# CLAUSO v. MARTINELLI

> District Court, D. New Jersey · March 15, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10270307

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** March 15, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10270307

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a defendant’s conduct must be at minimum reckless or callous to impose punitive damages under § 1983

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
______________________________
:
THOMAS JAMES CLAUSO, :
:
Plaintiff, : Civ. No. 18-12217 (NLH) (LHG)
:
v. : OPINION
:
:
:
WARDEN WILLIE BONDS, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
:
______________________________:

APPEARANCES:

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey
Niccole L. Sandora, Deputy Attorney General
Office of the New Jersey Attorney General
R.J. Hughes Justice Complex
PO Box 116
Trenton, NJ 08625

Counsel for Defendants Willie Bonds, Guard Hansen, and
Guard Martinelli

Thomas James Clauso
59252
South Woods State Prison
215 South Burlington Road
Bridgeton, NJ 08302

Plaintiff pro se

HILLMAN, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Willie Bonds’, Guard
Hansen’s, and Guard Martinelli’s (collectively “Defendants”)
motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 47. Plaintiff Thomas
Clauso has filed several letters opposing the motion for summary
judgment. ECF Nos. 56, 58, 59.
For the reasons stated herein, the Court will grant the

motion for summary judgment in part. Summary judgment will be
denied to Guard Hansen on the excessive force claim and to Guard
Martinelli on the denial of showers claim.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff has submitted letters and documentation in
opposition to the motion but no opposing statement of material
facts. As such, the Court accepts Defendants’ statement of
material facts not in dispute (“DSOF”), ECF No. 47-1, as true.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
Plaintiff is a convicted and sentenced state prisoner
currently detained in South Woods State Prison (“SWSP”),
Bridgeton, New Jersey. DSOF ¶ 1. On July 26, 2018, Plaintiff

filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants and
other individuals raising claims regarding the conditions of his
confinement. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. Prior to Plaintiff’s transfer to SWSP
in April 2018, Plaintiff received disciplinary sanctions at
Northern State Prison for prohibited act *.704, perpetrating
frauds, deceptions, confidence games, riots or escape plots, a
category B offense. Id. ¶ 8. The hearing officer imposed 155
days administrative segregation, 155 days loss of computation
time, 20 days loss of recreation privileges, and 10 days loss of
telephone privileges as sanctions. Id. Plaintiff was placed
into SWSP’s Administrative Close Supervisor Unit (“ACSU”) C-Pod
1029 C after his transfer due to the charges from Northern

State. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. “[H]e was housed in ACSU C-Pod 1029 C from
April 19, 2018 to May 27, 2018, and the[n] again from May 28,
2018 to August 22, 2018.” Id. ¶ 9.
According to the complaint,1 Guard Martinelli falsely
claimed that Plaintiff threatened to stab him with a screwdriver
Plaintiff kept in his cell. ECF No. 1 at 16. On or about May
27, officers took Plaintiff to “the rubber room.” Id. at 17.
Sergeant Chard threatened Plaintiff with his “Iron Maiden” and
said they “got the idea from Apartheid.” Id. Plaintiff alleges
Guard Martinelli threatened to chain his face to the toilet.
Id. The disciplinary charges against Plaintiff were later
dropped, but the officers allegedly continued to harass

Plaintiff. Id. at 18. Plaintiff alleged that the officers were
“all racist, Nazis and white Supremacists” and described various
acts of torture against Black people. Id. Plaintiff claims he

1 “Plaintiff’s complaint is lengthy, handwritten, difficult to
read, and may be missing pages. Plaintiff’s allegations in any
event are somewhat unclear – they weave back in on themselves
and it is not always clear whether some repeated allegations
refer to the same incidents or incidents which reoccurred. It
is also difficult to discern from Plaintiff’s complaint the
exact timeline of when Plaintiff was confined to his cell, and
how much of the time that he claims he has been without a shower
or yard time overlaps with his temporary confinement to the
‘rubber room’ in May 2018.” ECF No. 3 at 3 n.1.
informed Administrator Bonds of all this, and Administrator
Bonds responded at one point that if Plaintiff “[kept] it up,”
Administrator Bonds “would have Sgt. Chard finish [him] off.”

Id. at 22-23.
Plaintiff’s complaint also alleges various claims related
to the conditions of his confinement. According to Plaintiff,
Plaintiff was confined to his cell for a period of a few weeks.
During this time, Plaintiff states that he was denied access to
a shower, denied exercise time, denied his walking equipment or
a wheelchair, and was essentially left to fester in his cell by
Chard, Hansen, and Martinelli. Plaintiff further alleges that
the guards refused to turn on the lights in his cell.2
On July 3, 2019, the Court screened the complaint under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e) and permitted a conditions of confinement claim
against Defendants Chard, Goldsborough, Hansen, Martinelli,

Bonds, and Williams; a claim for targeted harassment unrelated
to prison needs by the four guards; a claim for denial of
medical care related to the seizing of his walkers and
wheelchair by the four guards; an excessive force claim against
Goldsborough; and a legal mail claim against Defendants

2 Plaintiff made other allegations against people who are not
parties to the motion for summary judgment. The Court need not
address those claims at this time since Defendants Chard,
Goldsborough, and Williams have not entered an appearance in
this matter.
Goldsborough and Bonds to proceed. ECF No. 3. Defendants
Hansen, Martinelli, and Bonds now move for summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s claims against them. ECF No. 47.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is
satisfied that the materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, or
interrogatory answers, demonstrate that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
An issue is “genuine” if it is supported by evidence such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving
party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). A fact is “material” if, under the governing
substantive law, a dispute about the fact might affect the
outcome of the suit. Id. In considering a motion for summary
judgment, a district court may not make credibility
determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence;
instead, the non-moving party’s evidence “is to be believed and
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”
Marino v. Industrial Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir.
2004)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
Initially, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp.,
477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party has met this burden, the

nonmoving party must identify, by affidavits or otherwise,
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Id. Thus, to withstand a properly supported motion for summary
judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and
affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the moving
party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57. A party opposing summary
judgment must do more than just rest upon mere allegations,
general denials, or vague statements. Saldana v. Kmart Corp.,
260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claims against them should be
dismissed because he failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies. Alternatively, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot
prove his constitutional claims as a matter of law.
A. Failure to Exhaust
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) “mandates that an
inmate exhaust ‘such administrative remedies as are available’
before bringing suit to challenge prison conditions.” Ross v.
Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1854–55 (2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a)). “[T]hat language is ‘mandatory’: An inmate ‘shall’
bring ‘no action’ (or said more conversationally, may not bring
any action) absent exhaustion of available administrative
remedies.” Id. at 1856 (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85
(2007)). “There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory

under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in
court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). This includes
constitutional claims, Woodford, 548 U.S. at 91 n.2, and
“applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and
whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.”
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
Exhaustion under the PLRA must be proper, meaning
“prisoners must ‘complete the administrative review process in
accordance with the applicable procedural rules,’ rules that are
defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process
itself.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218 (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at

88). “A prisoner must exhaust these remedies ‘in the literal
sense[;]’ no further avenues in the prison’s grievance process
should be available.” Smith v. Lagana, 574 F. App’x 130, 131
(3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 232 (3d
Cir. 2004)). “Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense the
defendant must plead and prove[.]” Small v. Camden Cty., 728
F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013).
“As formulated in this Circuit, the failure-to-exhaust
affirmative defense has two distinct stages. The first inquiry
is whether the prison-employee defendants can demonstrate that
the inmate failed to exhaust the on-the-books remedies.” West
v. Emig, 787 F. App’x 812, 814 (3d Cir. 2019). Defendants

present the certification of Edward Hugh Haas, Esq., who is
employed by the State of New Jersey Department of Corrections as
a Legal Specialist in the Office of Legal and Regulatory
Affairs, in support of their motion. Certification of Edward
Hugh Haas, Esq. (“Haas Cert.”), ECF No. 47-7 ¶ 3.
Mr. Haas states “the DOC utilizes a multi-level inmate
remedy system (IRS) to allow inmates access to appropriate
correctional facility staff and administration in order to
obtain information and for the review and potential resolution
of grievances.” Id. ¶ 14. He further certifies that kiosks
maintained by JPay, a privately held corrections-related service
provider, are located within each housing unit of each DOC

facility. Id. “Through the Kiosks, inmates can submit JPay
inquiry forms to obtain information, file grievance forms,
concerns and complaints to correctional facility staff. They
can also file administrative appeals of grievances, which go
directly to the Administrator or Administrator’s designee, to
appeal decisions or findings rendered by correctional facility
staff.” Id.
Mr. Haas describes the internal remedy process at NJSP:
Pursuant to DOC policy, an inmate inquiry form should be
utilized to make routine inquiries to obtain
information. Inquiry forms are to be addressed within
fifteen (15) days. They are not subject to
administrative appeal. If there are additional
questions, the inmate should submit a new inquiry form.
An inmate grievance form should be utilized when there
are circumstances or actions an inmate believes to be
unjust or grounds for complaint. They must be submitted
within ten (10) of the date of the incident/issue unless
it is not possible. Inmates should provide a summary of
details, date, time and individuals involved and
description of the incident. Supportive documents or
other information may be attached. Inmate’s grievance
forms are to be responded to within thirty (30) days.

Pursuant to DOC policy, inmates may appeal a staff
response to a grievance form if he/she is dissatisfied
with the response. This is done by using the appeal
section of the inmate grievance form, to file an
administrative appeal. This must be done within ten
(10) days of the receipt of the disputed grievance
response. The administrator or administrative designee
has ten (10) working days to answer the appeal, excluding
weekends and holidays. The decision or finding of the
Administrator or designee is the final level of review
and the final finding of the New Jersey Department of
Corrections.

Id. ¶¶ 15-16.
Defendants submitted copies of 12 grievances filed by
Plaintiff that pertain to the allegations in the complaint. Id.
¶ 6; ECF No. 47-9. Mr. Haas certifies that “[t]he DOC does not
have any records of Director Bonds receiving any other letters
or information from Clauso.” Hass Cert. ¶ 6.
The Court finds the following grievances to be exhausted:
Grievance SWSP18015934 dated June 16, 2018 alleging inadequate
medical care, ECF No. 47-9 at 6; Grievance SWSP18017252 dated
June 24, 2018 alleging Plaintiff was denied his prescription
skin cream, id. at 8;3 Grievance SWSP18018211 dated June 29,
2018, alleging Guard Hansen was “purposely closing [Plaintiff’s]

skin in the handcuffs”, id. at 9; Grievance SWSP18018374 dated
June 30, 2018, alleging Plaintiff was placed on Camera Watch
without notice and was being denied showers and exercise, id. at
11;4 Grievance SWSP18018844 dated July 3, 2018, alleging Sgt.
Chard and other officers were denying Plaintiff showers and
exercise, id. at 12; and Grievance SWSP18019330 dated July 6,
2018, reiterating the allegation that Plaintiff was being denied
showers, exercise, and legal access, id. at 13. Under NJSP’s
protocols, these are the only claims that have been properly
exhausted. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). The
Court concludes that Plaintiff exhausted his claims that he
received “terrible medical care” and was denied prescribed

3 Defendants argue Grievance SWSP18017252 was not appealed. ECF
No. 47-2 at 16-17. The record indicates Plaintiff appealed on
August 5, 2018 and Administrator Bond responded on August 6,
2018. ECF No. 47-9 at 8. The Court find this claim to have
been exhausted.

4 Defendants argue Grievance SWSP18018374 was not appealed. ECF
No. 47-2 at 18. Plaintiff submitted his grievance on June 30,
2018 and Administrator Bonds responded on August 6, 2018. ECF
No. 47-9 at 11. As the response was more than 30 days from the
filing of the grievance, it is considered exhausted. See
Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148 (3d Cir.
2016). Additionally, the Administrator issued the first
response so the highest authority in the prison has already
addressed the grievance.
medication, that Guard Hansen purposefully used excessive force
in handcuffing him, and that Plaintiff was denied showers and
exercise while on Camera Watch.

Plaintiff did not exhaust his other claims that were
permitted to proceed past this Court’s § 1915 screening:
targeted harassment (excluding the allegation of excessive force
by Guard Hansen), improper seizure of his walkers and
wheelchair, and interference with his legal mail. “[O]nce the
defendant has established that the inmate failed to resort to
administrative remedies, the onus falls on the inmate to show
that such remedies were unavailable to him.” Rinaldi v. United
States, 904 F.3d 257, 268 (3d Cir. 2018). Plaintiff has not
submitted any evidence contradicting Defendants’ assertions;
therefore, the Court considers whether a reasonable factfinder
could conclude that NJSP’s remedies were unavailable to

Plaintiff on the record before the Court.
The Supreme Court has identified at least “three kinds of
circumstances in which an administrative remedy, although
officially on the books,” is not “available” because it is “not
capable of use to obtain relief”: (1) when “it operates as a
simple dead end — with officers unable or consistently unwilling
to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates”; (2) when it is “so
opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use,”
such as when no ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it; or
(3) when “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking
advantage of a grievance process through machination,
misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct.

1850, 1859-60 (2016). The Third Circuit has also found remedies
to be unavailable to inmates when prison officials failed to
comply with their own deadlines for responding to grievances,
Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148 (3d Cir.
2016), and “where an inmate is deterred from pursuing an
administrative grievance by a prison official’s serious threats
of substantial retaliation,” Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 267.
There is no indication that prison officials took
affirmative action to prevent Plaintiff from filing grievances,
whether by intimidation or some other means. Plaintiff filed
several grievances concerning his claims and appealed some of
them to Administrator Bonds. See generally ECF No. 47-9. The

record also indicates that the grievance procedure was not a
“dead end.” Plaintiff received responses from prison staff,
whether by directing him to follow the appropriate procedures or
investigating his allegations. For example, the prison
investigated Plaintiff’s claim that Guard Hansen injured
Plaintiff while handcuffing him. Id. at 9. The investigation
concluded the allegation was “unfounded but nonetheless staff
was reminded about proper protocol and procedure for the
application of restraints.” Id. Plaintiff may not have always
received the result he wanted, but he did receive responses from
staff. Plaintiff’s frequent use of the system, including filing
appeals of initial responses, indicates the system was not too

confusing for a reasonable inmate to use.
There are some grievances where the prison did not comply
with the 30-day response time as stated in the handbook. “‘A
prisoner’s administrative remedies are deemed exhausted when a
valid grievance has been filed and the state’s time for
responding thereto has expired.’” Robinson v. Superintendent
Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148, 153 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Powe v.
Ennis, 177 F.3d 393, 394 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)).
Accordingly, the Court considers Grievance SWSP18008521, filed
May 5, 2018 and responded to June 19, 2018 (37 days) ECF No. 47-
9 at 2, and Grievance SWSP18012498, filed May 26, 2018 and
responded to June 29, 2018 (34 days) id. at 3, to be exhausted.

Based upon the evidence submitted, the Court concludes
Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available prison remedies for
his targeted harassment and interference with his legal mail
claims. Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law
on these claims.
B. Merits
Defendants also move for summary judgment on the merits of
the claims against them. A plaintiff may have a cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of his
constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress ....

§ 1983. Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second,
that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person
acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir.
2011).
Defendants argue they are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim against
Hansen, Martinelli, and Bonds, targeted harassment claims
against Hansen and Martinelli; denial of medical care claims;
and a legal mail claim against Bonds.
1. Denial of Medical Care
Plaintiff alleges Guards Hansen and Martinelli denied him
adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment when
they seized his wheelchair and walker cane. He also alleges
Administrator Bonds was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
“terrible” situation and did not provide Plaintiff with
hydrocerin skin cream.
To prove an Eighth Amendment Claim, a plaintiff must show

that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his or her
serious medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
(1976). To accomplish this, “a plaintiff must make (1) a
subjective showing that ‘the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to [his or her] medical needs’ and (2) an objective
showing that ‘those needs were serious.’” Pearson v. Prison
Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Rouse v.
Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (second alteration in
original)).
“[T]he failure to provide a wheelchair for an inmate may
constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in
some circumstances.” Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 167 (4th

Cir. 1995). The Court concludes there is a factual dispute as
to whether Plaintiff had a serious medical need for a
wheelchair, brace, or cane. Defendants argue that there was no
medical necessity at the relevant time since the order for those
items had expired at the time they were taken. ECF No. 47-9 at
3. They assert that the alert on Plaintiff’s face sheet that
states: “NEED FOR WHEEL CHAIR OR OTHER DEVICE,” ECF No. 47-4 at
2, “was placed on [Plaintiff’s face sheet after medical orders
were entered on September 19, 2018.” ECF No. 57 at 1-2. “Thus,
the medical brace and/or cane were removed from Clauso’s
possession in May 2018 because there was no active medical order
those pieces of equipment at that time. When he filed his

grievance regarding the brace and cane he was advised by the
medical patient advocate that there were no active medical
orders for either.” Id. at 2. “At no time after these items
were deemed medically necessary was Clauso denied access to
those items, nor does he allege he was denied access aside from
this May 2018 incident prior to the medical alerts being in
place.” Id.
However, Plaintiff submitted copies of medical records
dated May 3, 2018 which includes a reference to an order for a
“wheelchair [EQ021].” ECF No. 58 at 8. This predates the May
26, 2018 grievance about the seizure of the items. He also
provided records from East Jersey State Prison dated June 21,

2016 that state “Per Medical Dpt I/M has cane permanent . . . .”
Id. at 9. There are also orders that indicated a wheelchair was
necessary in March 2018, before it was seized in May 2018. ECF
No. 57-2 at 4. The conflicting medical records indicate there
is a genuine dispute as to the objective prong of the Eighth
Amendment analysis.
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment despite this
dispute because there is no evidence the officers acted with
deliberate indifference. “Deliberate indifference is a
‘subjective standard of liability consistent with recklessness
as that term is defined in criminal law.’” Natale v. Camden
Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting

Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 811 (3d Cir. 2000)). Assuming
there was a current order for a medical device in May 2108,
Plaintiff must submit more than a scintilla of evidence that
Guards Hansen and Martinelli actually knew of and intentionally
ignored that order; it is not enough to say they should have
known of its existence. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38. “[A]n
official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he
should have perceived but did not, while no cause for
commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the
infliction of punishment.” Id. at 838. Plaintiff has not
provided any evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that Hansen and Martinelli were deliberately

indifferent to his need for the devices. The Court will grant
summary judgment on this claim.
The Court will also grant summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
vague claim of “terrible” medical care. Plaintiff submitted a
grievance directed to Administrator Bonds stating “this
situation with medical is [terrible] . . . .” ECF No. 47-9 at
6. There is no clarification what the “situation” is other than
mentioning someone had cursed at him and “dose’nt [sic] care
about who my people calls about my health[.]” Id. The person
accused of providing poor care is not a defendant. A general
accusation of a terrible situation does not prove a serious
medical condition. Plaintiff’s grievance does not explain what

medical treatment was being denied or how the situation was
“terrible” other than objecting to the person’s demeanor.
Administrator Bonds noted in his response that he was
forwarding Plaintiff’s complaint to the Patient Advocate and
gave Plaintiff the contact information for the Statewide Patient
Advocate. Id. In the absence of a more specific complaint,
directing Plaintiff to the Patient Advocate does not indicate
deliberate indifference. See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313,
337 (3d Cir. 2016) (“The written responses to those grievance
show that the prison officials ensured that [plaintiff] was
under the care of medical personnel and being treated, and
therefore that the officials were not deliberately

indifferent.”). Summary judgment is appropriate for all
Defendants as there is no allegation against Hansen and
Martinelli and there is no evidence that Administrator Bonds was
deliberately indifferent.
Plaintiff’s third medical complaint is that Administrator
Bonds did not ensure Plaintiff was given hydrocerin cream for a
skin condition. Plaintiff stated in his grievance that he
sustained severe damage to his skin while deployed overseas and
had been treated with hydrocerin. ECF No. 47-9 at 8. “All of a
sudden my hydrocerin has been abruptly replaced with mentholated
cream irritates, burns, and aggravates my skin condition.” Id.
Staff responded that the hydrocerin order expired three weeks

prior. Id.
Defendants’ evidence indicates the skin cream had only been
prescribed on a temporary basis: “Hydrocerin is an ‘as needed’
Rx and you will need to submit an MR007 if you’d like to speak
with medical about renewing it. If your provider determines
that this cream is medically necessary, it will be re-ordered
for you.” Id. Plaintiff’s medical team determined that only a
temporary prescription was necessary, and “when medical care is
provided, we presume that the treatment of a prisoner is proper
absent evidence that it violates professional standards of
care.” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d
Cir. 2017). Plaintiff also has not produced evidence that

decision to switch medications “was based on an ulterior motive
beyond routine patient care within the confines of the prison’s
policies.” Fortune v. Hamberger, 379 F. App’x 116, 123 (3d Cir.
2010); see also White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir.
1990) (doctor’s choice of one drug over another is not
actionable).
Moreover, there is no evidence from which a reasonable
juror could conclude that Administrator Bonds, who is not a
medical provider, would have had reason to believe the medical
staff was not treating Plaintiff appropriately. See Spruill v.
Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004) (“If a prisoner is
under the care of medical experts . . . , a non-medical prison

official will generally be justified in believing that the
prisoner is in capable hands.”). Plaintiff told Administrator
Bonds via grievance appeal that “I still need the forementioned
cream. I had no success with the nurse,” and Administrator
Bonds forwarded Plaintiff’s request to the medical staff. ECF
No. 49-9 at 8. This “show[s] that the prison officials ensured
that [plaintiff] was under the care of medical personnel and
being treated, and therefore that the officials were not
deliberately indifferent.” Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313,
337 (3d Cir. 2016). “[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual
knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are
mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison

official . . . will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment
scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.” Spruill, 372
F.3d at 236.
The Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s denial of medical
care claims because a reasonable factfinder could not conclude
from the evidence that Defendants were deliberately indifferent
to any serious medical need.
2. Conditions of Confinement
“The Constitution ‘does not mandate comfortable prisons,’
but neither does it permit inhumane ones and it is now settled

that ‘the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the
conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny
under the Eighth Amendment.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
832 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981);
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). “The Eighth
Amendment imposes duties on prison officials to ‘provide humane
conditions of confinement’ and ‘ensure that inmates receive
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.’” Barndt v.
Wenerowicz, 698 F. App’x 673, 676–77 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832). “To establish an Eighth Amendment
conditions of confinement claim, [Plaintiff] must show that (1)
the deprivation alleged was objectively, ‘sufficiently serious’

such that the prison officials’ acts or omissions resulted in
the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities’; and (2) that the prison officials exhibited a
‘deliberate indifference’ to his health and safety.” Id. at 677
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
a. Placement on Constant and Camera Watch
Plaintiff alleges that he was put in the Administrative
Close Supervision Unit (“ACSU”) when Guard Martinelli made a
false accusation that Plaintiff had threatened to kill him with
a screwdriver. ECF No. 1 at 16. Eventually a nurse came by to
ask him questions about his mental health.5 Id. “[A] nurse came
to my cell said I got to answer mental health questions I said I

would not answer questions in front of the guards.” Id. At
some point thereafter Hansen, Sgt. Chard, and others placed
Plaintiff into a “rubber room.” Id. at 19. Plaintiff claims he
was put on constant watch for no reason whatsoever.
“As defined by DOC Policy, ‘Constant Watch status’ is the
term used for the procedures used by the DOC to manage suicidal
or potentially suicidal inmates consistent with security
requirements and accepted mental health practices. It is the
uninterrupted observance of an inmate either in person or by
video monitor.” Haas Cert. ¶ 10. “Pursuant to DOC policy
regarding Constant Watch status, when an inmate demonstrates or
reports a risk of self-destructive behavior, the inmate will be

placed on Constant Watch status until the inmate is evaluated by
the mental health staff. Any staff member, whether clinical,
custody or administrative has the authority to place an inmate
on watch when such behavior is observed.” Id.
Defendants state Plaintiff was in the ACSU from May 2018 to
August 2018. Id. ¶ 7. Mr. Haas certifies that “Clauso was
placed on Constant Watch from May 27, 2018 to May 29, 2018 after

5 The timeline of events is not entirely clear from the
complaint. See supra note 1.
failing to contract for safety, meaning he refused to agree that
he was not a danger to himself or others.” Id. ¶ 11. A
psychologist authorized this placement. DSOF ¶ 20. Plaintiff

received “a suicide gown, suicide blanket, a suicide mattress
and finger foods,” Haas Cert. ¶ 12, and he was evaluated daily,
ECF No. 48. Plaintiff was released from Constant Watch status
on May 29, 20186 after the psychologist evaluated Plaintiff and
Plaintiff affirmed that he was not a danger to himself or
others. Haas Cert. ¶ 11. Afterwards, he was placed on “camera
watch”, which “can be used only after an inmate has been on
constant watch. . . . [T]his type of watch involves
intermittent observation of an inmate, either by video or in
person, in variables not to exceed 15 minutes.” Id. ¶ 13.
Plaintiff has not proved an Eighth Amendment claim based on
his time on camera and close watch. The evidence before the

Court indicates Plaintiff was placed on Constant Watch for his
safety because he refused to state he was not a danger to
himself or others. Plaintiff does “not state any facts that, if
proven, would show that [he] was denied one of life’s minimal
necessities. At most, the facts that [Plaintiff] did plead
allow the potential inference that he suffered or perceived

6 The Court presumes the May 29, 2019 date in Mr. Haas’
certification is an error as the medical records provided are
for May 2018.
inconvenience, discomfort, and stigma due to [Defendants’]
decision to implement a suicide watch . . . .” Smith v. Bolava,
632 F. App’x 683, 687 (3d Cir. 2015). “Rather than denying a

human need, a suicide watch is canonically understood as
protecting inmates who are vulnerable to self-harm.” Id. The
Court shall grant summary judgment to Defendants on this claim.
b. Denial of Shower Access
Plaintiff further alleges that Hansen and Martinelli would
not let Plaintiff take showers for at least two weeks.
Plaintiff allegedly developed a rash because of not being able
to take showers. ECF No. 1 at 23. The Court concludes there is
a factual dispute precluding summary judgment on this claim.
“[R]easonable access to safe bathing . . . constitute[s] a
component of civilized living . . . .” Partelow v.
Massachusetts, 442 F. Supp. 2d 41, 50 (D. Mass. 2006). The

parties agree that Plaintiff did not take a shower for a period
of time but dispute the length and the reason why. Defendants
submit copies of the ASCU shower log in support of their motion.
ECF No. 47-10. According to the logbook, Plaintiff refused to
take a shower on June 22 and July 2, 4, 6, 9, and 11 in 2018.
Id. at 13-15. Plaintiff’s name does not appear in the book for
the June 28, 2018 shower date. Id. at 12-13. Defendants argue
that Plaintiff chose not to take a shower for seven days, which
is not enough time to rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. ECF No. 47-2 at 34. Plaintiff denies refusing
showers and states he was intentionally kept from the showers
for seventeen days. Plaintiff produced copies of medical

records wherein the medical professional documented Plaintiff’s
consistent allegation that “he has been kept from showering for
17 days- including today [July 13, 2018]. He denied ever
refusing a shower.” ECF No. 56 at 2. The logbook indicates
Plaintiff took a shower on July 13. ECF No. 47-10 at 16.
This dispute is central to the deliberate indifference
claim, and “courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in
favor of the party seeking summary judgment.” Tolan v. Cotton,
572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014). Accepting Plaintiff’s version of
events as true, a reasonable juror could conclude that denying
Plaintiff access to showers for seventeen days in summertime,
causing a skin condition, violates basic human dignity. Cf.

Fortune v. Hamberger, 379 F. App’x 116, 122 (3d Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) (finding that fifteen days without shower did not
violate Eighth Amendment when plaintiff did not “suffer[] any
harm as a result of the denial of additional showers”).
A reasonable juror could make a reasonable inference of
deliberate indifference by Guard Martinelli. The logbook
reflects he was on duty several times when Plaintiff did not
shower. See ECF No. 47-10 at 12-16. Accepting Plaintiff’s
version as true for summary judgment purposes, a reasonable
juror could conclude Guard Martinelli evidenced a culpable state
of mind when he falsified the logbook to state Plaintiff refused
a shower. There is nothing indicating Guard Hansen was on duty,

however. Id. Therefore, a reasonable juror could not find that
Guard Hansen disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health
or safety. The Court will deny summary judgment to Guard
Martinelli and grant summary judgment to Guard Hansen.
Plaintiff asserts that “Willie Bonds knows all the above,”
ECF No. 1 at 21, but the only “evidence” is Administrator Bonds’
responses to Plaintiff’s grievances. ECF No. 47-9 at 11-12. “A
warden’s participation in the review of a grievance is
insufficient to establish personal involvement . . . .”
Robinson v. Green, No. 12-1212, 2012 WL 5401079, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 5, 2012) (citing Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d
Cir. 1993)). There is no evidence that Administrator Bonds

directed Guard Martinelli to deny Plaintiff showers. The Court
will grant summary judgment to Administrator Bonds on this
claim.
c. Targeted Harassment
Plaintiff alleges a harassment campaign by various SWSP
guards; however, most of those allegations are against
defendants who are not a party to this motion. The only
incidents attributed to the moving Defendants are an allegation
of excessive force against Guard Hansen for purposefully
injuring Plaintiff while handcuffing him and a statement in
Plaintiff’s complaint that Guard Martinelli threatened to chain
Plaintiff to the toilet. As there is no evidence outside of

Plaintiff’s complaint that supports his claim that Guard
Martinelli threatened him and there is no evidence supporting a
claim that Guard Martinelli participated in an ongoing
harassment campaign, the Court will grant summary judgment to
Guard Martinelli on this claim.
“SCO Hansen is purposefully closing my skin in the
handcuffs. My wrists are bruised and lacerated. I know this is
intentional because SCO Hansen was trained to properly cuff
inmates. Yet, he does this every time that he cuffs me.” ECF
No. 47-9 at 9. On June 29, 2018, Plaintiff showed the “small
cuts on both wrists” during a medical visit and stated that
“this is happening each and every time he is handcuffed by a

specific officer.” ECF No. 56 at 3. Prison staff investigated
Plaintiff’s allegation and concluded the “allegations were
unfounded but nonetheless staff was reminded about proper
protocol and procedure for the application of restraints.” ECF
No. 47-9 at 9.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from
unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain in a manner that
offends contemporary standards of decency. See Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 347 (1981). In an excessive force claim under the Eighth
Amendment, the inquiry is whether force was applied in a good
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously

and sadistically to cause harm. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34,
40 (2010). “Thus, courts considering a prisoner’s claim must
ask both if ‘the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable
state of mind’ and if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively
‘harmful enough’ to establish a constitutional violation.”
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
298, 303 (1991)).
The Court will deny summary judgment to Guard Hansen on
this claim. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, Guard Hansen repeatedly placed handcuffs on Plaintiff
in a manner that left bruises and cuts on Plaintiff’s wrists. A
social worker documented cuts to Plaintiff’s wrists on June 29,

2018. ECF No. 56 at 3. A jury could conclude that Guard Hansen
intentionally inflicted the injuries because he did so again and
again. “[T]he absence of significant resulting injury is not a
per se reason for dismissing a claim based on alleged wanton and
unnecessary use of force against a prisoner. Although the
extent of an injury provides a means of assessing the legitimacy
and scope of the force, the focus always remains on the force
used (the blows).” Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 108 (3d Cir.
2000).
In assessing the use of force, Courts must consider: “(1)
the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship
between the need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the

extent of injury inflicted; (4) the extent of the threat to the
safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by
responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them;
and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful
response.” Id. at 106 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
321 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants have
not addressed these factors, nor have they addressed the
“particular criteria relevant to the use of excessive force
test” that apply when mechanical restraints were used. Young v.
Martin, 801 F.3d 172, 180 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730 (2002)); therefore, they have not shown that they
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The Court will deny summary judgment to Guard Hansen on
this claim and will grant summary judgment to Guard Martinelli
and Administrator Bonds.
d. Denial of Recreation Time and Adequate Light

Plaintiff’s final Eighth Amendment claims against moving
Defendants are allegations that they denied him recreation time
and adequate light while in the ASCU. The Court will grant
summary judgment to Defendants on these claims.
“Where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at
trial, the moving party may meet its burden by showing that the
admissible evidence contained in the record would be

insufficient to carry the nonmoving party’s burden of proof.”
Ins. Co. of Greater New York v. Fire Fighter Sales & Serv. Co.,
120 F. Supp. 3d 449, 456 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (citing Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). “The nonmoving party
cannot defeat a well-supported motion for summary judgment by
simply reasserting unsupported factual allegations contained in
his or her pleadings.” Id.
Defendants have submitted evidence in the form of Mr. Haas’
certification that “the office in the LCP has control of the
lighting in each cell. However, there is always a ‘night light’
on in each cell, that is not controlled by the officer, such
that no inmate is ever without light.” Haas Cert. ¶ 19.

Medical records indicate that a nurse investigated Plaintiff’s
claim he had no light and received confirmation that “the light
in his cell was indeed already on.” ECF No. 48 at 11.
Plaintiff has produced nothing to contradict this evidence.
Defendants have also put forth evidence that Plaintiff was
not unconstitutionally deprived of recreation time. “There is
no question that meaningful recreation ‘is extremely important
to the psychological and physical well-being of the inmates.’”
Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1031 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting
Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979)).
Defendants’ uncontradicted evidence indicates Plaintiff had
recreational time while in the ACSU except for when he lost

recreation privileges as the result of being adjudicated guilty
in disciplinary proceedings. ECF No. 47-4 at 11, 27; DSOF ¶¶
29-30. Plaintiff has produced no evidence to contradict this.
“[S]ummary judgment is essentially ‘put up or shut up’ time
for the non-moving party: the non-moving party must rebut the
motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on
assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral
argument.” Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195,
201 (3d Cir. 2006). The “nonmoving party must adduce more than
a mere scintilla of evidence in its favor, and cannot simply
reassert factually unsupported allegations contained in its
pleadings.” Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d

458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989) (internal citation and footnote
omitted). Plaintiff has produced no evidence, let alone more
than a scintilla, to create an issue of fact on his inadequate
lighting and denial of recreation claims. Therefore, the Court
will grant summary judgment to Defendants on these claims.
3. Interference with Legal Mail and Access to the Courts
Plaintiff brings a claim of interference with his legal
mail against Administrator Bonds. He also asserts Defendants
violated his right of access to the courts by refusing to let
him make telephone calls. As discussed supra, Plaintiff did not
exhaust these claims in his administrative remedies. Although
that alone warrants summary judgment, the Court notes that the

claims would fail on their merits as well.
The Constitution permits prisons to restrict prisoners’
right to send and receive mail for legitimate penological
interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). However,
“prisoners, by virtue of their incarceration, ‘do not forfeit
their First Amendment right to use of the mails,’ and . . . a
‘pattern and practice of opening properly marked incoming
[legal] mail outside an inmate’s presence infringes
communication protected by the right to free speech.’” Jones v.
Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 358 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Bieregu v.
Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1452 (3d Cir. 1995)) (alteration in
original). Prisoners’ legal mail is accorded heightened

protection because “opening properly marked court mail . . .
chills protected expression and may inhibit the inmate’s ability
to speak, protest, and complain openly, directly, and without
reservation with the court.” Id. at 358–59 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Plaintiff’s (unexhausted) grievance states that he “mailed
legal mail to the District Court in Camden, the Third Circuit,
and to Rutgers (medical). Yet, to date I have received no mail
receipts indicating that my mail has been delivered.” ECF No.
47-9 at 10. Dianna Sheehan responded: “We can only send in
receipts that we have received back.” Id. Plaintiff has not
provided any evidence from which a reasonable juror could

conclude Administrator Bonds had anything to do with this
incident. Moreover, a single incident of interfering with legal
mail is not enough to prove a First Amendment claim absent
evidence of improper motive. See Gibson v. Erickson, 830 F.
App’x 372, 373 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam); Thompson v.
Ferguson, No. 19-4580, 2020 WL 7872629, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 31,
2020). Plaintiff has produced no such evidence, so the Court
will grant summary judgment to Administrator Bonds.
Plaintiff’s vague allegation of denial of legal access,
which the Court presumes refers to his unexhausted claim in
Grievance SWSP18016475 that he was not able to make a legal
telephone call, ECF No. 47-9 at 7, does not meet the standard

for a denial of access to the courts. For his access to the
courts claim, Plaintiff must prove that “he has suffered an
actual injury to his ability to present a claim. A prisoner can
show an actual injury only when a nonfrivolous, arguable claim
is lost.” Henry v. Moore, 500 F. App’x 115, 117 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002); Lewis
v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352–54 (1996)). Additionally, “the
claim must relate to either a direct or collateral challenge to
the prisoner’s sentence or conditions of confinement [and] a
prisoner must demonstrate that no other remedy will potentially
compensate for the lost claim.” Id. (internal citations
omitted); see also Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355 (“Impairment of any

other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and
perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and
incarceration.”). Plaintiff has not produced evidence on either
of these requirements, i.e., he has not shown that the inability
to make phone calls caused him to lose a direct or collateral
challenge to his sentence or conditions of confinement. The
Court will therefore grant summary judgment on this claim.
4. Summary
In conclusion, the Court will deny summary judgment to
Guard Hansen on the excessive force claim and to Guard
Martinelli on the denial of showers claim. The Court will grant
summary judgment on the remainder of the claims and dismiss

Administrator Bonds from this action.
C. Qualified Immunity
Defendants further assert they are entitled to qualified
immunity on Plaintiff’s claims. “[O]fficers are entitled to
qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a
federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the
unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly established at the
time.’” D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (quoting
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). The first prong
of the analysis “asks whether the facts, [t]aken in the light
most favorable to the party asserting the injury, ... show the
officer’s conduct violated a [federal] right[.]” Tolan v.

Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-56 (2014) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted) (alterations and omissions in original).
The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff does not show a constitutional violation of his Eighth
Amendment right to adequate medical care or his First Amendment
rights to legal mail or access to the courts. Nor does the
evidence indicate a violation of Plaintiff’s right to be free
from cruel and unusual conditions of confinement because of
inadequate lighting, lack of recreation time, or arbitrary close
watch placement. As these claims fail on the first prong,
Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity as well as
judgment on the merits for these claims.

The Court will deny qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s claim
that Guard Martinelli deliberately deprived him of basic hygiene
and that Guard Hansen used excessive force against him at this
time because there are disputed issues of fact for those claims.
Specifically, it is a matter of dispute how long Plaintiff was
denied showers, whether he intentionally refused to take
showers, and the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s handcuff
injuries. Although the Court is cognizant of the need for
resolution of qualified immunity questions at the earliest
possible stage of litigation, the Court cannot do so until all
the material historical facts are no longer in dispute. “Just
as the granting of summary judgment is inappropriate when a

genuine issue exists as to any material fact, a decision on
qualified immunity will be premature when there are unresolved
disputes of historical fact relevant to the immunity analysis.”
Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2002). After a jury
has decided the remaining factual issues, the Court will
reconsider whether qualified immunity is warranted.
D. Damages
Defendants ask the Court to dismiss any claims Plaintiff
may have for punitive, compensatory, and emotional distress
damages. The Court declines to do so.
Under § 1983, a defendant whose conduct demonstrates a
reckless or callous indifference toward others’ rights may be

liable for punitive damages. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56
(1983) (stating that a jury may award punitive damages when a
“defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or
intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to
the federally protected rights of others”); Savarese v. Agriss,
883 F.2d 1194, 1204 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that a defendant’s
conduct must be at minimum reckless or callous to impose
punitive damages under § 1983). The Third Circuit “has
explained that the term ‘reckless indifference’ refers to the
defendant’s knowledge that he ‘may be acting in violation of
federal law.’” Whittaker v. Fayette Cty., 65 F. App’x 387, 393
(3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 431 (3d

Cir. 2000)). A reasonable jury could decide on the record
before the Court that Defendants were aware that they were
violating Plaintiff’s federally protected rights. This is
therefore a question for the jury. See Coleman v. Rahija, 114
F.3d 778, 787 (3d Cir. 1997).
“It is well settled that compensatory damages under § 1983
are governed by general tort-law compensation theory. In other
words, ‘damages are available under [§ 1983] for actions found .
. . to have been violative of . . . constitutional rights and to
have caused compensable injury . . . .’” Allah v. Al-Hafeez,
226 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247, 255 (1978) (alteration and omissions in original)).

The Supreme Court has held “that substantial damages may only be
awarded to compensate for actual injury suffered as a result of
the violation of a constitutional right.” Id. (citing Memphis
Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986)); see
also Carey, 435 U.S. at 248 (compensatory damages may not be
awarded absent proof of actual injury).
Plaintiff has actual costs associated with the two claims
that the Court will send to the jury. Giving Plaintiff the
benefit of all reasonable inferences on summary judgment,
Plaintiff has medical co-pays and prescription costs that are
directly associated with the denial of showers and handcuff
injuries. ECF No. 56 at 6. The Court will not dismiss these

claims at this time.
However, the Court will dismiss any claims for mental or
emotional damages. Section 1997e bars compensatory damages for
mental and emotional injuries in § 1983 cases brought by
prisoners “without a prior showing of physical injury or the
commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of Title
18).” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). “[R]eading 1997e(e) to allow a
plaintiff to allege any physical injury, no matter how minor,
would produce an unintended (indeed absurd) result.” Mitchell
v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 535 (3d Cir. 2003). The Third Circuit
has held that prisoners subject to § 1997e must show “a less-
than-significant-but-more-than-de minimis physical injury as a

predicate to allegations of emotional injury.” Id. at 536.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the
evidence before the Court indicates Plaintiff developed a skin
condition as a result of being denied access to the shower and
received “small cuts” and bruises from Guard Hansen’s handcuffs.
There is no evidence to suggest these physical symptoms are more
than de minimus; therefore, Plaintiff does not qualify for
damages as the result of mental and emotional injuries.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court will deny
summary judgment to Guard Hansen on the excessive force claim

and to Guard Martinelli on the denial of showers claim. The
Court will grant summary judgment on the remainder of the claims
and dismiss Administrator Bonds from this action. The Court
will also dismiss any claim for damages as the result of mental
and emotional injuries.
An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: March 15, 2021 s/ Noel L. Hillman
At Camden, New Jersey NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10270307. Public record. Not legal advice.