# CAMPS v. SCHOLTZ

> District Court, D. New Jersey · March 23, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10267776

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** March 23, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10267776

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting supervisory liability may be found when a supervisor is deliberately indifferent to a known deficiency in government policy or procedure that creates an unreasonable risk of constitutional injury
- noting scant guidance from the Supreme Court on what constitutes “punishment” under the Fourteenth Amendment

## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION ECF No. 170

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

CALVIN CAMPS,

Plaintiff Civ. No. 17-1895 (RMB-JS)
v.

MILLIE SCHOLTZ, et al., OPINION

Defendants

APPEARANCES:

CALVIN CAMPS
MQ 1920
SCI Phoenix
P.O. Box 244
Collegeville, PA 19426
Plaintiff, pro se

DANIEL GEE, Esq.
Evan H.C. Crook, Esq.
MALAMUT & ASSOCIATES, LLC.
457 Haddonfield Road, Suite 500
Cherry Hill, NJ 08002
On behalf of Defendants Warden Scholtz, Captain
McDonnell, Sgt. Davis and Board of Chosen Freeholders of
Burlington County1

BUMB, United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon the summary judgment
motion of Defendants Warden Scholtz, Captain McDonnell, Sgt. Davis

1 The County Defendants have corrected their names and titles,
which were misidentified in the Amended Complaint. The Court will
refer to the defendants’ corrected names. (ECF No. 170 at 1.)
and Board of Chosen Freeholders (collectively the “County
Defendants”) (County Defs’ Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 170); and
Brief in Supp. of Summ. J. (County Defs’ Brief, ECF No. 170-1.)

Plaintiff did not file a brief in opposition to the County
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment but he filed a series of
letters and motions (ECF Nos. 171-185), which the Court will
consider.
The Court takes judicial notice of dozens of civil cases filed
by Plaintiff in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, available on
the Court’s Public Access to Court Electronic Records,
www.PACER.gov. See In re Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d 675, 678 n. 2
(3d Cir. 2005) (taking judicial notice of proceedings in other
courts). Particularly, the Court takes judicial notice of Camps v.
Nutter, Civ. Action No. 14-01498 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2014).
Plaintiff’s complaint concerning the conditions of confinement in

this matter are virtually a carbon copy of his allegations of the
conditions in Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility in
Philadelphia in 2014.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), the Court
will determine the motion for summary judgment on the briefs
without oral argument.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s original complaint was filed in the New Jersey
Superior Court, Burlington County on February 29, 2016. (Compl.,
ECF No. 1 at 8.) Defendant Mildred Scholtz removed the action to
this Court on March 22, 2017. (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1 at 1.)
On May 1, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
because Plaintiff, who was granted in forma pauperis status in

state court, had “three strikes” under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which prohibited him from filing a civil
action in federal court unless he showed imminent danger of serious
physical injury. (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9.) Although Plaintiff
filed at least three cases in forma pauperis that were dismissed
as frivolous, the Court was constrained to deny the motion to
dismiss based on the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
restricting the rule to cases filed in forma pauperis in federal
court. (Opinion, ECF. No. 20.) To prevent prisoners from filing in
state court to get around the three strikes rule in federal court
requires congressional action. Until such time, “recreational

litigants” such as Plaintiff get around the three strikes rule by
filing in state court.
On December 18, 2018, Plaintiff was granted leave to amend
the complaint to add Defendants CFG Health Systems, LLC; Dr. Grace
Nugent; Christina Owens, LPN; Mary Quinn-Murphy, LPN; Lynn
Johnson, NP and Stacey Chase, RN as defendants. (Order, ECF No.
92; Am. Compl., ECF No. 93.) On January 23, 2020, the County
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (County Defs’ Mot.
for Summ. J., ECF No. 170.) Plaintiff subsequently filed a series
of letters and documents. (ECF Nos. 171-183.)
II. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT

On December 18, 2018, the Honorable Magistrate Judge Joel
Schneider granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Join Defendants and
directed the Clerk to docket Plaintiff’s Motion to Join Defendants
as the Amended Complaint. (Order, ECF No. 92.) Plaintiff did not
reassert all allegations against the original defendants in his
Motion to Join Defendants. Plaintiff’s many filings in this matter
suggest that he intended to continue his claims as pled in the
original complaint. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and is
thus entitled to liberal construction of pleadings, the Court will
treat the Amended Complaint as incorporating the allegations filed
in the original Complaint. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (“a document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed[.]”)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
Plaintiff alleges the following facts against the County
Defendants. (Compl., ECF No. 1; Am. Compl., ECF No. 93.) Plaintiff
was a pre-trial detainee in Burlington County Detention Center
(“BCDC”)2 at all relevant times alleged in the Complaint. (Am.
Compl., ¶4.) Warden Mildred Scholtz, Captain McDonnell and

2 Plaintiff refers to the facility as “Burlington County Jail” but
documents submitted by Warden Matthew Leith indicate the facility
is officially called “Burlington County Detention Center.” (ECF
No. 170-2 at 5.) The Court will refer to the facility as “BCDC.”
Sergeant Davis are employed by BCDC and are responsible for its
daily operations and overseeing all of its employees. (Id., ¶¶5-
7.) Plaintiff alleges the Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington

County are responsible for all policies carried out by the
officials at BCDC. (Id., ¶8.)
At the time Plaintiff filed the original Complaint, he was
the third man in his assigned cell, which was seven feet by ten
feet in size and designed to hold two inmates; and he was forced
to sleep in a plastic boat next to the toilet, exposed to urine
and feces. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 11.) Plaintiff spent the majority
of his pre-trial detention in this overcrowded cell. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that the overcrowding combined with
continuous lockdowns subjected him to inadequate medical care and
deprived him of access to the courts. (Id. at 12.) The lockdowns
prevented him from showering on a daily basis. (Id.) The showers

were covered in black mold and were in disrepair. (Id. at 12-13.)
The cells were infested with insects and rodents. (Id. at 13.)
Plaintiff further alleged that due to overcrowding there was
(1) inadequate “day room” and recreational space; (2) poor
ventilation and poor air quality; (3) stained or damaged mattresses
with stained or damaged sheets, towels and blankets; (3) inadequate
laundry practices, which forced inmates to wash clothes in their
sinks and toilets in their cells; (4) failure to train and
supervise staff; (5) inadequate staffing leading to constant
lockdowns; and (6) denial of access to programs and services. (Id.
at 14-17.)
As to individual defendants, Plaintiff alleged Sergeant Davis

denied his requests, over the course of a number of months, for
envelopes with postage, which precluded him from sending legal
mail for his cases in Pennsylvania state and federal courts. (Id.
at 17.) Plaintiff alleged Captain McDonnell refused him use of the
law library, refused his requests regarding his missing property,
including money taken when he was arrested; and refused his
requests about sleeping on the floor in a plastic boat. (Compl.,
ECF No. 1 at 17.) Plaintiff alleged Warden Scholtz “refused to
stop those illegal acts.” (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 18.) Plaintiff
alleged all of the defendants approved the policies and customs
that caused his constitutional injuries. (Id. at 23.)
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he was deprived

of his property taken by BCDC employees without due process. (Am.
Compl., ECF No. 93 at 8.) He further alleges that Defendants
refused to send out his legal mail to the Court of Common Pleas,
Civil Division, and he “suffered injury to his filed LEGAL Cases….”
(Id.)
Plaintiff added several medical provider defendants in the
Amended Complaint, alleging they refused to provide him with anti-
viral medications that he had been receiving for Hepatitis C prior
to his incarceration in BCDC. It appears that Plaintiff also seeks
to hold the County Defendants liable for failing to provide him
with requested medical treatment. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff brings his
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleges violations of the United

States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution. (Id. at 10.)
The New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 et seq., was
modeled after and has repeatedly been interpreted analogously to
§ 1983. Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799 F.Supp.2d 417, 443 (D.N.J.
2011) (citations omitted). Thus, the Court will analyze the claims
together, following § 1983 jurisprudence.
III. DISCUSSION

A. Summary of Arguments

1. The County Defendants’ Brief

The County Defendants argue they are entitled to summary
judgment because Plaintiff fails to state a claim supported by
competent evidence in the record. (County Defs’ Brief, ECF No.
170-1 at 9.) First, the County Defendants assert the fact that
Plaintiff was subject to sleeping three to a cell designed for
two, in proximity to the toilet, does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. (Id.) Second, the record is devoid of
competent evidence concerning the alleged unsanitary conditions.
(Id. at 10.) In sum, the County Defendants contend the complained
of conditions of confinement do not rise to the level of asserting
a violation of a “clearly established” right. (Id.)
Second, the County Defendants argue they are entitled to
qualified immunity. (Id.) They rely on the Third Circuit’s decision
in Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2008), noting

that the degree of prison overcrowding that constitutes punishment
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment is not clearly
established. (County Defs’ Brief, ECF No. 170-1 at 12.) The Third
Circuit specifically stated, “our own precedents have never
established a right of pretrial detainees to be free from triple-
celling or from sleeping on a mattress placed on the floor.” Id.
(quoting Hubbard, 538 F.3d at 236.)
As to the alleged unsanitary conditions, the County
Defendants contend the record is devoid of any evidence of mold
and/or insects and rodents. (Id. at 13.) Even assuming the
conditions existed, the County Defendants contend the record is
devoid of any facts showing that any defendants ignored the

unsanitary conditions or denied plaintiff medical treatment for
any medical injuries arising from either insect population and/or
mold. (Id. at 13-14.)
Third, the County Defendants maintain that the claims against
each of them must be dismissed as a matter of law because there
are no facts alleged and/or competent evidence in the record as to
any personal involvement of these individuals in any
constitutional violation. (Id. at 14.) The County Defendants also
suggest the Burlington County Board of Chosen Freeholders is not
a separate legal entity from Burlington County and therefore, not
subject to suit. (Id. at 15.)
Even if the proper municipal defendant is Burlington County,

the County Defendants assert Plaintiff has failed to plead facts
and/or support the complaint with competent evidence that county
policymakers are subject to liability. (County Defs’ Brief, ECF
No. 170-1 at 16.) Plaintiff has failed to put forth competent
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that the
complained of conditions of confinement i.e. overcrowding,
lockdowns and/or unsanitary conditions were caused by the customs
and/or policies of the facility as to be the moving force behind
any alleged constitutional violation. (Id.)
2. Plaintiff’s Filings
Plaintiff did not file a brief in opposition to the County
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56(c)(3), “[t]he court need consider only the
cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the
record.” Thus, the Court considers the following materials in the
record.
After the County Defendants filed their motion for summary
judgment, Plaintiff’s first filing was a motion to appoint pro
bono counsel (Mot. Appoint Counsel, ECF No. 171), which was denied
on February 27, 2020. (Order, ECF No. 181.) In that motion,
Plaintiff asserted he was not provided with discovery concerning
the conditions of confinement. (Id. at 2.)
On February 3, 2020, Plaintiff submitted his own affidavit,

stating that his property was taken when he was arrested and
brought to Burlington County Jail. (Aff., ECF No. 172 at 2.) He
cites to seven different lawsuits he initiated in 2014 for failure
to treat his liver condition. (Aff. ECF No. 172 at 3.) Plaintiff
states that he exhausted his administrative remedies by appealing
to Warden Scholtz. (Id. at 5.)
Plaintiff also continued to file copies of his late discovery
requests on the Medical Defendants. (Letters, ECF Nos. 175-177.)
He filed a motion to compel discovery, which was denied because
the deadline for discovery, which had been ongoing for
approximately three years, had passed. (Mot. to Compel, ECF No.
178; Order, ECF No. 182.) Plaintiff also filed documents concerning

medical malpractice lawsuits brought in other jurisdictions. (ECF
No. 183.)
B. Summary Judgment Standard of Review
Summary Judgment is proper where the moving party “shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Daubert v. NRA Group, LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2017). “A
dispute is “genuine” if ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party[.]’” Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist.,
927 F.3d 742, 752 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Santini v. Fuentes, 795
F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “[A] fact is ‘material’ where

‘its existence or nonexistence might impact the outcome of the
suit under the applicable substantive law.’” Baloga, 927 F.3d at
752 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show, beyond the
pleadings, “‘that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Daubert,
861 F.3d at 391 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 447 U.S. 317,
324 (1986) (emphasis in Daubert)). “With respect to an issue on
which the non-moving party bears the burden of proof, the burden
on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’—that is,
pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Conoshenti v.
Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2004)

(quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325).
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion
by:

(A) citing to particular parts of
materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically
stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations (including
those made for purposes of the motion
only), admissions, interrogatory
answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do
not establish the absence or presence of
a genuine dispute, or that an adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence
to support the fact.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
“At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a
‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 380 (2007) (citing Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c)). The court’s
role is “‘not ... to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of
the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial.’” Baloga, 927 F.3d at 752 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249)).
Plaintiff alleged that he has not received all discovery
(Letter, ECF No. 185); therefore, summary judgment for the
defendants is improper. The Court disagrees. The Court denied
Plaintiff’s most recent discovery motion, noting “Plaintiff has
had more than a sufficient opportunity to conduct discovery and
the discovery at issue was served late.” (Order, ECF No. 182.)
Discovery was permitted for a period of nearly three years. (Id.
at 2.) No further discovery is permitted.
C. Conditions of Confinement
1. Standard of Law
Conditions of confinement claims brought by pretrial
detainees are analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Hubbard, 538 F.3d at 230. The inquiry in
such cases is whether the conditions amount “to punishment of the
detainee.” Id. at 231 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535
(1979)). The first part of the inquiry is “whether the disability

is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an
incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.” Hubbard,
538 F.3d at 232 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39)). If there is
a legitimate governmental purpose, the question is whether the
condition is excessive in relation to that purpose. Id. Governments
have an interest in maintaining security and order in operating
correctional facilities in manageable fashion, and courts should
ordinarily defer to the professional expertise of corrections
officials in the administration of detention facilities. Id.
(quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 540 n. 23) (citations omitted)).
2. Analysis
Triple-celling, even if it occurred for the majority of

Plaintiff’s seven-month confinement in BCDC, does not amount to
punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hubbard, 538
F.3d at 233 (without evidence that sleeping on the floor resulted
in disease, sleeping on a floor mattress for three to seven months
did not violate Due Process rights). Prison officials have a
legitimate interest in managing an overcrowded prison. Id. (citing
Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984, 993 (3d Cir.
1983). Plaintiff’s nonspecific allegations of unsanitary
conditions such as mold in the showers, insects and rodents, poor
ventilation, inadequate laundry practices and lockdowns due to
staff shortages, especially where unsupported by evidence in the
record3 after the close of discovery, fail to establish that

Plaintiff was subjected to a genuine privation and hardship over
an extended period of time. Hubbard, 538 F.3d at 235; see Lindsey
v. Shaffer, 411 F. App’x 466, 468 (3d Cir. 2011) (sleeping on
mattress on the floor and sharing a toilet did not amount to cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment).
Even if Plaintiff had garnered some evidence in support of
his allegations, the individual defendants would be entitled to

3 Local Civil Rule 56.1 provides, in pertinent part:

The opponent of summary judgment shall
furnish, with its opposition papers, a
responsive statement of material facts,
addressing each paragraph of the movant’s
statement, indicating agreement or
disagreement, and if not agreed, stating each
material fact in dispute and citing to the
affidavits and other documents submitted in
connection with the motion; any material fact
not disputed shall be deemed undisputed for
purposes of the summary judgment motion. In
addition, the opponent may also furnish a
supplemental statement of disputed material
facts, in separately numbered paragraphs
citing to the affidavits and other documents
submitted in connection with the motion, if
necessary to substantiate the factual basis
for opposition….

Plaintiff did not comply with this rule. If there is competent
evidence supporting Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement, loss of
property or access to courts claims in this voluminous record that
the Court missed, Plaintiff may file a motion for reconsideration.
qualified immunity. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects
government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “A clearly
established right is one that is ‘sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing
violates that right.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)
(quoting Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012) (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted)). “[E]xisting precedent
must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.” Id. (citing Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741,
(2011)).
Plaintiff has not cited, nor can the Court find, clearly

established law that “triple celling,” with nonspecific
allegations of inadequate community space, mold in the showers,
the presence of insects and rodents, torn or stained bedding, poor
ventilation and a nonspecific number and duration of lockdowns
constitutes punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Hubbard, 538 F.3d at 236 (noting scant guidance from the
Supreme Court on what constitutes “punishment” under the
Fourteenth Amendment); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305 (1991)
(“Nothing so amorphous as ‘overall conditions’ can rise to the
level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation
of a single human need exists.”)
D. Claims Against Individual Defendants

The County Defendants maintain that there are no facts alleged
nor competent evidence in the record as to any personal involvement
of Warden Scholtz, Captain McDonnell or Sergeant Davis in a
constitutional violation. (County Defs’ Brief, ECF No. 170-1 at
14-15.) As to Sergeant Davis, Plaintiff alleged she denied his
requests for envelopes and postage, over the course of several
months, which precluded him from sending legal mail for his cases
in Pennsylvania state and federal courts. In order to state a First
Amendment claim for violation of the right of access to courts, a
plaintiff must establish an actual injury. Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 352-53 (1996). Thus, a plaintiff must demonstrate “that
a nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being

impeded.” Id. Plaintiff’s allegations do not rise to this level
because he does not allege any actual injury from delay in sending
a specific piece of legal mail relevant to a nonfrivolous legal
claim.
Next, Plaintiff seeks to hold Captain McDonnell liable for
refusing use of the law library, refusing requests regarding
missing property, and refusing requests about sleeping on the floor
in a plastic boat. Plaintiff has not established that sleeping on
the floor in a plastic boat violated his constitutional rights;
therefore, Captain McDonnell is not liable for not addressing
Plaintiff’s requests in this regard. Like his claim that Sergeant
Davis denied him postage and envelopes for legal mail, Plaintiff

has not demonstrated or even alleged that McDonnell’s denial of
his requests to use the law library denied Plaintiff access to the
courts. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (because there is not a freestanding
right to a law library, a plaintiff must show actual injury, for
example, that inadequacies of the law library prevented him even
from filing a complaint.)
Plaintiff also attempts to state a claim for deprivation of
property. “A prisoner's due process claim based on a state actor's
unauthorized deprivation of property is not actionable under §
1983 unless no adequate post-deprivation remedy is available.”
Mattis v. Dohman, 260 F. App'x 458, 461 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)). Prison grievance

systems that allow prisoners to complain about lost property are
adequate post-deprivations remedies. Id. (citing Tillman v.
Lebanon County Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000)).
State tort suits for conversion of property are also adequate post-
deprivation remedies. Id. (citing Hudson, 468 U.S. at 535).
Plaintiff has not alleged facts that would permit a reasonable
fact finder to conclude that adequate post-deprivation remedies
were unavailable to him. Thus, this claim fails against Captain
McDonnell.
Finally, Plaintiff alleged Warden Scholtz is liable for
failing to stop illegal acts. A supervisor is not liable for the
unconstitutional acts of his or her subordinates under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 based on respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S
662, 676 (2009). Here, Plaintiff has not established Warden
Scholtz’s knowledge of any unconstitutional acts, nor has he
alleged in a nonconclusory manner that Warden Scholtz maintained
a policy or custom that violated his constitutional rights. See
Barkes v. First Correctional Medical Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 320 (3d
Cir. 2014) (noting supervisory liability may be found when a
supervisor is deliberately indifferent to a known deficiency in
government policy or procedure that creates an unreasonable risk
of constitutional injury) rev’d on other grounds by Taylor v.
Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015). Therefore, the individual
defendants, Davis, McDonnell and Scholtz, are entitled to summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 and NJCRA claims.
E. Claims Against Burlington County
The County Defendants contend that the Board of Chosen
Freeholders of Burlington County is not an entity that is
independently subject to legal suit. (County Defs’ Brief, ECF No.
170-1 at 15.) The Court finds that even if the complaint is
construed as against Burlington County, Plaintiff has not pled
sufficient facts to establish the County was the moving force
behind an alleged constitutional violation based on its policies
or customs.
A plaintiff may bring a claim for municipal liability under

§ 1983 by alleging that an official municipal policy, including
practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the
force of law, caused his or her constitutional injuries. Connick
v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60-61 (2011). Vague assertions of a
custom or policy, with virtually no evidentiary support, fail to
state a § 1983 claim against a municipality. Groman v. Township of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1995). Plaintiff’s claims of
customs or policies causing constitutional injury are nothing more
than conclusory assertions. Therefore, Burlington County is
entitled to summary judgment.
F. Medical Claims Against Non-Medical Officials
It appears the Plaintiff seeks to hold all defendants liable

for the alleged failure to treatment his Hepatitis C with anti-
viral medications. In a separate Opinion, the Court has found that
the claims against the Medical Defendants are barred by the statute
of limitations. The County Defendants are non-medical prison
officials.
“If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts …, a non-
medical prison official will generally be justified in believing
that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372
F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). Thus, writing complaints about
medical treatment to a non-medical prison official when the
prisoner is being treated by a prison doctor will not subject the
non-medical prison official to liability under § 1983. Spruill,

372 F.3d at 236 (citing Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d
Cir. 1993). “[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge)
that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not
treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official … will not be
chargeable with … deliberate indifference.’” Id.; see Natale v.
Camden County Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581-82 (3d Cir.
2003) (analyzing Fourteenth Amendment claim for inadequate medical
care under the standard used to evaluate similar Eighth Amendment
claims). Instead, a plaintiff must show that a prison authority
“den[ied] reasonable requests for medical
treatment ... and such denial exposes the
inmate ‘to undue suffering or the threat of
tangible residual injury,’ [Monmouth County
Correctional Institutional Inmates v.
Lanzaro], 834 F.2d [326], 346 (quoting
Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir.
1976)), and (2) where ‘knowledge of the need
for medical care [is accompanied by the] ...
intentional refusal to provide that care,’”
id. (quoting Ancata v. Prison Health Servs.,
769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985))
(alterations in original).

Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff makes only conclusory allegations, based on
submitting grievances, to hold the County Defendants liable for
alleged inadequate medical care. Plaintiff falls far short of
meeting the pleading standard, let alone providing competent
evidence supporting his claims in opposition to summary judgment.
The County Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all
claims.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court will grant the
County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

An appropriate Order follows.
Date: March 23, 2020
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10267776. Public record. Not legal advice.