# CZACHOWSKI v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

> District Court, D. New Jersey · June 24, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10273201

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** June 24, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CHRISTOPHER C., Civ. No. 21-09667 (KM)

Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:
Christopher C. brings this action to review a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his claims for Title
II Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Title XVI supplemental social
security income. Upon reviewing and weighing certain evidence, the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) concluded that Christopher C. was not
disabled from September 7, 2015, through May 19, 2020, the date of the
decision. Christopher C. claims the ALJ’s decision is not supported by
substantial evidence.
I find that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. The
Commissioner’s decision is therefore AFFIRMED.
I. BACKGROUND1
Christopher C. first applied for DIB pursuant to Sections 216(i) and
223(d) of the Social Security Act (“SSA”) and for supplemental social security
income pursuant to section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act on March
23, 2018, alleging disability as of September 7, 2015. (AR 15.) Christopher C.’s
application was denied initially and on Reconsideration. (AR 56–107.)
Christopher C. requested a hearing before an ALJ to review his application de
novo. (AR 119–21.) A hearing was held on December 18, 2019, before ALJ
Richard West, who issued a decision on May 19, 2020. ALJ West denied
disability at step five of the sequential evaluation, on the grounds that,
Christopher C. is capable of performing a broad range of sedentary work that
exists in significant numbers in the national economy. (AR 19–24.)
Christopher C. requested Appeals Council Review of ALJ West’s decision,
but his request was denied on February 11, 2021. This denial rendered ALJ
West’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (AR 1–6.) Christopher
C. then appealed that decision to this court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)
and 1383(c).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Five-Step Process and this Court’s Standard of Review
To qualify for Title II DIB benefits, a claimant must meet the insured
status requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 423. To qualify, a claimant must show that
she is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to

1 Certain citations to the record are abbreviated as follows:

DE = docket entry in this case
AR = Administrative Record (DE 6)
Pl. Br. = Plaintiff’s brief in support of remand (DE 11)
result in death or that has lasted (or can be expected to last) for a continuous
period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(c), 1382(a).
Under the authority of the SSA, the Social Security Administration (the
“Administration”) has established a five-step evaluation process for determining
whether a claimant is entitled to benefits. 20 CFR §§ 404.1520, 416.920. This
Court’s review necessarily incorporates a determination of whether the ALJ
properly followed the five-step process, which is prescribed by regulation. The
steps may be briefly summarized as follows:
Step 1: Determine whether the claimant has engaged in substantial
gainful activity since the onset date of the alleged disability. 20 CFR §§
404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If not, move to step two.
Step 2: Determine if the claimant’s alleged impairment, or
combination of impairments, is “severe.” Id. §§ 404.1520(c),
416.920(c). If the claimant has a severe impairment, move to step
three.
Step 3: Determine whether the severe impairment meets or equals
the criteria of any impairment found in the Listing of Impairments.
20 CFR Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Pt. A. If so, the claimant is
automatically eligible to receive disability benefits (and the analysis
ends); if not, move to step four. Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d).
RFC and Step 4: Determine the claimants “residual functional
capacity,” (the “RFC”) meaning “the most [the claimant] can still do
despite [her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). Caraballo v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2015 WL 457301, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2015).
Decide whether, based on his RFC, the claimant can return to his
prior occupation. 20 C.F.R. § 1520(a) (4)(iv); Id. §§ 404.1520(e)–(f),
416.920(e)–(f). If not, move to step five.
Step 5: At this point, the burden shifts to the Administration to
demonstrate that the claimant, considering his age, education,
work experience, and RFC, is capable of performing jobs that exist
in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 CFR §§
404.1520(g), 416.920(g); see Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474
F.3d 88, 91–92 (3d Cir. 2007). If so, benefits will be denied; if not,
they will be awarded.
For the purpose of this appeal, the Court conducts a plenary review of
the legal issues. See Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d
Cir. 1999). The factual findings of the ALJ are reviewed “only to determine
whether the administrative record contains substantial evidence supporting the
findings.” Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000). Substantial
evidence is “less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere
scintilla.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted). “It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. When substantial evidence exists to
support the ALJ’s factual findings, this Court must abide by the ALJ’s
determinations. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).
This Court may, under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), affirm, modify, or reverse the
Commissioner’s decision, or it may remand the matter to the Commissioner for
a rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984); Bordes v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 235 F. App’x 853, 865–66 (3d Cir. 2007). Outright reversal
with an award of benefits is appropriate only when a fully developed
administrative record contains substantial evidence that the claimant is
disabled and entitled to benefits. Podedworny, 745 F.2d at 221–222; Morales v.
Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2000).
Remand is proper if the record is incomplete, or if there is a lack of
substantial evidence to support a definitive finding on one or more steps of the
five-step inquiry. See Podedworny, 745 F.2d at 221–22. Remand is also proper
if the ALJ’s decision lacks adequate reasoning or support for its conclusions, or
if it contains illogical or contradictory findings. See Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119–20 (3d Cir. 2000); Leech v. Barnhart, 111 F. App’x 652,
658 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We will not accept the ALJ's conclusion that Leech was not
disabled during the relevant period, where his decision contains significant
contradictions and is therefore unreliable.”). It is also proper to remand where
the ALJ’s findings are not the product of a complete review which “explicitly
weigh[s] all relevant, probative and available evidence” in the record. Adorno v.
Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
B. The ALJ’s Decision
ALJ West undertook the five-step inquiry. His conclusions are
summarized as follows:
Step 1
ALJ West found that Christopher C. had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity from the alleged onset date of September 7, 2015, through the
date of his hearing. (AR 17.)
Step 2
The ALJ found that Christopher C. had the following severe impairments:
degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, and plantar fasciitis. (AR 17.) In
addition, the ALJ found that he had one non-severe impairment: bipolar
disorder. (AR 18.) ALJ West found that his bipolar disorder was non-severe
because Christopher C. had only mild limitations in the four broad functional
areas of mental functioning: 1) Understand, remember, or apply information; 2)
Interact with others; 3) Concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; 4) Adapt or
manage oneself. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, § 12.04. (AR 18.)
Step 3
With respect to his severe impairments, Christopher C. did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the
severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1 (AR 19). ALJ West paid particular attention to medical listings 1.04
(Disorders of the spine) and 1.03 (reconstructive surgery or surgical arthrodesis
of a major weight-bearing joint).
First, ALJ West declined to find that Christopher C. met the
requirements of listing 1.04 (disorders of the spine) because the medical
evidence did not show that Christopher C. experienced “listing level nerve root
compression” and because “[t]here is no evidence of spinal arachnoiditis” or of
“spinal stenosis resulting in pseudoclaudication nor an inability to ambulate
effectively.” (AR 19.)
Second, ALJ West declined to find that Christopher C. met the
requirements of listing 1.03 (reconstructive surgery or surgical arthrodesis of a
major weight-bearing joint) because the record “does not demonstrate
reconstructive surgery or surgical arthrodesis of a major weightbearing joint
with an inability to ambulate effectively, as defined in 1.00B2b, and return to
effective ambulation did not occur, or is not expected to occur, within 12
months of onset.” (AR 19.)
RFC and Step 4 – Ability to Perform Past Work
Next, ALJ West defined Christopher C.’s RFC:
[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to
perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except occasionally climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, stoop, kneel, crouch, and
crawl; and he must avoid exposure to dangerous
machinery and unprotected heights.

(AR 19.)
ALJ West began his RFC analysis by explaining that he followed a two-
step process in which he first determined whether Christopher C. had an
underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment “that can be
shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques—
[and] could reasonably be expected to produce [Christopher C.’s] pain or other
symptoms.” (AR 19–20.) He then explained that in the second step, he “must
evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of [Christopher C.’s]
symptoms to determine the extent to which they limit [his] work-related
activities.” (AR 20.) To do this, he is required to look to objective medical
evidence, or to the entire case record where objective medical evidence does not
substantiate Christopher C.’s statements about “the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects claimant’s symptoms.” (AR 20.)
ALJ West concluded “the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent
with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (AR 20.) Because
Christopher C.’s arguments focus primarily on the ALJ’s rejection of the
opinion of Dr. Nomaan Ashraf2 and the ALJ’s finding that Christopher C.’s
bipolar disorder was non-severe and therefore did not impact Christopher C’s
RFC, I focus my summary of the record on those aspects.
The ALJ found Dr. Ashraf’s opinion unpersuasive. Dr. Ashraf had opined
in his “Medical Source Statement” that Christopher C. would miss work more
than three times per month and was in constant pain that made him unable to
sit, stand, or walk for any length of time. (AR 831–37.) ALJ West found,
however, that Dr. Ashraf’s opinion was inconsistent with the remainder of the
record, including Dr. Ashraf’s own previous opinion that Christopher C. could
perform the full range of light work. (AR 22, 659.) In addition, ALJ West
discounted several other pieces of record evidence that opined that Christopher
C. was capable of doing the full range of light work, determining that these
findings were “not consistent with the longitudinal evidence including the
claimant’s continued complaints of pain and difficulty with activities of daily
living including driving and preparing meals.” (AR 22.)
In determining that Christopher C. had no severe mental limitations, ALJ
West cited a plethora of evidence from the record. Examining each of the
“Paragraph B” criteria, ALJ West found that the record evidence revealed that
Christopher C. had only mild limitations in all four areas. (AR 18.) What is
more, Christopher C. did not seek mental health treatment until 2019, well
after he had applied for disability benefits. (AR 663.) It appears mental health
treatment improved Christopher C.’s symptoms, for example by helping him get
significantly more sleep. (AR 679, 691.) In short, ALJ West concluded that the
record evidence shows that although Christopher C. undoubtedly has

2 Sometimes misspelled “Norman Ashraft” in plaintiff’s brief. (DE 11.)
difficulties, they are not severe enough to limit the type of work that he is
capable of performing.
ALJ West decided this case pursuant to the “expedited process” set forth
in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(h) and 416.920(h) and therefore proceeded to Step 5
without making a finding about whether Christopher C. could perform his past
relevant work.
Step 5
At step five, ALJ West explained that “considering the claimant’s age,
education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs
that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can
perform.” (AR 23.) Accordingly, he found that Christopher C. is not disabled
under the SSA. (AR 24.)
To make this determination, ALJ West relied on Social Security Rulings
that determine whether a person of a given age and experience level is capable
of work. If Christopher C. were capable of performing the full range of
sedentary work, a finding of not disabled would be compelled by Medical-
Vocational Rule 201.27. (AR 24.) His RFC, however, includes some additional
exertional limitations. ALJ West determined, however, that these minor
limitations did little to erode the occupational base of jobs that Christopher C.
is capable of performing. (AR 24.) ALJ West thus concluded that “[t]here are
many jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that the
claimant is able to perform.” (AR 24.) ALJ West thus found Christopher C. not
to be disabled under the SSA.
C. Christopher C.’s Challenge
Christopher C. challenges the Commissioner’s decision on two primary
grounds. First, he argues that the RFC was not supported by substantial
evidence because it discounted without sufficient reason the evidence of Dr.
Ashraf. (AR 12–16.) Second, Christopher C. argues that ALJ West erred at Step
2 by failing to find that Christopher C.’s bipolar disorder was a severe
limitation. (AR 16–19.) Both of these arguments fail, and I therefore AFFIRM
the ALJ’s decision.
1. Analysis
ALJ West’s decision to disregard Dr. Ashraf’s final January 2020 opinion
as inconsistent with other record evidence and with his own prior opinion was
supported by substantial evidence.
Dr. Ashraf himself earlier opined that Christopher C. was capable of light
work with no further restrictions (AR 21-22, 310-12, 376-78, 424-26, 430, 445,
653-55, 659). In 2018, for example, Dr. Ashraf found that Christopher C. was
capable of a full range of light work, despite evidence of “strong symptom
magnification.”3 (AR 360.) The ALJ noted the evidence from 2018 which showed
that Christopher C. was improving after his surgery. (AR 21.) As noted, the
most recent such report dated from May 30, 2019, just seven months before
the January 2020 report in question. (AR 657–61 (stating that claimant is able
to return to work so long as he is not required to lift anything weighing over 15
pounds).) In his May 30, 2019 report, Dr. Ashraf reported “maximal medical
improvement” following surgery. (AR 659.)
Dr. Ashraf’s opinion dated January 6, 2020 (AR 831–37), however, finds
Christopher C. disabled. Ashraf reports that Christopher C. is in severe pain,
for which Ashraf has currently prescribed naproxen, Tylenol, and ibuprofen.4
Ashraf reports further that Christopher C. is unable to walk a single city block
without resting, that he cannot sit, stand, or walk more than a half hour
without relief, that he would have to lie down for 10 minutes every hour when
working, that his pain would constantly interfere with attention and
concentration, and that he could occasionally lift no more than 6–10 pounds.

3 An apparent euphemism for malingering, and the ALJ seems to have
interpreted it as such. (AR 21.) Dr. Ashraf noted the claimant’s “self-limiting” of
movement and strength, concluded that his “true maximal capabilities are therefore
left to conjecture,” but opined at a minimum that he could perform light category
work. (AR 360.) That conclusion appears to stem from Dr. Ashraf’s interpretation of
the functional assessment described at p. 10, below.
4 Stronger painkillers had been prescribed in the past, before and around the
time of surgery. Dr. Ashraf notes that other physicians have prescribed Trazodone (an
antidepressant) and Olazopine (an antipsychotic).
Such conclusions would presumably have to reflect a severe decline in the
claimant’s condition over the previous seven months.
The January 2020 opinion consists of a form submitted after the hearing
in support of the disability claim. (AR 831-37.) No explanation appears for the
change in Dr. Ashraf’s opinion, and there is no documentation of any rapid
decline in Christopher C.’s condition. As support, the January 2020 report
generically cites such diagnostic tests as X-rays and MRI evidence (AR 831); it
does not indicate, however, whether any new or recent diagnostic tests had
been performed since the earlier opinions were rendered. It simply states
conclusions, and it is not—like, e.g., the May 30, 2019 report—supported by
treatment notes and other documentation.5 Indeed, in the January 2020 report
itself, Ashraf states that his description of the symptoms and limitations would
apply going back as early as September 9, 2015, the date Dr. Ashraf first
treated the claimant. If so, then the earlier reports would be inexplicable.
In addition, ALJ West found that Dr. Ashraf’s opinion was inconsistent
with other record evidence, particularly citing reports of State agency medical
consultants who analyzed the medical records. (AR 22.) For example, in April
2018, Arthur Canario, M.D., reviewed the medical records and opined that
Christopher C. could return to his prior, medium-level work. (AR 22, 450.) In
February 2018, Thomas Xanakis (not a physician but a physical therapist
referred by Dr. Ashraf) performed a functional capacity evaluation. Xanakis
noted “to a reasonable degree of biomechanical probability that these c.v.
values may be compatible with a symptom magnification component to his
complaints, and/or, a conscious attempt by the Examinee to portray less than
maximum effort for this evaluation.” (AR 649.) He concluded, however, that the
claimant could, at a minimum perform light work and lift up to 20 pounds. (Id.;
see also AR 22, 649). The state agency retained two expert physicians, Joseph
Sobelman, M.D., and Jacques Gulekjian, M.D., who likewise reviewed the

5 The form requests that any such test reports not already submitted to the
Agency be supplied. No such reports are attached. (AR 831.)
record and concluded that Plaintiff could perform light work, even just months
after his 2018 surgery. (AR 22; AR 61-63 (Sobelman, 5/22/2018); AR 84-86
(Gulekjian, 9/4/2018).) The ALJ did not swallow this evidence whole, but
assessed it in context, ultimately imposing further limitations than were
suggested. These reports do, however, provide further substantial evidence in
support of the ALJ’s conclusions.6
What is more, although Christopher C. testified about his pain and
difficulties walking, standing, and sitting at the December 2019 hearing, he did
not mention anything about a sudden worsening of symptoms and instead
described a stable, if difficult, state in 2019, with a consistent level of pain and
other symptoms. (AR 38-42.) This testimony fits with the treatment reports
produced by Dr. Pearlman, a podiatrist, during 2019, which indicate that his
foot pain, though not his back pain, improved with treatment. (AR 699, 710.) In
short, ALJ West found that the medical evidence showed that Christopher C.
had remained in pain, but capable of most sedentary work during 2019, when
the bulk of the medical evidence was produced. The ALJ had a legitimate basis
to conclude that Dr. Ashraf’s January 2020 report, submitted after the hearing,
came out of nowhere, and failed to support its implicit conclusion that
Christopher C.’s symptoms had severely worsened since May 2019.
Finally, the ALJ’s determination that Christopher C.’s bipolar disorder
was non-severe was supported by substantial evidence. In his brief,
Christopher C. focuses largely on the initial report of Catherine C. Shalhoub
who treated plaintiff’s mental health conditions starting in 2019. (Pl. Br. at 17.)
This argument ignores Dr. Shalhoub’s assessment that claimant’s condition
improved, at least somewhat, with treatment. (AR 673–96.) Even the initial

6 Christopher C. also briefly argues that ALJ West erred by finding that
Christopher C. does not require a cane to ambulate. (Pl. Br. at 14–16.) Although Dr.
Ashraf did indicate in his final, disregarded, opinion that Christopher C. needed a
cane, he was never prescribed one. It is clearly possible for a cane to be helpful to a
person who has mobility issues without being strictly required. The ALJ’s finding that
Christopher C. could walk without a cane was supported by substantial record
evidence which the ALJ cited in his opinion. (AR 21.)
report that Christopher C. discusses, however, contains no evidence that
Christopher C. has substantial limitations in the four areas of mental
functioning and in his brief, Christopher C. does not cite any specific evidence
relating to any of those four areas. The record evidence shows that Christopher
C. was generally pleasant, maintained a long-term relationship with a
girlfriend, attended his medical appointments, and managed his own financial
affairs. In determining that Christopher C.’s mental limitations were non-
severe, ALJ West considered the whole record and cited extensively from it to
support his determination. (AR 18.) ALJ West’s determination was thus
supported by substantial evidence.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED. An
appropriate order accompanies this Opinion.
Dated: June 24, 2022
/s/ Kevin McNulty
______________________________
Hon. Kevin McNulty
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10273201. Public record. Not legal advice.