# RAMOS v. MAIN

> District Court, D. New Jersey · September 22, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10271649

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** September 22, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10271649

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that the right to treatment inherent in the NJSVPA “present[s] the type of liberty interest that is at the heart of procedural and substantive due process”
- stating that the right to treatment inherent in the NJSVPA “present[s] the type of liberty interest that is at the heart of procedural and substantive due process”
- holding that plaintiff must allege the period, object, and acts taken in furtherance of a conspiracy to defeat a motion to dismiss

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ALEX RAMOS Civil Action No. 21-1284 (MCA) (MAH)
Plaintiff,
v. OPINION & ORDER
MERRIL M. MAIN, et al.,
Defendants.

Plaintiff is a civilly committed detainee at the Special Treatment Unit (“STU”) in Avenel,
New Jersey pursuant to New Jersey’s Sexually Violent Predators Act (“NJSVPA”), N.J. Stat. §§
30:4-27.24 to 30:4-27.38. He is proceeding pro se with a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The Court has screened the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A to determine whether this Court should dismiss it as frivolous or malicious, for failure to
state a claim upon which the Court may grant relief, or because it seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from suit, and concludes, with the following caveats, that dismissal of
the entire Complaint is not warranted at this time.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Court will construe the factual allegations of the Complaint as true for the purpose of
this Opinion. This case arises from state officials’ alleged acts of verbal and sexual harassment of
Plaintiff as well as alleged retaliation for Plaintiff’s reporting of harassment. (See generally

Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff names correctional officers Gallotta, Baird, and S. Cerone; social
workers Samantha Ames and Sana Kamrin; Drs. Merrill M. Main, D. Stanzione, and J. Riley; and
“John and Jane Does One Through Ten” as Defendants.
During the latter part of 2014 to the beginning of 2015, Plaintiff was confined at the Adult
Diagnostic and Treatment Center in Avenel, New Jersey. (Id. at 8.) On several occasions during
that period, Defendant Cerone opened the shower while Plaintiff was in it and made several
inappropriate comments. (Id.) Around the same time, Defendant Cerone called Plaintiff into the
unit bathroom and asked Plaintiff if he wanted to look at the officer’s genitalia. (Id. at 9.) Shortly

after these incidents, Plaintiff initiated an investigation through the Department of Corrections
Ombudsman and Special Investigation Division. (Id.)
Following the initiation of the investigation, officials transferred Plaintiff to East Jersey
State Prison. (Id. at 9–10.) Officials later transferred Plaintiff again to Northern State Prison,
South Woods State Prison, and, following his sentence, the STU. (Id. at 9.)
On May 31, 2016, Defendant Cerone confronted Plaintiff in a hallway at the STU Annex
and threatened to beat him up. (See id.) Plaintiff reported the incident on the J-Pay system and to
the Special Investigation Division. (Id.)
In the latter part of 2017, Plaintiff observed Defendant Kamrin perform sexual acts on a

resident of the STU. (Id. at 5.) On several unspecified dates during Plaintiff’s treatment,
Defendant Kamrin advanced on Plaintiff and offered to perform the same acts on him. (Id.)
Plaintiff reported these events to the Special Investigation Division and described the events in a
letter to the Treatment Ombudsman. (Id. at 5–6.)
On or around June 12, 2019, Defendant Gallotta touched Plaintiff’s buttocks in a sexual
manner. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff reported this event to the Special Investigation Division and filed a
grievance on the J-Pay system. (Id.)
In October of 2019, Plaintiff sustained an injury while in the recreation yard. (Id.)
Defendant Baird refused to allow Plaintiff to go to the medical department. (Id.) As a result,
Plaintiff filed a grievance against Defendant Baird on October 22, 2019. (See id.)
According to Plaintiff, Defendant Baird retaliated against him for the grievance by
touching his buttocks in a sexual manner on several occasions during the next month while

Defendant Baird was searching Plaintiff on his way to the recreation yard. (Id. at 8.) As he touched
Plaintiff, Defendant Baird threatened Plaintiff by telling him to “Go to South,” which referred to
the lock-up unit and implied that Baird would lock up Plaintiff if he reported the incidents. (Id.)
At an unspecified date, Plaintiff observed Defendant Cook perform sexual acts on another
resident. (Id. at 4.) Defendant Cook later called the same resident on the telephone, which Plaintiff
answered. (See id.) When Plaintiff recognized her voice, Defendant Cook repeatedly told Plaintiff
“don’t say my name.” (Id.) Plaintiff reported these events to the Special Investigation Division.
(Id.)
Defendant Cook used her position as a therapist to retaliate against Plaintiff by changing

his job assignment from dock worker to an inside job cleaning the unit, falsifying treatment
records, and claiming Plaintiff’s statements to other residents threatened her. (Id. at 5.) Defendant
Cook also placed Plaintiff on Modified Activities Program (“MAP”) and, eventually, tier MAP.
(Id. at 5–7.)
On March 19, 2020, Defendants Ames and Dr. Riley called Plaintiff into a therapy room
for an interview. (Id. at 6–7.) Ames and Dr. Riley had obtained the letter that Plaintiff wrote to
the Treatment Ombudsman regarding Defendant Kamrin’s conduct, and Ames held and read from
it during the interview. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that Ames and Dr. Riley retaliated against him for filing grievances against
other Defendants by improperly characterizing his behavior as “escalating.” (Id.) According to
Plaintiff, when he asked if his “escalating” behavior was in reference to the letter to the Treatment
Ombudsman, Ames and Dr. Riley indicated that it was and told Plaintiff that he could be placed
on MAP and moved to the South Unit, a restricted custody unit. (Id.)

Plaintiff also alleges by inference that Ames and Dr. Riley further retaliated against him
by placing Plaintiff on MAP. (Id.) For example, Plaintiff alleges that, approximately thirty
minutes after the interview, a Department of Corrections Sergeant told Plaintiff that officials would
move him to the South Unit and place him on MAP. (Id.) As a result, officials discontinued
Plaintiff’s therapy and reduced Plaintiff’s phase of treatment from Phase Three to Phase Two. (Id.
at 12.) Plaintiff also lost his job. (Id.)
Defendants Drs. Main and Stanzione were legally responsible for the operation of the STU
at all relevant times. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that they were aware of, approved, condoned,
and/or failed to act or train subordinates to prevent the acts of harassment and retaliation. (Id.)

On January 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint. In it, Plaintiff raises claims of
sexual harassment, retaliation, denial of sex offender treatment, slander, “false report,” and
conspiracy to interfere with civil rights.1

1 Although the Complaint is unclear at times because it occasionally uses improper “group
pleading,” as set forth below, the Court does not construe the Complaint as asserting all claims
against all Defendants. Even if it did, the additional claims would fail for lack of personal
involvement, see Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (“To establish liability under
§ 1983, each individual defendant ‘must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing.’”),
or lack of sufficient factual matter. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
District courts must review complaints in civil actions in which a plaintiff is proceeding in
forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). District courts may sua sponte dismiss any claim
that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. According to the

Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. See Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the [alleged] misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Moreover, while courts liberally
construe pro se pleadings, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to

support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and state law.
The Court liberally construes the Complaint as asserting: (1) First Amendment retaliation claims
against Defendants Cook, Ames, Riley, Baird, Main, and Stanzione; (2) Fourteenth Amendment
denial of sex offender treatment claims against Defendants Cook, Ames, and Riley; (3) Fourteenth
Amendment sexual harassment claims against Defendants Cerone, Kamrin, Gallotta, Baird, Main
and Stanzione; (4) Fifth Amendment due process claims against all Defendants; (5) Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection claims against all Defendants; (6) state law claims for slander and
defamation against Defendants Cook, Ames, and Riley, and state law harassment claims against
Defendants Cerone and Kamrin; and (7) claims for conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights
under subsections (2) and (3) of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against all Defendants.
A. Persons Amenable to Suit Under Sections 1983 and 1985

As an initial matter, Plaintiff brings claims against the Defendants in their official and
individual capacities. (See ECF No. 1, at 11.) As explained below, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff’s § 1983 and § 1985 claims against the Defendants in their official capacities because
they are not “persons” subject to liability within the meaning of the statutes.
Section 1983 imposes liability on “[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured
by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). To be liable under Section
1983, therefore, a defendant must be a “person.” See id. The Supreme Court has held that “neither

a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Accordingly, a cause of action under Section 1983
“cannot be asserted against the state, its agencies, or its officials acting in their official capacities.”
Landi v. Borough of Seaside Park, No. 07-5319, 2009 WL 606141, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 9, 2009).
Likewise, although neither the Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit have
ruled directly upon the issue, district courts in the Third Circuit have consistently held that neither
States nor their officials acting in official capacities are “persons” within the meaning of Section
1985. Estate of Lagano v. Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office, 769 F.3d 850, 854 n.3 (3d Cir.
2014).
Here, all named Defendants are state officials. (See ECF No. 1, at 2–9.) The Court,
therefore, will dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff’s Sections 1983 and 1985 claims against the
Defendants in their official capacities because they are not persons amenable to suit under either
statute.
B. Section 1983 Claims

Having narrowed the scope of Plaintiff’s claims and the relief available, the Court must
now determine whether Plaintiff states a claim under § 1983. “To establish a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of a right protected by the Constitution or
laws of the United States that was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.”
Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000).
1. Retaliation Claims
The First Amendment enshrines the right of the people to petition the government for
redress of grievances. See U.S. Const. amend. I. A claim of First Amendment retaliation requires
that a plaintiff establish: (1) constitutionally protected conduct; (2) an adverse action sufficient to

deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) a causal
connection between the exercise of constitutional rights and the adverse action. Mack v. Yost, 427
F. App’x 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). It is well-established that the First Amendment
protects the act of filing grievances. Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016).
(i) Defendants Cook, Ames, Dr. Riley, and Baird
The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against Defendants Cook, Ames, Dr.
Riley, and Baird and declines to dismiss them prior to a responsive pleading. Accordingly, the
Court will permit these retaliation claims to proceed past this initial screening.
(ii) Defendants Drs. Main and Stanzione
Plaintiff attempts to assert supervisory liability claims against Defendants Drs. Main and
Stanzione based on retaliation. For the reasons below, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Drs.
Main and Stanzione fail.
“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs;

liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode v.
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1987). A plaintiff may establish supervisory liability
under § 1983 by showing “liability based on an establishment of policies, practices, or customs
that directly caused the constitutional violation [or] personal liability based on the supervisor
participating in the violation of [the p]laintiff’s rights, directing others to violate [the p]laintiff’s
rights, or having knowledge of and acquiescing to a subordinate’s conduct.” Doe v. New Jersey
Dep’t of Corr., No. 14-5284, 2015 WL 3448233, at *9 (D.N.J. May 29, 2015). “Allegations of
participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence . . . must be made with appropriate
particularity.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.

Claims that a supervisor failed to properly train or discipline his subordinates fall within
the category of violations based upon policies, practices, or customs. Doe, 2015 WL 3448233, at
*9. To prevail on a failure to train or discipline claim, a plaintiff must “show both
contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of similar
incidents” and “circumstances under which the supervisor’s actions or inaction could be found to
have communicated a message of approval to the offending subordinate.” Drake v. Andruczyk,
No. 08-4249, 2011 WL 1402158, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 13, 2011) (quoting Montgomery v. De Simone,
159 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 1998)).
Here, Plaintiff provides what is essentially a rote and formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action for supervisory liability based on knowledge and acquiescence as well as a
failure to train or adopt policies to prevent retaliation. (See ECF No. 1, at 2–4.) Plaintiff pleads
no facts that would support the contention that Drs. Main and Stanzione had contemporaneous
knowledge of the offending acts of retaliation or that there was a pattern of retaliation sufficient to

put Drs. Main and Stanzione on notice of their subordinates’ retaliatory acts. (See id.) Nor does
Plaintiff plead any facts for the Court to infer that Drs. Main and Stanzione’s conduct
communicated a message of approval to their subordinates. (See id.) Instead, Plaintiff merely
asserts, without factual support, that Drs. Main and Stanzione failed to train subordinates or adopt
policies that would have prevented the complained of conduct. (See id. at 2–4.) Plaintiff,
therefore, fails to state a plausible claim for supervisory liability. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
2. Denial of Sex Offender Treatment Claims
Plaintiff also presents a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment
for denial of his sex offender treatment against Defendants Cook, Dr. Riley, and Ames. The Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The
substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects a civilly committed detainee’s right to
adequate medical care, including sex offender treatment. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324
(1982); see Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 544 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that the right to treatment
inherent in the NJSVPA “present[s] the type of liberty interest that is at the heart of procedural and
substantive due process”).
The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s denial of sex offender treatment claims against
Defendants Cook, Dr. Riley, and Ames and concludes that dismissal is not warranted at this time.
Accordingly, the Court will proceed these claims past initial screening.
3. Sexual Harassment Claims
Plaintiff also asserts sexual harassment claims against Defendants Gallotta, Baird, Kamrin

and Cerone and supervisor liability claims against Drs. Main and Stanzione. (See ECF No. 1, at
2–4, 12.) The substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
also protects a detainee’s right to “not be sexually assaulted by a state employee while in
confinement.” E.D. v. Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299, 307 (3d Cir. 2019). Sexual assault cannot serve a
legitimate governmental objective, and, therefore, a detainee’s allegations of sexual assault
constitutes impermissible punishment and a violation of the detainee’s right to personal bodily
integrity under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Verbal abuse or
harassment, however, is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Matthews v. Norristown State
Hosp., 528 F. App’x 115, 119 (3d Cir. 2013).

(i) Defendants Gallotta and Baird
The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s sexual assault claims against Defendanats Gallotta and
Baird. The Court concludes that Plaintiff adequately states sexual assault claims against
Defendants Gallotta and Baird sufficient to proceed past this screening stage.
(ii) Defendants Kamrin, Cerone, Main, and Stanzione
Plaintiff fails to state claims of sexual harassment against Defendants Kamrin and Cerone
and claims of supervisor liability based on sexual harassment against Drs. Main and Stanzione.
With respect to the sexual harassment claims against Defendants Kamrin and Cerone, Plaintiff
does not allege any physical contact with either of them, (see id. at 5, 8–9), and verbal abuse or
harassment is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Matthews, 528 F. App’x at 119.2
Plaintiff also fails to state supervisor liability claims against Drs. Main and Stanzione based
on sexual harassment. To the extent that Plaintiff’s claims are based upon a failure to train theory,
Plaintiff fails to identify any specific inadequacy in the training of Drs. Main and Stanzione’s

subordinates. See Montgomery, 159 F.3d at 127. In addition, Plaintiff has failed to allege with
sufficient factual support any act or omission by Drs. Main and Stanzione that the Court could
interpret as encouraging or condoning sexual harassment. See id. Likewise, to the extent that
Plaintiff’s claims are based on knowledge and acquiescence, Plaintiff fails to provide sufficient
factual support of his allegations that Drs. Main and Stanzione had knowledge and approved of
their subordinates’ alleged acts of sexual harassment. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
Accordingly, the Court will permit Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims against Defendants
Gallotta and Baird to proceed. The Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s sexual
harassment claims against Defendants Kamrin and Cerone and Plaintiff’s supervisor liability

sexual harassment claims against Drs. Main and Stanzione.

2 Moreover, the sexual harassment claims against Defendants Cerone and Kamrin appear to be
time barred. The Third Circuit has repeatedly found that a state’s statute of limitations for personal
injury actions applies to all actions brought under § 1983. See, e.g., Padilla v. Twp. of Cherry Hill,
110 F. App’x 272, 276 (3d Cir. 2004). Accordingly, New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations
for personal injury actions governs Plaintiff’s claim under Section 1983. See N.J. Stat. § 2A:14-
2. As the acts that gave rise to Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants Cerone and Kamrin occurred
between 2014 and 2017, and Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint on January 22, 2021, the statute
of limitations bars Plaintiff’s claim absent unpled facts supporting application of statutory or
equitable tolling.
4. Fifth Amendment Claims
Plaintiff vaguely asserts Fifth Amendment claims against all Defendants. (See ECF No. 1,
at 13.) It is a “fundamental principal of constitutional adjudication” that “[t]he limitations of the
Fifth Amendment restrict only federal government action.” Nguyen v. U.S. Catholic Conference,
719 F.2d 52, 54 (3d Cir. 1983). As the Fifth Amendment is inapplicable to state actors, and

Plaintiff brings claims against state officials only, Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claims necessarily
fail. See id. The Court, therefore, will dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claims against all
Defendants for failure to state a claim.
5. Equal Protection Claims
Plaintiff also vaguely asserts equal protection claims against all Defendants. (See ECF No.
1, at 12–13.) “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State
shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). To state a class-based equal protection claim,

a plaintiff must allege that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; and (b) that the defendants
treated him differently from similarly situated inmates. See id. Where the plaintiff does not claim
membership in a protected class, he must state facts showing that: “(1) the defendant treated him
differently from others similarly situated, (2) the defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there was
no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239
(3d Cir. 2006).
Here, Plaintiff fails to state a class-based equal protection claim because he does not allege
that he is a member of a protected class. (See generally ECF No. 1.) Persons designated as
sexually violent predators are not a protected class. See Grohs v. Fratalone, No. 13-7870, 2015
WL 6122147, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2015). Plaintiff also fails to state a non-class-based equal
protection claim because he does not allege that Defendants treated him differently from others
similarly situated or that there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment. (See generally
ECF No. 1.) Accordingly, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s equal protection
claims for failure to state a claim.

C. State Law Claims for Slander/Harassment/False Reports
The Court construes the Complaint as asserting that Defendants Cook, Ames, and Riley
slandered Plaintiff (or defamed him through false reports) and that Defendants Kamrin and Cerone
verbally harassed him. Violations of state law, however, are insufficient to state a claim under §
1983. Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1468 (3d Cir. 1992); see, e.g., Brittingham v. Nunn,
No. 20-014, 2020 WL 2404776, at *4 (D. Del. May 12, 2020) (concluding that a pre-trial detainee’s
claims for slander, harassment, and false report were legally frivolous because such claims were
not actionable under § 1983).
To be fair, although the Complaint indicates that the Plaintiff brings the claims pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court liberally construes the Complaint as asserting state law claims
pursuant to the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1367. Nevertheless, as
indicated below, the Complaint fails to state a claim for relief under state law.
To state a claim for slander or defamation, a plaintiff must allege “that defendant
communicated a false statement about plaintiff to a third person that harms plaintiff’s reputation
in the eyes of the community or deters third persons from associated with the plaintiff.” Russo v.
Nagel, 358 N.J. Super. 254, 262–63 (App. Div. 2003). To be actionable, the false statement must
be a false assertion of fact rather than simply an expression of the speaker’s opinion. See Ward v.
Zelikovsky, 263 N.J. Super. 497, 513–14 (App. Div. 1993).
Plaintiff fails to state a claim for slander or defamation. In support of his claim, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants Cook, Ames, and Riley placed Plaintiff’s reporting of staff sexual
harassment and misconduct in Plaintiff’s treatment record and improperly claimed that Plaintiff’s
reporting constituted an “escalation” of Plaintiff’s behavior. (See ECF No. 1, at 11.) Plaintiff also
alleges that an unknown member of the staff called Plaintiff’s godmother and falsely claimed that

officials caught him “sexually acting out” causing emotional distress and humiliation to Plaintiff.
(See id.) Plaintiff’s allegations relating to his reporting of staff sexual harassment and misconduct
do not constitute a false statement. Plaintiff did report staff sexual harassment, and Defendants’
characterization of Plaintiff’s actions is an opinion, not a false assertion of fact. See Ward, 263
N.J. Super. at 513–14. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to allege that any of Defendants’ conduct harmed
Plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of the community or deterred third persons from associating with
him. (See generally ECF No. 1.) Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for slander or
defamation, and the Court will dismiss these claims without prejudice.
Regarding Plaintiff’s claim of harassment against Defendants Kamin and Cerone, New

Jersey has not recognized a civil cause of action for verbal harassment. See Aly v. Garcia, 333
N.J. Super. 195, 203 (App. Div. 2000). Instead, when confronted with such a claim, New Jersey
courts “consider [the] claim akin to one for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. at
203–04. To recover on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff is required
to show, among other things, that he has suffered emotional distress “so severe that no reasonable
[person] could be expected to endure it.” Schillaci v. First Fidelity Bank, 311 N.J. Super. 396, 406
(App. Div. 1998). “Severe emotional distress refers to any type of severe and disabling emotional
or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to
do so.” Aly, 333 N.J. Super. at 204. “It is not enough to establish that a party is acutely upset by
reason of the incident. To be actionable, the claimed emotional distress must be sufficiently
substantial to result in physical illness or serious psychological sequelae.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff fails to adequately allege substantial emotional distress. He does not allege
that his emotional distress resulted in physical illness or that a professional diagnosed him with a
mental condition. (See generally ECF No. 1.) Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s
verbal harassment claims against Defendants Kamrin and Cerone.
D. Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights Claim
Finally, as to Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim, the Court assumes at the outset that the
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ conduct violated Section 1985(2) or 1985(3).3 Although Plaintiff
does not specify which subsection from which he basis his claims, Sections 1985(1) clearly does
not pertain to the present case. Section 1985(1) prohibits “two or more persons” from interfering
with a federal officer’s performance of his duties, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1), and Plaintiff is not a federal

3 To the extent that the Court could construe the Complaint as also asserting a common law or
Section 1983 conspiracy, Plaintiff fails to provide a “factual basis to support the existence of the
elements of a conspiracy: agreement and concerted action.” Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588
F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2009). “A general allegation of conspiracy without a statement of the facts
is an allegation of a legal conclusion and insufficient of itself to constitute a cause of action.”
Loftus v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 843 F. Supp. 981, 986 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1994). “[O]nly allegations
which are particularized, such as those addressing the period of the conspiracy, the object of the
conspiracy, and actions taken in furtherance of the conspiracy, will be deemed sufficient.” Grigsby
v. Kane, 250 F. Supp. 2d 453, 458 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (holding that plaintiff must allege the period,
object, and acts taken in furtherance of a conspiracy to defeat a motion to dismiss). Although
Plaintiff broadly alleges that Defendants “acted in concert” and “with real agreement” to violate
his constitutional rights, the Complaint does not contain any factual support for those assertions.
(See ECF No. 1, at 11-12.) For example, it does not articulate how, where, or when the Defendants
entered into their alleged agreement, and only broadly speculates as to why they may have
cooperated. (See id.) Accordingly, the Complaint fails to state a common law or Section 1983
conspiracy. See, e.g., Gross-Quatrone v. Mizdol, 811 F. App’x 95, 100 (3d Cir. 2020).
officer. Additionally, for the reasons below, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s
Section 1985(2) and 1985(3) claims against all Defendants.
Section 1985(2) contains several distinct clauses, each creating a distinct cause of action.
The second clause creates a cause of action “if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of
impending, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any

State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure
him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or
class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). Section 1985(3)
permits a party to bring an action for injuries incurred by a conspiracy formed “for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protections of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” § 1985(3).
The Supreme Court has interpreted both the second clause of § 1985(2) and § 1985(3)
similarly, finding that each contains language “requiring that the conspirators’ actions be
motivated by an intent to deprive their victims of the equal protections of the laws.” Kush v.

Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 725 (1983). It is well-settled that “intent to deprive of equal protection,
or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise,
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Id. at 726.
Here, Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for conspiracy under either § 1985(2) or §
1985(3). The Complaint fails to allege any racial or class-based discriminatory animus on behalf
of Defendants. (See generally ECF No. 1.) The Court, therefore, will dismiss without prejudice
Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims under § 1985 against all Defendants.4

4 To the extent Plaintiff can provide facts curing the pleading deficiencies noted above, he may do
so by filing an amended complaint consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.
IT IS, THEREFORE, on this 22nd day of September, 2021,
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Sections 1983 and 1985 claims against the Defendants in their
official capacities are dismissed WITH PREJUDICE; and it is further
ORDERED that the following claims are dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE:
1. Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against Defendants Main and Stanzione;

2. Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims against Defendants Kamrin, Cerone, Main, and
Stanzione;
3. Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claims against all Defendants;
4. Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Claims against all Defendants;
5. Plaintiff’s state-law slander/false report claims against Defendants Cook, Ames, and
Dr. Riley;
6. Plaintiff’s state-law harrassment claims against Defendants Kamrin and Cerone; and
7. Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims against all Defendants; and it is further
ORDERED that, except to the extent Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants in their

official capacities seek non-injunctive relief, the following claims shall PROCEED at this time:
1. Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against Defendants Cook, Ames, Dr. Riley, and Baird;
2. Plaintiff’s denial of sex offender treatment claims against Defendants Cook, Ames, and
Dr. Riley; and
3. Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims against Defendants Gallotta and Baird; and it is
further
ORDERED that, the Clerk shall mail to Plaintiff a transmittal letter explaining the
procedure for completing Unites States Marshal (“Marshal”) 285 Forms (“USM-285 Forms”); and
it is further
ORDERED that, once the Marshal receives the USM-285 Form(s) from Plaintiff and the
Marshal so alerts the Clerk, the Clerk shall issue summons in connection with each USM-285
Form that has been submitted by Plaintiff, and the Marshal shall serve summons, the Complaint
and this Order to the address specified on each USM-285 Form, with all costs of service advanced
by the United States;> and it is further
ORDERED that Defendant(s) shall file and serve a responsive pleading within the time
specified by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12; and it is further
ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) and § 4(a) of Appendix H of the Local
Civil Rules, the Clerk shall notify Plaintiff of the opportunity to apply in writing to the assigned
judge for the appointment of pro bono counsel; and it is further
ORDERED that, if at any time prior to the filing of a notice of appearance by Defendant(s),
Plaintiff seeks the appointment of pro bono counsel or other relief, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)
and (d), Plaintiff shall (1) serve a copy of the application by regular mail upon each party at his
last known address and (2) file a Certificate of Service; ° and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall send a copy of this Order and the
accompanying Opinion to Plaintiff at the address on file.
| □
~HON. MADELINE COX ARLEO □
United States District Judge

> Alternatively, the U.S. Marshal may notify Defendant(s) that an action has been commenced and
request that the defendant(s) waive personal service of a summons in accordance with Fed. R. Civ.
Shes an attorney files a notice of appearance on behalf of a Defendant, the attorney will
automatically be electronically served all documents that are filed in the case.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10271649. Public record. Not legal advice.