# CALIO v. CAMDEN COUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS

> District Court, D. New Jersey · August 6, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10271171

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** August 6, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
MATTHEW CALIO,
Plaintiff,
No. 19-8393 (RMB/AMD)
v.
CAMDEN COUNTY BOARD OF OPINION
CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES
William B. Hildebrand
Law Offices of William B. Hildebrand, LLC
36 Tanner Street, Suite 110
Haddonfield, New Jersey 08033
On behalf of Plaintiff
Howard Lane Goldberg
Office of Camden County Counsel
520 Market Street Courthouse, 14th Floor
Camden, New Jersey 08102-1375
On behalf of Defendant
RENÉE MARIE BUMB, United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on the parties’ opposing Motions for Summary
Judgment. [Docket Nos. 16, 20.] Plaintiff Matthew Calio (“Calio” or “Plaintiff”) seeks
partial summary judgment in his favor on liability only. [Docket No. 16.] Defendant
Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders d/b/a Camden County Department of
Corrections (“CCDC” or “Defendant”) opposes this Motion, and filed a Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment in its favor, which Calio opposes.1 [Docket Nos. 20, 21.] For the
reasons set forth herein, both parties’ Motions will be denied without prejudice.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case arises out of CCDC disciplining Calio for his allegedly improper use of sick

leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and New Jersey’s Family Leave
Act (“NJFLA”).2 [Docket No. 6.] CCDC has employed Calio as a corrections officer since
2001. [Docket No. 16-2, ¶ 1.] Calio sought approval to take intermittent FMLA leave on
four occasions: once in 2016, once in 2017, and twice in 2018. [Docket No. 16-2, ¶ 9.]
CCDC denied the 2016 application because Calio had not worked enough hours to qualify
for FMLA, but approved the 2017 and both 2018 applications. [Docket No. 16-10, at 8–9.]
Calio requested this leave each time in order to care for his mother, who suffers from
dementia and needs help with day-to-day tasks.3 [See Docket No. 6, ¶ 7–8.] The issues in
this case arise out of FMLA leave that Calio took under the second 2018 approval, in which

CCDC approved Calio to take intermittent leave between December 12, 2018 and June 12,
2019. [Docket No. 6.] CCDC approved Calio to take leave up to one absence per month, for

1 Defendants XYZ Corp. 1–10 and ABC 1–10 have not joined CCDC’s Cross Motion or
otherwise explicitly opposed Calio’s Motion.
2 Because of the similarity between the FMLA and NJFLA statutes, courts generally apply
the same standards and framework to claims under the FMLA and NJFLA. See Wolpert v.
Abbott Labs., 817 F. Supp. 2d 424, 437 (D.N.J. 2011) (citing Santosuosso v. NovaCare
Rehab., 462 F. Supp. 2d 590, 596 (D.N.J. 2006). Unless noted otherwise, the Court’s
discussion of Calio’s FMLA claims also applies to his NJFLA claims.
3 All parties appear to agree that this medical condition qualifies Calio, as her son, to be
entitled to take intermittent FMLA leave to care for her.
up to five days per absence. [Docket No. 6, at 17–19.] As part of this most recent
application, Calio submitted a medical certification on which the certifying physician
estimated that Calio’s mother would have intermittent flare ups that would cause her to
become incapacitated one time every four weeks, with each flare up lasting eight hours or

five days per flare up. [Docket No. 16-7, at 25.] It was on this basis that CCDC approved
Calio’s intermittent FMLA leave for one absence per month for a duration of up to five days
per absence. [Docket No. 16-2, ¶ 16.]
Calio took his first FMLA day of this most recent approval period on December 15,
2018. [Docket No. 27, at 37.] Calio then took additional FMLA days on January 6, January
14, and January 28, 2019. [Docket No. 6, ¶ 13; Docket No. 20-1, at 6.] On February 1,
2019, Calio’s supervisor, Lt. Charyetta Hinson, submitted two staff complaint reports
recommending that Calio be disciplined for using FMLA in excess of what he had been
approved for because his January 6 and January 28 absences were both taken within 30 days
of a preceding FMLA absence—in other words, Calio had only been approved for one

absence per month (which could last up to five days) and, so, January 6 and January 28
were unapproved. [Docket No. 27, at 27.]
The parties dispute whether or not Hinson asked Calio to recertify his leave—that is,
to seek new documentation from his mother’s doctor in order to make adjustments to his
approved FMLA leave—before issuing these staff complaints. [Docket No. 21, at 12–13.]
The record is undisputed, however, that Calio never sought a change to his FMLA-
approved leave. On February 19, 2019, CCDC provided Calio with two notices of
disciplinary action, notifying him that he would be suspended as a result of exceeding the
frequency of his allotted FMLA days on January 6 and January 28. [Docket No. 27, at 30–
31.] On March 7, 2019, one of CCDC’s Human Resources representatives, Lt. Peter
Celeste, provided a letter to Calio requiring him to submit a doctor’s note for any sick time
used going forward, and noting that failure to submit such a note would result in
disciplinary action. [Docket No. 6, at 27.]

On March 12, 2019, Calio filed the instant Complaint with the Court. [Docket No.
6.] On March 26, 2019, CCDC issued Calio a letter notifying him that the two absences at
issue (January 6 and January 28) would be converted to sick days, closing the matter, and
noting that he had been asked to recertify if his FMLA needs had changed. [Docket No. 27,
at 33.] There appears to be no direct evidence that CCDC was aware of the filing of the
Complaint at the time of the decision to convert the two days at issue to sick leave. On
March 28, 2019, Lt. Celeste issued Calio a letter again requesting that he recertify his
FMLA if he needed to take more than one absence per month. [Docket No. 27, at 35.]
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Calio brought this suit alleging four Counts stemming from CCDC’s alleged
violations of his federal FMLA and state NJFLA rights. [Docket No. 6.] Counts One and
Two allege that CCDC violated Calio’s rights by unreasonably limiting his leave to one
occurrence per month, and by disciplining him or otherwise interfering with his rights when
he exceeded this limit. [Id., ¶¶ 16–27.] Count Three alleges similar violations under the
NJFLA. [Id., ¶¶ 28–30.] Count Four alleges that CCDC violated Calio’s FMLA and
NJFLA rights in its March 7, 2019 letter requiring him to submit a doctor’s note for any
future sick time that he used going forward, allegedly as a result of him taking protected
FMLA days. [Id., ¶¶ 31–34.]
Calio filed the instant Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on January 31, 2020,
seeking judgment in his favor on the issue of liability only. [Docket No. 16.] CCDC
opposed Calio’s Motion, and filed its instant Cross Motion for Summary Judgment on
March 30, 2020. [Docket No. 20.] The Court administratively terminated the Motions on

September 29, 2020, and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing. [Docket No.
22.] In accordance with the Court’s order, the parties have submitted supplemental briefing
in support of their respective Motions. [Docket Nos. 23, 26, 27.]
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might impact the “outcome of the suit
under the governing law.” Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dept of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 261
(3d Cir. 2012). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find

for the nonmoving party. Id.
In determining the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact, a court’s role is not
to weigh the evidence; all reasonable inferences and doubts should be resolved in favor of
the nonmoving party. Melrose, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 387 (3d Cir. 2010).
However, a mere “scintilla of evidence,” without more, will not give rise to a genuine
dispute for trial. Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001). Moreover, a
court need not adopt the version of facts asserted by the nonmoving party if those facts are
“utterly discredited by the record [so] that no reasonable jury” could believe them. Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). In the face of such evidence, summary judgment is still
appropriate “where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find
for the nonmoving party.” Walsh v. Krantz, 386 F. App’x 334, 338 (3d Cir. 2010).
The movant has the initial burden of showing through the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and any affidavits “that the non-movant has

failed to establish one or more essential elements of its case.” Connection Training Servs. v.
City of Phila., 358 F. App’x 315, 318 (3d Cir. 2009). “If the moving party meets its burden,
the burden then shifts to the non-movant to establish that summary judgment is
inappropriate.” Id. In the face of a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the
nonmovant’s burden is rigorous: it “must point to concrete evidence in the record”; mere
allegations, conclusions, conjecture, and speculation will not defeat summary judgment.
Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995); accord Jackson v.
Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Acumed LLC. v. Advanced Surgical
Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 228 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[S]peculation and conjecture may not defeat
summary judgment.”). However, “the court need only determine if the nonmoving party

can produce admissible evidence regarding a disputed issue of material fact at trial”; the
evidence does not need to be in admissible form at the time of summary judgment. FOP v.
City of Camden, 842 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir. 2016).
IV. DISCUSSION
The FMLA is intended to allow employees to take reasonable unpaid leave for
medical reasons, including to care for a parent who has a serious health condition, without
fear of losing their job or being otherwise disciplined or penalized by their employer.
29 C.F.R. § 825.101. It is illegal “for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the
exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under [the FMLA.]” 29 U.S.C.
§ 2615(a).
If an employee’s leave is foreseeable, they must provide their employer with advance
notice that they will be taking such leave.4 29 C.F.R. § 825.304. The parties do not dispute

that Calio followed the proper procedures to provide notice and apply for his initial FMLA
approval, including seeking the appropriate medical certification. After the initial approval
and certification, an employer is allowed to periodically request a recertification for an
employee’s previously approved FMLA. 29 C.F.R. § 825.308. This recertification can
generally be requested no more often than every six months for a lifelong condition, unless
an exception applies. 29 C.F.R. § 825.308(b). One of these exceptions is if circumstances
described by the previous certification have changed significantly, with the frequency of the
absence being specifically listed as being one such significant change. 29 C.F.R. §
825.308(c)(2). After being asked to recertify, the employee must provide the requested
recertification to the employer within the time period specified by the employer, which must

be a minimum of fifteen calendar days. 29 C.F.R. 825.308(d). The employee has the same
obligations to participate and cooperate in the recertification process as in the initial
certification process. 29 C.F.R. § 825.308(e). If the employee fails to provide a recertification

4 While Calio argues that the leave was unforeseeable, he did provide advance notice and
certification to CCDC to support future absences. [Docket No. 6, ¶ 10; Docket No. 16-7, at
17–26.] Notably, it is by definition impossible to provide advance notice for unforeseeable
events. Accordingly, intermittent leave is mentioned in the regulations covering foreseeable
notice, but is absent from the regulations covering unforeseeable notice. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.302–303. Because the leave’s characterization as foreseeable or unforeseeable does not
change the Court’s analysis, this distinction is irrelevant in the instant motion.
within a reasonable time, then the employer may deny continuation of the FMLA leave
protections until the employee provides a sufficient recertification. 29 C.F.R. § 825.313(c).
“If the employee never produces the recertification, the leave is not FMLA leave.” Id. In
sum, the FMLA statutes and associated regulations make it clear that an employer may not

interfere with, or otherwise attempt to deny, the right of an employee to take FMLA leave
for a legitimate reason. However, in order to make use of the protections that the FMLA
provides, employees must follow the processes and rules laid out by the FMLA in order to
provide appropriate notice, certification, and recertification (if applicable) to their employer.
At the outset, whether or not CCDC asked Calio to recertify the frequency of his
FMLA leave and provided him the required minimum of fifteen calendar days to do so
before disciplining him is critical to determining whether or not CCDC violated Calio’s
FMLA rights. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.308(d). While Calio argues that “this is a discipline case,
not a recertification case,” he overlooks the fact that the circumstances surrounding
CCDC’s request (or lack thereof) to have him recertify will be dispositive as to whether or

not CCDC’s disciplinary actions were prohibited by the FMLA. [Docket No. 27, at 6
(emphasis in original).] If CCDC properly asked Calio to recertify and he failed to do so in
the provided time, then his absences at issue are not FMLA-approved absences and the
protections that the FMLA affords do not apply. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.313(c). Likewise, if
CCDC never properly asked Calio to recertify, then his absences would be protected under
the FMLA and CCDC would not be able to discipline him for taking these protected
absences.
Central to this material factual dispute is that the parties dispute when CCDC first
asked Calio to recertify. Calio testified that he was not asked to recertify before being
disciplined, and that the first time that CCDC approached him regarding the absences was
to impose official discipline with a suspension. [Docket No. 27, at 11.] This testimony and
assertion directly contradict the testimony of CCDC’s employees. Hinson testified that
shortly after the January 6, 2019 absence5 she spoke with Calio and asked him to “get his

paperwork fixed,” notified him that “he wasn’t in compliance with what his paperwork
said,” and told him that “if you do need to use those days, you need to speak to your
mother’s doctor or human resources to get it rectified somehow.”6 [Docket Nos. 20-9,
20-10.] Because a request for recertification—and not an initial certification—is at issue, an
oral request to provide recertification is sufficient. 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(a). Calio’s testimony
also appears contradictory, as he actually testified that Hinson, Celeste, and another
individual talked with him before Hinson issued the staff complaints, although he does not
specify when this conversation took place, or whether he was explicitly asked to recertify.
[Docket Nos. 20-15, 20-16.]
There is additional evidence that points to the possibility of an earlier recertification

request having been made as CCDC urges this Court to find. Hinson testified that she
noticed Calio’s January 6th absence shortly after it was taken as part of her daily attendance
review, however she did not issue the actual staff complaint reports until much later, on

5 Hinson did not provide a specific date when she allegedly spoke with Calio about the first
absence and requested that he recertify, noting only that it was “after the first [January 6]
incident.” [Docket No. 20-9.]
6 While Calio argues that Hinson was not responsible for requesting recertification and this
responsibility actually fell to Celeste, the FMLA only requires that the “employer” request
recertification. [Docket No. 27, at 7–8; 29 C.F.R. § 825.308.] Calio has made no argument
that Hinson, his supervisor, would be unable to make this request on CCDC’s behalf.
February 1, 2019. [Docket No. 20-9.] Hinson testified that it does not usually take nearly a
month to issue a staff complaint report, but that she waited in order to give Calio an
opportunity to recertify, and that she did not issue the complaint recommending discipline
until after she had a chance to talk with human resources and confirm that Calio had not

provided the requested recertification. [Docket No. 20-10.] An additional letter from Lt.
James Richer to Calio dated March 26, 2019, also noted that Calio had been previously
notified by Human Resources to recertify his FMLA if he needed to change the time(s) he
was approved for, but that he had failed to do so. [Docket No. 16-9, at 6]
Although the record appears to support CCDC’s position—that Hinson or another
CCDC employee asked Calio to recertify—it becomes a credibility issue that this Court
cannot resolve on summary judgment. Whether or not the conversations actually took
place, as well as their content, is material to determining if CCDC improperly disciplined
Calio, or if Calio instead forfeited his FMLA protections by failing to comply with the
recertification request.

Also, the Court notes that even if Calio succeeds in proving that CCDC did not
actually request recertification and therefore interfered with his FMLA rights, it is difficult
for the Court to see what, if any, damages he will be able to prove or for that matter,
whether he is entitled to any relief. Throughout the events at issue here, it appears that
CCDC attempted to work with Calio and tried on multiple occasions to advise him of what
he needed to do in order to update his FMLA leave to allow him a greater frequency of
FMLA days. CCDC previously allowed Calio to take leave multiple days per month,
approved his FMLA days for three times per month on one occasion, and gave him an
“undetermined” frequency of leave on another occasion. [Docket No. 16-6, at 14; Docket
No. 16-7, at 2.] There is no evidence that CCDC would have been unwilling to grant a
frequency of multiple absences per month, but Calio’s most recent certification only noted a
frequency of one time per month, which is effectively exactly what he was granted.7 [Docket
No. 16-7, at 17, 25.] In fact, much of the evidence put forward shows that CCDC was

entirely willing to increase Calio’s frequency of leave, with the only requirement being that
he recertify. [See, e.g., Docket No. 20-10.] If Calio is successful in proving that CCDC did,
in fact, fail to request a recertification before disciplining him, it appears that this stems from
an internal miscommunication or break in procedure as part of a good-faith effort to correct
a perceived issue with Calio’s FMLA approval and not from an attempt to punish Calio for
using his legitimate FMLA allowance.
On the other hand, Calio appears to have been unwilling to work with CCDC in
order to correct any paperwork issues or update his leave allowance. While it is disputed
whether Hinson orally requested for Calio to recertify before issuing the staff complaints,
there are additional examples where Calio appears to have been unwilling to work with

CCDC to come to an amicable resolution. When CCDC gave him an opportunity to rebut
the February 1, 2019 staff complaint, Calio refused to do so, claiming that “I know how
they all are, and I don’t have any time for them.” [Docket No. 20-16.] Calio also appears to
have decided to refuse to recertify on principle even if he thought the request was justified,

7 Because four weeks is (with the exception of most Februarys) slightly less than one month,
CCDC actually approved Calio for slightly less frequent leave than he requested. However,
Calio does not seem to take issue with this slightly less frequent allowance and instead takes
issue with the entirety of the frequency restriction.
because he was unhappy with the manner that his supervisors handled the situation and felt
that they were in violation of the FMLA. [Docket No. 20-21.]
In the end, Calio was not terminated, demoted, or reassigned, nor did he otherwise
suffer any adverse financial or employment effects. He concedes as much, but baldly claims
he is entitled to equitable relief.8 [See Docket No. 21, 21–24.] It is not at all clear what type

of equitable relief Calio could be entitled to. Having conceded the issue of damages, Calio’s
only other demands are prospective injunctive relief and the expungement of his disciplinary
record. [Docket No. 6, ¶¶ 24, 27, 30, 34.] Yet, the record does not demonstrate that absent a
Court injunction CCDC will violate Calio’s FMLA rights.9 Likewise, it appears that CCDC
has already expunged the relevant portions of Plaintiff’s disciplinary record. [Docket No.
27, at 13.]
Finally, Calio alleges that CCDC’s conversion of his absences into regular sick days
constitutes interference with his FMLA rights, however the FMLA explicitly allows for an
employer to require an employee to use their sick days concurrently with FMLA, as long as

proper notice and designation was provided. [Docket No. 21, at 12; 29 C.F.R.

8 While Calio also argues that he can recover for emotional distress under the NJFLA, the
referenced statute does not appear to support this claim. [Docket No. 21, at 24; N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:11B-11.]
9 Moreover, to the extent Calio seeks attorney’s fees in the event he ultimately prevails,
[Docket No. 6, ¶¶ 24, 27, 30, 34], a reasonable fee award must be commensurate with the
relief obtained, and it seems unlikely that any relief Calio could obtain would be more than
de minimis. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983) (“[If] a plaintiff has achieved
only partial or limited success, the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as
a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount. . . . [T]he most critical
factor is the degree of success obtained.”).
§ 825.702(d)(2).] Calio was provided with advance notice that he would be required to use
his sick days for FMLA absences, and it appears that CCDC was acting in full compliance
with the law and its policies when requiring Calio to use sick days for these absences.10
[Docket No. 16-7, at 18.]

Calio alleges that the limitation that he could only take intermittent FMLA leave one
time per month for a maximum duration of five days “interfered with and otherwise
violated [his] rights under the FMLA” and that it constituted “unjustified and overly harsh
restrictions” on his leave. [Docket No. 6, ¶ 21; Docket No. 16-10, at 9–10.] Calio submitted
a certification saying that he expected flare-ups once every four weeks, which is the FMLA
leave that CCDC approved. [Docket No. 16-7, at 25.] While Calio makes an argument that
the certification should not have been interpreted as requesting one absence every four
weeks and should have instead been interpreted as requesting leave any number of times,
CCDC approved a previous six-month period of Calio’s leave with a higher frequency listed
in this same manner and Calio did not take issue with this approval. [Docket No. 16-6, at

14.] Calio was provided with this limitation from the outset based on his certification, and if
it was overly restrictive or it was not what he had actually intended to request then he could,
and should, have requested to have it increased.

10 There is a chance that converting these days to sick days from FMLA days may have
actually benefited Calio, since it is unclear whether they were counted towards his twelve-
week FMLA allowance despite the fact that the FMLA allows CCDC to both count them
against Calio’s FMLA allowance and deduct them from his ordinary sick time allowance.
29 C.F.R. § 825.702(d)(2).
While Calio points to cases supporting his assertion that limitations on FMLA leave
are de facto illegal, reading these cases does not lead to the conclusion that these limitations
are illegal when they are simply the amount of leave that the employee requested in the first
place. One case in particular that Calio cites actually notes that the recertification process

exists specifically for the instance where an employee’s FMLA leave needs change from
those that he or she was initially approved for:
[I]f the frequency and duration stated in the certification set a limit to the
employee’s entitlement to FMLA leave, there would be no need for the
regulation that authorizes an employer to request recertification . . . . This
regulation, as the district judge recognized, “contemplates the precise
situation present here where an employee’s frequency of absences exceeds
what is described in the initial certification . . . .” [The employer] should have
sought recertification when the frequency of [the employee’s] absences
exceeded what was estimated in his certification, rather than simply denying
him leave.
Hansen v. Fincantieri Marine Grp., LLC, 763 F.3d 832, 842 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations
omitted). As the Seventh Circuit noted, while the frequency and duration in the certification
cannot be used to deny or otherwise interfere with FMLA leave that an employee would be
entitled to, exceeding these certified frequencies or durations does trigger the recertification
provisions and an employer is authorized to request such recertification. Id. If the employee
is asked to recertify but fails to do so, then the leave is no longer considered FMLA leave.
29 C.F.R. § 825.313(c).
The situation in Hansen involving an employee exceeding the frequency of his or her
certification is nearly identical to Calio’s situation, with the exception that there is no
evidence that Hansen’s employer properly requested recertification before interfering with
Hanson’s FMLA leave. Hansen, 763 F.3d at 842. Indeed, Hansen highlights the fact that
whether or not CCDC requested certification before disciplining Calio is a material fact in
determining whether Calio’s FMLA rights were violated. The other main case that Calio
points to involves a significantly different situation than the instant case, where an employer
repeatedly refused to approve a reduced schedule that the employee requested and was
supported by the certification. Morin v. Hannaford Bros. Co., LLC, 1:17-CV-50-GZS, 2018

WL 2746570 (D. Me. June 7, 2018).
Even Calio agrees that “CCDC had the right to issue the Designation Notice
imposing the restrictions,” and his argument is instead that it was “CCDC’s use of the
restrictions, not the restrictions themselves, that was unlawful.” [Docket No. 23, at 12
(emphasis in original).] Setting aside the fact that it would be illogical to allow restrictions
that cannot actually serve to restrict anything, it appears that Calio is conflating the fact that
restrictions cannot be used to deny or interfere with legitimate FMLA leave with the fact
that exceeding such restrictions can trigger the right of the employer to request
recertification and the duty of the employee to comply with that request.
V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny both Calio’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and CCDC’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment without prejudice.
An accompanying Order shall issue.

August 6, 2021 s/Renée Marie Bumb
Date RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10271171. Public record. Not legal advice.