# HASLER v. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF PRISONS

> District Court, D. New Jersey · December 7, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10269650

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** December 7, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10269650

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate his right to habeas relief custody credit against his federal sentence

## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
SAMUEL HASLER, : CIV. NO. 20-1164 (RMB)
:
Petitioner :
:
v. : OPINION
:
WARDEN, FCI FORT DIX, :
:
Respondent :
BUMB, United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon Petitioner Samuel
Hasler’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
challenging the calculation of his sentence by the Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”) (Pet., Dkt. No. 1); Petitioner’s Motion to Amend
(Mot. to Amend, Dkt. No. 4); Respondent’s Answer to Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Dkt. No. 5), Petitioner’s Motion
to Strike and/or Tender of Petitioner's Response to Respondent's
Answer (“Mot. to Strike/Reply Brief,” Dkt. No. 6); and Petitioner’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Mot. for Summ. J., Dkt. No. 7.)
Petitioner alleges the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) failed to award
him prior custody credit for nine months and eight days that he
spent housed in a Volunteers of America (“VOA”) facility. (Pet.,
Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3-8.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court
will grant Petitioner’s motion to amend and deny Petitioner’s
motion to strike and his motion for summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Petitioner’s Arrest, Conviction and Sentence
On March 9, 2010, Petitioner was arrested by Immigrations and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents at the United States Courthouse
in Indianapolis, Indiana for possession of child pornography, with
charges filed in federal court under Docket No. 1:10CR00084-001.
(Declaration of Dawn L. Giddings1 (“Giddings Decl.”) ¶5, Dkt. No.
5-2; Ex. A at 1, Dkt. No. 5-3 at 2; Ex. D at 1, Dkt. No. 5-3 at
13.) Petitioner was released the same day under conditions to
“participate in [a] location monitoring program[] and abide by its
requirements as the pretrial services officer or supervising
officer instructs.” (Id., Ex. B, ¶(8)(s), Dkt. No. 5-3 at 6.) The
release order specified that Petitioner participate in “VOA

Incarceration,” with “24-hour lockdown” at the Volunteers of
America facility. (Id., ¶8(s)(iii).) Petitioner left federal
custody for the VOA program on March 9, 2010. (Id., ¶7, Dkt. No.
5-2; Ex. A at 1, Dkt. No. 5-3 at 2.) On October 29, 2010, Petitioner
pled guilty to transportation and possession of child pornography,

1 Dawn L. Giddings is employed as a Correctional Programs
Specialist with the United States Department of Justice, Federal
Bureau of Prisons (BOP), Designations and Sentence Computation
Center located in Grand Prairie, Texas. (Giddings Decl., ¶1, Dkt.
No. 5-2.) She has reviewed Petitioner’s file maintained by the
BOP. (Id., ¶3.)
and the district court sentenced him to an aggregate 151-month
term of imprisonment. (Giddings Decl., Ex. D at 1-2, Dkt. No. 5-3
at 13-14.) The criminal judgment required Petitioner to

voluntarily surrender for service of his sentence, and he
surrendered at FCI Fort Dix on January 19, 2011. (Id., Ex. D at 2,
Dkt. No. 5-3 at 14; Ex. E at 1, Dkt. No. 5-3 at 20.)
B. Computation of Petitioner’s Federal Sentence
The BOP calculated Petitioner’s sentence by commencing his
151-month term of imprisonment on January 19, 2011, the date he
surrendered for service of his federal sentence at FCI Fort Dix.
(Giddings Decl. ¶15, Dkt. No. 5-2; Ex. E at 1, Dkt. No. 5-3 at 20;
Ex. G at 1, Dkt. No. 5-3 at 26.) The BOP awarded Petitioner prior
custody credit for March 9, 2010. (Id., ¶15, Dkt. No. 5-2; Ex. G
at 2, Dkt. No. 5-3 at 27.) The BOP did not credit Petitioner for
the time spent in pretrial supervision at the VOA facility, March

10, 2010 to January 18, 2011. (Id., Ex. G at 2, Dkt. No. 5-3 at
27.) If Petitioner receives the maximum possible good-conduct
time, his projected release date from BOP custody is October 7,
2021. (Id.)
II. MOTION TO AMEND AND MOTION TO STRIKE
Prior to the date Respondent filed his answer to the habeas
petition, Petitioner filed a motion to amend. (Mot. to Amend, Dkt.
No. 4.) Petitioner’s amendment is to his brief in support of his
petition for writ of habeas corpus, rather than an amended
petition. Because there is no prejudice to Respondent, the Court
grants Petitioner’s motion to amend and will consider Petitioner’s
brief.

On June 22, 2020, Petitioner filed a motion to strike
Respondent’s answer as untimely. (Mot. to Strike/Reply Brief, Dkt.
No. 6.) Petitioner may have been unaware of the District of New
Jersey Standing Order No. 2020-4, IN RE: ADDITIONAL MEASURES DUE
TO THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, CREATED BY COVID-19, which provides:
all filing and discovery deadlines in civil
matters that currently fall between March 25,
2020 and April 30, 2020, are EXTENDED by
forty-five (45) days, unless the presiding
judge in an individual case directs otherwise
after the date of this Order.
Respondent’s answer, filed on June 4, 2020, was timely under
Standing Order 2020-4. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner’s
motion to strike. The Court will consider Petitioner’s reply brief,
contained within his motion to strike.
III. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HABEAS PETITION
A. Standard of Law
“‘[T]he courts may fashion appropriate modes of procedure
[for habeas proceedings under § 2241], by analogy to existing rules
or otherwise in conformity with judicial usage.’” SECT 2254 Rule
12, Advisory Committee Notes (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S.
286, 299 (1969). It is unnecessary to file a motion for summary
judgment to obtain resolution on a petition for writ of habeas
corpus. Therefore, the Court will not require the parties to
conform to the Local Civil Rule governing motions for summary
judgment. See Local Civil Rule 56.1. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3),

the Court has jurisdiction to grant a writ of habeas corpus if
Petitioner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States.”
In his motion for summary judgment, Petitioner seeks an
evidentiary hearing and appointment of counsel. As discussed
below, an evidentiary hearing is not required on Petitioner’s
assertion that he was under BOP control while housed at the VOA in
Indianapolis, because Petitioner has not “alleged facts, that, if
proved, would entitle him to relief.” See Jacquet v. Warden Fort
Dix FCI, 707 F. App'x 124, 127 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Zettlemoyer
v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 301 (3d Cir. 1991)). Petitioner has
adeptly presented the facts and legal issues raised in his habeas

petition. Therefore, the Court concludes that it is not in the
interest of justice to appoint counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.
See Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 264 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Courts
have held, for example, that there was no abuse of a district
court's discretion in failing to appoint counsel when no
evidentiary hearing was required and … the petitioner had ‘a good
understanding of the issues and the ability to present forcefully
and coherently his contentions’” (quoting La Mere v. Risley, 827
F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987)).
B. Law Governing Calculation of Federal Sentence
The BOP has the exclusive authority to calculate a federal
sentence. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334-35 (1992).

First, the BOP must determine when the federal sentence commenced
and, second, whether the prisoner is entitled to prior custody
credit. Blood v. Bledsoe, 648 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2011). The
commencement of a federal sentence is governed by 18 U.S.C. §
3585(a), which provides:
A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences
on the date the defendant is received in
custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives
voluntarily to commence service of sentence
at, the official detention facility at which
the sentence is to be served.
Prior custody credit is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), which
provides:
[a] defendant shall be given credit toward the
service of a term of imprisonment for any time
he has spent in official detention prior to
the date the sentence commences—
(1) as a result of the offense for which
the sentence was imposed; or
(2) as a result of any other charge for
which the defendant was arrested after
the commission of the offense for which
the sentence was imposed;
that has not been credited against another
sentence.
C. Analysis
The BOP awarded Petitioner prior custody credit for the time
he spent in custody on the day of his arrest, March 9, 2010.

(Giddings Decl. ¶15; Ex. G at 2, Dkt. No. 5-3 at 27.) The law is
clear that Petitioner may not receive prior custody credit for
time spent in a community corrections center while released on
bail. In Reno v. Koray, the Supreme Court held that a defendant
only enters “official detention’” within the meaning of § 3585(b)
when he is “committed to the custody of the Attorney General; a
defendant admitted to bail on restrictive conditions . . . is
‘released.’” Snyder v. Attorney Gen., 612 F. App’x 645, 646 (3d
Cir. 2015) (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 57 (1995)). The
Supreme Court reasoned that Koray’s time in a community corrections
center while “released” on bail did not qualify as “official
detention” under § 3585(b), because he was not subject to the BOP’s

control. Id. at 63-64.
In his brief in support of the petition, Petitioner
distinguishes Koray. Petitioner contends that “anyone
conditionally released under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) and charged with
a crime under 18 U.S.C. 2252A or 2252 (as was Petitioner) must be
placed on electronic monitoring.” (Mot. to Amend, Dkt. No. 4 at
2.) Petitioner notes that he was not placed on electronic
monitoring, and thus concludes that he was not released. (Id.)
Petitioner argues,
[b]y finding that Petitioner was not entitled
to pretrial detention credit, Respondent
relied on the fact of where Petitioner was
detained rather than the fact the Petitioner
was not placed on electronic monitoring.
Therefore, Respondent relied on facts other
than those clearly intended by Congress and,
thus, the Respondent’s action was arbitrary
and capricious.
(Mot to Amend, Dkt. No. 6 at 3, citing Koray, 515 U.S. at 61).
Petitioner is mistaken in his assumption that a person charged
with a crime under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A or 2252, if conditionally
released under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c), must be placed on electronic
monitoring. As a condition of release, the statute requires
electronic monitoring “at a minimum.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(B).
Petitioner’s release order placed greater restrictions on him than
electronic monitoring; Petitioner was placed in 24-hour lockdown
in a VOA facility. (Giddings Decl., Ex. B, ¶(8)(s)(iii), Dkt. No.
5-3 at 6.)
In his reply brief, Petitioner further argues that it was
the district court’s intention to keep him in detention, as
required by 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E). (Mot. to Strike/Reply
Brief, Dkt. No. 6 at 3.) Accordingly, he challenges Respondent’s
reliance on the court’s release order for the conclusion
that he was released from BOP custody. However, the pretrial
release order demonstrates that, for the time period at issue,
Petitioner was released subject to the specified conditions.
(Giddings Decl., Ex. B, Dkt. No. 5-3 at 6.) This is evidenced by
with the requirements for release under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(h).
Petitioner suggests that the Court should interpret the order as
a detention order because he was charged with a sex offense and

there is a presumption for detention under those circumstances,
but the order does not conform to the requirements of a detention
order under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i). Moreover, the Court notes that 18
U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E), creates only a rebuttable presumption that
“no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure
the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the
community” for a person charged under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 and 2252A.
It is obvious from the court’s release order that Petitioner was
able to rebut the presumption and, thus, was not detained under 18
U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E). (Giddings Decl., Ex. B, Dkt. No. 5-3 at
6.) Therefore, the BOP did not err in determining Petitioner was
released rather than detained, for purposes of pretrial custody

credit under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).
Petitioner also points to Respondent’s failure to submit any
evidence to prove that the BOP did not control the VOA facility.
It is Petitioner’s burden to demonstrate his right to habeas
relief. See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007)
(finding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate his right to habeas
relief custody credit against his federal sentence). Petitioner’s
affidavit (Dkt. No. 6 at 6), stating that others incarcerated in
the Indianapolis VOA were federal inmates serving their time on
re-entry; that he was instructed on the BOP's disciplinary rules
and notified that his behavior must conform to those rules; that
he was not free to leave the VOA; and that there was a person known

to be serving his sentence on a federal misdemeanor at the VOA
facility, fails to establish that Petitioner remained in BOP
custody because the VOA facility houses federal prisoners and
pretrial detainees who are not in BOP custody. According to the
VOA Ohio and Indiana website,2 of which the Court takes judicial
notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201,3 “Indianapolis -
Brandon Hall is a 95 bed work-release center for previously
incarcerated men and women. Referrals are received from the Federal
Bureau of Prisons. Residents are required to maintain employment
and follow court orders/restrictions.”
18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1) requires the BOP
to the extent practicable, ensure that a
prisoner serving a term of imprisonment spends
a portion of the final months of that term
(not to exceed 12 months), under conditions
that will afford that prisoner a reasonable
opportunity to adjust to and prepare for the
reentry of that prisoner into the community.
Such conditions may include a community
correctional facility.
2 Available at https://www.voaohin.org/residential-
reentry.
3 Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2) provides, “[t]he court may
judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute
because it: … can be accurately and readily determined from sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
Further, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2)(B) “a prisoner placed
in prerelease custody pursuant to this subsection who is placed at
a residential reentry center shall be subject to such conditions

as the Director of the Bureau of Prisons determines appropriate.”
No doubt, there were persons at the VOA in Indianapolis who were
in prerelease custody under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2)(B). Petitioner,
however, was subject to the terms of his order of pretrial release,
which differs from prerelease custody by the BOP for the final
portion of service of a federal sentence. Thus, even accepting
Petitioner’s affidavit as true, Petitioner has not established
that the BOP controlled his detention in the VOA in Indianapolis.
The reasoning by the U.S. Supreme Court in Koray is applicable
here. “‘Credit for time spent in ‘official detention’ under §
3585(b) is available only to those defendants who were detained in
a ‘penal or correctional facility’ ... and who were subject to the

BOP’s control.’”) West v. Warden Fort Dix FCI, 740 F. App'x 237,
238 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Koray, 515 U.S. at 58.) The BOP
calculated Petitioner’s sentence based on the proper conclusion
that Petitioner was not in “official detention,” because the
Supreme Court in Koray held that “time … spent at the Volunteers
of America community treatment center while “released” on bail
pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was not “official
detention” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).” 515 U.S. at
65.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons described above, the Court will grant the
motion to amend, deny the motion to strike, and deny Petitioner’s

motion for summary judgment on the Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

An appropriate Order follows.

Date: December 7, 2020 s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10269650. Public record. Not legal advice.