# MAGNANI v. MADDALUNA

> District Court, D. New Jersey · August 17, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10268848

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** August 17, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10268848

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting expressions of opinion usually cannot form the basis for a fraud claim

## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MICHELLE MAGNANI,
Plaintatt, Civil Action No. 18-12930 (ZNQ)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
KIM METZ, et al.,
Defendants.

QURAISHI, Magistrate Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants Kim Metz, Hunterdon County Board
of Vocational Education (the “Board’’), Kevin Gillman, Ridgeley Hutchinson, John Philips, Juan
Torres, and Elizabeth Martin’s (collectively “Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment (the
“Motion”) on Plaintiff's Complaint, including her claims of breach of contract and age
discrimination. (ECF No. 29.) The undersigned is authorized to hear this matter pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (See Notice of Consent, ECF No. 28.) Plaintiff Michelle Magnani (“Plaintiff”)
opposed Defendants’ Motion, (ECF No. 35), to which Defendants replied, (ECF No. 37). The
Court has carefully considered the parties’ arguments and decides the matter without oral argument
pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Undisputed Facts
Plaintiff is a former employee of the Hunterdon County Vocational School District (the
“District”). (Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts (“DMF”) 9 1, ECF No. 29-6; Plaintiff’s
Counterstatement of Material Facts (“PMP”) 1, 3, ECF No. 35-11.)! In 2014, Plaintiff was
interviewed for a teaching position by then-Principal Daniel Kerr (“Principal Kerr”) and Director
of Curriculum Jessica Cangelosi (“Director Cangelosi”). (DMF { 5; PMF { 3.) The Board then
approved her for hire. (DMF {| 6; PMF { 3.) Plaintiff was offered a ten-month employment contract
for a three-fifths position without benefits. (DMF {| 6-7; PMF J 3.) She began working as a
cosmetology teacher at the Polytech Vocational High School (“Polytech”) at the beginning of the
2014-15 school year. (DMF { 4; PMF {jf 3-4.) Plaintiff taught approximately sixteen students,
four of whom she believed had an Individualized Education Plan (“TEP”) or a Section 504 Plan
(504 Plan’).” (DMF {f 8, 14; PMF 3, 7-8.)

' The Court notes that, in response to Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts, Plaintiff only filed
a Counterstatement of Material Facts. Plaintiff’s Counterstatement contains a paragraph,
identifying which enumerated facts in Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts are in dispute, and
which are undisputed. (See PMF 4 3.) Defendants did not respond to Plaintiff’s Counterstatement.
Any additional facts Plaintiff asserted in her Counterstatement the Court deems admitted for the
purposes of deciding this Motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
* The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) requires school districts to “identify
and evaluate all children who they have reason to believe are disabled under the statute,” and “offer
an IEP that is ‘reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive meaningful educational benefits
in light of the student’s intellectual potential.’” Munir v. Pottsville Area Sch. Dist., 723 F.3d 423,
426 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727,
729-30 (3d Cir. 2009)). Similarly, under the Rehabilitation Act “a school district must reasonably
accommodate the needs of the handicapped child so as to ensure meaningful participation in
educational activities and meaningful access to educational benefits.” Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R.,
680 F.3d 260, 280 (3d Cir. 2012).

Plaintiff considered Principal Kerr and Director Cangelosi her supervisors, and both
evaluated her. (DMF {| 10; PMF {{f[ 3, 9.) At the end of the school year, Plaintiff alleges Principal
Kerr and Director Cangelosi told her they liked how she dealt with her class and that they would
like to have her on next year. (DMF { 12; PMF J 3.) Plaintiff concedes Director Cangelosi advised
her to put more information in her lesson plans for JEP and 504 Plan students under the
Accommodations/Modifications and Differentiation sections. (DMF Y 13; PMF Jf 3, 10.)
The Board renewed Plaintiffs appointment for the 2015-16 school year, and granted her a
fulltime teaching position. (DMF § 15; PMF Jf 3, 5.) As a fulltime teacher, Plaintiff taught two
classes, with a total of about fifty-two students, including fourteen or fifteen with IEPs or 504
Plans. (DMF {{[ 16-18; PMF {J 3, 17.) Plaintiff claims Principal Kerr told her she was doing a
good job at the beginning of the year, and Director Cangelosi told her she was doing well during
a midyear review. (DMF { 19; PMF {ff 3, 19.) Plaintiff also claims that in late 2015, the
Superintendent, Kim Metz (“Superintendent Metz’), told her she was doing well. (DMF 7 30; PMF
3, 23.) On April 15, 2016, Plaintiff received a Rice notice,’ advising her that the Board would
be conducting their annual personnel review and would address employment renewals. (DMF { 31;
PMF { 3.) Plaintiffs union representative informed her that she could discuss her employment
status in public before the Board. (DMF □□ 32; PMF { 3.) At the next Board meeting, on April 18,
2016, Plaintiff, her union representative, and several parents and students spoke on her behalf.
(DMF {{ 33; PMF { 3.) On April 26, 2016, Plaintiff was notified that her teaching contract would
not be renewed. (DMF { 34; PMF { 3.) Plaintiff again spoke to the Board on May 16, 2016. (DMF

> Public employees are “entitled to reasonable notice of the intention of the board [of education]
to consider personnel matters related to them.” Rice v. Union Cty. Reg’! High Sch. Bd. of Ed., 382
A.2d 386, 390 (N.J. App. Div. 1977).

PMF { 3.) The Board’s members included Defendants Kevin Gillman, Ridgeley Hutchinson,
John Philips, Juan Torres, and Elizabeth Martin. (DMF J 35; PMF J 3.)
Regarding personnel decisions, Superintendent Metz makes recommendations to the
Board, and the Board makes the ultimate decision. (DMF { 46; PMF J 3.) The Board generally
followed Superintendent Metz’s recommendations. (DMF { 48; PMF J 3.) She considered multiple
factors in making her recommendations, including observations reports and performance. (DMF
49-50; PMF {[ 3.) Believing Plaintiff was “not a good fit,” Superintendent Metz recommended
Plaintiffs contract not be renewed, and the Board followed that recommendation. (DMF J 54—
55; PMF { 3.)
Plaintiff was either fifty-four or fifty-five when her contract was not renewed. (DMF { 37;
PMF { 3.) Plaintiffs eventual replacement was younger than her. (DMF {[ 38; PMF 3.) Plaintiff
claims Principal Kerr once told her “you’re never too old to learn,” but conceded at her deposition
that she had no evidence any member of the Board held age-based animus. (DMF 4] 39-40;
PMF { 3.)
B. Disputed Facts
Defendants claim that, in November 2015, Principal Kerr gave Plaintiff a formal letter of
reprimand for failing to follow the 504 Plans and IEPs of four students. (DMF 9 20-21; see also
Mem. of Reprimand, Ex. A to Kerr Aff., ECF No. 29-4.) Specifically, Defendants allege Plaintiff
failed to provide oral or small-group testing accommodations for several students. (DMF Jf 22-
23; see also Mem. of Reprimand.) Plaintiff lists this item as disputed, (PMF {[ 3), yet does not
dispute that she received the letter, (see id. { 18). Plaintiff claims, instead, that some of her students
were “very abusive” towards her. (Jd. J 15.) In particular, Plaintiff explains that she “had a problem
with one of [her] student[s] J.B.,” and that incident resulted in the letter of reprimand. (Id. [J □□□
18.) Plaintiff asserts J.B.’s certification now debunks the letter of reprimand. (/d. 18.) In her

certification J.B. states the administration violated her IEP by failing to inform Plaintiff her first
exam was to be given orally. (J.B. Certif. {| 6, Ex. C to Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 35-15.)
Further, Defendants claim that over the course of the 2015-16 school year, numerous
parents complained about Plaintiff to Principal Kerr. (DMF { 25.) Defendants charge Principal
Kerr received reports that Plaintiff shared details of her personal life with her class, failed to
provide adequate instruction, and singled out a student and treated that student unfairly.
(DME {if 25-27, 29; see also Principal Kerr’s Notes, Ex. B to Kerr Aff., ECF No. 29-4.) Plaintiff
claims she had no knowledge of Principal Kerr’s one-sided notes, always treated her students
equally, and that she simply answered students’ life questions when asked. (Magnani Certif. in
Resp. to Affs. of Metz, Kerr, and Cangelosi {| 25, 49, 75-77, ECF No. 35-6.)
Plaintiff asserts that, during his deposition, Principal Kerr admitted Plaintiff was rated
proficient in her end-of-year assessment and confirmed she always maintained a professional
demeanor. (PMF {J 39-40.) Plaintiff further contends Principal Kerr expressed a desire for her to
be rehired, (Magnani Certif. in Resp. to Affs. of Metz, Kerr, and Cangelosi { 40), and the parties
agree Principal Kerr offered to provide Plaintiff with a letter of recommendation, (DMF 7 41; PMF
q 3).
U. PLAINTIFE’S CLAIMS
In her nine-count Complaint, Plaintiff seeks damages for her alleged unlawful termination.
(See Compl. {{ 46, 55, 63.) Plaintiff alleges:
1. She was told she was doing well and reasonably relied on the promise of job
security. (Compl. {| 42.) Defendants breached Plaintiffs employment agreement
by wrongfully terminating her. (/d. [ 45.)
2. Defendants breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in Plaintiff’ s
employment contract by wrongfully terminating her. (/d. [{] 48-50.)
3. Defendants engaged in deceit and fraud in their dealings with Plaintiff. (/d. {{ 57.)

4. Defendants intentionally and with malice wrongfully interfered with Plaintiff's
contractual rights under her employment agreement. (/d. 65, 67.)
5. Defendants willfully, intentionally, and with malice inflicted malicious harm on
Plaintiff by breaching her employment agreement. (/d. Jf 72, 75.)
6. Defendants made a clear and definite promise in her employment agreement, upon
which Plaintiff reasonably and justifiably relied, and Defendants deprived Plaintiff
of the benefits of her employment agreement. (Id. J] 78-82.)
7, Defendants conspired and acted in concert to commit an unlawful act, or a lawful
act by unlawful means, against Plaintiff. (fd. J§| 85-86.)
8. Age discrimination in employment in violation of New Jersey’s Law Against
Discrimination (“LAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann. 10.5-1, et seg. (Id. JJ 90-91.)
9, Age discrimination in employment in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”), 28 U.S.C. section 621, et seg. (Id. 1 95.)
In their Motion, asserting discovery has failed to yield evidence to support Plaintiffs claims,
Defendants seek summary judgment in their favor. (Moving Br. 1-2, ECF No. 29-7.)
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
A “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A material fact raises a “genuine” dispute “if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Williams v. Borough of W.
Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 459 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
“In evaluating the evidence, the Court must consider all facts and their logical inferences
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Rhodes v. Marix Servicing, LLC, 302
F, Supp. 3d 656, 661 (D.N.J. 2018) (citing Curley y. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2002)).
“While the moving party bears the initial burden of proving an absence of a genuine dispute of

material fact, meeting this obligation shifts the burden to the non-moving party to ‘set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine [dispute] for trial.’” Jd. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250),
“Unsupported allegations, subjective beliefs, or argument alone . . . cannot forestall summary
judgment.” Read v. Profeta, 397 F, Supp. 3d 597, 625 (D.N.J. 2019). “Thus, if the nonmoving
party fails ‘to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, ... there can be no genuine issue of material fact.’” /d. (quoting Katz v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur, Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir, 1992) (quotation marks omitted)). “In considering the motion,
the Court ‘does not resolve factual disputes or make credibility determinations.’” Rhodes, 302 F.
Supp. 3d at 661 (quoting Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Express, Inc., 54 F.3d 1125, 1127 (3d
Cir, 1995)).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Count 1: Breach of Contract
Defendants assert Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract is predicated on nothing more
than her belief that her contract would be renewed because she was told she was doing a good job.
(Moving Br. 5.) Defendants submit Plaintiff’s one-year employment contract contained no
assurance of renewal, that Plaintiff has not identified a provision of her contract that was breached,
and that Plaintiff failed to identify any conduct by the District as a breach. (/d.)
Plaintiff concedes her one-year employment contract contains no guarantee of renewal, but
argues Defendants’ employees indicated she would be renewed. (P1.’s Opp’n 9, ECF No. 35.) She
contends there were at least three instances of statements by Principal Kerr and Superintendent
Metz that would lead a reasonably prudent person, like Plaintiff, to conclude her contract would
be renewed. (/d.) Plaintiff also highlights that another cosmetology teacher, Elaine DiBenedetto,
told Principal Kerr to tell Plaintiff whether be would not renew her contract because she was
planning on downsizing her salon. (/d.)

In reply, Defendants emphasize that Plaintiff relies on positive comments about her
performance, and stress that Plaintiff has failed to point to any promise that her contract would be
renewed. (Defs.’ Reply 2, ECF No. 37.) Defendants argue Plaintiff's subjective assumptions
cannot bind the District. (/d.)
“To state a claim for breach of contract, [a plaintiff] must allege (1) a contract between the
parties; (2) a breach of that contract; (3) damages flowing therefrom; and (4) that the party stating
the claim performed its own contractual obligations.” Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188,
203 (3d Cir, 2007). N.J. Stat. Ann. section 18A:27-1 provides “[n]o teaching staff member shall
be appointed, except by a recorded roll call majority vote of the full membership of the board of
education appointing him,” Nontenured teachers may receive one-year contracts renewable upon
“the recommendation of the chief school administrator and by a recorded roll call majority vote of
the full membership of the board.” Millar v. Pitman Bd. of Educ., No. 10-4104, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 63962, at *11 (D.N.J. June 13, 2011) (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:27-4.1). Boards of
education have no obligation to renew the one-year employment contracts of nontenured teachers.
Leang v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 969 A.2d 1097, 1109 (N.J. 2009).
The Court finds Plaintiff cannot establish a claim for breach of contract. Plaintiff has failed
to identify a promise of renewal by Defendants or Principal Kerr. Instead, Plaintiff points to
positive feedback and, at most, precatory statements. (See, e.g., Second Magnani Certif. in Resp.
to Affs. of Metz, Kerr, and Cangelosi {| 18-21, 40-41, 45, 65, ECF No. 35-7.) Plaintiff’s strongest
evidence of a promise is an alleged conversation occurring around Christmas—four months before
her nonrenewal—where Superintendent Metz told Plaintiff there was no reason why she should
not be renewed as a fulltime cosmetology teacher. (/d. J 21.) Far from a promise of renewal,
Superintendent Metz’s phrasing seems to implicitly acknowledge the ultimate discretion was with

the Board. Similarly, Plaintiff alleges Principal Kerr “expressed [a] desire for [her] to be rehired
for the upcoming school year.” (Id. | 40.) Those statements are insufficient to establish a promise
of renewal.
Moreover, as this Court noted above, “New Jersey law prohibits the Board from offering
Plaintiff any guarantee of continued employment beyond her initial one-year contract.” Millar,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63962, at *12. Thus, even if Principal Kerr’s or Superintendent Metz’s
comments were taken as assurances that Plaintiff's contract would be renewed, their statements
could not bind the Board. /d. at *16. “In light of the Board’s clear statutory right to decline to
renew her contract, [P]laintiff’s breach of contract claim must fail because that claim is based on
the Board’s non-renewal decision.” Leang, 969 A.2d at 1109.
B. Count 2: Breach of the Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to allege, and discovery has failed to yield, anything
suggesting Plaintiff did not receive the benefit of her contract with the District. (Moving Br. 7.)
Nonrenewal, they submit, does not establish a breach of good faith or fair dealing. (Zd.)
Plaintiff directs the Court to its arguments as to Count One. (P1.’s Opp’n 10.) Plaintiff adds
that Principal Kerr surreptitiously gathered false and misleading information from students who
did not like Plaintiff. 7d. at 10-11.) Plaintiff contends these notes were an attempt to thwart her
renewal, “thus preventing her from getting one of the benefits of the bargain originally intended
as part of the one-year contract (i.e. renewal).” (/d. at 11.)
In every contract, there is the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Palisades
Props., Inc. v. Brunetti, 207 A.2d 522, 531 (N.J. 1965). The New Jersey Supreme Court has
explained that, pursuant to the implied covenant, “neither party shall do anything which will have
the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract.”
Id. The Court has further held “a party exercising its right to use discretion . . . under a contract

breaches the duty of good faith and fair dealing if that party exercises its discretionary authority
arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capriciously, with the objective of preventing the other party from
receiving its reasonably expected fruits under the contract.” Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 773
A.2d 1121, 1130 (NJ. 2001).
At base, Plaintiff’s claim must fail because she has not demonstrated she had a contractual
right to renewal. As explained above, Plaintiff has not alleged she was promised that her contract
would be renewed, much less that she was entitled to it under her one-year employment contract.
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is thus a poor fit under the circumstances.
Even assuming arguendo Principal Kerr conspired to deprive her of the renewed contract, there is
no breach of the implied covenant because Plaintiff was never entitled to renewal. See Millar, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63962, at *12.
C. Count 3: Fraud
Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to allege facts or present any evidence demonstrating
fraud. (Moving Br. 9.) First, they note that Plaintiffs contract was not terminated, but was simply
not renewed. (/d.) Second, Defendants contend Superintendent Metz’s comments about Plaintiff’ s
performance cannot be shown to be fraud because they were made months before Superintendent
Metz recommended Plaintiff’s contract not be renewed, and Plaintiff has not demonstrated or
alleged Superintendent Metz knew her statements were false. (Jd. at 9-10.)
Plaintiff responds that Superintendent Metz’s and Principal Kerr’s comments related to
Plaintiff’s performance, and Principal Kerr’s “non-action towards the Plaintiff in not letting her
know that her contract was not going to be renewed after a conversation with [Elaine]
DiBenedetto,” satisfies the common law elements of fraud. (Pl.’s Opp’n 12.) Plaintiff alleges both
Superintendent Metz and Principal Kerr made material misrepresentations and that they knew
those misrepresentations were false. (/d.)

Om

In reply, Defendants assert Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence of fraud because neither
Superintendent Metz or Principal Kerr told Plaintiff her contract would be renewed. (Defs.’ Reply
4.) Defendants submit the Board complied with the statutory framework for a nonrenewal and this
claim must be dismissed. (d.)
“{T]o avoid summary judgment, [Plaintiff] must present evidence by which a jury could
find fraud by clear and convincing evidence.” Diaz v. Johnson Matthey, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1155,
1164 (D.N.J. 1994). To prove a claim for common law fraud, a Plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) a
material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the
defendant of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable reliance
thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting damages.” Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Lajara,
117 A.3d 1221, 1231 (N.J. 2015) (quoting Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 172-73
(2005)); see also Intile Realty Co., Inc. v. Raho, 614 A.2d 167, 186 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1992) (listing
three elements that are substantively the same). “Common law fraud requires a showing of actual
reliance, but not objectively reasonable reliance, since the perpetrator of a fraud may not urge that
the victim should have been ‘more circumspect or astute.’” Union Ink Co. v. AT&T Corp., 801
A.2d 361, 379-80 (N.J. App. Div. 2002) (quoting Jewish Ctr. of Sussex County vy. Whale, 86 N.J.
619, 626 n.1 (1981)).
The Court finds summary judgment appropriate on Plaintiff’s fraud claim. Plaintiff’s
Complaint alleges Superintendent Metz and a defendant who was voluntarily dismissed conspired
to wrongfully terminate her contract. (Compl. {| 57-60.) There is no dispute that Plaintiff's
contract was not terminated, rather the Board decided not to renew it. (DMF { 34; PMF J 3.)
Turning to the elements of fraud, Plaintiff’s entire claim is based on her assertion that
Superintendent Metz and Principal Kerr materially misrepresented their opinion of her

11

performance, and that she relied on those representations to her detriment. Those allegations fail
to establish a prima facie case of fraud. First, Plaintiff has put forward little evidence that
Superintendent Metz’s statements, and no evidence that Principal Kerr’s statements, were
misrepresentations at the time they were made. As discussed above, Plaintiff alleges
Superintendent Metz told her in December there was no reason why she would not be renewed as
a fulltime cosmetology teacher. (Second Magnani Certif. in Resp. to Affs. of Metz, Kerr, and
Cangelosi {[ 21.) Superintendent Metz’s statement came before students purportedly complained
about Plaintiffs inappropriate classroom comments, (see Principal Kerr’s Notes 1-2), and such an
indefinite statement supposedly made to boost employee morale cannot satisfy the first element,
see Suarez v. E. Int’l Coll., 50 A.3d 75, 86 (N.J. App. Div. 2012) (noting expressions of opinion
usually cannot form the basis for a fraud claim). Similarly, Principal Kerr’s expressed “desire” for
Plaintiffs contract to be renewed cannot qualify as a material misrepresentation. (See Suarez, 50
A.3d at 86.) Second, even if Superintendent Metz’s statement was a misrepresentation, Plaintiff
has not brought forward any evidence that she intended Plaintiff to rely on it. Plaintiff’s evidence
of the falsity of that statement is Superintendent Metz’s testimony that she told teachers they were
doing a good job around Christmas regardless of their actual performance to make them feel good.
(Second Magnani Certif. in Resp. to Affs. of Metz, Kerr, and Cangelosi {| 18-21.) Plaintiff does
not even put forward a theory about why Defendants or Principal Kerr would mislead her about
her performance, especially if they would later use her performance to justify not renewing her
contract. Third, where the statutory framework clearly vests renewal in the discretion of the Board,
no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Plaintiff relied on positive performance reviews and
Superintendent Metz’s opinion in expecting that her contract would be renewed.

19

D. Count 4: Interference with Economic Advantage
Plaintiff concedes she cannot establish a prima facie claim for tortious interference with an
economic advantage. (Pl.’s Opp’n 13.) Accordingly, the Court finds summary judgment
appropriate on Count Four.
E. Count 5: Malicious Harm
Next Defendants argue that there is no tort for “malicious harm” and, even if there is,
Plaintiff’s claim is barred because she failed to file a notice of tort claim. (Moving Br. 19.)
Addressing the substance of Plaintiff's claim, Defendants contend her claim must fail because it
stems from her breach of contract claim and because she has failed to discover evidence of malice.

Plaintiff does not dispute that her “cause of action for malicious harm is embedded within
[her] breach of contract claim.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 13.) Plaintiff relies on her arguments regarding
Principal Kerr and Superintendent Metz’s statements related to Plaintiff’s performance. (See id. at
14.)
“The prima facie tort is designed to redress unjustified intentional, willful or malicious
harms where no adequate common law or statutory remedy exists.” Silvestre v. Bell Atl. Corp.,
973 F. Supp. 475, 485 (D.N.J. 1997), aff'd, 156 F.3d 1225 (3d Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). “In
Richard A. Pulaski Construction Co. v. Air Frame Hangars, 950 A.2d 868 (N.J. 2008), the New
Jersey Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that this amorphous tort may be available, but
that it is strictly a ‘gap-filler.’” Gibbs v. Massey, No. 07-3604, 2009 WL 838138, at *9 (D.N.J.
Mar, 26, 2009). The Court stated “the availability of the prima facie tort doctrine is limited
exclusively to those instances of intentional and culpable conduct unjustified under the
circumstances that, as a threshold matter, do not fall within a traditional tort cause of action.”
Richard A. Pulaski Const., 950 A.2d 868, 870 (N.J. 2008).

12

As previously stated, Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence of intentional, malicious,
or willful harm, or even proffer an explanation as to why Superintendent Metz or Principal Kerr
would lie to her about her performance. Absent evidence that Superintendent Metz or Principal
Kerr intended to harm Plaintiff in making positive statements about her performance, summary
judgment is appropriate on her malicious harm claim. See Silvestre, 973 F. Supp. at 485.
F., Count 6: Promissory Estoppel
Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot set out a prima facie case for promissory estoppel
because the District honored the terms of her employment contract and she was never promised
renewal, (Moving Br. 21.) Defendants assert the statements of Principal Kerr and Superintendent
Metz do not constitute a promise of future employment, and Plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim
thus fails as a matter of law. Ud.) Additionally, Defendants claim Plaintiff failed to show
detrimental reliance because she has proffered no evidence that she actually reduced her clientele
as a hair stylist in reliance on the alleged promise. (/d.)
Plaintiff relies on her previous arguments regarding Principal Kerr’s and Superintendent
Metz’s statements. (Pl.’s Opp’n 15.) Plaintiff further reiterates that Principal Kerr’s statements
would indicate to a reasonable person that their contract would be renewed, and his failure to tell
Plaintiff her contract would not be renewed casts doubt on the reason for nonrenewal. (/d.)
To maintain a claim for promissory estoppel at this stage, Plaintiff must show a genuine
dispute of material fact that (1) “there was a clear and definite promise,” (2) “made with the
expectation that the promisee [would] rely on it”; (3) that the promisee reasonably relied on the
promise; and (4) detrimental reliance. Peck v. Imedia, Inc., 679 A.2d 745, 752 (N.J. App. Div.
1996) (quotation omitted),
As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to identify a clear and definite promise that her
contract would be renewed. Even if her supervisor’s favorable statements of her performance

1A

months before the Board considered renewing Plaintiff’s contract are construed as assurances that
Plaintiffs contract would be renewed, the ultimate discretion rested with the Board. (See DMF J
19; PMF YJ 3, 19; DMF J 30; PMF 3, 23; Leang, 969 A.2d at 1109.) Reliance on such indefinite
statements, or on positive comments about her performance, would thus be unreasonable.
Summary judgment is appropriate on Count Six because Plaintiff has failed to advance evidence
to permit a reasonable factfinder to make a determination in her favor at trial that these statements
were clear or definite promises, or that she reasonably relied upon them.
G. Count 7: Civil Conspiracy
Plaintiff concedes she cannot establish a prima facie claim of civil conspiracy. (Pl.’s Opp’n
16.) Summary judgment is appropriate on Count Seven.
H. Count 8: Age Discrimination Prohibited by LAD
Defendants claim Plaintiff failed to assert a prima facie case of age discrimination because
discovery did not yield evidence to support Plaintiff’s claim that she was replaced by a younger,
less-experienced teacher. (Moving Br. 27.) Defendants explain that, while Plaintiff testified she
was fifty-four or fifty-five when her contract was not renewed, she could not recall if her initial
replacement was younger, and while her eventual replacement was younger, Plaintiff has not
proffered any evidence that her eventual replacement was less experienced or less competent. (Id.)
Citing Director Cangelosi’s testimony, Defendants highlight that she recommended, and the Board
approved, a teacher close to Plaintiff's age, but that candidate ultimately declined the offer. (Id.
(citing Cangelosi Aff. 12-13, ECF No. 29-5).) Assuming arguendo Plaintiff has established a
prima facie case, Defendants argue they have proffered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for
Plaintiffs nonrenewal, her “poor performance and unprofessional conduct.” (/d. at 28.)
Defendants point to Director Cangelosi’s testimony that she spoke to Plaintiff during her first year
of teaching about Plaintiff arriving late, failing to follow IEPs and 504 Plans, and having

1h

inappropriate conversations with students. (/d. (citing Cangelosi Aff. {{[ 7—10).) During her second
year, Defendants highlight that Principal Kerr gave Plaintiff a formal reprimand for failing to
accommodate students, and allege several parents and students complained about conversations
Plaintiff had with her students. (id. at 29-30.) It was those issues, Defendants contend, that led
Principal Kerr to recommend Plaintiff’s contract not be renewed. (/d. at 30.) Defendants submit
there is no evidence of pretext masking a discriminatory motive. (/d. at 32.)
Plaintiff responds simply that she was a proficient teacher. (Pl.’s Opp’n 17.) Plaintiff
contends that she was repeatedly told she was doing well and that her one reprimand was made in
violation of union rules and in contradiction to the student’s certification. (/d.) Plaintiff argues she
has raised sufficient factual issues to warrant a trial on Defendants’ true motives. (/d.)
The purpose of LAD is to ban invidious employment discrimination, including
discrimination based on age. Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944, 949 (N.J. 1999);
see also N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 10:5-4, -12(a). It is an unlawful employment practice under LAD “to
refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge or require to retire” someone based on her age.
Id. § -12(a),
“Tn a case alleging age discrimination under the LAD, [a claimant] must show that the
prohibited consideration, age, played a role in the decision making process and that it had a
determinative influence on the outcome of that process.” Sisler, 723 A.2d at 953 (quotation and
alteration omitted). The claimant may satisfy that burden by advancing direct or circumstantial
evidence of discrimination. Jd. at 954. To qualify as direct evidence, “[t]he evidence produced
must, if true, demonstrate not only a hostility toward members of the employce’s class, but also a
direct causal connection between that hostility and the challenged employment decision.”

16

Buchholz v. Victor Printing, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 180, 185 (D.N.J. 2012) (quoting Geltzer v. Virtua
West Jersey Health Systems, 804 F.Supp.2d 241, 250 (D.N.J.2011)).
In analyzing claims based on circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, the New Jersey
Supreme Court has adopted the tripartite framework outlined by the United States Supreme Court
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Wright v. L-3 Comme’ns Corp., 227
F. Supp. 2d 293, 297 (D.N.J. 2002). First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by
demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence “(1) [s]he was in a protected group; (2) [s]he
was performing [her] job at a level that met [her] employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) [s]he
nevertheless was fired; and (4) the employer sought someone to perform the same work after [s]he
left.” Buchholz, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 187-88. “[I]n order to satisfy the fourth prong of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case, [a] plaintiff must show that [s]he was replaced by someone sufficiently
younger to create an inference of unlawful age discrimination.” Swider v. Ha-Lo Indus., Inc., 134
F. Supp. 2d 607, 625 (D.N.J. 2001); accord Monaco y. Am. Gen. Assur. Co., 359 F.3d 296, 303
(3d Cir. 2004). “[A] [p]laintiff’s burden in establishing a prima facie case is not onerous and the
prima facie case is generally easily made out.” Swider, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 621. If the plaintiff is
successful, then the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for the employment action. Buchholz, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 187. Then, if the defendant
articulates a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to show sufficient evidence to support an inference that the defendant did not act for the
stated nondiscriminatory reason. Jd. at 189-90. “An employee successfully meets this burden by
‘persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly
by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.’” Swider, 134 F.
Supp. 2d at 622 (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).

17

Construing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court finds Plaintiff
has fallen short of establishing a prima facie case. Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated that she
is a member of a protected group under the first prong, as LAD makes it unlawful for an employer
to discriminate based on age. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12. On the second prong, Plaintiff has
advanced a genuine dispute, in the form of Defendants’ representations, that Plaintiff was
performing her job at a satisfactory level, (see DMF {| 19; PMF {J 3, 19; DMF J 30; PMF {J 3,
23), and by demonstrating that several parents and students spoke on her behalf to the Board,
(DMF { 33; PMF □□ 3). Plaintiff also met the third prong, as it is undisputed that Plaintiffs contract
was not renewed. (Nini v. Mercer Cty, Cmty. Coll., 968 A.2d 739, 745 (N.J. App. Div. 2009), aff’d,
995 A.2d 1094 (N.J. 2010) (“[T]here is no difference for purposes of the LAD between plaintiff’ s
nonrenewal and termination.”); DMF {Jf 54-55; PMF {[ 3.) Plaintiff, however, has not produced
any evidence that either her replacement or her eventual replacement was sufficiently younger to
raise an inference of discrimination to satisfy the fourth prong. Swider, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 625,
The mere fact that her eventual replacement was younger, without evidence as to how much
younger, is not enough to satisfy Plaintiff's evidentiary burden. Further, Plaintiff fails to point to
any other evidence that could help raise an inference of discrimination. This failure is reflected in
Plaintiff's argument, which begins and ends with the assertion that she was a satisfactory teacher.
(See Pl.’s Opp’n 16-17.)
Even assuming Plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case,
Defendants have proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for Plaintiff’s nonrenewal—
namely, Plaintiff's performance and classroom conduct—and Plaintiff has failed to provide
evidence that casts sufficient doubt on those reasons to raise the inference of discrimination. For
example, Defendants cite Plaintiff's formal reprimand as evidence of her malperformance.

12

(Moving Br. 29.) Plaintiff does not dispute she received the letter of reprimand, (PMF { 18), but
attempts to attack the basis for the reprimand. Plaintiff argues the letter was the result of an incident
with her student J.B., who submitted a certification on Plaintiff’s behalf, allegedly debunking the
allegations. Ud. {| 17-18.) Yet, J.B.’s certification simply states the administration violated her
IEP by failing to inform Plaintiff of her accommodations. (J.B. Certif. J 6.) Further, the letter of
reprimand alleges Plaintiff failed to accommodate six students. (Mem. of Reprimand.) Plaintiff’ s
explanation is that some students were abusive to her, or lied about her. (PMF {[ 15; see also J.B.
Certif. {| 8.) That evidence does not suggest any anti-age bias. In fact, other than a single comment
by Principal Kerr, Plaintiff points to no evidence of age-based animus, and even concedes she has
no evidence of animus by any of the Board’s members. (DMF {J 54—55; PMF 3.)
As to Plaintiff's allegedly inappropriate classroom comments, she explains that, “[i]f a
student asked me a question about life outside the classroom, J answered the students’ questions
and if I used examples in my life for them to benefit from the years of experience, then that would
make them better students when going out in life.” (Second Magnani Certif. in Resp. to Affs. of
Metz, Kerr, and Cangelosi { 74.) Plaintiff adds “[t]here is no state rule against answering a
student’s life questions with examples in my life nor was there any regulation at the school against
this nor was I ever reprimanded nor discouraged from doing so... .” (id. J 76.) Plaintiff’s
explanation is not only devoid of any hint of agism by the administration, but it fails to undermine
Defendants’ proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. Even assuming Plaintiff’s explanation
was true, or that her students lied about her, the specter of age discrimination is absent. In fact, if
Plaintiff's students made up stories about her, causing the administration to act, that in and of itself
would constitute a nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s nonrenewal.

19

In essence, Plaintiff is trying to litigate the merits of her work. But whether Plaintiff was,
in fact, a good teacher is not a triable issue. Indeed, it appears many of her students loved and
supported her, (see, e.g., The Lezaks’ May 8, 2016 Letter, ECF No. 35-24), but that does not
demonstrate Defendants’ legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons are pretextual. “At this stage,
plaintiff may defeat a motion for summary judgment either: (1) by discrediting the proffered
reasons for termination, directly or circumstantially; or (2) by adducing evidence the
discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse action.”
Lawrence v. Nat'l Westminster Bank N.J., 98 F.3d 61, 66 (d Cir.1996) (discussing the pretext
prong of LAD). Plaintiff has failed to either discredit Defendants’ reasons for nonrenewal, or
advance evidence that would permit an inference of age discrimination. Summary judgment on
Count Eight is thus appropriate.
I. Count 9: Age Discrimination Prohibited by ADEA
Turning to Plaintiff's ADEA claim, Defendants argue the Court is barred from considering
it because she never filed a claim with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission
(“EEOC”). (Moving Br. 33-34 (citing Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 384 (3d Cir. 2007)).)
Additionally, Defendants contend Plaintiff's ADEA claim would fail for the same reasons as her
LAD claim. (Ud. at 34.)
In response, Plaintiff essentially restates her LAD arguments. (See P].’s Opp’n 16-21.) She
does not address Defendants’ primary argument in the section of her brief on her ADEA claim.
(See id, at 18-21.) In a separate section, however, Plaintiff makes a general argument that, even
though she has not complied with certain time limits under New Jersey law, “the Court can still
fashion an equitable remedy for the Plaintiff to compensate her for the unfair treatment she
received by her superiors in wrongfully not renewing her contract for the new year.” (Id. at 23.)

YY

“It is a basic tenet of administrative law that a plaintiff must exhaust all required
administrative remedies before bringing a claim for judicial relief.” Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d
1018, 1020 (3d Cir. 1997). “Generally, a judicial complaint under the ADEA will be dismissed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies if a supporting EEOC charge was not filed within 180
or 300 days (depending on state law) of notification to the employee of the adverse employment
action.” Ruehl, 500 F.3d at 382.
The Board informed Plaintiff that her contract would not be renewed on April 26, 2016,
(DMF { 34; PMF { 3), and she does not argue any equitable doctrine applies to toll the time to file
the charge. The Court will not read Plaintiffs general equitable plea as a substitute for an argument
that the time to file the EEOC charge has been equitably tolled. Accordingly, the Court finds
Plaintiff's ADEA claim statutorily barred. See Ruehl, 500 F.3d at 378 (directing summary
judgment be entered for failure to timely exhaust administrative remedies), Further, turning to the
substance of Plaintiff's ADEA claim, the Court’s analysis would be substantively the same as its
analysis under LAD, Plaintiff’s ADEA claim would thus also fail under the McDonald Douglass
burden-shifting framework.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
Summary judgment will be entered in favor of Defendants. An appropriate order follows.

Dated: August 17, 2020 se ‘A (wae
ZAHID N\QURAISHT,
UNITED Srares MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10268848. Public record. Not legal advice.