# Hyatt v. Miller

> District Court, W.D. North Carolina · March 29, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10259604

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** March 29, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:19-cv-00250-MR-WCM

MARCUS HYATT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) MEMORANDUM OF
) DECISION AND ORDER
JEFF MAY, )
)
Defendant. )
________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Hyatt’s Application to
Award Attorneys’ Fees [Doc. 144].
I. BACKGROUND
On January 20, 2018, officers from the Buncombe County Sheriff’s
Office (“BCSO”), acting on a tip, conducted a traffic stop of a car driven by
Brandon Pickens in which the Plaintiff Marcus Hyatt was a passenger.
Plaintiff Hyatt was detained for the next several hours while officers searched
the car and its occupants for illegal narcotics. After completing the search of
the car, the officers procured a search warrant and conducted a strip search
of Plaintiff Hyatt in a nearby convenience store bathroom. Ultimately, Plaintiff
Hyatt was not found to be in possession of any controlled substances, and
he was released without charges.
At the same time that Plaintiff Hyatt was being detained, his girlfriend,
Plaintiff Ashley Barrett, was stopped by BCSO officers in a separate traffic

stop on suspicion that she was attempting to dispose of controlled
substances at the couple’s apartment. Following a search of Plaintiff
Barrett’s vehicle and the couple’s apartment, no controlled substances were

found, and Plaintiff Barrett was also released without charges.
The Plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
North Carolina state law, challenging the officers’ actions during the
respective traffic stops and searches. Specifically, Plaintiff Hyatt asserted

claims for false imprisonment, false arrest, and assault and battery under
state law and for unlawful search and seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
BCSO deputies J.D. Lambert, Jeff May, and Katherine Lewis. Plaintiff Hyatt

also asserted a claim for unreasonable sexually invasive search in violation
of the Fourth Amendment under § 1983 against Defendants Lambert and
May. Plaintiff Barrett asserted claims for false imprisonment and false arrest
under state law and for unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment

under § 1983 against Defendants Lambert and Lewis. The Plaintiffs also

2
asserted a claim for action under the bond against Defendant Miller and
Defendant Western Surety Company.1

The Court held a jury trial in this matter from March 17, 2021 to March
25, 2021. The jury was able to return only a partial verdict and deadlocked
as to a number of issues. The parties stipulated their acceptance of the jury’s

verdict as to the issues on which they could unanimously agree and for the
Court to serve as the finder of fact as to any issues on which the jury reached
an impasse. Following the trial, and in accordance with the parties’
stipulation, the Court subsequently entered an Order memorializing the jury’s

findings and setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect
to the issues on which the jury had deadlocked. [Doc. 142]. In that Order,
the Court dismissed Plaintiff Barrett’s claims in their entirety. With respect

to Plaintiff Hyatt’s claims, the Court entered Judgment in favor of Plaintiff
Hyatt against Defendant May in the amount of $50,000 on Plaintiff Hyatt’s §
1983 claims for unreasonable search and seizure and on Plaintiff Hyatt’s

1 Plaintiff Barrett also asserted state law claims for trespass to property and § 1983 claims
for unlawful search, but these claims were dismissed on summary judgment. [Doc. 99].
The Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against the Defendants in their official capacities were
dismissed as well. [Id.].

3
state law claims for false imprisonment/false arrest, assault, and battery and
dismissed the remainder of the Plaintiff’s claims. [Doc. 143].

Plaintiff Hyatt now moves the Court to award him $261,563.25 in
attorneys’ fees as a “prevailing party” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.2 [Doc.
148]. Defendant May does not contest that Plaintiff Hyatt is the prevailing

party in this matter and is entitled to an award of fees, but he asks the Court
to use its discretion and significantly reduce the requested award. [Doc.
146].
II. DISCUSSION

Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1988 provides that “[i]n any
action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [42 U.S.C. § 1983], the court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's

fee as part of the costs . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). A plaintiff constitutes a
“prevailing party” if he “succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation which
achieves some of the benefit [he] sought in bringing suit.” Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). It is undisputed that Plaintiff Hyatt is a

“prevailing party” and thus entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees under §
1988.

2 The Plaintiff indicates in his motion that he intends to seek a separate award of costs
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920. [Doc. 144 at 4].
4
“The starting point for establishing the proper amount of an award is
the number of hours reasonably expended, multiplied by a reasonable hourly

rate.” Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 174 (4th Cir.
1994). The burden is on the fee applicant to justify the reasonableness of
the requested fee. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984).

In exercising its discretion in the application of this lodestar method,
the Court is guided by the following factors:
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required
to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4)
the attorney’s opportunity costs in pressing the
instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work;
(6) the attorney’s expectations at the outset of the
litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client
or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and
the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation
and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of
the case within the legal community in which the suit
arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship between attorney and client; and (12)
attorneys’ fees awards in similar cases.

Grissom v. The Mills Corp., 549 F.3d 313, 321 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Spell
v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1402 n.18 (4th Cir. 1987)). “Although the Court
considers all of the factors, they need not be strictly applied in every case
inasmuch as all of the factors are not always applicable.” Firehouse
Restaurant Group, Inc. v. Scurmont LLC, No. 4:09-cv-00618-RBH, 2011 WL
5
4943889, at *12 (D.S.C. Oct. 17, 2011) (citing EEOC v. Service News Co.,
898 F.2d 958, 965 (4th Cir. 1990)).

In opposing the Plaintiff’s fee request, Defendant May addresses only
one of these factors: the reasonableness of the time and labor expended by
Plaintiff Hyatt’s counsel. While the Defendant states that “many of the [other]

lodestar factors weigh against the Plaintiff’s fee request,” [Doc. 146 at 2], he
offers no argument regarding these other factors. Nevertheless, the Court
endeavors to address each of these factors in turn.
A. Time and Labor Expended

The Court begins its lodestar analysis with considering the time and
labor expended by the Plaintiff’s attorneys. “In determining the appropriate
number of hours to be included in a lodestar calculation, the district court

should exclude hours ‘that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise
unnecessary.’” Doe v. Kidd, 656 F. App’x 643, 656 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting
in part Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434).
Plaintiffs Hyatt and Barrett were represented by three attorneys in this

action: Chad R. Donnahoo of Asheville, North Carolina; Brian D. Elston of
Asheville, North Carolina; and John R. Sutton, Jr., of Candler, North
Carolina. Mr. Donnahoo recorded 336.95 hours in work expended on the

prosecution of this action. After reviewing the appropriate case law and his
6
billing statement, however, Mr. Donnahoo reduced his billing by 45.0 hours
(to a total of 291.95 hours) to account for some activities for which he felt it

was important to be present but for which his participation was not
necessary (e.g., depositions for Defendants taken by Mr. Elston and/or Mr.
Sutton). Mr. Donnahoo contends he should be compensated at $300.00

per hour; therefore, Mr. Donnahoo seeks $87,585.00 as a reasonable
attorney fee in this action. [See Doc. 144 at 2; Doc. 144-3: Donnahoo Decl.].
Attorney Brian D. Elston recorded 178.75 hours in work expended on
the prosecution of this action. After reviewing the appropriate case law and

this billing statement, Mr. Elston reduced his billing by 21.25 hours (to a total
of 157.50 hours) to account for some activities for which he felt it was
important to be present but for which is participation was not necessary

(e.g., depositions for Defendants taken by Mr. Donnahoo and/or Mr. Sutton).
Mr. Elston contends he should be compensated at $300.00 per hour;
therefore, Mr. Elston seeks $47,250.00 as a reasonable attorney fee in this
action. [See Doc. 144 at 2-3; Doc. 144-4: Elston Decl.].

7
Attorney John Sutton recorded 430.13 hours in work expended on the
prosecution of this action. After reviewing the appropriate case law and this

billing statement, Mr. Sutton reduced his billing by 15.50 hours (to a total of
414.6 hours) to account for some activities for which he felt it was important
to be present but for which his participation was not necessary (e.g.,

depositions for Defendants taken by Mr. Donnahoo and/or Mr. Elston). Mr.
Sutton contends he should be compensated at $300.00 per hour; therefore,
Mr. Sutton seeks $124,380.00 as a reasonable attorney fee in this action.
[Doc. 144 at 3; Doc. 144-2: Sutton Decl.].

Additionally, the Plaintiff’s attorneys utilized the services of Mr.
Sutton’s legal assistant/paralegal, Laurie Mathis, who recorded a total of
28.1 hours in work expended on the prosecution of this action. Attorney

Sutton contends that Ms. Mathis should be compensated at a rate of $90.00
per hour; therefore, Attorney Sutton seeks a paralegal/legal assistant fee of
$2,529.004 for the work performed by Ms. Mathis. [Doc. 144 at 3-4; Doc.
144-2: Sutton Decl. at 14-15].

3 The Plaintiff’s Motion states that Sutton recorded 445.60 hours in work [Doc. 144 at 3];
however, his billing records indicate that he recorded a total of 430.1 hours. [Doc. 144-2
at 13].

4 In the Plaintiff’s Motion, the Plaintiff seeks recovery of only $2,416.50 for Ms. Mathis’
work; however, this appears to be a mathematical error, as multiplying Ms. Mathis’ hours
worked (28.1) by an hourly rate of $90.00 equals $2,529.00.
8
The Defendant objects to the Plaintiff’s fee request on the grounds
that many of the billing entries are vague; that the Plaintiff’s attorney

engaged in block billing; that some of the billing is duplicative; and that the
fees sought related to unsuccessful claims (including claims of the
unsuccessful Plaintiff) are unreasonable.5 [Doc. 146 at 3-7].

1. Vague Billing
The Defendant argues that Mr. Sutton’s billing entries are “so lacking
in detail that it is impossible for this Court to analyze what task was
performed, let alone whether the time spent for that task was reasonable.”

[Doc. 146 at 3].
The Defendant cites a number of examples from Mr. Sutton’s billing
records that he contends lack sufficient detail. For example, on July 31,

5 In support of his brief opposing Plaintiff Hyatt’s fee request, Defendant May’s counsel
submits a spreadsheet that he prepared using Mr. Donnahoo, Mr. Elston and Mr. Sutton’s
submitted timesheets, and he refers to this spreadsheet in discussing certain time entries.
[Doc. 146-2]. A review of this spreadsheet reveals, however, that it does not accurately
reflect all of the time entries made by Plaintiff’s attorneys. As just one example, defense
counsel’s spreadsheet represents that on June 17, 2020, Mr. Donnahoo claims 1.25
hours with the following narrative description: “provide documents for review and general
deposition discussion.” [Doc. 146-2 at 4]. In fact, however, the full narrative description
for Mr. Donnahoo’s June 17, 2020 billing entry reads as follows: “Initial meeting with
Plaintiff Barrett re: upcoming deposition; provide documents for review and general
deposition discussion.” [Doc. 144-3: Donnahoo Decl. at 31-32 (emphasis added)]. As
such, it does not appear that defense counsel’s spreadsheet is an accurate summary of
counsel’s billing records. As such, the Court will disregard defense counsel’s
spreadsheet and will instead reference only the actual timesheets prepared and
presented by Plaintiff Hyatt’s attorneys.
9
2018, Mr. Sutton billed 1.50 hours for “Prep for meeting/court-continued”;
on September 24, 2019, he billed 3.00 hours for “Consult Bill Wilke,” a

person unknown to the defense; and on April 2, 2020, he billed 2.00 for
“Review Draft Discovery, email from Donnahoo.” [Doc. 144-2 at 9-10].
Additionally, Mr. Sutton reported expending 164.75 hours between 2/15/21

and 3/16/21 in trial preparation, with many of these entries being described
as only “Trial prep.” [See Doc. 144-2 at 12]. The Defendant also argues
that it appears from Mr. Sutton’s billing that he spent at least 23.75 hours in
preparing for jury selection, which the Defendant argues is unreasonable.

With respect to these latter entries, however, a careful review shows that
Mr. Sutton was spending time preparing for jury selection along with
completing other tasks related to trial preparation, such as preparing cross-
examinations.6 Nevertheless, the Court agrees that some of Mr. Sutton’s

billing entries are unduly vague and that this warrants a minor reduction of
his requested fee. Accordingly, in the exercise of its discretion, the Court
will reduce Mr. Sutton’s time by a total of forty (40) hours.

6 The Defendant argues that it is unreasonable for Mr. Sutton to have claimed time for
preparing for the cross-examination of a witness when he did not in fact examine that
witness at trial. Given that the division of labor at trial can often change at the last minute,
the Court does not find the time spent by Mr. Sutton in preparing to examine this witness
to be unreasonable.
10
2. Block Billing
Next, the Defendant argues that “the vast majority” of counsel’s billing

entries are block-billed, and that this practice warrants an across-the-board
reduction of their requested fees. [Doc. 146 at 4-5].
The term “block billing” refers to the practice of grouping tasks

together in time entries rather than making separating entries for each
discrete task. See McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81, 90 (4th Cir. 2013). Block
billing inhibits the Court from “discern[ing] with precision how . . . hours were
billed and precisely why those hours were needed.” Dyer v. City of

Gastonia, No. 3:15-cv-00033-MOC-DCK, 2016 WL 4443190, at *5
(W.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2016). “Because of the obligation to maintain billing
records with sufficient detail that the court may review and determine the

reasonableness of individual activities, block billing entries are disfavored in
attorney's fees award cases.” Denton v. PennyMac Loan Servs., LLC, 252
F. Supp. 3d 504, 525 (E.D. Va. 2017). Where block billing prevents an
accurate assessment of the reasonableness of the fee request, courts may

decline to award fees for hours that are not sufficiently documented, or they
may reduce the overall fee award by a fixed percentage or amount. Project
Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long, 887 F. Supp. 2d 704, 716 (E.D. Va. 2012).

11
While some of counsel’s entries are block-billed, the Court does not
find that the practice was excessive or that the manner in which these billing

entries were made prevents the Court from determining the appropriateness
or reasonableness of counsel’s claimed fee. Moreover, two of the examples
of block billing cited by the Defendant, i.e., Mr. Donnahoo’s September 1,

2020 and September 25, 2020 entries [Doc. 146 at 4], have been withdrawn
by Plaintiff’s counsel. [See Doc. 147 at 3 n.2]. For all of these reasons, the
Court declines in its discretion to reduce the fee award due to the occasional
use of block billing.

3. Tasks Performed by Multiple Timekeepers
Next, the Defendant challenges the billing entries made with respect
to services performed by more than one attorney. As the First Circuit has

stated: “As a general matter, the time for two or three lawyers in a courtroom
or conference, when one would do, may obviously be discounted . . . . A trial
court should ordinarily greet a claim that several lawyers were required to
perform a single set of tasks with healthy skepticism.” Lipsett v. Blanco, 975

F.2d 934, 938 (1st Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). Therefore, “a court should not hesitate to discount hours if it sees
signs that a prevailing party has overstaffed a case.” Guillemard-Ginorio v.

Contreras, 603 F. Supp. 2d 301, 318 (D.P.R. 2009) (citation omitted).
12
First, the Defendant cites to a two-hour meeting on May 15, 2020,
between Mr. Elston, Mr. Donnahoo, and Major Munday, a retired North

Carolina state trooper whom the Plaintiffs had retained and designated as
an expert witness. The Defendant contends that any counsel fees related
to Major Munday should be reduced or eliminated because Major Munday

“was patently unqualified to be an expert in this case, and they never called
him for trial.” [Doc. 146 at 5-6]. Regardless of whether the Plaintiffs
ultimately called Major Munday as a trial witness, the fact remains that he
was their designated expert. The Court does not find two attorneys meeting

with an expert witness for two hours to be unreasonable, and the Court
declines to reduce counsel’s requested fee on this basis.
Next, the Defendant objects to the Plaintiff’s attorneys claiming fees

for intra-attorney conferences and communications. [Doc. 146 at 6]. Having
reviewed the attorneys’ billing records, the Court does not find the time
spent by the Plaintiffs’ attorneys in conference among themselves to be
excessive and therefore will not reduce the requested fee award on this

basis.
The Defendant also objects to the Plaintiff seeking fees for all three of
his attorneys attending trial, and he requests that the Court reduce all fees

for trial attendance by 33%. [Doc. 146 at 6-7, 8]. However, the Plaintiffs
13
have already reduced their billing entries to account for any unnecessary
duplication. For example, Mr. Donnahoo reduced his bill by 45 hours “on

some activities where [he] felt it important to be present but not necessary
to bill [his] time…” [Doc. 144-3 at 6 ¶ 17]. Mr. Donnahoo’s timesheet clearly
shows that he either did not bill or that he reduced his bill for various

activities where the lead activity was undertaken by another attorney on the
team. Mr. Donnahoo did not bill for participating in the Initial Attorney’s
Conference [id. at 40 (12/20/19)] or in the depositions of Plaintiff Hyatt [Id.
at 32 (6/16/20)]; Defendant May [id. at 29 (7/6/2020)]; Defendant Lambert

[id. at 27 (7/15/20)]; and Defendant Miller [id. at 26 (7/21/20)]. Furthermore,
Mr. Donnahoo carefully edited his time spent at the trial: of the thirty-four
and one half (34.5) hours listed on his timesheet for time spent at the trial,

Mr. Donnahoo did not bill eighteen hours at all and significantly reduced his
time accordingly given his more limited role than that of Mr. Elston and Mr.
Sutton. [Id. at 11-13].
Mr. Elston reduced his bill by 21.25 hours. [Doc. 144-4 at 5 ¶ 16]. Mr.

Elston did not bill for the following activities: the deposition of Defendant
Stockton [id. at 13 (7/17/20)]; the mediation [id. at 12 (9/23/20)]; and
reviewing some draft documents [id. at 11 (2/20/21)]. Mr. Elston was the

lead trial attorney, and he appropriately billed his time for the trial.
14
Mr. Sutton reduced his bill by fifteen and one-half (15.5) hours. [Doc.
144-2 at 11]. Mr. Sutton did not bill for the depositions of Major Munday [Id.

(7/30/20)] and Defendant Miller [Id. (7/21/20)]. Like Mr. Elston, Mr. Sutton
played a significant role at the trial, and he appropriately billed his time for
the trial.

Counsel’s timesheets reflect that counsel made a concerted effort to
avoid the duplication of effort and adjusted their billing entries accordingly.
As such, the Court concludes that it is unnecessary to further reduce billing
entries related to this issue.

4. Fees related to Third Amended Complaint
The Defendant further argues that the Plaintiff should not recover any
fees related to the preparation of and litigation related to the Plaintiffs’ Third

Amended Complaint. [Doc. 146 at 8]. Plaintiff Hyatt’s counsel concedes
that these fees should not be recovered. Counsel concedes that their fee
award should be reduced by $5,400 (representing 18 hours of time
expended). [Doc. 147 at 9]. Accordingly, counsel’s claimed hours will be

reduced by 18 hours.
The Defendant further contends that Plaintiff’s fee award should be
reduced by $6,682.50, the amount of fees incurred by the Defendants in

litigating the motion to strike the Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint. [Doc.
15
146 at 8]. The Defendants previously requested an award of fees and costs
related to their motion to strike, and the Magistrate Judge denied that

request on September 25, 2020. [Doc. 64 at 7]. The Defendant did not
appeal the Magistrate Judge’s decision at the time, and the Court declines
to revisit this issue now. The Defendant’s request for a reduction of fees in

the amount of $6,682.50 is denied.
5. Paralegal Fees
As noted above, paralegal Laurie Mathis recorded a total of 28.1 hours
in work expended on the prosecution of this action. Upon careful review of

the billing records, the Court finds that Ms. Mathis’s hours are reasonable
and should be awarded in full.
B. Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions Raised

As for the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised, the Court notes
that this case presented unusual and complex issues that are not present in
the typical, run-of-the-mill law enforcement traffic stop. To the contrary, this
case was extremely fact intensive and dealt with a number of unusual and/or

complex issues, including: the reliance on a confidential informant and an
anonymous tip; the use of Plaintiff Hyatt’s and Brandon Pickens’ criminal
backgrounds in applying for the search warrant; issues pertaining to the

canine sniff of Mr. Pickens’ vehicle; the lack of Defendant Deputies’ body
16
camera footage; the fabrication of evidence, including in the search warrant
application; a pre-arrest strip search in a gas station bathroom; the display

of a weapon during that strip search; and the assertion of qualified immunity
and public official immunity with respect to all of the Plaintiff’s claims. The
litigation involved a hotly disputed motion for summary judgment, a jury trial

that lasted over seven (7) days, deliberations that spanned over several
days, a hung jury, and a partial jury verdict. The novelty and difficulty of the
issues in this case weigh in favor of a substantial fee.
C. Skill Required to Properly Perform the Legal Services

This case required a considerable degree of skill and familiarity with
civil rights law and practice. As already noted, there were multiple, significant
factual and legal issues involved, and the Defendants vigorously defended

each and every issue at each stage in litigation. This factor, therefore,
weighs in favor of a substantial fee.
D. Opportunity Costs of Litigation
Under the relevant factors, an “attorneys’ opportunity costs include the

higher rates they would have otherwise charged in other cases and projects.”
Irwin Indus. Tool Co. v. Worthington Cylinders Wis., LLC, 747 F. Supp. 2d
568, 596 (W.D.N.C. 2010). Here, Plaintiff Hyatt’s counsel spent a significant

amount of time working on his case—especially during the weeks leading up
17
to trial and attending and participating in a seven (7) day trial. [Doc. 142-3:
Donnahoo Decl. at ¶ 18; Doc. 142-4: Elston Decl. at ¶ 17; Doc. 142-2: Sutton

Decl. at ¶ 27]. Each of Plaintiff Hyatt’s attorneys are local and have firms
consisting only of themselves; they do not have any associates or multiple
staff members to assist them in managing their case load while they were

devoted to Plaintiff Hyatt’s case. The time spent on the Plaintiff’s case came
at the expense of other existing clients, as well as prospective clients looking
to retain counsel. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of a substantial fee.
E. Customary Fee for Similar Work

As the Fourth Circuit has recognized:
Determination of the hourly rate will generally be the
critical inquiry in setting the reasonable fee, and the
burden rests with the fee applicant to establish the
reasonableness of a requested rate. In addition to the
attorney’s own affidavits, the fee applicant must
produce satisfactory specific evidence of the
prevailing market rates in the relevant community for
the type of work for which he seeks an award.
Although the determination of a market rate in the
legal profession is inherently problematic, as wide
variations in skill and reputation render the usual
laws of supply and demand largely inapplicable, the
Court has nonetheless emphasized that market rate
should guide the fee inquiry.

Robinson v. Equifax Info. Svcs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 244 (4th Cir. 2009)
(citing Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 1990)). In addition to
18
consideration of specific evidence regarding the prevailing market rate, the
Court may rely upon its own knowledge and experience of the relevant

market in determining a reasonable rate. See Rum Creek Coal, 31 F.3d at
175 (“The relevant market for determining the prevailing rate is ordinarily the
community in which the court where the action is prosecuted sits.”).

Here, Mr. Donnahoo, Mr. Elston, and Mr. Sutton seek to be awarded
fees based on the hourly rate of $300.00. Ms. Mathis seeks an hourly rate
of $90.00 for the work she performed as a paralegal.
In support of their request, Plaintiff’s counsel have submitted an

affidavit from attorney Frank Goldsmith, who is experienced in litigating
complex cases in western North Carolina. Mr. Goldsmith opines that the
hourly rates of the Plaintiff’s attorneys are consistent with those in the

community for similar services offered by lawyers with comparable skills.
[Doc. 144-5: Goldsmith Decl.]. Based on the Court’s own experience and
familiarity with the hourly rates charged in western North Carolina, the Court
finds that a rate of $300.00 per hour for the work performed by these

attorneys is reasonable and in keeping with the prevailing rates in this
particular market. The Court further finds Ms. Mathis’s claimed hourly rate
of $90.00 to be reasonable and in keeping with the prevailing rates for

paralegals in this area. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s attorneys’ hours will be
19
calculated at the rate of $300.00 per hour, while Ms. Mathis’s hours will be
calculated at the rate of $90.00 per hour.

F. Attorneys’ Expectation at Outset of Litigation
At the outset of litigation, the Plaintiffs’ attorneys agreed to take this
case on a contingency fee basis and to advance litigation expenses, despite

their awareness of the distinct possibility that the Plaintiffs would not recover
anything from the Defendants and therefore the attorneys would recover
nothing. However, now the Plaintiff seeks recovery of fees under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988, which does not limit an award of attorneys’ fees in a prevailing party

in a § 1983 case to a proportion of the damages awarded. See City of
Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 577 (1986) (“[T]he contingent fee
arrangements that make legal services available to many victims of personal

injuries would often not encourage lawyers to accept civil rights cases, which
frequently involve substantial expenditures of time and effort but produce
only small monetary recoveries.”). Accordingly, the attorneys’ expectations
at the outset of this litigation weigh neither in favor of nor against awarding

the full of amount of fees incurred.

20
G. Time Limitations
Aside from otherwise expected deadlines of litigation, there were no

unusual time limitations imposed by Plaintiff Hyatt or this litigation that would
merit any impact in either way on the requested award. Therefore, this factor
weighs neither in favor of nor against the requested award.

H. Experience, Reputation, and Ability of Counsel
All of the attorneys involved in this matter are experienced lawyers with
excellent reputations in the legal community. As such, the Court concludes
that the requested hourly rate of $300.00 for the work performed by these

attorneys is a reasonable rate.
I. Undesirability of the Case in the Legal Community
Complex § 1983 actions are admittedly difficult to litigate. The

complexity of this action was compounded by the fact that there was no body
cam footage of several key issues, meaning that, for many of the important
issues, the case would boil down to Plaintiff Hyatt’s word against the word of
three sworn law-enforcement officers. Additionally, even if Plaintiff Hyatt’s

version of the events were to be accepted, law enforcement officers are
entitled to considerable immunity protections, which could have precluded
recovery altogether. Finally, even if the Plaintiff were to overcome these

immunity protections, the potential for any significant financial recovery was
21
slight. In light of these issues, the Court concludes that this case was
generally undesirable in the legal community, a factor which weighs in favor

of the fully requested fee.
J. Relationship between the Attorneys and Clients
Aside from the customary relationship between Plaintiff Hyatt and his

legal counsel, there is not a unique situation or relationship in this case that
weighs in favor of or against the requested fee award.
K. Fee Awards in Similar Cases
The Plaintiffs cite two civil rights cases in which the plaintiff was a

similar damages award and the court subsequently awarded attorneys’ fees
in excess of the damages award. [See Doc. 144-1 at 14-15 (citing Crawford
v. City of New London, No. 3:11-cv-1371, 2015 WL 1125491, at **1, 10 (D.

Conn. Mar. 12, 2015) (awarding $197,403.75 in attorneys’ fees; plaintiff
previously awarded $50,000 in damages); Mglej v. Gardner, No. 2:13-cv-
00713-CW, 2022 WL 2065588, at **1, 6 (D. Utah June 8, 2022) (awarding
$314,077.00 in attorneys’ fees; plaintiff previously awarded $60,720.00 in

damages)]. The cases cited by the Plaintiff weigh in favor of awarding the
requested fee award.

22
L. Amount Involved and Results Obtained
As noted by the Supreme Court, “‘the most critical factor’ in

determining the reasonableness of a fee award ‘is the degree of success
obtained . . . .’” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992) (quoting Hensley,
461 U.S. at 436).

Here, Plaintiff Hyatt prevailed on both his Section 1983 constitutional
claims and his state law tort claims against Defendant May. The Plaintiff,
however, did not succeed on any of his constitutional or state law tort claims
against Defendants Lambert and Lewis, or any of the other officers who were

initially named in this action. Additionally, the Plaintiff was not successful in
his bid to impose liability on the Sheriff of Buncombe County or the surety
company which issued the Sheriff’s bond. Finally, it must be noted that the

ultimate award of $50,000 is far less than the $350,000 that Plaintiff’s
counsel argued for in closing arguments to the jury. For these reasons, the
Court concludes that the results obtained by Plaintiff Hyatt weigh in favor of
reducing the requested fee by 25%.

Additionally, while Plaintiff Hyatt prevailed on at least some of his
claims, Plaintiff Barrett did not. Both Plaintiffs were represented by the same
attorneys in this matter, and counsel’s billing records include some billing

entries that appear to be related only to Plaintiff Barrett. The Defendant
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argues that 5.0 hours should be deducted from counsel’s time in order to
account for Plaintiff Barrett’s unsuccessful claims. [Doc. 146 at 7-8]. The

Court finds that this would be a reasonable deduction, and therefore, 5.0
hours will be deducted from counsel’s overall time.
In total, the Plaintiff’s attorneys claimed 864.05 hours, to be

compensated at the rate of $300.00 per hour. While the Court concludes
that the hourly rate requested is reasonable, the total number of hours should
be reduced by a total of 63 hours to 801.05 hours, in order to account for Mr.
Sutton’s vague billing, the time spent exclusively with respect to Plaintiff

Barrett’s case, the time spent related to the filing and litigation of the
Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint. Further, to account for the limited
success achieved by Plaintiff Hyatt, the Court that an overall reduction in the

hours expended by 25% is appropriate. That would result in a total of 600.8
hours. Multiplying those reduced hours by the reasonable hourly rate
determined by the Court results in a lodestar amount of $180,240.00 with
respect to the work performed by Plaintiff’s attorneys. Additionally, with

respect to the work performed by Ms. Mathis, counsel will be compensated
for Ms. Mathis’ time for 28.1 hours at a rate of $90.00 ($2,529.00), resulting
in a total fee award of $182,769.00. For the reasons stated herein, the Court

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finds and concludes that this lodestar amount constitutes a reasonable
attorneys’ fee in this matter.

ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff Hyatt’s Application to
Award Attorneys’ Fees [Doc. 144] is GRANTED, and Plaintiff Hyatt is hereby
awarded $182,769.00 in attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: March 29, 2023

a i
Reidinger wey
Chief United States District Judge eA

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10259604. Public record. Not legal advice.