# BROWN v. EDWARDS

> District Court, D. New Jersey · January 20, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10269763

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** January 20, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

:
ROSS W. BROWN, :
:
Petitioner, : Civil Action No.
: 20-14648 (JMV)
v. :
: OPINION
DIRECTOR EDWARDS, :
:
Respondent. :
:
VAZQUEZ, District Judge:
Petitioner, a state pretrial detainee, has filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (D.E. 1.) The Court ordered an expedited response,1 and Respondent filed a
motion to dismiss this matter for Petitioner’s failure to exhaust his state court remedies. (D.E. 19.)
Petitioner did not file an opposition. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Respondent’s
motion and dismiss the Petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from Petitioner’s pre-trial detention at the Hudson County Jail. As a person
with many preexisting conditions, Petitioner contends that Respondent’s handling of the COVID-
19 pandemic violate Petitioner’s rights.
By way of background, on June 9, 2019, Petitioner allegedly pushed an individual at a café
in Newark, New Jersey, and stole her laptop and cellphone. A Grand Jury returned an indictment

1 Respondent had missed his original deadline as there was confusion as to which state office
would be handling this matter. Ultimately, the Hudson and Essex County Prosecutor’s Offices
entered the case, and the Court granted an extension of time to respond for good cause shown.
(D.E. 17).
charging Petitioner with second degree robbery in violation of N.J.S. § 2C:15-1. (D.E. 18-1.) Later
that month, the State moved for pretrial detention. (D.E. 18-1.) Following a hearing, the New
Jersey Superior Court found that no amount of bail or non-monetary release conditions would
reasonably assure Petitioner’s appearance in court, the safety of the victims and the community,

or that Petitioner would not obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice. (D.E. 18-2.)
In arriving at that conclusion, the court considered, among other things, Petitioner’s Public
Safety Assessment (“PSA”). The PSA indicated that Petitioner’s risk of failure to appear and risk
of engaging in new criminal activity were each at level six, the maximum. (D.E. 18-2, at 10–11;
D.E. 18-3, at 18). In particular, Petitioner had seven prior disorderly persons convictions, two
indictable convictions for theft, and one violent conviction for aggravated assault. (D.E. 18-3, at
18–20.) As to his risk of failing to appear, Petitioner had failed to appear five times in the past
two years and an additional eleven times before. (Id.) Consequently, that court ordered Petitioner’s
pretrial detention. (Id. at 22.) Petitioner appealed the detention order, and the New Jersey
Appellate Division affirmed on November 22, 2019. (D.E. 18-5.) Petitioner did not seek

certification from the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
On September 23, 2020, Petitioner, through his public defender, filed a motion to reopen
detention. (D.E. 18-6.) Petitioner argued that the indefinite postponement of jury trials due to
COVID-19 violated his due process and speedy trial rights. (Id.) Petitioner did not, however,
challenge the conditions of his confinement in that motion. The State filed an opposition, and that
motion remains pending before the trial court. (D.E. 19.)
On or about October 19, 2020, Petitioner filed the instant Petition, arguing that the
conditions of his confinement are unconstitutional and seeking his release. (D.E. 1, at 6–7.) He
contends that he is at risk of severe illness from COVID-19 because he is obese, has asthma, and
has a variety of mental illnesses. (Id.) Petitioner also maintains that because of the pandemic, he
is isolated at the jail for approximately twenty-two hours per day, which exacerbates his mental
illnesses. (Id.)
According to Petitioner, the jail “has not undertaken efforts to permit social distancing,

increase general cleaning, monitor detainee[s’] health, [or] provide ongoing medical treatment,
including testing, to detainees who exhibit symptoms consistent with COVID-19.” (Id. at 9.)
Additionally, Petitioner maintains that his detention violates his due process and speedy trial rights.
(Id. at 6–7.) In response, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss this matter for Petitioner’s failure
to exhaust his state court remedies, and Petitioner did not file a reply. (D.E. 19.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading requirements.” McFarland v.
Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). A petition must “specify all the grounds for relief” and set forth
“facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 2(c) (amended Dec.
1, 2004), applicable to § 2241 petitions through Habeas Rule 1(b). A court addressing a petition

for writ of habeas corpus “shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent
to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the
applicant or person detained is not entitled there.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
Thus, “[f]ederal courts . . . [may] dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears
legally insufficient on its face.” McFarland, 512 U.S. at 856. More specifically, a district court
may “dismiss a [habeas] petition summarily when it plainly appears from the face of the petition
and any exhibits . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314,
320 (1996).
III. DISCUSSION
Respondent contends that the Court should dismiss this matter for Petitioner’s failure to
exhaust his state court remedies. Generally, federal habeas corpus is primarily a post-conviction
remedy for state prisoners. Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 441–42 (3d Cir. 1975). Although

this court has “jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to issue a writ of habeas corpus before a
criminal judgment is entered against an individual in state court,” see id., courts should exercise
that jurisdiction “sparingly” in order to prevent federal pretrial interference of “’the normal
functioning of state criminal processes.’” Duran v. Thomas, 393 F. App’x 3, 4 (3d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Moore, 515 F.3d at 445–46).
Consequently, district courts should not exercise pretrial habeas jurisdiction without the
exhaustion of state court remedies, unless the detainee presents extraordinary circumstances. See
id.; Jackson Bey v. Daniels, No. 19-16374, 2019 WL 4749822, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2019).
Exhaustion requires petitioners to have fairly presented each federal ground raised in their petition
to each level of the New Jersey state courts, including the Supreme Court of New Jersey. See

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999); Muhammad v. Cohen, No. 12-6836, 2013 WL
588144, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 13, 2013). Without extraordinary circumstances, a district court should
only exercise pretrial habeas jurisdiction if the “petitioner makes a special showing of the need for
such adjudication and has exhausted [his] state remedies.” Daniels, 2019 WL 4749822, at *1
(emphasis added) (citing Moore, 515 F.2d at 443; Sampson v. Ortiz, No. 17-1298, 2017 WL
4697049, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2017)).
With those principles in mind, Petitioner has not exhausted his state court remedies as to
any of his claims. Although Petitioner, through counsel, raised COVID-19 related due process
and speedy trial claims in his motion to reopen pretrial detention, that motion remains pending
before the trial court. As a result, it does not appear that Petitioner has presented those claims to
the Appellate Division or to the Supreme Court of New Jersey. To the extent Petitioner contends
that the trial court should dismiss his indictment or that the conditions of his confinement violate
his constitutional rights, Petitioner concedes that he has not presented these grounds, or any of the

other grounds in the Petition, “in all appeals that were available to [him].” (Id. at 6–7.)
In one of his letters to the Court, Petitioner appears to believe that presenting any claim to
the Appellate Division is sufficient to exhaust his state court remedies, but he is incorrect. (D.E.
11.) Petitioner must present each of his claims at each level of the state courts, including the
Supreme Court of New Jersey. See O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. 838; Muhammad, 2013 WL 588144, at
*2.
Nor does Petitioner allege any extraordinary circumstances that would justify pretrial
habeas jurisdiction or provide a basis for this Court to intervene in his state criminal proceedings.
See Ashford v. Briggs, No. 20-01118, 2020 WL 5548716, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2020) (finding
that COVID-19 related issues do not constitute extraordinary circumstances); Galloway v. Walton,

No. 20-611, 2020 WL 3977376, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 14, 2020) (same); Milbourne v. Smith, No.
20-0012, 2020 WL 2744608, at *3 (D.N.J. May 27, 2020) (same).
Just as Petitioner seeks emergency relief before this Court, he could seek such relief or
otherwise challenged the conditions of his confinement in the state courts. See, e.g., Malloy v. Dist.
Attorney of Montgomery Cty., No. 20-1804, 2020 WL 2571170, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 21, 2020)
(dismissing a petition for failure to exhaust, in a COVID-19 case, where the “Petition contains no
suggestion that Petitioner has attempted to exhaust the state court process through emergency
motion or petition to the state trial or appellate courts.”); see also Bussinger v. Gramp, No. 20-
5600, 2020 WL 2989080, at *2 (D.N.J. June 3, 2020).
As Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state court remedies as to any of his claims and
because he has not shown extraordinary circumstances, the Court declines to exercise pretrial
habeas jurisdiction and will dismiss the Petition.
IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Generally, federal prisoners do not require a certificate of appealability to appeal decisions
arising from petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See, e.g., Day v. Nash, 191 F. App’x 137, 139
(3d Cir. 2006). State pre-trial detainees, however, must obtain a certificate of appealability to
challenge “the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of
arises out of a process issued by a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Stepney v. Anderson,
No. 20-2476, 2020 WL 2079241, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2020).
“When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching
the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim,” a certificate of appealability “should issue when
the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states
a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000)).
For the reasons discussed above, jurists of reason would not find it debatable that Petitioner
has failed to exhaust his state court remedies and that the Court should not exercise pretrial habeas
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the Petition without prejudice for failure
to exhaust. A certificate of appealability shall not issue. An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: 1/20/2021
~ — yO ©. \f i
5 \
JOHN MICHAEL al
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10269763. Public record. Not legal advice.