# STRIKE 3 HOLDINGS, LLC v. VOKOUN

> District Court, D. New Jersey · February 2, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10272455

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** February 2, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10272455

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting the presumption of public access to court proceedings

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

STRIKE 3 HOLDINGS, LLC, No. 1:20-cv-14321-NLH-AMD

Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.

ROBERT VOKOUN,

Defendant.

APPEARANCES:

JOHN C. ATKIN
THE ATKIN FIRM, LLC
55 MADISON AVENUE
SUITE 400
MORRISTOWN, NJ 07960

On behalf of Plaintiff.

HILLMAN, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s, Strike 3
Holdings, LLC’s, motion for default judgment against Defendant,
Robert Vokoun, filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). For
the reasons expressed below, Plaintiffs’ motion will be granted
in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is the owner of the copyright of various adult
videos which it distributes on subscription-based websites and
which it sometimes licenses to other broadcasters. (ECF 8 at
4). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant used a protocol called
BitTorrent to illegally download 24 of Plaintiff’s copyrighted
works. (Id. at 5-7). Plaintiff states that it used a scanning

system, called VXN Scan, which allowed it to find the media
files that Defendant downloaded and then compared the downloaded
media files with Plaintiff’s copyrighted works. (Id. at 5-8).
VXN Scan also showed Plaintiff that Defendant improperly
distributed media files containing Plaintiff’s copyrighted
works. (Id).
Plaintiff initially filed this action on October 23, 2020.
(ECF 1). Plaintiff then promptly sought permission from the
Court to issue a subpoena to Defendant’s Internet Service
Provider (“ISP”) to obtain the name and address of Defendant.
(ECF 4). The Court granted that request (ECF 5), and Plaintiff
filed an amended complaint on February 6, 2021, identifying

Defendant by name and address. (ECF 8). Plaintiff then
attempted to personally serve Defendant four times and each
time, no one answered the door, despite it being apparent that
there were people inside of the residence. (See ECF 21-1).
Plaintiff also filed proof that it mailed the complaint and
summons to Defendant, multiple times, by certified mail and
ordinary mail. (Id.) Nonetheless, Defendant never returned the
green return receipt card sent with the certified mailings or
otherwise appeared in this matter. (Id.)
Plaintiff ultimately moved for default judgment on June 24,
20211. (Id.) Plaintiff requests that the Court enjoin Defendant
from committing more infringing activities, destroy illegally

downloaded materials, and award statutory damages, costs, and
post-judgment interest. (Id.)
DISCUSSION
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331.
II. Legal Standard for Motion for Default Judgment
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2),
courts may enter a default judgment against a properly served
defendant who fails to plead or otherwise defend an action.
Chanel v. Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d 532, 535 (D.N.J. 2008)
(citing Anchorage Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Rev., 922 F.2d 168,

177 n.9 (3d Cir. 1990)). The decision to enter a default

1 Plaintiff also asks that the Court file any opinion or order
under seal to protect Defendant’s identity. (Id.) However,
since Plaintiff filed its motions seeking that relief, the
Magistrate Judge denied Plaintiff’s motion to seal and gave it
until January 14, 2021 to file another motion to seal or the
Court would direct the Clerk of the Court to unseal the
documents that had been filed under seal. (ECF 29). No such
further motion was filed. Therefore, the Court will direct the
Clerk of the Court to amend the docket to reflect Defendant’s
real name and unseal all documents that are currently sealed.
See Doe v. Coll. of New Jersey, 997 F.3d 489, 495 (3d Cir.
2021)(noting the presumption of public access to court
proceedings).
judgement is left to the discretion of the district courts;
however, the Third Circuit has stated its “preference that cases
be disposed of on the merits whenever practicable.” Hritz v.

Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1180–81 (3d Cir. 1984).
In assessing a motion for default judgment, courts should
accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations — other than
those regarding damages — but should not accept a plaintiff’s
legal conclusions. Dempsey v. Pistol Pete’s Beef N Beer, LLC,
No. 08-5454, 2009 WL 3584597, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2009).
Three factors guide whether a default judgement should be
granted: (1) prejudice to the plaintiff if the default is
denied, (2) whether the defendant appears to have a litigable
defense, and (3) whether the defendant’s delay is due to
culpable conduct. Chaberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d
Cir. 2000). However, before determining whether a plaintiff is

entitled to default judgment, courts must first review whether:
(1) there is sufficient proof of service, Gold Kist, Inc. v.
Laurinburg Oil Co., 756 F.2d 14, 19 (3d Cir. 1985), and (2) the
complaint demonstrates a valid cause of action. Richardson v.
Cascade Skating Rink, No. 19-08935, 2020 WL 7383188, at *2
(D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2020).
III. Analysis
In this case, all relevant criteria weigh in favor of
granting Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment. First, as
noted above, before a court can enter default judgment against a
defendant, it must find that process was properly served on the
defendant. Gold Kist, 756 F.2d at 19. Defendant is an

individual who must be served under the applicable rules under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or New Jersey’s rules. A
plaintiff must serve an individual in the United States under
Rule 4(e)(2) which allows service by “delivering a copy of the
summons and of the complaint to the individual personally,...
leaving a copy of each at the individual's dwelling or usual
place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who
resides there; or. . . delivering a copy of each to an agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process.” Id.
New Jersey allows an individual to be served by “by
delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the individual

personally, or by leaving a copy thereof at the individual's
dwelling place or usual place of abode with a competent member
of the household of the age of 14 or over then residing
therein[.]” N.J. Ct. R. R. 4:4-4(a)(1). Alternatively, if
after diligently trying to serve this way a plaintiff is unable
to effectuate service, a plaintiff may serve by “mailing a copy
of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail,
return receipt requested, and, simultaneously, by ordinary mail”
Id. at 4:4-4(b)(1)(C).
The Court finds that the requisite service requirement for
a default judgment has been met because Plaintiff has
sufficiently shown that Defendant has been trying to evade

service and that he received the papers. World Ent. Inc. v.
Brown, 487 F. App'x 758, 761 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Leaving papers in
the defendant's physical proximity is usually sufficient if (1)
defendant actively evades service, and (2) there is clear
evidence that the defendant actually received the papers at
issue when allegedly served.”); Knights Franchise Sys., Inc. v.
Patel, 2017 WL 5191805, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2017) (on a motion
for default judgment, service was sufficient where process
server tried multiple times to serve and then sent the summons
and complaint via regular mail and certified mail). In Brown,
the court found evasion where the defendant shut and locked the
door on the process server, closed the garage, and refused to

answer the door. 487 F. App'x 758, 761.
The Court finds the circumstances here similar.
Plaintiff’s process server went to Defendant’s residence four
times to attempt personal service and each time no one answered
the door despite the lights being on and there being a driveway
full of cars. (See ECF 12-1). Plaintiff also mailed the
summons and complaint to the Defendant multiple times and has
filed proof that the package was delivered to Defendant’s
address. (ECF 12-3).
The fact that Plaintiff never received the return receipts
for their certified mailings does not change the Court’s view.
The Defendant’s refusal to sign the return receipt would be

consistent with trying to evade service. In light of the
apparent refusal to answer the door on the four occasions
Plaintiff attempted personal service, and the multiple mailings
that Plaintiff sent to Defendant’s address (ECF 21-1 at 1), the
Court concludes as the court did in Brown, that Defendant tried
to evade service and actually received the papers.2
Separately, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs have
done enough investigation to confirm that Defendant is indeed
the infringer. The law in this district as well as in others
makes clear that it is not enough for a plaintiff in a copyright
infringement case to simply tie a defendant to an IP address.
See Malibu Media, LLC v. Peled, 2020 WL 831072, at *6 (D.N.J.

Feb. 20, 2020)(“[Plaintiff] will have to show something more
than merely tying Defendant to an IP address in order to
sufficiently establish copyright infringement.”) This concern

2 Plaintiff is technically correct that lack of proof of service
does not mean that service was not completed. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(l)(3) (“Failure to prove service does not affect the
validity of service.”) However, in the context of granting a
default judgment a court has a duty to satisfy itself that
service was effectuated, Gold Kist, 756 F.2d at 19, and proof of
service is probative of that fact. That said, in light of the
fact that the Court concludes that Defendant evaded service and
knew about the case, it need not address this issue.
is particularly salient when evidence shows that there are
multiple individuals who have access to the internet via the IP
address that has been identified. See Cobbler Nevada, LLC v.

Gonzales, 901 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 2018) (where IP address
was linked to an adult care home with multiple inhabitants who
had access to the internet, it was not enough to simply say that
the subscriber was the individual infringing on copyrights). In
this case, it is noteworthy that part of Plaintiff’s claim as to
Defendant’s effort to dodge service was the presence of several
cars in the driveway of the home when one answered the process
server’s knock.
Courts in this district has held, however, that a plaintiff
may overcome this hurdle by alleging that it has conducted its
own investigation, particularly through social media searches.
Media v. Rahuse, 2015 WL 2231853, at *4 (D.N.J. May 11, 2015)

(“Further, by alleging that Plaintiff conducted an investigation
and discovered that Defendant's publicly available social media
profile contains images that match the types of third party
works that Plaintiff's investigator detected being infringed,
Plaintiff has sufficiently connected Defendant personally with
evidence of BitTorrent use traced to the subject IP address and
residence assigned that IP address, where Defendant lived.”).
First, Plaintiff has confirmed that the residential address
provided with the ISP provider was consistent with the
geolocation of the infringer. (ECF 21-1 at 11). Second,
Plaintiff conducted its own investigation. It looked at other
third-party works that were downloaded at the infringer’s IP

address via BitTorrent to determine that they were consistent
with illegal downloads of Plaintiff’s works. (ECF 21-1 at 11).
It also reviewed the social media of all of the individuals it
identified as likely having access to the IP address to
determine who was the most likely infringer. (Id.) Finally, it
identified “matches between Defendant’s professional expertise
and software that was downloaded and distributed using the same
IP address during the period of infringement.” (Id.; ECF 8 at 10
(revealing that Defendant is a systems engineer with experience
with programs similar to BitTorrent)). Thus, the Court is
satisfied that Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that
Defendant is indeed the infringer.

The Court next holds that the complaint states a valid
cause of action. Plaintiffs assert that Defendant infringed
their copyrights in violation of the United States Copyright Act
of 1976, as amended, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., specifically in
violation of 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 501 by copying and
distributing elements of Plaintiff’s works. (ECF 8 at 11). To
state a claim for copyright infringement, Plaintiff must allege
that it (1) owns of a valid copyright, and (2) Defendants copied
constituent elements of the work that are the original. Feist
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361
(1991); In re McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. Holdings LLC, 909 F.3d 48,
67 (3d Cir. 2018). Plaintiff here has sufficiently pled that

they own the copyright for the 24 works in question and that
Defendant copied, downloaded, and distributed the works. (ECF 8
at 9). Assuming the complaint’s allegations to be true, the
Court holds that Plaintiff has stated a legitimate cause of
action.
The Court next turns to the three factors for assessing
whether default judgment should be entered. With respect to the
first factor, the Court finds that Plaintiff would be prejudiced
if default judgment were not entered in its favor because this
suit is its only way to enforce its copyright. United States v.
Vo, 2016 WL 475313, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 8, 2016) (“When a
defendant fails to respond to a plaintiff's claims, the

plaintiff will be prejudiced absent a default judgment because
plaintiff will be left with no other means to vindicate his or
her claims.”) Not entering default judgment would simply result
in an interminable delay during which Defendant continues to
violate Plaintiff’s rights. Id.
Second, the Court holds that Defendant has failed to put
forward any meritorious defenses which would caution against
default judgment. A “meritorious defense” is a defense which,
if established at trial, would completely bar a plaintiff’s
recovery. Foy v. Dicks, 146 F.R.D. 113, 116 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
“Because Defendant did not respond, the Court cannot determine
whether Defendant had any meritorious defenses.” Teamsters

Health & Welfare Fund of Philadelphia and Vicinity v. Dubin
Paper Co., 2012 WL 3018062, at *4 (D.N.J. July 24, 2012).
Third, the Court holds that Defendant’s failure to respond
demonstrates culpability in its default. See Slover v. Live
Universe, Inc., 2009 WL 606133, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 9, 2009) (A
defendant is “presumed culpable where it has failed to answer,
move, or otherwise respond.”)
Since all three factors weigh against Defendant, the Court
holds that Plaintiffs are entitled to default judgment.
A. Remedies
Having determined that Plaintiff will be granted default
judgment, the Court must next assess remedies. On a motion for

default judgment, allegations pertaining to damages are not
assumed to be true. Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142,
1149 (3d Cir. 1990). As such, a district court “may conduct
such hearing or order such references as it deems necessary and
proper” in order “to determine the amount of damages.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 55(b)(2). However, if the damages are for a “sum
certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain,”
further evidentiary inquiry is not necessary. Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(b)(1); Comdyne I, 908 F.2d at 1149.
Here, Plaintiffs have proffered enough information for the
Court to determine the appropriate amount of damages.
Plaintiffs request “$18,000, representing the minimum $750

statutory award for each of the 24 copyrighted works Defendant
infringed upon.” (ECF 21-1 at 19). They also request $400 for
administrative and filing fees and $400 and $126.60 for the cost
of service. (Id.) For the statutory damages, 17 U.S.C. §
504(c)(1) allows an award of “a sum not less than $750 or more
than $30,000 as the court considers just.” Here, Plaintiff is
requesting the statutory minimum of $750 for its 24 works, for a
total of $18,000. In this context where Plaintiff is asking for
the minimum amount it could be awarded as statutory damages, the
Court finds that such an award would be just. See Ackourey v.
La Rukico Custom Tailor, 2012 WL 2920884, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July
18, 2012).

Further, the Copyright Act allows a prevailing plaintiff to
recover its filing fees and the cost of service. 17 U.S.C. §
505. Plaintiffs adequately showed that they paid $350 pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) and another $50 for actually filing the
complaint. (ECF 21-2 at 4-5); Judicial Conference Schedule of
Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1,
2014)3. They have provided sufficient documentation of having

3 As of December 1, 2020, the filing fee is now $52. District
Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, available at
paid $126.60 for service as well, by attaching receipts to their
application. (ECF 21-2 at 6-14).
In addition, the Court holds that Plaintiff is entitled to

the permanent injunctive relief that it is seeking. Courts
often grant injunctive relief on motions for default judgment.
See Chanel, Inc. v. Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d 678, 690 (D.N.J.
2015)(“For all of these reasons, the Court will grant
Plaintiff's motion for default judgment, will enter a default
judgment of $180,400, and will issue a permanent injunction.”);
Comcast Cable Commc'ns LLC v. Soto, 2007 WL 2066357, at *2
(D.N.J. July 16, 2007)(same).
There is a four factor test that a Court must undertake to
determine if permanent injunctive relief is appropriate. A
plaintiff must show “(1) that it has suffered an irreparable
injury; (2) that the remedies available at law, such as monetary

damages, prove inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3)
that the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant favor equitable relief; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”
Chanel, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 3d at 689 (internal quotation marks
omitted).

https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/district-court-
miscellaneous-fee-schedule (last visited January 28, 2022).
Plaintiff has shown that it has suffered an irreparable
injury because it has stated a prima facie case of copyright
infringement and that it will continue to suffer if Defendant

continues to infringe on its works. Comcast Cable Commc'ns LLC,
2007 WL 2066357 at *5 (“As to the first factor, . . .there
exists a significant risk that defendant may continue to
unlawfully access programming without repercussion, quite
literally causing [Plaintiff] irreparable injury.”) (internal
quotation marks and alternations omitted).
For the second factor, because there is a significant risk
that Defendant will continue to infringe without an injunction
and because the harm is ongoing and not past in nature, monetary
damages are not enough. Id. (acknowledging that remedies at law
are often retrospective in nature).
For the third factor, the balance of hardships clearly

weighs in favor of Plaintiff because Plaintiff risks continued
loss of revenues and Defendant would only have to destroy and
stop downloading and distributing Plaintiff’s copyrighted works
to which he clearly has no right. See id.
For the fourth factor, there is no evidence that the public
would be harmed by the issuance of a permanent injunction.
Members of the public could still access Plaintiff’s copyrighted
works by purchasing access through legal channels. TD Bank N.A.
v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 285 (3d Cir. 2019) (“By recognizing the
public's interest in accessing intriguing works, we do not
countenance blatant piracy or indulge in second-guessing of a
copyright holder's business model.”); Virgin Recs. Am., Inc. v.

Bagan, 2009 WL 2170153, at *5 (D.N.J. July 21, 2009)
(acknowledging the public interest in preserving the integrity
of the copyright laws).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall grant
Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, and enter a permanent
injunction, requiring Defendant to delete and remove any digital
media files containing Plaintiff’s copyrighted works in his
possession, custody, or control and to refrain from continuing
to infringe on Plaintiff’s copyrighted works. The Court will
also award $18,000 in statutory damages, $526.60 in costs and
post-judgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961. The Court will

also direct the Clerk of the Court to unseal the currently
sealed documents consistent with the Magistrate Judge’s Order
dated December 22, 2021 (ECF 29) and to amend the caption to
reflect Defendant’s name.
An accompanying Order and Judgment will follow.

Date: February 1, 2022 /s Noel L. Hillman
At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10272455. Public record. Not legal advice.