# BARTLEY v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY

> District Court, D. New Jersey · August 31, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10271606

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** August 31, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10271606

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining unlawful search claims accrue at the time of injury

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

:
EVERTON BARTLEY, :
: Case No. 3:18-cv-16283(BRM)(TJB)
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : MEMORANDUM OPINION
:
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
:

Before this Court is pro se prisoner Everton Bartley’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Re-Open and
his Amended Complaint, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 27.) On August 30, 2019,
the Court entered an Opinion and Order dismissing Plaintiff’s initial Complaint (ECF No. 1) for
time bar issues and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, but gave Plaintiff
leave to file an amended complaint (ECF Nos. 6 & 7). His Amended Complaint is currently before
this Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A.
I. BACKGROUND
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff again names Colonel Justin Dintino and Officer
Joseph Fuentes, John Doe Officers, and the New Jersey State Police Agency as defendants. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 2-6.) Plaintiff also now names the State of New Jersey and the Attorney General of the
State of New Jersey as defendants. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2-3.) Plaintiff again raises an unlawful search
claim against John Doe Officers. (Am. Compl. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff’s next three claims are labeled as
procedural and substantive due process claims against the State of New Jersey, the Attorney
General of the State of New Jersey, the Head of the New Jersey State Police, and Colonel Dintino
and Officer Fuentes; however, the Court construes the claims as supervisory liability claims. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 24-26.) Plaintiff alleges the State of New Jersey, by and through its Attorney General
and the Head of the New Jersey State Police, “whose duty it is to enforce Regulations, Policies,
New Jersey statutory law that pertains to citizens . . . , failed to protect Plaintiff’s ‘minimal
procedural due process’ rights by the use of insufficient mechanisms that did not protect the liberty

interest of Plaintiff and should have been prevented by issuing implementing Regulations.” (Am.
Compl. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff alleges the Defendants violated his procedural due process rights “because
the procedures that were used in prosecuting Plaintiff ignored the Directives, Policies, and statutes
of the state of New Jersey[] and were insufficient to safeguard requirements to secure Plaintiff’s
‘minimal due process.’” (Am. Compl. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff also alleges Defendants Dintino and Fuentes
failed to “recognize the actions of their subordinate police officers, whose duty it is to oversee
each and every action of the officers” who violated Plaintiff’s substantive and procedural due
process rights. (Am. Compl. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff again raises a conspiracy claim against the officer
Defendants and now adds the State of New Jersey and the Attorney General to the claim. (Am.
Compl. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff argues the Defendants collectively conspired to “protect the initial illegal

actions of Defendants John Doe” and continuing with Plaintiff’s prosecution. (Id.) Plaintiff’s final
claim alleges Plaintiff’s rights to Equal Protection of the law were violated when he was treated
differently to persons of a different class. (Am. Compl. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff is seeking the termination
of employment of Defendants John Doe, Dintino, and Fuentes. (Am. Compl. ¶ 30(D)(E).) Plaintiff
is also seeking monetary damages. (Am. Compl. ¶ 30(A)(B)(C).)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66
to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions
in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress
against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim with
respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte
dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A because
Plaintiff is a prisoner who is proceeding as indigent.
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “a pleading that offers
‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To
survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient
factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir.
2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed,
“pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v.
Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
B. Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of his
constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

Therefore, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation
of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, the alleged
deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
III. DECISION
A. False Arrest, Illegal Search, Selective Enforcement, Conspiracy
Here, the allegations in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint regarding the claims of illegal
search and seizure and conspiracy were raised in Plaintiff’s initial Complaint.1 (See ECF No. 1 at
4-5, 8-9; see also ECF No. 27-2 at 6-7.) Plaintiff’s equal protection claim was also raised
previously raised in the initial Complaint. (See ECF No. 1 at 5.) The Court addressed the claim as
a selective enforcement claim in the August 20, 2019 Opinion. Selective enforcement is a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 813, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). To make a viable equal protection claim based
on selective enforcement, the Complaint must plausibly suggest that the challenged law
enforcement practice had a discriminatory effect and was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.
Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828, 834 (3d Cir. 2002). As the Court previously informed
Plaintiff, these claims are time barred. Section 1983 claims are governed by the applicable state’s
statute of limitations for personal-injury claims. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); see
also Cito v. Bridgewater Twp. Police Dep’t, 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989). Under New Jersey

1 The Court notes Plaintiff does add the State of New Jersey, the Attorney General of the State of
New Jersey and the Head of the New Jersey State Police to these claims. As discussed below, all
claims against these Defendants in both their official and personal capacity fail.
law, there is a two-year statute of limitations period for personal-injury torts. N.J. Stat. Ann. §
2A:14–2. Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.
See Cito, 892 F.2d at 25. The limitation period begins to run on the accrual date, which is governed
by federal law. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009). Under federal law, a claim accrues

when the facts which support the claim reasonably should have become known to the plaintiff.
Sameric Corp. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998). New Jersey law governs when
accrual of a § 1983 claim may be delayed pursuant to the discovery rule and when a limitation
period may be equitably tolled. See Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir.
2010). The discovery rule postpones a claim from accruing if a plaintiff is reasonably unaware that
he has suffered an injury or, even though he is aware of the injury, that it was the fault of an
identifiable person. See Caravaggio v. D’Agostini, 765 A.2d 182, 187 (N.J. 2001).
The Court found Plaintiff’s false arrest claims was time barred by the statute of limitations.
As explained previously, a claim of false arrest, and the accompanying claim for false
imprisonment, accrues immediately upon the arrest at issue. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389–90 & n.3,

127 S. Ct. 1091; Singleton v. DA Philadelphia, 411 F. App’x 470, 472 (3d Cir. 2011) (accrual of
a claim for false arrest occurred on the date the plaintiff “was arrested and charges were filed
against him”). Nevertheless, while the claim accrues upon arrest, the statute of limitations does not
begin to run at the same time. Instead, the statute of limitations for a false arrest/imprisonment
claim begins to run “when the individual is released, or becomes held pursuant to legal process,”
i.e., when he is arraigned. Alexander, 367 F. App’x at 290 n.2 (citing Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389–
90, 127 S. Ct. 1091); see also Pittman v. Metuchen Police Dep’t, 441 F. App’x 826, 828 (3d Cir.
2011). The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s false arrest claim without prejudice because his
guilty plea was more than twenty years before the filing of the initial Complaint here.
The Court also found Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful search was
dismissed because it is barred by the two-year limitations period. That claim accrued, and the
limitation period began to run, at the time Plaintiff was injured in 1992. Mujaddid v. Wehling, 663
F. App’x 115, 119 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining unlawful search claims accrue at the time of injury);

Rolax v. Whitman, 53 F. App’x 635, 637 (3d Cir. 2002) (unlawful search claim accrues at time of
search).
The Court also dismissed the selective enforcement claim as time barred. Typically, a
“selective-enforcement claim will accrue at the time that the wrongful act resulting in damages
occurs.” Dique, 603 F.3d at 188. Under certain circumstances, however, a plaintiff may be
reasonably unaware he has been injured, and, in such circumstances, the selective enforcement
claim does not accrue until the plaintiff becomes aware he has been the victim of selective
enforcement. Id. The Court explained in order to show delay of accrual, Plaintiff must plead facts
showing he was unaware of his injury. After analyzing relevant cases from this District, the Court
found the initial Complaint was replete with allegations showing Plaintiff was aware of the facts

necessary for his selective enforcement claim on the night of his arrest. Because Plaintiff’s filed
his initial Complaint over 20 years after his arrest, the claim is time barred.
Likewise, the Court dismissed the conspiracy claim as time barred. The Court explained
the New Jersey two-year statute of limitation is applicable to § 1985 claims and runs from when a
plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged conspiracy. Dique, 603 F.3d at 189 (citing
Bougher v. Univ. of Pitts., 882 F.2d 74, 80 (3d Cir. 1989)). The Court found Plaintiff was clearly
aware of the selective enforcement, false arrest, illegal search at the time of his arrest, thus, his
conspiracy claim arising from these actions were also time barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to address the deficiencies identified by the Court in
the August 20, 2019 Opinion regarding Plaintiff’s illegal search and seizure, selective
enforcement, and conspiracy claims. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is silent as to the time bar
issues and does not make a tolling argument. Therefore, for the reasons stated herein and in the

Court’s prior Opinion these claims remain time barred.
B. Supervisory Liability
The Court construes Plaintiff’s three remaining “substantive and procedural due process”
claims as supervisory liability claims. (Am. Compl. ¶ 24-26.) Plaintiff brings these claims against
the State of New Jersey, the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, the Head of the New
Jersey State Police, and Colonel Dintino and Officer Fuentes. Plaintiff alleges the State of New
Jersey, by and through its Attorney General and the Head of the New Jersey State Police,
whose duty it is to enforce Regulations, Policies, New Jersey
statutory law that pertains to citizens . . . , failed to protect Plaintiff’s
‘minimal procedural due process’ rights by the use of insufficient
mechanisms that did not protect the liberty interest of Plaintiff and
should have been prevented by issuing implementing Regulations.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff alleges the Defendants violated his procedural due process rights
“because the procedures that were used in prosecuting Plaintiff ignored the Directives, Policies,
and statutes of the state of New Jersey[] and were insufficient to safeguard requirements to secure
Plaintiff’s ‘minimal due process.’” (Am. Compl. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff also alleges Defendants Dintino
and Fuentes failed to “recognize the actions of their subordinate police officers, whose duty it is
to oversee each and every action of the officers” who violated Plaintiff’s substantive and
procedural due process rights. (Am. Compl. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff is arguing the State of New Jersey, the
Attorney General for the State of New Jersey and the Head of the New Jersey State Police should
be liable because the policies and procedures in place were inadequate to protect Plaintiff’s due
process rights. Plaintiff is also alleging Defendants Dintino and Fuentes are liable based on action
of their subordinates.
First, as explained above, claims under § 1983 are “governed by the applicable state’s
statute of limitations,” and therefore, Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claims, which arose in New

Jersey, are also subject to a two-year limitations period. Dique, 603 F.3d at 185. Claims arising
under § 1983 accrue “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the
basis for a section 1983 action.” Ozoroski v. Maue, 460 F. App’x 94, 97 (3d Cir. 2012). As
discussed at length above and in the Court’s prior Opinion all of the facts Plaintiff alleges in
support of his claims that there were no proper regulations or policies, including his alleged illegal
search and seizure, false arrest, and selective enforcement, all occurred more than twenty years
before the filing of Plaintiff’s initial complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claims
are time barred and subject to dismissal. The Amended Complaint does not demonstrate any basis
for the Court to equitably toll the limitations period. Therefore, the supervisory liability claims
against the State of New Jersey, the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, the Head of the

New Jersey State Police, and Colonel Dintine and Officer Fuentes are dismissed without prejudice.
Even without the time bar issues, the Court additionally finds these Defendants are immune
from suit under § 1983 and must be dismissed with prejudice as such. See, e.g., Walker v. Beard,
244 Fed. App’x 439, 440 (3d Cir. 2007). Neither a state, nor its officials are “persons” for the
purposes of § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105
L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); Dorsett v. N.J. State Police, No. 04–5652, 2007 WL 556890, at *2–3 (D.N.J.
Feb. 15, 2007). Further, “[i]t is well settled that the New Jersey State Police is an arm of the state
and thus not a person within the meaning of § 1983.” Gonzalez v. Bobal, 2015 WL 1469776, at *3
(D.N.J. March 30, 2015). “Section 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of
civil liberties, but it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a
State . . . . The Eleventh Amendment bars such suits unless the State has waived its immunity.”
Will, 491 U.S. at 66, 109 S. Ct. 2304. Defendants Dintino and Fuentes in their official capacity are
also not persons for the purpose of § 1983. In Will, the Supreme Court held that state actors in their

official capacities are not persons who may be sued under § 1983, stating, “a suit against a state
official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the
official's office . . . . As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” Smith v. New
Jersey, 908 F. Supp. 2d 560, 563-65 (D.N.J. 2012) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 71) (internal citation
omitted). Since immunity has not been waived here, and neither states nor their officials are subject
to liability under § 1983, Plaintiff's constitutional claims against the State of New Jersey, the
Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, the Head of the New Jersey State Police and
Defendants Dintino and Fuentes in their official capacities are dismissed with prejudice.
Additionally, Plaintiff may not base his claims against the Attorney General, the Head of
the New Jersey State Police, or Defendants Dintino and Fuentes in their personal capacities strictly

on a theory of respondeat superior. See Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d
Cir. 2015). Supervisory liability generally requires some affirmative conduct by the supervisor,
such as a supervisor's implementation or maintenance of a policy, practice, or custom that caused
the plaintiff constitutional harm. Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016); Santiago
v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010). Hence, there are two potential
theories of supervisory liability. See A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372
F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004). Under the first theory, defendants may be sued as policy makers “if
it is shown that such defendants, ‘with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and
maintained a policy, custom, or practice which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.’” Id.
(quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989)). The second
theory of liability provides that a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she
participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in
charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations. See Baker v. Monroe

Township, 50 F.3d 1186, 1190–91 (3d Cir. 1995). Knowledge in a “failure to supervise” claim
must consist of either “contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a
prior pattern of similar incidents.” C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff is asserting a policy-maker theory of supervisory liability against the State of New
Jersey, the Attorney General and the Head of the New Jersey State Police. Plaintiff alleges the
regulations and policies in place were “insufficient to safeguard requirements to secure Plaintiff’s
‘minimal due process’ rights.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 24.) He argues the Defendants failed to implement
regulations to prevent violations of procedural due process. (Id.) Plaintiff claims regulations were
implemented “only after widespread systemic racial profiling had risen to the point of violating an
inordinate number of rights of citizens and/or legal aliens in the state of New Jersey.” (Am. Compl.

¶ 25.) Under a policy-maker theory, a person who has final policy-making authority may be liable
under § 1983 if that person establishes a policy that is unconstitutional and that injures the plaintiff.
Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 223; Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989). “[T]o
establish a claim against a policy maker under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege and prove that the
official established or enforced policies and practices directly causing the constitutional violation.”
Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 223. Alternatively, “[a] course of conduct is considered to be a custom
when, though not authorized by law, such practices of state officials are so permanent and well-
settled as to virtually constitute law.” Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d
Cir. 1990), superseded in part by statute on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1072; see also Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to plead a claim of supervisory liability against the
State of New Jersey, the Attorney General or the Head of the New Jersey State Police. Plaintiff

does not allege these Defendants implemented any policy. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges no facts
to support a conclusion that the Defendants were aware of any custom. Plaintiff makes conclusory
statements without asserting any facts which would support personal involvement on the part of
these Defendants in a policy or custom. Plaintiff’s vague claims of the failure to implement
appropriate policy or regulations, without more, are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983
against the State of New Jersey, the Attorney General or the Head of the New Jersey State Police.
As such, Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claims against these Defendants are dismissed without
prejudice.
Regarding Defendants Dintino and Fuentes, Plaintiff alleges they failed to recognize the
actions of their subordinate police officers. Plaintiff is attempting to hold them liable strictly based

on their supervisory status. As explained, above supervisory liability generally requires some
affirmative conduct by the supervisor. Parkell, 833 F.3d at 330. Plaintiff does not state specific
facts regarding Defendants Dintino and Fuentes personal involvement or affirmative conduct as
supervisors. Plaintiff makes a conclusory argument that the Defendants “had a duty [] to oversee
each and every action of the officers.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 26(b).) Without more, Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim under § 1983 against Defendants Dintino and Fuentes. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
supervisory liability claim against Defendants Dintino and Fuentes is dismissed without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice in its
entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.2 Because it is conceivable Plaintiff may be able to supplement his pleading

with facts sufficient to overcome the deficiencies noted herein, Plaintiff is granted leave to move
to re-open this case and to file a proposed amended complaint. An appropriate order follows.
Dated: August 31, 2021
/s/Brian R. Martinotti
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2 Because the Court dismissed all federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over any potential state law claim Plaintiff may have been attempting to bring. See
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) ( a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim
if the court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”)

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10271606. Public record. Not legal advice.