# MAURER v. GL QICHEN INVESTMENT LTD

> District Court, D. New Jersey · June 11, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10271081

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** June 11, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

[Docket No. 16]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

DENNIS MAURER,

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 20-20028 (RMB/KMW)
v.

GL QICHEN INVESTMENT LTD, OPINION

Defendant.

APPEARANCES:

Shadinger Law, LLC
By: Jon G. Shadinger, Jr. Esq.
717 E. Elmer St.
Vineland, NJ 08360
Attorney for Plaintiff

Hang & Associates, PLLC
By: Ge Qu, Esq.
136-20 38th Avenue, Suite 10G
Flushing, NY 11354
Attorney for Defendant

BUMB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
This matter comes before the Court upon its own Motion.
Plaintiff Dennis Maurer brings this action under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et. seq. and the New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12. In
addition, Defendant GL Qichen Investment LTD has filed a Motion
to Dismiss for Insufficient Service, which is currently pending
before the Court. [Docket No. 16].
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I. ANALYSIS
A. Standing
In reviewing the Complaint, the Court is not satisfied that
Plaintiff has established the Court’s jurisdiction. “The federal
courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own

jurisdiction, and standing ‘is perhaps the most important of
[the jurisdictional] doctrines.’” FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of
Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990) (modification in original)
(quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)). A plaintiff
states a viable claim when he satisfies three elements; the
plaintiff must have: “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that
is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant,
and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).
Plaintiff, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the
burden of establishing these elements. Id.
Injury in fact is the “‘[f]irst and foremost’ of standing’s

three requirements.” Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for
Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998). Moreover, this is a
constitutional requirement that Congress cannot erase. Id. at
1547-48. A plaintiff establishes injury in fact only by showing
that “he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected
interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized,’ and ‘actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. at 1548
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(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992)). “For an injury to be ‘particularized,’ it must affect
the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Id. (cleaned-
up). An injury is “concrete” only when it is “de facto; that is,
it must actually exist.” Id.

Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive
relief, he satisfies the injury in fact requirement only by
showing that he is “‘likely to suffer future injury’ from the
defendant’s conduct.” McNair v. Synapse Grp. Inc., 672 F.3d 213,
223 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 105 (1983)); see also Indep. Project, Inc. v. Shore
Point Plaza, LLC, No. 18-cv-15048(FLW/ZNQ), 2020 WL 6363714, at
*2 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2020). Stated differently, “past exposure to
illegal conduct does not show a present claim for injunctive
relief.” Indep. Project, Inc., 2020 WL 6363714, at *2 (quoting
Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 400 (3d Cir. 1987)).
Consistent with these standards, courts within this

District rely on a four-factor test to determine whether a
plaintiff has pleaded a concrete and particularized injury for
an ADA claim: (1) the plaintiff's proximity to the defendant’s
place of public accommodation; (2) the plaintiff’s past
patronage; (3) the plaintiff’s frequency of nearby travel; and

3
(4) the definiteness of the plaintiff’s plan to return1.
Louisiana Counseling & Fam. Servs. Inc. v. Mt. Fuji Japanese
Rest., 08-cv-6143, 2014 WL 941353, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014),
aff’d sub nom. Brown v. Mt. Fuji Japanese Rest., 615 F. App’x
757 (3d Cir. 2015); Indep. Project, Inc., 2020 WL 6363714, at

*2.
Here, the Complaint fails to allege that Plaintiff suffered
a concrete and particularized injury under these factors. First,
the Complaint identifies both Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s
addresses. The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff’s
listed address is approximately 50 miles away from Defendant’s
listed address. Second, Plaintiff identifies only a single visit
to the property in question. [See Docket No. 1, at ¶ 7].
Plaintiff does so without stating or approximating the exact
date of his visit. Instead, he provides only that he visited
Defendant’s property sometime “in October 2020.” [Id.].
Third, Plaintiff has failed to allege any definitive plans

to return to Defendant’s establishment. Although Plaintiff makes

1 Within the Third Circuit, some District Courts use a substantially
similar test. See e.g., Hollinger v. Reading Health Sys., No. CV 15-5249,
2017 WL 429804, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2017) (reciting the test for
evaluating standing under the ADA as “(1) plaintiff has alleged defendant
engaged in past discriminatory conduct that violates the ADA; (2) it is
reasonable to infer from the allegations in the complaint that the
discriminatory conduct will continue; and (3) it is reasonable to infer based
on past patronage, proximity of the place to the plaintiff's home, business,
or personal connections to the area, that the plaintiff intends to return to
the place in the future.”).

4
several vague references to his plan to “return to the Subject
Property in the very near future,” [see e.g., id.] this is
clearly not enough. See e.g., Kennedy v. Floridian Hotel, Inc.,
No. 20-10648, --F 3d.--, 2021 WL 2149361, at *9 (11th Cir. May
27, 2021) (“[Plaintiff] failed to demonstrate a real and

immediate threat of future injury that goes beyond the type of
vague, ‘some day’ intention [to return] the Supreme Court found
insufficient in Lujan.”). Fourth, Plaintiff has not articulated
any facts showing his “frequency of nearby travel.” Given the
approximately 50-mile journey from Plaintiff’s home to
Defendant’s location, Plaintiff’s failure to offer any
explanation on the frequency of his nearby travel prevents the
Court from inferring that Plaintiff actually intends to return
in the future2.
Moreover, Plaintiff has similarly failed to allege any
personal (i.e., particularized, under Spokeo) injury from
Defendant’s alleged ADA violations. Under Title III of the ADA,

a plaintiff’s only available relief is an injunction. See 42
U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1). But § 12188 still requires Plaintiff to
establish a personal stake in the case. Instead, as explained
more fully below, historically Plaintiff’s Complaints seemingly

2 The Complaint attempts to establish both previous patronage and a
definitive plan to return through a formulaic recitation of the elements of
an ADA cause of action. This is insufficient. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
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appear to assume the role of a code compliance officer who uses
the ADA as a strict liability statute without establishing any
relationship between his own disabilities and the alleged
violations.
Taken together, the Court cannot be assured that Plaintiff

has standing to pursue his claims.
B. Additional Deficiencies
The Court will also use this opportunity to note that
Plaintiff’s Complaint appears to be a copy-and-paste template
that Plaintiff has previously used in 155 cases in the District
of New Jersey alone over the last 8 years. Indeed, most of these
Complaints contain the exact same typo-- omitting the word “of”
in between “Section 606” and “the” in a particular paragraph.
See e.g., Docket No. 1, at ¶ 13k (“violating Section 606 the
2010. . .]; Maurer v. Sloane, 20-13650, Docket No. 1 (same);
Maurer v. Heights Plaza Group, LLC, 20-13705, Docket No. 1
(same); Maurer v. Meckel Enterprises, LLC, 19-9869, Docket No. 1

(same); Maurer v. Pep Boys, 18-9175, Docket No. 1 (same).
Relatedly, the Court will take judicial notice that Jon G.
Shadinger, Plaintiff’s counsel in this matter, (1) has
represented Plaintiff in all of Plaintiff’s ADA cases since
March 2018-- approximately 66 cases in total-- and (2) never
represented Plaintiff before March 2018. Yet the typo identified
above appears in Plaintiff’s complaints dating back to 2014. See
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e.g., Maurer v. Traders Lane, LLC, 14-3654, Docket No. 1
(“violating Section 606 the 2010 . . .”); Maurer v. Village Walk
LLC, 15-5510, Docket No. 1 (same). In these cases, Plaintiff was
represented by John P. Fuller and Robert Donaher.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s current counsel has filed numerous

complaints for other plaintiffs-- namely, Charlene Cheli, Ronald
Moore, and the Independence Project Inc.-- which also contain
this typo. See e.g., Charlene Cheli v. Cases Nova Today, LLC,
19-19034, Docket No. 1 (“violating Section 606 the 2010 . . .”);
Ronald Moore v. Riccardi Realty Company, 21-10601, Docket No. 1
(same); The Independence Project, Inc. v. Kimsco, Inc., 18-705,
Docket No. 1 (same). By no means are the cases identified here
an exhaustive list.
Although the Court does not fault a party for the
occasional typo, this situation is far different. Here, the
Court has identified what appears to be a nearly decade-long
practice of filing cookie-cutter complaints, which were

seemingly never proofread beforehand.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s cases all follow a predictable
pattern: a case is filed and shortly thereafter settled, leaving
the Court uncertain whether each defendant’s purported ADA
violation was remedied or if Plaintiff ever returned to each
defendant’s location. This is a practice and pattern that the
Court intends to probe further. There is no independent inquiry
7
ever undertaken as to the nature of the alleged violations and
whether the complaints fall within the spirit of the ADA’s
language. In re Zyprexa Prod. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488,
492 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
529, 530 (1824)) (stating that the Court has the “well-

established authority to exercise ethical supervision of the
bar.”); cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682 (1977)
(Recognizing that a party should not use a “a legal process . .
. against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it
is not designed.”)
Finally, in a similar case, the Court previously
“encourage[d] Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel to attempt to
resolve any future disputes without involving the courts at the
outset.” Maurer v. Michael Sloane LTD, 20-13650, Docket No. 7.
Given Plaintiff’s historical practice, the Court will reiterate
that same advice now.
II. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Complaint has not established the Court’s
jurisdiction, and the case cannot proceed at this time. An
appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

DATE: June 11, 2021 s/ Renée Marie Bumb _
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10271081. Public record. Not legal advice.