# Trent v. Honeycutt

> District Court, W.D. North Carolina · December 2, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10259236

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** December 2, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
5:22-cv-000149-MR

TERRANCE J. TRENT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) ORDER
)
FNU HONEYCUTT, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s
Complaint [Doc. 1], filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)
and 1915A. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Docs. 2, 7].
I. BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Terrance J. Trent (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner of the State
of North Carolina currently incarcerated at Alexander Correctional Institution
(“Alexander”) in Taylorsville, North Carolina. On or about October 11, 2022,
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against the
following Defendants: (1) FNU Honeycutt, identified as the Warden at
Alexander; (2) Chris Biecker, identified as the Unit Manager at Alexander;
(3) Jerry Laws, identified as a Disciplinary Hearing Officer at Alexander; (4)
FNU Morrison, identified as a Correctional Officer at Alexander; (5) FNU
Poteat, identified as a Unit Manager at Alexander; and (6) FNU Duncan, not
otherwise identified. [Doc. 1 at 1-2]. Plaintiff is suing all Defendants in their

individual and official capacities. [Doc. 1-1 at 6].
Plaintiff alleges as follows. On May 6, 2021, Plaintiff was assaulted by
Case Manager Baers and attempted to seek redress for this incident. [Doc.

1-1 at 1]. Defendant Biecker retaliated against Plaintiff by interfering with the
grievance process and denying Plaintiff an opportunity to be heard.
Defendant Biecker’s actions hindered Plaintiff’s access to the Court’s
because administrative remedies must be exhausted before filing a

Complaint.1 [Id. at 1].

1 On February 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court against Defendants Baers,
Beicker, and Latrice Blackburn. [Civil Case No. 5:22-cv-00014-MR, Doc. 1]. In that
action, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Baers assaulted him on May 6, 2021, and that
Defendants Beicker interfered with the grievance process, violating Plaintiff’s due process
rights. [Id., id.]. Plaintiff’s Complaint survived initial review against Defendant Baers
under the Eighth Amendment and the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s due process claim
against Defendant Beicker, noting that Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right of
access to grievance procedures, and Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Blackburn. [Id.,
Doc. 9 at 5]. On August 18, 2022, Plaintiff sought to amend his Complaint in that action
to add all the Defendants that he names in the instant action, along with Captain Hester,
seeking to state claims for retaliation and cruel and unusual punishment. [Id., Doc. 19].
He alleged that, since filing the Complaint in that action, he had been subject to retaliation.
[Id., id. at 1]. Plaintiff also alleged that, in May 2021, Poteat and Morrison claimed that
Plaintiff attempted to bring contraband into Alexander and then, in September 2021,
Poteat suspended Plaintiff’s tablet privileges because Plaintiff was consequently deemed
a security risk. [Id., id. at 2-3]. Plaintiff did not, however, maintain his claim against
Defendant Baers in the attempted amended complaint. [Id., see id.]. The Court denied
Plaintiff’s motion to amend without prejudice and advised Plaintiff that he must make a
motion and submit a proposed amended Complaint that contains all claims he intends to
bring against all Defendants he intends to sue and states all relief he is seeking. [Id.,
Doc. 23 at 4]. The deadline to amend his Complaint in that action expired on October 10,
2022, [Id., Doc. 18 at 1], one day before the Complaint in the instant action was
On September 16, 2021, Defendant Poteat began an investigation of
Plaintiff, which resulted in Plaintiff being charged on September 24, 2021

with “trying to introduce contraband to the facility on a 3-way call.” [Doc. 1-
1 at 3]. Plaintiff lost his tablet privileges because of the charge. [Id.].
Originally, the tablet restriction was set to be lifted in April 2023, but the

Defendants continue to extend the restriction when Plaintiff writes
grievances. Now, the restriction is set to be lifted in November 2023. [Id. at
4]. On August 29, 2022, Plaintiff remained under investigation for this
charge.2 Under North Carolina Department of Public Safety (NCDPS) policy,

investigations must be concluded within 60 days. The investigation of this
charge, however, was subject to “constant continuations” of which Plaintiff
was not notified. [Id.]. Defendants Duncan and Poteat knew about “this

whole delima and continued to allow the denial of due process, the
deprivation of liberty and the promotion of atypical and significant hardship,”
which “constitutes deliberate indifference and liability.” [Id. at 5].
At some unidentified time, Defendant Biecker continued to retaliate

postmarked. [Doc. 1-2]. For now, at least, the Court will allow these actions to proceed
separately.

2 Plaintiff makes no other allegations specific to this date. Plaintiff, however, attached a
copy of an August 29, 2022 grievance to his verified Administrative Remedy Statement.
[Doc. 5 at 4]. In that grievance, he complains that he is being denied a fair opportunity to
use the law library because of the 2-year-long tablet restriction. [Id.].
against Plaintiff by conspiring with Defendant DHO Laws and Defendant
Officer Morrison to bring “severe charges” against Plaintiff. Defendants

Biecker and Laws never investigated these charges, but they approved them
knowing Plaintiff would receive extensive punishment. Specifically,
Defendant Laws failed to be an impartial factfinder in the disciplinary

proceedings. Plaintiff pleaded not guilty to the charges, wrote a statement,
and requested physical evidence and witnesses. Defendant Laws claimed
that Plaintiff never asked for evidence or witnesses and Plaintiff was not
allowed either. Defendant Laws moved to find Plaintiff guilty, even though

Plaintiff was innocent, and imposed sanctions, including 30 days in
segregation; 180 days of “credit loss time;” 100 hours of extra duty; “2
months draw limited;” and loss of radio and canteen privileges, visitation, and

recreation time for 90 days. [Id. at 2]. Plaintiff appealed the charges and
sanctions, and the charges were dismissed on appeal by Chief Disciplinary
Officer Monica Bonds. [Id. at 2-3]. Plaintiff received notice of the dismissal
on July 18, 2022.3 [Id. at 3; see Doc. 5 at 5].

Defendant Honeycutt is aware of all of Plaintiff’s claims here because

3 Plaintiff filed a copy of this Notice with his Administrative Remedy Statement. [Doc. 5 at
5]. The Notice provides that the charges were “dated” – and presumably committed on –
February 25, 2022, which was over nine (9) months after the alleged assault by Baers.
[Id.].
“the plaintiff’s mother constantly contacts [Honeycutt] and attempts to seek
assistance for her son.” [Doc. 1-1 at 5]. Defendant Honeycutt “contribut[es]

to [the] deliberate indifference” by “ignoring the numerous constitutional
violations by his staff members.” [Id.].
Plaintiff also seeks to state a claim against Defendant Honeycutt

because Alexander “is operating under a 22 hour and 30 minute lock-down
a day.” [Doc. 1-1 at 5]. Inmates are only allowed out of their cells for 90
minutes per day and have only been allowed 45 minutes of outside
recreation time per week for the last year. Inmates are entitled to at least 3

hours of outside recreation time per week. “Sunlight is a basic necessity of
any living organism and the deprivation of it for 6 days at a time is
unconstitutional.” [Id.]. Plaintiff makes no other allegations and states no

injuries relative to this claim. [See Doc. 1].
Plaintiff purports to state claims for retaliation, denial of court access,
denial of due process, promotion of atypical and significant hardship,
deprivation of liberty, cruel and unusual punishment, deliberate indifference,

and wrongful placement in segregation.4 Plaintiff also claims he was subject
to intentional infliction of emotional distress. [Id. at 1].

4 The Court will construe these claims under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, as appropriate.
For injuries, Plaintiff claims to have been falsely accused of various
infractions and suffered the sanctions set forth above. [Id. at 3]. Plaintiff

seeks compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages. [Id. at 6].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the
grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, under § 1915A
the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the

complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune to such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint
raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly
baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a
district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which

set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983
“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States

and must show that the deprivation of that right was committed by a person
acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Plaintiff makes claims under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments,
as well as a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

1. Official Capacity Claims
“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit
against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will v.

Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Because a state is
not a “person” under § 1983, state officials acting in their official capacities
cannot be sued for damages thereunder. Allen v. Cooper, No. 1:19-cv-794,
2019 WL 6255220, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 22, 2019). Furthermore, as noted

the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary damages against the State
of North Carolina and its various agencies. See Ballenger v. Owens, 352
F.3d 842, 844-45 (4th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff’s official capacity claims, therefore,

do not survive initial review and will be dismissed.
2. First Amendment
a. Retaliation

Plaintiff’s claims Defendants Laws, Biecker, Morrison, Poteat, and
Duncan retaliated against him for filing grievances. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Honeycutt is aware of all the claims Plaintiff asserts here because

Plaintiff’s mother frequently calls Honeycutt seeking assistance for Plaintiff
and that Honeycutt “ignores” the constitutional violations committed by his
staff.
An inmate has a clearly established First Amendment right to be free

from retaliation for filing grievances. See Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 855
F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir. 2017); Thompson v. Commonwealth of Va., 878 F.3d
89, 110 (4th Cir. 2017). Inmates also have a protected First Amendment

right to complain to prison officials about prison conditions and improper
treatment by prison employees that affect them. See Patton v. Kimble, 717
Fed. App’x 271, 272 (4th Cir. 2018).
To state a colorable First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must

allege that (1) he engaged in protected First Amendment activity, (2) the
defendant took some action that adversely affected his First Amendment
rights, and (3) there was a causal relationship between his protected activity

and the defendant’s conduct. Martin v. Duffy, 977 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir.
2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Retaliation claims brought by
prisoners, however, are treated with skepticism because every act of

discipline by a prison official is retaliatory in that it responds directly to
prisoner misconduct. See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994).
Moreover, to establish liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that

the defendants “acted personally” to cause the alleged violation. See
Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). As
such, doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in actions brought
under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

Under Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791 (4th Cir. 1994), however, supervisory
liability may attach under § 1983 if a plaintiff can establish three elements:
(1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate

was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of
constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor’s response
to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference to
or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices”; and (3) and

“affirmative causal link” between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular
constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. 13 F.3d at 799 (citations
omitted).
Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the benefit of every
reasonable inference, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amendment

retaliation claim is not clearly frivolous and survives initial review as to all
Defendants in their individual capacities.
b. Denial of Access to the Courts

Prisoners must have meaningful access to the courts. Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). The “meaningful access” referred to in Bounds
does not, however, entitle a plaintiff to total or unlimited access. See Moore
v. Gray, No. 5:04-CT-918-FL, 2005 WL 3448047, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 26,

2005), aff’d, 133 Fed. App’x 913 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (citation
omitted). The right of access to the courts only requires that prisoners have
the capability of bringing challenges to sentences or conditions of

confinement. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356-57 (1996). Moreover,
as a jurisdictional requirement flowing from the standing doctrine, the
prisoner must allege an actual injury. See id. at 349. “Actual injury” is
prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the

inability to meet a filing deadline or present a non-frivolous claim. See id. A
plaintiff’s “[f]ailure to show that a ‘nonfrivolous legal claim has been
frustrated’ is fatal to his Bounds claim.” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1155

n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Casey, 518 U.S. at 353).
Plaintiff here alleges only that Defendant Biecker interfered with the
grievance process relative to the alleged assault by Baers, and, therefore,

hindered Plaintiff’s access to the Court’s because administrative exhaustion
is required before filing a Complaint. Plaintiff, however, nonetheless
successfully filed a Complaint relative to that claim, [see Case No. 5:22-cv-

14, Docs. 1, 9], and successfully instituted the instant action. Plaintiff has
not alleged any actual injury. Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to state a claim
based on the denial of access to the courts. This claim will be dismissed as
to all Defendants.

3. Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of
punishment and from inhumane conditions of confinement. Williams v.

Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). “The Eighth Amendment ‘does
not prohibit cruel and unusual prison conditions.’” Thorpe v. Clarke, 37 F.4th
926, 940 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381
(4th Cir. 1993)). “It asks instead whether the conditions of confinement inflict

harm that is, objectively, sufficiently serious to deprive of minimal civilized
necessities.” Id. (citation omitted). Extreme deprivations are required.
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).
To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must satisfy both
an objective component–that the harm inflicted was sufficiently serious–and

a subjective component–that the prison official acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind. Williams, 77 F.3d at 761. In conditions of
confinement cases, the requisite state of mind is deliberate indifference.

Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016). To prove deliberate
indifference, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a claim that
prison officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm. 5
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).

As to Defendants Laws, Biecker, and Morrison, Plaintiff claims his
Eighth Amendment rights were violated by the imposition of various
sanctions for infraction charges that were ultimately dismissed. These

included 30 days in segregation; 180 days of lost good time credit; 100 hours
of extra duty; loss of radio and canteen privileges, visitation, and recreation
time for 90 days; and what Plaintiff calls “2 months draw limited.” While these
sanctions were certainly uncomfortable for and meaningful to Plaintiff, their

5 Plaintiff purports to assert claims against Defendants Honeycutt, Laws, Biecker, and
Morrison for cruel and unusual punishment and against all Defendants for “deliberate
indifference.” There is, however, no separate claim under the Eighth Amendment for
“deliberate indifference.” Rather, as noted, deliberate indifference is the state of mind
necessary to show that a prison official violated the Eight Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. The Court, therefore, will treat Plaintiff’s claims
accordingly.
imposition does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. That
is, they did not inflict harm that was objectively, sufficiently serious to deprive

Plaintiff of minimal civilized necessities. See Thorpe, 37 F.4th at 940.
Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants were subjectively aware
of any excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety by their imposition.

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Laws, Biecker, and
Morrison, therefore, will be dismissed.
As to Defendants Poteat and Duncan, Plaintiff alleges that restricting
his tablet use without justification constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the benefit of every
reasonable inference, he has not stated an Eighth Amendment claim against
these Defendants. Denying access to a computer tablet does not inflict a

sufficiently serious harm to deprive Plaintiff of life’s minimal civilized
necessities. The Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Poteat and
Duncan will also be dismissed.
Finally, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant

Honeycutt for his failure to act relative to these Defendants’ conduct here will
also be dismissed. Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Honeycutt’s
subordinates were engaged in conduct constitutionally redressable under

the Eighth Amendment.
4. Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiff claims that Defendants denied him due process, deprived him

of liberty, and promoted atypical and significant hardship. The Court will treat
these claims as alleging violations of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights.

To prevail on a procedural due process claim, an inmate must first
demonstrate that he was deprived of “life, liberty, or property” by
governmental action. Bevrati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1997).
Although prisoners are afforded some due process rights while incarcerated,

those liberty interests are limited to “the freedom from restraint which, while
not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to
protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes

atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
Moreover, changes “in a prisoner’s location, variations of daily routine,
changes in conditions of confinement (including administrative segregation),

and the denial of privileges [are] matters which every prisoner can anticipate
[and which] are contemplated by his original sentence to prison.” Gaston v.
Taylor, 946 F.2d 340, 343 (4th Cir. 1991).
Moreover, prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal
prosecution and the full array of rights due a defendant in such proceedings

does not apply. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (citing
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972)). Where a prison disciplinary
hearing may result in loss of good time credits or solitary confinement, an

inmate is entitled to certain due process protections. These include: (1)
advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when
consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses
and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written

statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the
disciplinary action. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-71. There is no constitutional
right, however, to confront and cross-examine witnesses or to retain and be

appointed counsel. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 322 (1976);
Brown v. Braxton, 373 F.3d 501, 505-06 (4th Cir. 2004). If the hearing
officer’s decision contains a written statement of the evidence relied upon,
due process is satisfied. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 323 n.5. Moreover,

substantive due process is satisfied if the disciplinary hearing decision was
based on “some evidence.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472
U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
Plaintiff alleges that, in the disciplinary proceeding on the “severe
charges” brought against Plaintiff, Defendant Laws failed to be an impartial

factfinder, claimed that Plaintiff never requested physical evidence or
witnesses and did not allow Plaintiff to present either, moved to find Plaintiff
guilty even though Plaintiff was innocent, that Plaintiff lost good time credits

for having been found guilty, and that Plaintiff’s charges were dismissed on
appeal. Again, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Honeycutt was aware of this
conduct and “ignored” it. Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him
the benefit of every reasonable inference, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s due

process claims against Defendants Laws and Honeycutt are not clearly
frivolous and survive initial review.
As to Defendants Biecker and Morrison, Plaintiff alleges that they

conspired with Defendant Laws to bring the “severe charges” against Plaintiff
and approved the charges without investigating them. Even taking these
allegations as true and giving Plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable
inference, these allegations are insufficient to state a claim against

Defendants Morrison and Biecker for violating Plaintiff’s due process rights.
While bringing these allegedly false charges may have constituted an act of
retaliation, as addressed above, this conduct does not implicate Plaintiff’s

due process rights. The due process claims against Defendants Biecker and
Morrison will be dismissed.
As to Defendants Poteat and Duncan, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

Poteat began an investigation that resulted in Plaintiff being charged with
introducing contraband and that Plaintiff lost his tablet privileges because of
the charge. Plaintiff also alleges that the investigation was subject to

“constant continuations” of which he was not notified. Finally, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants Duncan and Poteat knew about the situation and “continued
to allow” the denial of due process. These allegations are also insufficient to
state a due process claim against these Defendants. Denial of access to a

computer tablet is not constitutionally redressable. The due process claim
against these Defendants will be dismissed.
5. Denial of Out of Cell and Outside Time

As provided, the Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane
conditions of confinement. Williams, 77 F.3d at 761. Extreme deprivations
are required, Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, and the Plaintiff must allege facts
sufficient to support a claim that prison officials knew of and disregarded a

substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. A plaintiff must
also allege “a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from
the challenged conditions.” Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.3d 1375, 1381 (4th

Cir.1993).
A reviewing court “owe[s] ‘substantial deference to the professional
judgment of prison administrators.’” Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528

(2006) (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003)). “[R]estrictive
prison regulations are permissible if they are ‘reasonably related to legitimate
penological [objectives],’ and are not an ‘exaggerated response’ to such

objectives.” Id. (quotations omitted) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
87 (1987)). The length of time a plaintiff was subjected to the harsh
conditions is an important factor in analyzing whether his constitutional rights
were violated. See Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1997)

“[I]n certain circumstances, restricting inmates’ opportunities for
physical exercise constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eight Amendment.” Clay v. Miller, 626 F.2d 345, 347 (4th Cir. 1980)

(citations omitted). “In deciding whether conditions at a jail are so onerously
burdensome as to reach constitutional dimensions, courts must look at the
totality of the circumstances, including the extent to which the restrictions
adversely affect the mental or physical health of the inmate.” Id. (citations

omitted). These circumstances include the overall duration of incarceration,
the length of time for which prisoners are locked in their cells each day, and
the practical opportunities for the institution to provide prisoners with

increased exercise opportunities. Mitchell v. Rice, 954 F.2d 187, 191 (4th
Cir. 1992). “Thus, confinement or punishment conditions imposed under one
set of circumstances may constitute an Eighth Amendment violation; yet the

same conditions, imposed under different circumstances, would not.” Id.
Plaintiff here alleges that Defendant Honeycutt is operating Alexander
“under a 22 hour and 30 minute lock-down a day,” and has allowed only “45

minutes of outside recreation time a week for over a year.” [Doc. 1-1 at 5].
Plaintiff claims this constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because
inmates are entitled to at least three hours of outside recreation time per
week and sunlight is a “basic necessity for any living organism.” [Id.]. These

allegations are insufficient to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation. Plaintiff does not allege how long this relative “lock-down” has
been in place or any other potentially relevant circumstances. While the

“complete deprivation of exercise for an extended period of time violates
Eighth Amendment prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment,”
Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 191, Plaintiff does not allege that he is deprived of the
opportunity to exercise. Rather, he alleges that he is being deprived of the

opportunity to be outdoors more than 45 minutes per week. Plaintiff has also
failed to allege any serious physical or emotional injury from the challenged
conditions. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Honeycutt

based on the denial of out of cell and outdoor recreation time, therefore, fails
initial review and will be dismissed.
B. Section 1985

To state a claim under § 1985, a plaintiff must allege “concrete facts”
showing that defendants entered a conspiracy which deprived the plaintiff of
his civil rights. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 196-97 (4th Cir. 2009).

Courts reject “section 1985 claims whenever the purported conspiracy is
alleged in a merely conclusory manner, in the absence of concrete
supporting facts.” Williams, at *5 (quoting Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370,
1377 (4th Cir. 1995)). The Fourth Circuit has “rarely, if ever, found that a

plaintiff has set forth sufficient facts to establish a section 1985 conspiracy.”
Simmons, 47 F.3d at 1377. To allege a conspiracy, a party must show that
two or more persons acted in concert to commit an unlawful act or to commit

a lawful act by unlawful means. See id. at 1376. Further, “a party must show
an agreement or meeting of the minds between parties to inflict a wrong or
injury upon another that results in damage.” Williams, at *5 (citations
omitted). A plaintiff must also show harm resulting from the alleged

conspiracy. Id. (citations omitted).
Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing reasonable
inferences therefrom in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff has failed to allege a

conspiracy to deprive his civil rights. Plaintiff makes only a vague allegation
that Defendant Biecker retaliated against Plaintiff “by conspiring with” Laws
and Morrison to bring charges against Plaintiff. This is plainly not enough to

state a claim under Section 1985. The Court will dismiss this claim on initial
review.
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The essential elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress
are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) which is intended to cause and
does cause (3) severe emotional distress. Foster v. Crandell, 181 N.C.App.
152, 167, 638 S.E.2d 526, 537 (2007), disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 567, 650

S.E.2d 602 (2007).
Plaintiff alleges only that he “suffered from a mental health crisis”
arising from being convicted of and sanctioned for the “severe charges,”

which were ultimately dismissed on appeal. He does not allege extreme or
outrageous conduct or that such conduct was intended to cause severe
emotional distress. Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to state a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court will dismiss this claim.

V. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Complaint survives initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim against all Defendants and

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendants
Laws and Honeycutt, in accordance with the terms of this Order. All
remaining claims, including Plaintiff’s official capacity claims, fail initial review

and will be dismissed.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that all claims asserted in this matter

as to all Defendants are hereby DISMISSED for failure to state a claim,
except for Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim against all Defendants
and Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against
Defendants Laws and Honeycutt, which are allowed to pass initial review.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s remaining claims, including
Plaintiff’s official capacity claims, are DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall commence

the procedure for waiver of service as set forth in Local Civil Rule 4.3 for
Defendants Honeycutt, Biecker, Laws, Morrison, Poteat, and Duncan, who
are alleged to be current or former employees of NCDPS.
The Clerk is also instructed to mail Plaintiff an Opt-In/Opt-Out form

pursuant to Standing Order 3:19-mc-00060-FDW.
The Clerk is also instructed to update the docket in this matter to
include Plaintiff’s correct OPUS number, 1252087.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: December 1, 2022

Martifi Reidinger Lg
Chief United States District Judge WG

23

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10259236. Public record. Not legal advice.