# RaSaadi Lennox Hernandez el. v. Doe

> District Court, W.D. North Carolina · December 19, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10260516

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** December 19, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
1:23-cv-00271-MOC

RASAADI LENNOX HERNANDEZ, )
a/k/a JUAN CARLOS HERNANDEZ )
NAVARRETE-CESTUI QUE-TRUST )
and CARLOS HERNANDEZ, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) ORDER
)
JOHN DOE, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
____________________________________)

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, [Doc. 1],
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A, and Plaintiff’s letter, [Doc. 9].
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Docs. 2, 14].
I. BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff RaSaadi Lennox Hernandez1 filed this action on September 14, 2023,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendant John Doe, identified as the Warden of Scotland
Correctional Institutional (“Scotland CI”), which is in Laurinburg, North Carolina,2 and Ronnie
Honeycutt, identified as the Warden of Alexander Correctional Institution (“Alexander CI”),
which is in Taylorsville, North Carolina. [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff sues both Defendants in their official
capacity only. [Id. at 2]. Plaintiff alleges as follows. On June 8, 2023, Plaintiff was placed in
segregation while housed at Scotland CI. A week later, Plaintiff went before a Disciplinary

1 Plaintiff uses the name RaSaadi Lennox Hernandez in his purported sovereign citizen capacity. [See Doc.
1-1 at 6-8].

2 Laurinburg is in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
Hearing Officer (DHO) and was sentenced to 30 days in Restrictive Housing for Control Purposes
(RCHP). Plaintiff should have been released from RHCP on July 8, 2023. Plaintiff, however,
remained in RHCP at that time “with out any due process.” Plaintiff was then sent to Alexander
CI on August 8, 2023, “where they also kept [him].”3,4,5 [Id. at 5].
Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated “all [his] constitutional rights,” but he also

specifically claims violation of his rights under the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. [Id. at 3]. Plaintiff also asserts violations of “Article 1, section, 9” and 18 U.S.C.
§§ 241 and 242. [Id.]. For injuries, Plaintiff alleges emotional distress and lost wages. [Id. at 5].
Plaintiff seeks $5 million from each Defendant. [Id.].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review the Complaint to
determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or]
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, under
§ 1915A the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the complaint, or any

portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief. 28 U.S.C. §

3 Plaintiff has since been transferred to Tabor Correctional Institution in Tabor City, North Carolina. [See
Doc. 11].

4 Plaintiff attached disciplinary records to his Complaint reflecting that he was charged with “actively
participating in SRG activity directly related to sovereign citizens” on September 1, 2023, and that during
the September 8, 2023 hearing on this charge he was “immediately … disruptive and refused to cooperate
with the disciplinary hearing process.” [Doc. 1-1 at 3]. Plaintiff was found guilty on this charge and
sentenced to 30 days in RHCP. [Id. at 4]. It is unclear how these records relate to Plaintiff’s Complaint.

5 Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s unsigned letter directed to the Clerk in which he asks to amend his
Complaint with a Step Two grievance response. [Docs. 9, 9-1]. The Court will strike this improper letter.
Plaintiff is admonished to carefully review the Court’s Order of Instructions [Doc. 3], particularly regarding
the manner of submissions to this Court, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which requires that all
submissions to the Court be signed by an attorney or the party, if unrepresented. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a).
1915A.
In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint raises an
indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as
fantastic or delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore,
a pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district court to ignore a clear
failure to allege facts in his Complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law.
Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Venue
In an action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, venue is established by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b),
which provides: (b) A civil action may be brought in: (1) a judicial district where any defendant
resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial
district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or

a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district
in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in
which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.
Therefore, under Section 1391, Plaintiff’s action may be heard in a venue where all the
defendants reside, or in the venue where the issue substantially arose. Here, Plaintiff’s action
substantially arose in the Eastern District of North Carolina. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), the
Court may dismiss this action, or, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer this action to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. Because a portion of Plaintiff’s
claim arose in the Western District of North Carolina, the Court will only transfer that portion of
the action arising in the Eastern District – that is, Plaintiff’s claim against the Warden of Scotland
CI – to the Eastern District of North Carolina. The Court will conduct initial review of the portion
of the action arising in the Western District of North Carolina
B. Plaintiff’s Claim Against Defendant Honeycutt
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a right secured

by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed
by a “person” acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski, 599 U.S.
166, 143 S.Ct. 1444 (2023).
Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Honeycutt fails initial review for several reasons. To
begin, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding events at Alexander are so vague and conclusory that they
fail to satisfy the most basic pleading requirements. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a “short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); Simpson v. Welch,
900 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1990) (conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific allegations of

material fact are not sufficient); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 201-02 (4th Cir. 2002)
(a pleader must allege facts, directly or indirectly, that support each element of the claim). That
is, Plaintiff alleges only that he was transferred to Alexander CI on August 8, 2023, and “they also
kept [him].” [Doc. 1 at 5]. This allegation is wholly insufficient to state a claim related to events
at Alexander CI.
Next, Plaintiff sues Defendant Honeycutt in his official capacity only. However, “a suit
against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a
suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Because
a state is not a “person” under § 1983, state officials acting in their official capacities cannot be
sued for damages thereunder. Allen v. Cooper, No. 1:19-cv-794, 2019 WL 6255220, at *2
(M.D.N.C. Nov. 22, 2019). Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary
damages against the State of North Carolina and its various agencies. See Ballenger v. Owens,
352 F.3d 842, 844-45 (4th Cir. 2003). As such, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Honeycutt in
his official capacity does not survive initial review and will be dismissed.

Finally, even if Plaintiff had sued Defendant Honeycutt in his individual capacity, Plaintiff
has nonetheless failed to state a claim for relief against him. To establish liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendant “acted personally” to cause the alleged violation.
See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). As such, the doctrine
of respondeat superior does not apply in actions brought under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A supervisor can only be liable where (1) he knew that
his subordinate “was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of
constitutional injury;” (2) his response showed “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of
the alleged offensive practices;” and (3) there was an “affirmative causal link” between her

inaction and the constitutional injury.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff has alleged no facts in support of these elements. He, therefore,
would have failed to state a claim for relief against Defendant Honeycutt in any event.
As such, the remaining portion of Plaintiff’s Complaint fails initial review, and the Court
will dismiss it without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court transfers the portion of the Complaint related to events arising at Scotland
CI to the Eastern District of North Carolina and, as to the portion of Plaintiff’s Complaint arising
at Alexander CI, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court
will dismiss that portion of the Complaint without prejudice
The Court will allow Plaintiff thirty (30) days to amend his Complaint, if he so chooses
and if the facts support such amendment. Any Amended Complaint will be subject to all timeliness
and procedural requirements and will supersede the Complaint. Piecemeal amendment will not be
permitted. Should Plaintiff fail to timely amend his Complaint in accordance with this Order, this
action will be dismissed without prejudice and without further notice to Plaintiff.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the portion of Plaintiff’s action arising at Scotland
Correctional Institution is transferred to the Eastern District of North Carolina in accordance with
the terms of this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in which to amend
his Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order. If Plaintiff fails to so amend his
Complaint, the matter will be dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED without
prejudice in accordance with the terms of this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs letter [Doc. 9] is hereby STRICKEN from
the record in this matter.
The Clerk is respectfully instructed to mail Plaintiff a blank prisoner Section 1983 form.

Signed: December 19, 2023

i /
oit-eanco
Max O. Cogburn Ji
United States District Judge Hira gg te

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10260516. Public record. Not legal advice.