
Finally, the A.W. court highlighted 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), which “includes a judicial remedy for
violations of any right ‘relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of [a]
child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.’” Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)). The Third Circuit thus ruled that a plaintiff may not

use Section 1983 to vindicate IDEA rights. Id.
In light of A.W., the Court agrees with the State Defendants that Plaintiffs cannot maintain
an action against Allen-McMillan pursuant to Section 1983 for violations of IDEA rights. And
the FAC does not plausibly plead a violation of some other federal right traditionally enforceable
under Section 1983. Plaintiffs label their claim “Violation of Rights and Procedural Safeguards
Guaranteed by the IDEA pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Commissioner Allen-McMillan[.]”
FAC at 28. The allegations of the count refer almost exclusively to the IDEA and do not cite to or
directly implicate any constitutional right. At best, Plaintiffs asks the Court to “[f]ind[] that
Defendants have violated IDEA, §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (‘§504’), and 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, as applicable[,]” but the allegations do not actually speak to the Rehabilitation Act, which
in any event is not a constitutional provision. In the absence of plausible allegations that Allen-
McMillan is violating Plaintiffs’ rights other than those granted by the IDEA, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim.
Plaintiffs again urge that the State Defendants are collaterally estopped by M.D. Plf. Opp’n
at 23-24. Judge Hillman found that the complaint in M.D. had plausibly alleged a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, thereby enabling the plaintiff to maintain claims under Section 1983.
M.D., 2022 WL 844423, at *9. The FAC does not have comparable allegations. Thus, in addition
to not being sufficiently final for collateral estoppel purposes, M.D. also contained materially
different allegations. The State Defendants motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is granted.
F. Declaratory Judgment
Finally, the State Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for a declaratory
judgment because a party cannot advance a stand-alone claim for declaratory relief as “an

independent cause of action.” S.D. Br. at 25.
“The Declaratory Judgment Act allows any court of the United States to ‘declare the rights
and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further
relief is or could be sought.’” Giftboxcenter, LLC v. Petbox, Inc., No. 15-4390, 2018 WL 734664,
at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 5, 2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a)). “The Declaratory Judgment Act is a
procedural vehicle that creates a form of relief; it does not create a cause of action courts may be
compelled to enforce.” In re AZEK Building Prods., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 608, 624-25 (D.N.J.
2015). “To state it differently, the [Act] is not itself an independent cause of action sufficient to
invoke the court’s federal-question jurisdiction; the availability of relief under the [Act]

‘presupposes the existence of a judicially remediable right.’” Argen v. Kessler, No. 18-963, 2019
WL 2067639, at *3 (D.N.J. May 10, 2019) (quoting Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 677 (1960)).
It appears that the State Defendants’ argument hinges on the success on the remainder of
their motion—that is, the request for declaratory relief would “stand alone” only if the Court were
to dismiss the rest of the action. The Court has already decided that Plaintiffs’ IDEA claim is
viable. As a result, the Court will not at this juncture limit the potential remedies Plaintiffs may
be awarded.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in
part. Plaintiffs’ 1983 claim is dismissed. The motion is otherwise denied. An appropriate Order
accompanies this Opinion.
Dated: August 23, 2022
Ques VO2.N AC
John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10273656. Public record. Not legal advice.