# PRATTS v. HAMMONTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

> District Court, D. New Jersey · July 19, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10271012

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** July 19, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10271012

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that a complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially plausible”

## Opinion text

[Docket Nos. 5 and 6]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
ANTONIO PRATTS, JR.,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 21-6470 (RMB/KMW)
v.
HAMMONTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, et. OPINION AND ORDER
al.,
Defendants.
BUMB, United States District Judge:
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon the filing of a
Complaint and application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) by
Plaintiff Antonio Pratts, Jr. (“Plaintiff” or “Pratts”). [Docket
Nos. 5 and 6.]1 For the reasons stated herein, the Court will grant
Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP and dismiss Plaintiff’s
claims against the Hammonton Police Department, Detective Russel,
and the unnamed Responding Officers.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s claims arise from two separate incidents. First,
Plaintiff alleges that on October 13, 2019, two unnamed men

1 Plaintiff filed four Complaints [Docket Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5] and two IFP
applications [Docket Nos. 3, 6]. There are no substantial differences between
the different versions of these documents. As such, the Court will rely on
Plaintiff’s most recently filed Complaint [Docket No. 5] and IFP application
[Docket No. 6].
kidnapped him after a home invasion, held him at knifepoint, and
forced him to withdraw cash from an ATM at a 7-Eleven store.
[Docket No. 5 at 5.] Then, Plaintiff alleges, an unnamed police
officer intervened and pursued the kidnappers on foot. [Id.]
Although the unnamed officer apprehended the kidnappers, Plaintiff

claims that the officer released them because he recognized one
kidnapper as the nephew of a candidate running for an unspecified
political office. [Id.] Plaintiff claims he was evaluated and
treated by EMS while the unnamed officer filed a report. [Id.]
According to Plaintiff, the officer then advised Plaintiff to file
a formal complaint at the Police Station. [Id. at 6.]
Plaintiff alleges that for the next three days, he went to
the Police Station to file a formal complaint. [Id.] But Plaintiff
suggests that the dispatcher at the Police Station lied to him
about Detective Russel’s2 whereabouts, such that Plaintiff was
unable to file a formal complaint. [Id.] The Complaint does not
clearly explain why Plaintiff was unable to file a complaint at

the Police Station in the absence of Detective Russel. Nonetheless,
Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he responding officers purposefully
failed to take [the kidnappers] into custody.” [Id. at 8.]
Second, Plaintiff alleges that on March 23, 2020, he was
wrongfully arrested for distribution of a controlled dangerous

2 In his Complaint, Plaintiff does not explain who Detective Russel is or
Detective Russel’s significance to Plaintiff’s case.
substance. [Id. at 6.] Again, the Complaint does not clearly
identify which officer arrested Plaintiff. But Plaintiff claims
that his alleged kidnapper, whose uncle was running for political
office, from the October 13, 2019 incident was the actual culprit
of the crime for which Plaintiff was arrested. [Id.] That,

Plaintiff alleges, was the motivation for his arrest. [Id.]
Plaintiff further alleges that the arresting officers profiled him
based on his criminal record, and as a result, he experienced “pain
and suffering, mental anguish, [and] wrongful incarceration.”
[Id.]
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. IFP Application
When a non-prisoner seeks permission to proceed IFP under 28
U.S.C. § 1915, the applicant must submit an affidavit that includes
a complete list of the applicant’s assets and establishes that the
applicant is unable to pay the requisite fees. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a); Roy v. Penn. Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 14-4277, 2014 WL
4104979, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. Aug. 19, 2014) (internal citations

omitted). The decision to grant or deny an IFP application is based
solely upon the economic eligibility of the applicant. See Sinwell
v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 (3d Cir. 1976).
B. Sua Sponte Dismissal
A complaint filed by a litigant proceeding IFP is subject to
sua sponte dismissal by the Court if the case is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In determining the
sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful to
construe it liberally in favor of the pro se party. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants

still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support
a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d
Cir. 2013) (internal citation omitted). “The legal standard for
dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”
Schreane v. Seana, 506 F.App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)).
To survive a court’s sua sponte screening, a complaint must
allege “sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is
facially plausible.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210
(3d Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d
Cir. 2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
“[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
III. ANALYSIS
A. IFP Application
Plaintiff qualifies for permission to proceed IFP. In his
affidavit, Plaintiff indicates that he has no income, is
unemployed, and has no assets other than his prison account.

[Docket No. 6.] Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff
established that he lacks the financial ability to pay the filing
fee. Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s IFP
Application.
B. Section 1983 Claims
Plaintiff’s claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983
provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress[.]
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To establish a § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must demonstrate a
violation of a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States that was committed by a person acting under the color
of state law.” Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000).
The Court begins its analysis of a plaintiff’s § 1983 claims by
identifying “the exact contours of the underlying right said to
have been violated,” and determining “whether the plaintiff has
alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.” Id.
(quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 (1998)).

1. Pratts’s Claims Against the Hammonton Police
Department
The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the
Hammonton Police Department. Plaintiff alleges that the Hammonton
Police Department violated § 1983 by wrongfully arresting him,
profiling him based on his criminal record, and failing to
investigate his kidnapping. [Docket No. 5 at 6.] But a plaintiff
cannot assert a § 1983 claim against a police department because,
although municipalities and townships may be liable under § 1983,
a police department is “merely an arm of the Township” in which it
is located. Padilla v. Township of Cherry Hill, 110 F.App’x 272,
278 (3d Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
Ordinarily, this Court will interpret a pro se complaint to
state a § 1983 claim against a municipality, even where a plaintiff
failed to name that municipality as a defendant but has otherwise
sufficiently alleged a § 1983 claim against an arm of that
municipality. See Mikhaeil v. Santos, 646 F.App’x 158, 160 (3d
Cir. 2016) (giving a pro se litigant the benefit of “construing
[the] complaint liberally to allege a claim against [the
municipality]” where the plaintiff named the police department as
a defendant). The Court will not do so here, however, because
Plaintiff has not otherwise stated a valid § 1983 claim against
the Town of Hammonton.

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory and lack any
factual basis. To support his claim that officers profiled him
during his arrest, Plaintiff baldly alleges that “[he] was profiled
because of [his] criminal record.” [Docket No. 6 at 6.] Such
conclusory allegations will not suffice. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678; Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210 (stating that a complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially
plausible”). Plaintiff also vaguely suggests-- again without any
factual basis-- that his arrest was motivated by political
corruption. [Docket No. 6 at 5–6.] This too is insufficient.
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges that the Hammonton
Police Department failed to investigate his claims, Plaintiff does

not provide sufficient facts. [See id.] Accordingly, the Court
will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the Hammonton Police
Department for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
2. Pratts’s Claims Against Detective Russel and
Unnamed Responding Officers
The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Detective
Russel and the unnamed Responding Officers for failure to state a
claim. Indeed, Plaintiff again baldly asserts that Detective
Russel profiled Plaintiff based on his criminal record and arrested
Plaintiff because of a political corruption conspiracy.
Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts against the
unnamed Responding Officers that would form the basis for § 1983
liability.
C. Plaintiff’s Pending State Court Matter
Finally, Pratts is a defendant in a pending state court
criminal matter, which arises from the same set of facts as his

Complaint here. Federal district courts have “discretion to
abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a particular claim where
resolution of that claim in federal court would offend principles
of comity by interfering with an ongoing state proceeding.”
Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408
(3d Cir. 2005) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
Younger abstention “applies rarely, in only three exceptional
classes of cases: (1) state criminal prosecutions, (2) civil
enforcement proceedings, and (3) civil proceedings involving
certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state
courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Gonzalez v.
Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 755 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2014)
(citing Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013))
(cleaned up). Because Plaintiff has a pending state criminal
prosecution, this Court will abstain from exercising jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s claims to avoid interfering with an ongoing state

proceeding.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, IT IS on this 15th day of July
2021, hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s IFP Application [Docket No. 6] is
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that the claims against the Hammonton Police
Department are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a
claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); and it is further
ORDERED that the claims against Detective Russel and the
Responding Officers are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to
state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); Plaintiff may
refile his Complaint after resolution of his state court criminal

proceeding if Plaintiff believes he can, in good faith, cure the
pleading deficiencies identified above; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the court shall ADMINISTRATIVELY
TERMINATE this matter, subject to reopening upon this Court’s
screening of a timely filed amended complaint; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve Plaintiff
with copies of this Order via regular mail.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10271012. Public record. Not legal advice.