# Freeman v. Turner

> District Court, W.D. North Carolina · August 11, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10259993

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** August 11, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
5:23-cv-89-FDW

QUENTIN FREEMAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) ORDER
)
FNU TURNER, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
____________________________________)

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on initial review of the pro se Complaint [Doc.
1]. Also pending are the Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. 3] and Motion for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order [Doc. 9; see Doc. 12 (Signature Page)].
The Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Doc. 7].
I. BACKGROUND
The pro se Plaintiff, who is incarcerated at the Alexander Correctional Institution, filed the
instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He names as Defendants in their individual and
official capacities: FNU Turner, a Security Risk Group (SRG) officer; FNU Young, a mailroom
worker; FNU Eckard, a case manager; and FNU Haufman, a case manager or F.C.C. supervisor.
He asserts claims for violation of the “1st Amendment, 14th Amendment, retaliation, deliberate
indifference, and violation of [his] constitutional right to access the courts.” [Doc. 1 at 5]. For
injury, he claims:
My injury has been gain days taking away from me for the disciplinary over
250, my money not refunded for my quarterly monthly box I ordered & my shoes,
which where supposedly sent back yet they won’t give me my mail for me to find
out from my family if they received a refund! My family is being charged money
every time the write me using the service text behind, yet I’m not getting any of my
mail.

Ive had several anxiety ATTACKS since then due to the stress of not being
able to communicate with my family due to the staff holding my mail, stopping
my legal mail, and phone calls. I’ve missed 2 deadlines and I had to get time
extension.

#250 gain/good days
$100 quarterly box – NC quarterly package program
$95 per of shoes – NC shoe program
$36 for disciplinary reports

The Industrial Commission Assistant Attorney General never received
specific document from this facility that I sent to the Industrial Commission as well,
so my case was extended and almost dismissed because Ms. Young & the SRG
staff are holding my mail longer than the 48 hour mark or disapproving for no
reasons related to NCDAC Policy. Due to the age of my family members has fell
seriously ill and I had no knowledge till 2 months later.

[Id. at 7] (errors uncorrected). He seeks a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, compensatory
and punitive damages, a jury trial, costs, and any additional relief that the Court deems just. [Id. at
8].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review the Complaint to
determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or]
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, under
§ 1915A the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A.
In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether a complaint raises an indisputably
meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or
delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se
complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the
liberal construction requirement will not permit a district court to ignore a clear failure to allege
facts in the Complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed
by a “person” acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski, 599 U.S.
__, 143 S.Ct. 1444 (2023).
1. Parties
The Complaint contains vague terms or pronouns such that the Court cannot determine the
individual(s) to whom Plaintiff refers. [See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 5-6 (referring to “mail room staff,”

“others at the prison,” and “they”)]; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d
33, 35 (4th Cir. 1990) (conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific allegations of material fact
are not sufficient); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 201-02 (4th Cir. 2002) (a pleader
must allege facts, directly or indirectly, that support each element of the claim). The allegations
that are so vague and conclusory that the Court cannot determine to whom they refer are dismissed
without prejudice. These claims also cannot proceed insofar as they refer to individuals who are
not named as Defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must name all the
parties[.]”); Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]o make someone a party the
plaintiff must specify him in the caption and arrange for service of process.”); Perez v. Humphries,
No. 3:18-cv-107-GCM, 2018 WL 4705560, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 2018) (“A plaintiff’s failure
to name a defendant in the caption of a Complaint renders any action against the purported
defendant a legal nullity.”).
The Plaintiff purports to sue the Defendants, who are state officials, in their individual and

official capacities. However, “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a
suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Because a state is not a “person” under § 1983, state officials
acting in their official capacities cannot be sued for damages thereunder. Allen v. Cooper, No.
1:19-cv-794, 2019 WL 6255220, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 22, 2019). Furthermore, the Eleventh
Amendment bars suits for monetary damages against the State of North Carolina and its various
agencies. See Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 844-45 (4th Cir. 2003). As such, Plaintiff’s claim
for damages against the Defendants in their official capacities do not survive initial review and
will be dismissed with prejudice.

2. Disciplinary Infractions
The Plaintiff appears to claim that: Defendant Turner wrongfully charged him on April 25,
20231 with disciplinary infractions for smuggling K-2 into the facility in a legal mail envelope; the
Plaintiff received sanctions including the loss of privileges and gain time; and he was required to
pay a $36 for “disciplinary reports.” [See Doc. 1 at 5-6].

1 The NCDAC website indicates that the Plaintiff has had 126 disciplinary infractions since he was admitted into
custody on December 4, 2013, including two disciplinary infractions on April 25, 2023 for “misuse/unauth-use
phone/mail” and “attempt Class A offense.” See
https://webapps.doc.state.nc.us/opi/viewoffenderinfractions.do?method=view&offenderID=1398952&listpage=1&li
sturl=pagelistoffendersearchresults&searchOffenderId=1398952&searchDOBRange=0&obscure=Y (last accessed
Aug. 9, 2023); Fed. R. Ev. 201.
This claim appears to be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the
United States Supreme Court held as follows:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction and sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or
sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus,
when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider
whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity
of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if
successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal
judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the
absence of some other bar to the suit.

Id. at 485-87 (footnotes omitted). In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), the Supreme Court
extended the Heck rule to claims alleging constitutional deficiencies in prison disciplinary
proceedings that have resulted in the loss of good time credits.
Here, if the Plaintiff were to prevail on his claim that the disciplinary charges were
unfounded, that would necessarily imply the invalidity of the disciplinary convictions. See, e.g.,
Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646-47 (plaintiff’s claims that he was denied the opportunity to put on a
defense and that there was deceit and bias by the hearing officer would necessarily imply the
invalidity of the disciplinary proceedings); Moskos v. Hardee, 24 F.4th 289 (4th Cir. 2022)
(prisoner could not bring § 1983 due process claim that prison officials fabricated evidence so that
plaintiff would be wrongfully convicted of prison disciplinary infractions, causing him to lose
good-time credits, because the disciplinary conviction had not been invalidated). The Plaintiff has
not alleged that the disciplinary convictions have been reversed or otherwise invalidated.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim appears to be barred by Heck.
3. Mail and Communications
The Plaintiff appears to claim that: Defendant Young opened an envelope marked “legal
mail,” in which K-2 was found, outside of the Plaintiff’s presence and the Plaintiff never received
that piece of mail; Defendants Turner and Young are holding his mail for “longer than policy
allows” and are not sending the Plaintiff his “family mail;” Defendant Young is “hindering” and

“denying” all of the Plaintiff’s mail, “sayin disapproved with the reason that [Plaintiff’s] family is
discussing unauthorized funds, but that has nothing to do with the NCDAC Enterprise or this
facility;” and the Plaintiff is unable to “contact [his] family while Ms. Young is hindering [his]
mail.” [Doc. 1 at 5] (errors uncorrected).2
“Courts have generally concluded that the First Amendment rights retained by convicted
prisoners include the right to communicate with others beyond the prison walls.” Heyer v. U.S.
Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 213 (4th Cir. 2017). “[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on
inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Four factors relevant in

determining the reasonableness of the regulation at issue are: (1) whether there is a “‘valid, rational
connection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to
justify it;” (2) whether there are “alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to
prison inmates;” (3) what “impact” will “accommodation of the asserted constitutional right ...
have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally;” and (4)
whether there are “ready alternatives” for furthering the governmental interest available. Beard,
548 U.S. at 529 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90). The prisoner bears the burden of proving the
invalidity of the challenged regulation. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003).

2 The Plaintiff makes numerous additional allegations about his mail, however, they are unattributed to any Defendant.
[See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 6]; Section 1, supra.
For instance, prison officials may inspect an inmate’s outgoing and incoming mail because
such is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See generally Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 575 (1974); Turner, 482 U.S. at 89; see also Altizer v. Deeds, 191 F.3d 540, 547-
48 (4th Cir. 1999) (opening and inspecting a prisoner’s outgoing mail is, “[w]ithout question,”
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Matherly v. Andrews, 859 F.3d 264, 281

(4th Cir. 2017) (a “necessary implication” of Altizer is that prison officials may open and inspect
a prisoner’s incoming mail). A prison rule requiring that legal mail be opened in the presence of
the inmate, without being read, does not infringe on a prisoner’s constitutional rights. See Wolff,
418 U.S. at 575–77; see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (prison restrictions impinging on an inmate’s
constitutional rights are valid if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests);
Haze v. Harrison, 961 F.3d 654, 660 (4th Cir. 2020) (recognizing the privileged and confidential
nature of legal mail).
The Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Turner opened an envelope marked as legal mail
outside his presence fails to support a First Amendment violation. See Buie v. Jones, 717 F.2d 925,
926 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that “a few isolated instances of plaintiff’s mail being opened out of

his presence” that were “either accidental or the result of unauthorized subordinate conduct ... were
not of constitutional magnitude”); Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003) (“an isolated
incident of mail tampering is usually insufficient to establish a constitutional violation”). Any
suggestion that Defendant Turner was not authorized to seize that piece of mail is frivolous. See
generally Hanvey v. Blankenship, 631 F.2d 296 (4th Cir. 1980) (prison officials do not violate an
inmate’s constitutional rights when they seize contraband). The Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory
allegations against Defendants Turner and Young regarding mail delays and denials are
insufficient to state a plausible First Amendment claim, in light of prison officials’ legitimate
penological interest in inspecting his mail and in rejecting unauthorized content, especially in light
of the Plaintiff’s disciplinary conviction for smuggling contraband. The Plaintiff’s First
Amendment claims regarding his mail are, therefore, dismissed without prejudice.
4. Retaliation
The Plaintiff claims that Defendant Eckard has now referred him to ICON “which is 6

months behind the door in retaliation, b/c I can’t use the phone or contact my family while Ms.
Young is hindering my mail.”3 [Doc. 1 at 5].
An inmate has a clearly established First Amendment right to be free from retaliation for
filing lawsuits. See Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 855 F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir. 2017); Thompson
v. Commonwealth of Va., 878 F.3d 89, 110 (4th Cir. 2017). Inmates also have a protected First
Amendment right to complain to prison officials about prison conditions and improper treatment
by prison employees that affect them. See Patton v. Kimble, 717 F. App’x 271, 272 (4th Cir. 2018).
To state a colorable First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he engaged
in protected First Amendment activity, (2) the defendant took some action that adversely affected

his First Amendment rights, and (3) there was a causal relationship between his protected activity
and the defendant’s conduct. Martin v. Duffy, 977 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks
and citation omitted). Retaliation claims brought by prisoners, however, are treated with
skepticism because every act of discipline by a prison official is retaliatory in that it responds

3 The Plaintiff’s other allegations about retaliation are not attributed to any Defendant. [See Doc. 1 at 6]. They are
also too vague and conclusory to state a plausible claim. Further, the Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegations that
Defendant Eckert was “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t]” and violated equal protection by sending him to ICON are
insufficient to proceed. See generally Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (deliberate indifference entails
“more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety,” or “more than mere negligence,” but “less
than acts or omissions [done] for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result”); Morrison
v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648 (4th Cir. 2001) (“To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate
that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was
the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination”); Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 732 (4th Cir. 2002) (a
deferential standard of review applies to equal protection claims in the prison context, i.e., whether the disparate
treatment is reasonably related to any legitimate penological interests).
directly to prisoner misconduct. See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994). Moreover,
bare or conclusory assertions of retaliation are insufficient to establish a retaliation claim. Id.
Here, the Plaintiff’s vague and nonsensical allegations fail to plausibly establish that any
Defendant took an adverse action against him because he engaged in a protected activity. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief”); Simpson, 900 F.2d at 35; Dickson, 309 F.3d at 201-02. The retaliation claim
is, therefore, dismissed without prejudice.
5. Access to the Courts
The Plaintiff appears to claim that Defendant Young denied him access to the courts by:
contacting the Plaintiff’s attorney without permission; stopping and “hindering” his mail; and
giving his lawyer “problems about legal calls.” [Doc. 1 at 5-6].
The Supreme Court stated in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), that prisoners must
have meaningful access to the courts. The “meaningful access” referred to in Bounds does not,
however, entitle a plaintiff to total or unlimited access. See Moore v. Gray, No. 5:04-CT-918-FL,
2005 WL 3448047, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2005), aff’d, 133 Fed. App’x 913 (4th Cir. 2005)

(unpublished) (citation omitted). The right of access to the courts only requires that prisoners have
the capability of bringing challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement. See Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356-57 (1996). Moreover, as a jurisdictional requirement flowing from the
standing doctrine, the prisoner must allege an actual injury. See id. at 349. “Actual injury” is
prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing
deadline or present a non-frivolous claim challenging their conviction or conditions of
confinement. See id. A plaintiff’s “[f]ailure to show that a ‘nonfrivolous legal claim has been
frustrated’ is fatal to his Bounds claim.” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1155 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Casey, 518 U.S. at 353).
The Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegations about being “hindered” and having
“problems” fail to identify any actual injury that he allegedly suffered as a result of any
Defendant’s actions. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claims for denial of access to the courts are

dismissed without prejudice.
6. Property Deprivations
Construing the allegations liberally, the Plaintiff appears to claim that Defendant Young
denied him shipments of a “quarterly box” and a pair of shoes, for which he seeks reimbursement.
[Doc. 1 at 5, 7].
Plaintiff has failed to state a due process claim based on the alleged deprivation of property
because he has an adequate post-deprivation remedy in state tort law. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (stating that intentional deprivations of property do not violate the Due
Process Clause if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss is available); Wilkins v.
Whitaker, 714 F.2d 4, 6 (4th Cir. 1983) (“Under North Carolina law, an action for conversion will

lie against a public official who by an unauthorized act wrongfully deprives an owner of his
property.”). The Court, therefore, will dismiss this claim.
7. Policy Violations
The Plaintiff claims that the Defendants violated various prison policies. [See Doc. 1 at 5].
However, a policy violation does not rise to the level of a § 1983 claim absent a plausible allegation
of an underlying constitutional violation. See generally Jackson v. Sampson, 536 F. App’x 356,
357 (4th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (holding that “prison officials’ failure to follow internal prison
policies are not actionable under § 1983 unless the alleged breach of policy rises to the level of
constitutional violation”). Therefore, the Plaintiff’s allegations that the Defendants violated prison
policies, this fails to state an independent § 1983 claim.
8. Pending Motions
The Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. 3], and Motion for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order [Doc. 9].

The Plaintiff asks the Court to appoint counsel to represent him because: he cannot afford
counsel and is proceeding in forma pauperis; his solitary confinement will greatly limit his ability
to litigate; the issues in the case are complex and will require significant research and investigation;
Plaintiff has limited access to legal materials and limited knowledge of the law; he relies on verbal
communication with his family via pay phone for litigation assistance; Plaintiff’s evidence and
legal records will need to be gathered from Plaintiff’s family and friends; Plaintiff’s evidence,
legal paperwork, and mail are being “hindered,” held past the time specified in prison policy,
thrown away, disapproved, and not sent “due to grievances filed on 2 different occasions on parties
listed above;” a trial will likely involve conflicting testimony, and counsel would better enable

Plaintiff to gather evidence, testimony from non-incarcerated individuals, present evidence, and
cross-examine witnesses; and Plaintiff has repeatedly attempted to “exhaust all options only to be
retaliated against by mail not being sent out on numerous occasions since March 21, 2023.” [Doc.
3 at 1-2].
There is no absolute right to the appointment of counsel in civil actions such as this one.
Therefore, a plaintiff must present “exceptional circumstances” in order to require the Court to
seek the assistance of a private attorney for a plaintiff who is unable to afford counsel. Miller v.
Simmons, 814 F.2d 962, 966 (4th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of
exceptional circumstances that would warrant the appointment of counsel and, therefore, this
Motion will be denied.
In his Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order [Doc. 9], the
Plaintiff asks the Court to: prohibit Defendants Turner, Young, Eckard, and Haufman from
“purposely continuing to obstruct and/or hinder the delivery and/or reception of Plaintiff’s ingoing

and outgoing legal and personal mail, from continuously contacting and/or harassing, verbally or
otherwise, Plaintiff’s appellate attorney …; from fabricating and/or attempting to fabricate
fictitious and/or misleading disciplinary infractions against Plaintiff with the express intent to
injure, grieve, and/or afflict in any manner …; from perpetrating any and all forms of verbal and/or
physical and/or emotional harassment, and/or adverse action …; and from having any further direct
and/or indirect physical and/or verbal contact with the Plaintiff, so long as this civil action remains
open or active….” [Id. at 1-2]. He claims that he is likely to succeed in this action and that the
Defendants are “engaging in a systematic campaign of harassment and retaliation” against him,
and that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm should relief not be granted. [Id. at 2].

Preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy afforded before trial at the
discretion of the district court. In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 524-26 (4th
Cir. 2003). It is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right. Winter v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). In each case, courts “must balance the competing claims of
injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested
relief.” Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987). “[C]ourts of equity
should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy
of injunction.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. To obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must
establish (1) that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm
in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that
an injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 20. The Plaintiff has not established any of the
elements that would warrant preliminary injunctive relief. Therefore, this Motion is denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails initial

review. The claims against the Defendants for damages in their official capacities are dismissed
with prejudice, and the remaining claims are dismissed without prejudice. The Plaintiff’s Motion
for Appointment of Counsel, and Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order are denied.
The Court will allow Plaintiff thirty (30) days to amend his Complaint, if he so chooses, to
properly state a claim upon which relief can be granted in accordance with the terms of this Order.
Any Amended Complaint will be subject to all timeliness and procedural requirements and will
supersede the Complaint. Piecemeal amendment will not be permitted. Should Plaintiff fail to
timely amend his Complaint in accordance with this Order, the Court will dismiss this action

without further notice.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. The Complaint [Doc. 1] is dismissed pursuant to §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
2. The Plaintiff’s claims for damages against the Defendants in their official
capacities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
3. The remaining claims are is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
4. The Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in which to amend his Complaint in
accordance with the terms of this Order. If Plaintiff fails to so amend his
Complaint, the matter will be dismissed without further notice.
5. The Plaintiffs Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. 3] is DENIED.
6. The Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order [Doc. 9] is DENIED.

Signed: August 11, 2023

Frank D. Whitney é +3
United States District Judge ages

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10259993. Public record. Not legal advice.