# K.N. v. GLOUCESTER CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION

> District Court, D. New Jersey · March 2, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10272536

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** March 2, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that determining reasonableness of fees is within the trial court's discretion

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

K.N. and J.N., on behalf of 17-7976-NLH-SAK
J.N.,

Plaintiffs, OPINION

v.

GLOUCESTER CITY BOARD OF
EDUCATION,

Defendant.

Appearances:

CATHERINE MERINO REISMAN
REISMAN CAROLLA GRAN & ZUBA LLP
19 CHESTNUT STREET
HADDONFIELD, NJ 08033-1810

Counsel for Plaintiffs

BRETT E. J. GORMAN
PARKER MCCAY PA
9000 MIDLANTIC DRIVE
SUITE 300
MT. LAUREL, NJ 08054

Counsel for Defendant

HILLMAN, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on motion of Plaintiffs
seeking attorneys’ fees from Defendant Gloucester City Board of
Education (“Board”). (Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Docket Number
44). The relevant factual and procedural history of this matter
is set forth in this Court’s prior Opinions1 and need not be
repeated at length here. For the reasons expressed below,
Plaintiffs’ motion will be granted, and Defendant will be

ordered to reimburse Plaintiffs in the amount of $100,849.78.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed actions against the Board alleging a
series of violations under federal and state antidiscrimination
laws related to the school district’s (“District”) provision of
services for an autistic child, J.N., in an after-school program
(“ASP”). Specifically, Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Due
Process with the New Jersey Office of Special Education
Programs, alleging violations of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”), and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”). K.N. v. Gloucester City Bd. Of Educ.,

379 F. Supp. 3d 334, 343 (D.N.J. 2019). An Administrative Law

1 On March 29, 2019, the Court issued an Opinion and Order [Dkt.
Nos. 18 and 19 respectively] granting in part Plaintiffs’ motion
for summary judgment. The Court there found that Defendant
violated Section 504, the ADA, and the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (“NJLAD”). On August 27, 2019, the Court issued
an Opinion and Order [Dkt. Nos. 28 and 29 respectively] denying
Defendant’s motion for reconsideration and request that the
Court certify its Opinion to allow for interlocutory appeal. On
March 25, 2021, the Court issued an Opinion and Order [Dkt. Nos.
39 and 40 respectively] granting Plaintiffs’ request to
establish a compensatory special needs trust in the amount of
$26,017.20 and finding that Plaintiffs are prevailing parties
entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees.
Judge (“ALJ”) ruled in favor of Defendant, finding that
Plaintiff was provided with a free and appropriate public
education (“FAPE”) as well as proper ASP with supports in place.

Plaintiffs thereafter initiated the instant action, requesting
that the Court review the ALJ’s decision, but only on issues
concerning anti-discrimination laws — specifically Section 504,
the ADA, and the NJLAD.
This Court found that Defendant “violated Section 504, the
ADA, and the NJLAD by (1) failing to provide J.N. meaningful
access to the after-school program []; and (2) subjecting J.N.
to unnecessary social isolation.” K.N. v. Gloucester City Bd.
Of Educ., No. 17-09776-NLH-AMD, 2021 WL 1138136, at *1 (D.N.J.
Mar. 24, 2021). This Court further held that Plaintiffs are
“prevailing parties” entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and
thus instructed the parties to submit supplemental briefing on

the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees Plaintiffs are owed.
Id. at **4-5. As of May 10, 2021, the parties had filed the
instant motion, opposition, and reply papers2 on the issue of

2 The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ reply brief is not properly
formatted as it appears to be single-spaced in Times New Roman
12-point font. Local Civil Rule 7.2(d) requires that “[e]ach
page of a brief shall contain double-spaced text and/or single-
spaced footnotes or inserts. Typeface shall be in 12-point non-
proportional font (such as Courier New 12) or an equivalent 14-
point proportional font (such as Times New Roman 14).” The
Court will not on this occasion reject Plaintiffs’ reply papers.
However, as this is the second time Plaintiffs’ counsel
submitted an improperly formatted brief, see Reply Brief at Dkt.
attorney’s fees. Plaintiffs’ motion is therefore ripe for
adjudication.
DISCUSSION
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.
II. Analysis
Plaintiffs are seeking to recover $98,934.74 in attorneys’
fees and $1,915.04 in related costs that they claim they are
entitled to under both the ADA and Section 504. Plaintiffs are
correct that the Court has the discretion to award attorneys’
fees and costs to the “prevailing party” under both Section 504,
29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs”), and the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (“[T]he court ...,

in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a
reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and
costs”). Defendant’s opposition brief argues the amount of fees
awarded should be dramatically reduced from the amount
requested.
A. Plaintiffs Are Prevailing Parties

No. 35, Plaintiffs’ counsel is hereafter on notice that failure
to adhere to our Local Civil Rules may result in the rejection
of a deficient submission.
As the ADA and Section 504 provisions both make clear, to
obtain an award of attorneys’ fees and costs, Plaintiffs must
first demonstrate that they were prevailing parties in this

action. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b); 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Based on
the Court’s prior ruling, it is both accepted by the parties and
established in the record that Plaintiffs are prevailing
parties, leaving only the issue of determining what constitutes
an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to be reimbursed by
Defendant.
B. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Reasonable Fees and Costs
The Court will grant Plaintiffs’ fee request. Overall, the
Court finds the request is reasonable under the circumstances.
When calculating an attorney's fee award under the ADA and
similar statutes, the “lodestar” method provides the starting
point for determining reasonable attorney's fees. Lanni v. New

Jersey, 259 F.3d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2001); see also McKenna v.
City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 455 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The
starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is
the lodestar approach.”) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 433 (1983)). Under the lodestar approach, “court[s]
determine[] an attorney's lodestar award by multiplying the
number of hours he or she reasonably worked on a client's case
by a reasonable hourly billing rate for such services given the
geographical area, the nature of the services provided, and the
experience of the lawyer.” S.S. Body Armor I., Inc. v. Carter
Ledyard & Milburn LLP, 927 F.3d 763, 773 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting
Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir.

2000)).
A district court may discount any hours that it deems
unreasonable, including those considered to be “excessive,
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” See Hensley, 461 U.S. at
433. Although the Court has substantial discretion to determine
what constitutes a reasonable rate and reasonable hours, once
the lodestar is determined, it represents the presumptive
reasonable fee. Lanni, 259 F.3d at 149. “The prevailing party
bears the burden of establishing by way of satisfactory
evidence, in addition to [the] attorney's own affidavits ...
that the requested hourly rates meet this standard.” School
District of Philadelphia v. Kirsch, 722 F. App’x. 215, 229 (3d

Cir. 2018) (quoting Maldonado v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 184 (3d
Cir. 2001)). “The party normally satisfies this burden by
submitting the affidavits of other attorneys in the relevant
community, attesting to the range of prevailing rates charged by
attorneys with similar skill and experience. P.G. v. Brick Twp.
Bd. of Educ., 142 F. Supp. 2d 251, 261 (D.N.J. 2000) (citing
S.D. v. Manville Bd. Of Educ., 989 F. Supp. 649, 656 (D.N.J.
1998)).
“[O]nce the fee petitioner ‘submit[s] evidence supporting
the hours worked and rates claimed,’ the party opposing the fee
application has the burden to challenge the reasonableness of
the requested fee.” J.L. v. Harrison Township Bd. of Educ., No.

14-2666 (RMB/JS), 2017 WL 1954535, at *2 (D.N.J. May 11, 2017)
(quoting McKenna, 582 F.3d at 459). If sufficiently specific
objections to the requested fees are raised, “a district court
‘has a great deal of discretion to adjust the fee award in light
of those objections.’” Id. (quoting Taylor v. USF-Red Star
Exp., Inc., 212 F. App’x. 101, 111 (3d Cir. 2006)).
1. Counsels’ Hourly Rates Are Reasonable
To calculate Plaintiffs’ lodestar, the Court must first
evaluate the hourly rates claimed for Plaintiffs’ counsel. At
this stage, “a reasonable hourly rate is calculated according to
the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.”
Maldonado v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)). In determining a
reasonable hourly rate, courts will “assess the experience and
skill of the prevailing party’s attorneys and compare their
rates to the rates prevailing in the community3 for similar
services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience,

3 The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s firm is Reisman
Carolla Gran Zuba LLP. The firm is located in Haddonfield, New
Jersey — a South Jersey Borough in the Philadelphia Metropolitan
Area. Thus, the Court finds that the relevant legal market is
the Philadelphia Metropolitan Area.
and reputation.”
Plaintiffs have put forth the following hourly rates used
in their lodestar calculations: $545 per hour for Catherine

Merino Reisman, a partner; $500 per hour for Amelia Carolla, a
partner, and $100 per hour for Connie Tracey and Tina Tilton,
both paralegals.4 The Board only disputes Carolla and Reisman’s
hourly rates.
Plaintiffs first direct the Court to consider the rates
published by Community Legal Services, which demonstrate that
Plaintiffs’ requested rates are either average or well below
average for attorneys with the numbers of years of experience
they each have.5 (Motion Brief at 7-9). The Court finds this
argument compelling as “[t]he fee schedule established by
Community Legal Services, Inc. (“CLS”) ‘has been approvingly

4 Carolla worked 0.5 hours, and paralegals Connie Tracey and Tina
Tilton worked 2.5 and 1.8 hours respectively. Thus, the
majority of time billed is attributed to Reisman, who worked at
least 190 hours.
5 Reisman has practiced law for at least 32 years and has
specialized in special education law for approximately 23 years.
The Community Legal Services’ Attorneys Fess Schedule for the
Philadelphia legal market sets forth a range of: (1) $550-640
per hour for an attorney with 21-25 years’ experience, and (2)
$650-700 per hour for an attorney with more than 25 years’
experience. Therefore, Reisman’s requested rate of $545 not
only falls within the fee schedule, but the rate is also below
the minimum range regardless of how her years of experience are
calculated. Likewise, Plaintiffs’ requested rate of $500 for
Carolla, who has practiced law for approximately 26 years and
specialized in education law for at least 21 years, is well
within (and again below) the range of Community Legal Services’
Attorney Fee Schedule.
cited by the Third Circuit as being well developed and has been
found ... to be a fair reflection of the prevailing market
rates.’” Maldonado v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir.

2001) (quoting Rainey v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 832 F.
Supp. 127, 129 (E.D. Pa. 1993)); see also Rhodes v. Marix
Servicing, LLC, No. CV121636MASDEA, 2020 WL 5760455, at *5
(D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2020) (approving hourly rates based on CLS fee
schedule). Accordingly, the CLS fee schedule supports Reisman’s
$545 rate and Carolla’s $500 rate as reasonable hourly rates in
the relevant legal market.
In further support of the requested rates, Plaintiffs also
emphasize Reisman and Carolla’s experience in special education
law.6 (Motion Br. at 6-9). There is no doubting this
experience, which is reflected in the record as decades of
service as counsel in numerous special education matters,

published articles, lectures, and other activities in the realm

6 Upon graduation from Yale Law School in 1989, Reisman was
admitted to the bar of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 1989,
bar of the State of New Jersey in 2001, and the bar of the State
of New York in 2018. (Reisman Certification (“Reisman Cert.”)
[Dkt. No. 44-2], at ¶¶ 1-4). Therefore, Reisman practiced law
for approximately 32 years, and she has specialized in special
education law since 1999 (approximately 23 years). (Id. at ¶¶
1-6). Carolla graduated from Rutgers School of Law—Camden in
1995 and was admitted to the bars of the State of New Jersey and
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that same year. (Id. at ¶ 13).
Carolla therefore practiced law for approximately 26 years.
Moreover, Carolla began specializing in special education law in
2001 and thus possesses approximately 21 years of experience
special education law. (Id. at ¶ 15).
of special education law. (See Reisman Cert.). Reisman and
Carolla are founding partners of Reisman Carolla Gran & Zuba
LLP, which they started in 2008. (Id. at ¶ 7). The firm

currently bills Reisman and Carolla’s services at rates of $545
per hour and $500 per hour respectively. (Id. at ¶¶ 12, 17).
In line with the requested rate of $545, Reisman has
previously received hourly rates of $525 per hour and $475 per
hour by courts in 2020 and 2017 respectively. See E.H. v.
Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 2020 WL 6286709, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Oct.
27, 2020); see also Sch. Dist. Of Phila. v. Kirsch, 2017 WL
13180, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2017), aff’d in relevant part,
722 F. App’x 215, 230 (3d Cir. 2018). The Court in E.H. also
approved a $480 per hour rate for Carolla. E.H., 2020 WL
6286709, at *12.
In addition, Plaintiffs not only base the requested rates

on the prior rates awarded in E.H., but they also seek to add an
approximately 4-5% rate increase since that decision was issued
in 2020. (Motion Br. at 9). In support of this rate increase,
Plaintiffs cite to two unpublished opinions from another
district. See, e.g. Earley v. JMK Assocs., 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 66176, at **3-4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2020) (awarding
attorneys’ fees including an annual rate increase of 5%); Jada
H. v. Rivera, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94679, at **6-7 (E.D. Pa.
June 6, 2019)(awarding attorneys’ fees including a 4% increase,
finding such “an increase . . . is reasonable”). Plaintiffs
note the rate increase is justified as their requested rates are
below the CLS fee schedule and because said schedule has not

been updated since July 1, 2018. (Motion Br. at 8-9). The
Court does not disagree and, having not been presented with any
authority to the contrary, finds that, even with a minor 4-5%
adjustment, which is appropriate given the significant and
current inflationary pressures facing the U.S. economy, the
requested rates fall within and below the CLS fee schedule and
are supported by counsels’ lengthy, specialized experience.
While there is already a sufficient basis for the requested
rates based on the CLS fee schedule, Plaintiffs’ counsels’
significant experience in the niche field of special education
law, and the fact that courts have awarded counsel similar,
albeit lesser, fees in prior cases, the Court further finds that

Plaintiffs’ have met their burden of demonstrating the
reasonableness of the requested rates based on the
certifications and declarations of Reisman and three, local,
established attorneys7 who specialize in the area of civil rights
and special education. For example, in support of their motion,
Plaintiffs submit the Declaration of David J. Berney, Esq. a

7 Plaintiffs submitted the Declaration of David J. Berney
(“Berney Decl.”) [Dkt. No. 44-3], the Certification of John D.
Rue (“Rue Cert.”) [Dkt. No. 44-4], and the Certification of
Staci J. Greenwald (“Greenwald Cert.”) [Dkt. No. 44-5].
special education practitioner who has worked in this
specialized area of law since 1996. (Berney Decl. ¶ 3). Berney
notes that he bills his services at $540 per hour, and, in

connection with his practice, he has extensively researched the
customary billing rates for special education attorneys in the
greater Philadelphia metropolitan area. (Id. at ¶¶ 26-32).
After reviewing the experience and qualifications of Plaintiffs’
counsel, the most recent CLS fee schedule, his own experience,
and taking into account recent court decisions regarding fee
awards in these types of cases, Berney concludes that Reisman’s
requested hourly rate of $545 “is reasonable given her
reputation, skill, and expertise and what other special
education and/or civil rights attorneys of comparable reputation
and expertise charge.” (Id. at ¶¶ 26-39).
Plaintiffs also submitted the Certifications of Staci J.

Greenwald, Esq. and John D. Rue, Esq. Greenwald is a partner at
Sussan Greenwald & Wesler with approximately 29 years'
experience specializing in special education law. (Greenwald
Cert. at ¶¶ 1-3). Greenwald’s hourly rate is $465. (Id. at ¶
4). Greenwald states her familiarity with Reisman, and
certifies that “Ms. Reisman’s fee [of $545 per hour] is a
customary fee charged by other attorneys who specialize in this
area and who practice in the community in which this matter
arose, and, is reasonable in light of Ms. Reisman’s level of
expertise and years in practice.” (Id.).
Likewise, Rue, the founder of John Rue & Associates, who
possess over a decade of experience in special education

litigation and charges an hourly rate of $400, also agrees as to
the reasonableness of Reisman’s requested rate. (Rue Cert. at
¶¶ 2-13). Rue knows Reisman “through her work as an attorney in
the fields of special education and civil rights law [and is]
aware of her excellent reputation in these areas.” (Id. at ¶
14). Rue further certifies that, “[a]s an attorney practicing
in this field, as a former attorney at a large firm and having
personal knowledge of the quality of her legal work, I can state
that Ms. Reisman’s reduced rate of $545 per hour is more than
reasonable, and lower than, the rates of attorneys in our region
with similar levels of legal experience.” (Id. at ¶ 18).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have presented

several bases to satisfy their burden of establishing the
reasonableness of the requested rates, particularly as concerns
Reisman. See P.G., 142 F. Supp. 2d at 261.
In contrast, the Court holds that Defendant has not met its
burden to challenge the reasonableness of the requested rates.
Defendant quibbles over the requested rates noting that
Reisman’s rate is $80 more than Greenwald’s rate, even though
Reisman possesses only three more years of practice experience
than Greenwald. Defendant likewise takes offense that Carolla’s
rate is $35 more than Greenwald’s rate, despite Greenwald
possessing three years more experience than Carolla. However,
what these distinctions miss is the fact that Greenwald, Rue,

and Berney all attested that Reisman’s rate of $545 is
reasonable based on the above criteria and in the target legal
market.
Moreover, Defendant has not presented any rebuttal
declarations, certifications, affidavits, or other sworn
statements to challenge Plaintiffs’ supporting authorities.8 Nor
has Defendant attempted to diminish or distinguish Plaintiffs’
arguments regarding the intrinsic value of Reisman and Carolla’s
experience or consideration of the requested rates against the
CLS fee schedule.
The sole authority Defendant cites is an unpublished

8 Defendant submitted an outdated Certification, dated January
26, 2016, from Brett E.J. Gorman, Esq. that purportedly lists
other attorneys’ hourly rates, including Greenwald. However,
this certification is of de minimis value as it is over six
years out-of-date and therefore fails to demonstrate current
“prevailing rates charged by attorneys with similar skill and
experience” in the relevant community. P.G., 142 F. Supp. 2d at
261. Defendant likely submitted the certification to state that
Greenwald’s hour rate has risen from $395 to $465 over five
years and to show that Reisman’s requested rate, representing an
$80 premium over Greenwald’s, must somehow be excessive by
comparison. The Court rejects this argument, as stated above,
Greenwald explicitly endorses Reisman’s requested rate as within
the range of “prevailing rates charged by attorneys with similar
skill and experience.” Id. If Defendant wanted to rebut
Reisman’s requested rate or Greenwald’s sworn statement, then
Defendant should have proffered at least one rebuttal
certification.
opinion from another court in this District that awarded fees in
a special education matter for hourly rates of $400 and $375.
E.I.H. v. Fair Lawn Bd. of Educ., 2021 WL 1153139, at **4-6

(D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2021). However, that case supports Plaintiffs’
arguments here, as the court in E.I.H. considered the CLS fee
schedule, the fee petitioning attorneys’ years of experience,
and supporting certifications (including from Greenwald) in
reaching the conclusion that the requested rates of $400 and
$375 were reasonable. Defendant mistakenly fixates on the fact
that the court in E.I.H. awarded fees of $400 per hour as some
sort of cap. However, this misses the point that $400 was in
fact the requested rate. Nothing in that matter suggests the
Court would not have awarded $500 per hour if it had been
requested and likewise supported by the record. The E.I.H.
court did not find that attorneys possessing 37 years of

practice should only be awarded $400 rates. Moreover, the skill
differential between Reisman, who has specialized for decades in
special education law, and the attorney in E.I.H., who did not
specialize for decades in special education law, diminishes the
value of this comparison.
Defendant’s final arguments are that the requested rates
are unreasonable because: (1) Defendant’s counsel charges a rate
of $175 per hour; and (2) the COVID-19 global pandemic has
caused great financial hardship, making Plaintiffs’ request for
a 4-5% rate increase distasteful. Lacking any cited authority,
the court rejects these arguments as bald assertions that have
no bearing on the instant inquiry as to reasonableness.

The Court, therefore, is satisfied that Plaintiffs’ hourly
rates are reasonable here.
2. Plaintiffs Billed Reasonable Hours
“After a court ascertains a reasonable hourly rate, it must
then determine whether the hours that the attorney expended are
reasonable.” Machado v. Law Offices of Jeffrey H. Ward, No. 14-
7401, 2017 WL 2838458, at *2 (D.N.J. June 30, 2017) (citing
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433–34). The Court must “review the time
charged, decide whether the hours set out were reasonably
expended for each of the particular purposes described and then
exclude those that are ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise
unnecessary.’” Maldonado, 256 F.3d at 184. The Court will

exclude any hours that “were not reasonably expended” from the
fee calculation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (citation omitted).
“Hours are not reasonably expended if they are excessive,
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Rode v. Dellarciprete,
892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990). To determine whether the
hours expended in this matter are reasonable, “it is necessary
that the Court ‘go line, by line, by line’ through the billing
records supporting the fee request.” Evans v. Port Auth. of
N.Y. & N.J., 273 F.3d 346, 362 (3d Cir. 2001) (emphasis in
original).
“The party seeking attorney[s’] fees has the burden to
prove that its request for attorney[s’] fees is reasonable.”

Rode, 892 F.3d at 1183. “When the fee petitioner has produced
satisfactory evidence for a fee award, the burden shifts to ‘the
party opposing the fee to contest the reasonableness of the
hourly rate requested or the reasonableness of the hours
expended.’” Rhodes, 2020 WL 5760455, at *3 (quoting Apple
Corps. Ltd. v. Int'l Collectors Soc'y, 25 F. Supp. 2d 480, 485
(D.N.J. 1998)). “If the party opposing the fee petition meets
its burden of proving that an adjustment is necessary, the
[C]ourt has wide discretion to adjust the attorneys’ fee ....”
Apple Corps. Ltd., 25 F. Supp. at 480 (citation omitted); see
also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (noting that determining
reasonableness of fees is within the trial court's discretion).

In cases such as this, the Court “has wide discretion to
adjust the attorneys’ fee for a variety of reasons such as
inadequate documentation of hours spent, reasonableness of hours
expended or duplication of efforts.” Apple Corps. Ltd., 25 F.
Supp. 2d at 485 (citing Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670,
677 (3d Cir. 1983)). “The Court, however, must be prompted by
the opposing party to review specific charges and cannot make
any adjustments sua sponte.” Machado, 2017 WL 2838458, at *2
(citing Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 426 F.3d
694, 711 (3d Cir. 2005)). “The lodestar calculation is presumed
reasonable, but the ‘[C]ourt can adjust the lodestar downward if
the lodestar is not reasonable in light of the results

obtained.’” Id. (quoting Washington v. Phila. Cty. Court of
Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 1035 (3d Cir. 1996)).
As mentioned above, Plaintiffs here are seeking attorneys’
fees in the amount of $100,849.78 for hours billed by two
attorneys and two paralegals. Reisman billed at least 190
hours, Carolla billed 0.5 hours, and paralegals Tracey and
Tilton billed 2.5 and 1.8 hours respectively. Plaintiffs have
submitted full billing records for each proceeding, which
include time entries accounting for the entire time requested.9
Plaintiffs claim “[t]he work done at the administrative
level, including work related to the IDEA claims, was
appropriate, reasonable, and necessary for proper advocacy and

the successful prosecution of J.N.’s 504/ADA claims regarding
denial of access to the ASP.” (Motion Br. at 12). Likewise,
Plaintiffs claim “[t]he work done at the federal court level,
with the exception of the supplemental briefing on remedies
excluded from this motion for attorney’s fees, was appropriate,

9 Plaintiffs have already pared down and reduced the requested
award as they are not seeking fees for: (1) work related to the
supplemental briefing on remedy ($4,064.50); (2) time spent
regarding Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) meetings
($6,104.00); and (3) duplicative entries ($381.50).
reasonable, and necessary for proper advocacy and the successful
prosecution of J.N.’s discrimination claims.” (Id.). And, as
set forth above, Berney, Rue, and Greenwald all attested that

the total number of hours expended are reasonable. (See, e.g.,
Berney Decl. at ¶ 39 (“It is my opinion, based on the special
education hearings and federal IDEA cases that I have either
litigated or supervised, that the total number of hours accrued
by Ms. Reisman and her co-counsel are reasonable and may even be
on the low side given the complexity of this type of
litigation”); Rue Cert. at ¶ 19 (“Based on my review of the
records, the time expended by the family’s attorneys in the
administrative hearing and in the pending litigation to date was
reasonable and necessary for a vigorous and capable
representation of J.N.”); Greenwald Cert. at ¶ 5 (“I believe the
fees and expenses charged by Ms. Reisman are very reasonable

given the complexity of the matter and the issues addressed”)).
The Court has engaged in a searching and detailed review of
the billing records submitted by Plaintiffs. There is nothing
in the record to suggest the time spent was anything but fair
and reasonable.
In opposition, Defendant argues the time spent should be
reduced because Plaintiffs achieved only limited success on
their claims, taking issue with the hours billed for work prior
to the instant federal litigation before this Court. The Court
will address Defendant’s argument in another section, as
Defendant’s argument does not contest the hours billed as
excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. Accordingly,

there are no specific challenges to the billing records. As the
Court does not make adjustments sua sponte, the Court finds
Plaintiffs expended reasonable hours that are entitled to
reimbursement by Defendant. Machado, 2017 WL 2838458, at *2
(citing Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 426 F.3d
694, 711 (3d Cir. 2005)).
In sum as to the lodestar calclulation, Plaintiffs here
submitted fee requests for $100,849.78 for approximately 194.8
hours of work billed (190 hours for Reisman, 0.5 hours for
Carolla, and 4.3 hours for Tracey and Tilton) and expenses. The
Court has analyzed Plaintiffs’ billing entries on a line-by-line
basis, and Defendant does not present any specific challenges to

the hours billed. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs’
counsel reasonably expended approximately 194.8 hours on this
litigation and, based on the respective hourly rates for each
attorney and paralegal and expenses, calculates Plaintiffs’
lodestar as $100,849.78.
3. Plaintiffs’ Fee Award Will Not Be Reduced

Reaching a reasonable fee award as set forth above is not
the end of the Court’s analysis here. Throughout its opposition
brief, Defendant has repeatedly pushed for another, substantial
reduction of Plaintiffs’ fees award: Defendant claims that
Plaintiffs achieved only a limited degree of success in this
action, and therefore requests that the Court reduce its

lodestar calculation for fees associated with the administrative
proceeding regarding the IDEA claims. Plaintiffs disagree,
arguing the requested rates and billed hours reflect a
reasonable fee that should not be reduced beyond Plaintiffs’
own, self-imposed cuts.
Although the lodestar calculation “produces a presumptively
reasonable fee, that ‘does not end the inquiry. There remain
other considerations that may lead the district court to adjust
the fee upward or downward.’” United Auto. Workers Local 259
Social Sec. Dept. v. Metro Auto Center, 501 F.3d 283, 292 (3d
Cir. 2007) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434). Instead, the
Supreme Court has explained that when ‘a plaintiff has achieved

only partial or limited success, the product of hours reasonably
expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly
rate [i.e., the ‘lodestar’ amount] may be an excessive amount.”
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436. “In such cases, a reduction in the
fee award is warranted, and ‘[t]he district court may attempt to
identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may
simply reduce the award to account for the limited success.’”
A.S. ex rel. V.S. v. Colts Neck Bd. of Educ., 190 F. App’x. 140,
143 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436).
In other words, a district court “may adjust a requested
legal fee downward based upon the results obtained by counsel
for the prevailing party, particularly ‘where a plaintiff is

deemed “prevailing” even though he succeeded on only some of his
claims for relief.’” School District of Philadelphia v. Kirsch,
722 F. App’x. 215, 230 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S.
at 434). “Indeed, ‘the most critical factor’ in determining the
reasonableness of a fee award ‘is the degree of success
obtained.’” D.O., on Behalf of M.O. v. Jackson Twp. Bd. of Ed.,
No. 17-1581 (TJB), 2019 WL 1923388, at *2 (D.N.J. April 30,
2019) (quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114). Importantly,
“[d]istrict courts have wide discretion to determine whether,
and by how much, fees should be reduced for lack of success.”
D’Orazio v. Washington Twp., 501 F. App’x. 185, 188 (3d Cir.
2012). But as the Supreme Court explained in Hensley, “[w]here

a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should
recover a fully compensatory fee ... [and] the fee award should
not be reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on
every contention raised in the lawsuit.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at
435.
Defendant, obviously seeking the largest possible
reduction, frames Plaintiffs’ lawsuit as a half-win, since
“Plaintiffs’ success in this matter is limited to the claims
raised in this appeal only.” (Opposition Br. at 9). Defendant
admits Plaintiffs succeeded on their ADA, NJLAD, and Section 504
claims but argues these issues were tangential and instead
emphasizes that the majority of the underlying administrative

proceeding centered on Plaintiffs’ challenge to the proposed
IEPs and whether the school provided J.N. with a FAPE under the
IDEA. (Opposition Br. at 9-10). As if to prove this point,
Defendant cites to the number of pages of various witnesses’
transcripts from the administrative proceeding to demonstrate
that the ASP was not the central matter, noting: of the Williams
transcript, a mere 96 pages concerned the ASP, while a whopping
71 pages are unrelated; and of the Brennan transcript, only 28
pages concerned the ASP and the remaining 59 pages do not. (Id.
at 11-12). Defendant emphasizes that it prevailed on the IDEA
claim, proving J.N. was afforded proper FAPE and as Plaintiffs
did not seek appellate review from this Court, Plaintiffs should

not be awarded attorney’s fees for the significant amounts of
time spent pursuing the IDEA claims when they were ultimately
unsuccessful. (Id. at 10-13). The Court disagrees.
Here, Plaintiffs’ IDEA claim, ADA claim, Section 504 claim,
and NJLAD claim all arose from Defendant denying J.N. access to
an appropriate ASP. The ALJ’s opinion plainly spells out how
the ASP is the central issue: “Indeed, there is not much dispute
as to what occurred here, but whether the evidence, taken as a
whole, is sufficient to establish that J.N. received FAPE or
whether he was denied due process by the District not
incorporating the ASP into his IEP.” (ALJ Opinion [Dkt. No. 1-
1] at 15). Plaintiffs sought relief in the form of ASP for J.N.

as part of his IEP. The ALJ found that J.N. was provided with
FAPE and that there were no violations of the ADA and Section
504. Plaintiffs appealed and this Court found clear violations
of J.N.’s rights. Specifically, the Court held Defendant
violated the ADA, Section 504, and NJLAD by failing to provide
J.N. with meaningful access to the ASP and by unnecessarily
subjecting J.N. to social isolation.
The Court awarded J.N. compensatory education in the form
of a special needs trust in the amount of $26,017.20 and found
that Plaintiffs are prevailing parties entitled to attorney’s
fees.10 While the original IDEA, ADA, and Section 504 claims
were all discrete issues, they all derived from the same, one

claim, J.N.’s access to ASP — a claim Plaintiffs unequivocally
succeeded on. There is no parsing out the IDEA claim work from

10 Plaintiffs direct the Court to consider that the amount
awarded in compensatory education far exceeds Plaintiffs’ last
settlement demand of $12,300 (plus attorney’s fees and costs),
thus further demonstrating the degree of success achieved by
Plaintiffs’ counsel. (Reply Brief [Dkt. No. 47] at 9). While
the amount of relief awarded compared to the amount of relief
sought is a factor courts consider in evaluating counsel’s
success, such an analysis is unnecessary here where the record
plainly demonstrates that Plaintiffs’ counsel succeeded across
the board in achieving the relief sought and thus achieved
“excellent results” warranting full attorney’s fees.
the other claims as they all relate to the relief sought: proper
ASP for J.N.
Tellingly, as Plaintiffs correctly point out, the IDEA

claims, though unsuccessful at the administrative proceeding
level, were intertwined with the discrimination claims as an
alternative theory of relief, and the entire process of
presenting the IDEA claims was a necessary, prerequisite step to
enable Plaintiffs to pursue their discrimination claims at both
the administrative level and successfully here. See S.D. v.
Haddon Heights Bd. of Educ., 722 F. App’x 119, 121-25 (3d Cir.
2018). Defendant does not deny this.11 Just as important, this
issue and Defendant’s argument are not new; the Court has

11 Rather, Defendant misdirects the Court to consider a case
outside of this district and circuit, K.M. ex rel. Bright v.
Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 78 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1306 (C.D. Cal.
2015), where the court reduced a fee award by 50% because
although “the administrative proceeding was related to and
involved overlapping facts with the ADA claim, leading to a
development of the factual record, Plaintiff was unsuccessful in
achieving relief under the IDEA . . . [which] Plaintiff did not
challenge . . . on appeal[, thus, m]uch of Plaintiff’s counsel’s
time expended on the IDEA administrative proceedings was not
reasonably necessary to achieve success on the ADA claim,
meriting a proportional reduction in fees.” While facially,
this case may appear informative, the Third Circuit’s holding in
Rena C. v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 840 F. App’x 676, 682 (3d Cir.
2020)(discussed infra), and partially in S.D., compel this Court
to rule otherwise. Furthermore, as Plaintiffs correctly point
out, K.M. is not analogous to the present proceedings. For
example, the plaintiff in K.M. did not assert the discrimination
claims at the administrative hearing and instead first raised
them at her appeal to the district court. 78 F. Supp. 3d at
1293-94.
previously ruled on this issue:
[T]he District argues Plaintiffs’ status as
a prevailing party is limited to the claims
raised in its appeal only. The District
focuses on the fact that the District
prevailed on “a vast majority of the
underlying matter” between Plaintiffs and
the District. The District argues “[t]he
504 issue present here was, in comparison, a
tangential issue that was not the focus of
the hearing” and that Plaintiffs’ demand on
the 504 issue likely exceeds what will
actually be ordered by the Court and thus
should impact the prevailing party award.

. . .

This Court agrees that Plaintiffs are
“prevailing parties” and thus may be awarded
a certain amount of attorney’s fees for
succeeding on Plaintiffs’ claims in this
Court. Moreover, this Court agrees with
Plaintiffs that where, as here, a federal
statute requires exhaustion, the plaintiff
is entitled to fees for administrative
proceedings.

. . .

The District does not argue that exhaustion
was not required for Plaintiffs’ claims and
instead argues fees related the
administrative hearing should not be awarded
because the District prevailed on a the
I.D.E.A. portion of the appeal and
Plaintiffs never appealed this decision.
The District does not direct this Court’s
attention to any case law to support this
proposition. The Court finds persuasive the
case law that awards attorney’s fees
connected to administrative proceedings that
are a prerequisite to filing suit because
such hearings are a necessary precursor to
Plaintiffs’ ultimate success on their
federal claims. Plaintiffs had to exhaust
administrative remedies on the IDEA claims
in order to be able to pursue their ADA and
Section 504 claims in this Court.

K.N., 2021 WL 1138136, at *4 (citations omitted). Therefore,
the Court does not find that Plaintiffs’ loss of the IDEA claims
at the administrative level and choice to forego the same in
this forum should impact the award of attorney’s fees. Again,
the IDEA claims were merely an alternative ground for relief,
and more importantly, a necessary vehicle to exhaust the
administrative process. Plaintiffs were ultimately successful
in obtaining the very relief requested, namely relief from the
District’s exclusion of J.N. from ASP. Since Plaintiffs
prevailed on every claim raised in this action, counsels’ work
below, which was a necessary, prerequisite to reach this court,
is part and parcel to this successful outcome. In short,
excellent results warrant attorneys’ fees in full. Hensley, 461
U.S. at 435.
Moreover, as Plaintiffs adroitly point out, Defendant’s
request to isolate issues and their successes in a vacuum (e.g.
claims for IDEA, ADA, and Section 504, which are all independent
but alternative bases to achieve the same results) for
attorneys’ fees purposes is expressly rejected by the Third

Circuit. See Rena C. v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 840 F. App’x 676,
682 (3d Cir. 2020) (“When determining a fee award, an important
factor that may lead the district court to adjust the fee upward
or downward is the prevailing party’s degree of success.
[Importantly, w]hen a party . . . prevails in an action
involving either ‘only a single claim’ or multiple ‘claims for

relief’ that have ‘a common core of facts or . . . based on
related legal theories,’ the ‘lawsuit cannot be viewed as a
series of discrete claims. Instead the district court should
focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the
plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the
litigation.’ In doing so, ‘the fee award should not be reduced
simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every
contention raised in the lawsuit. Litigants in good faith may
raise alternative legal grounds for a desired outcome, and the
court’s rejection of or failure to reach certain grounds is not
a sufficient reason for reducing a fee. The result is what
matters.’” (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-37)).

Accordingly, the Court here finds that Plaintiffs’ framing
of the outcome in this litigation is entirely accurate.
Plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining excellent results, thus there
is no basis to reduce the lodestar award.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, Plaintiffs’ motion for
attorneys’ fees [Dkt. No. 44) shall be granted, and Defendant
will be ordered to reimburse Plaintiffs in the amount of
$100,849.78.
An appropriate Order will be entered.

Date: March 1, 2022 s/ Noel L. Hillman
At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10272536. Public record. Not legal advice.