# Lotharp-Crawford v. Mountain View Correctional Institute

> District Court, W.D. North Carolina · January 3, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10258027

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** January 3, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:21-cv-00291-MR

JAMARKUS R. LOTHARP- )
CRAWFORD, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
)
MOUNTAIN VIEW CORRECTIONAL )
INSTITUTION, ) ORDER
)
Defendant. )
_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the Complaint
[Doc. 1]. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Doc. 6].
I. BACKGROUND
The pro se Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
addressing the medical care he received at the Mountain View Correctional
Institution.1 He names as the sole Defendant the Mountain View CI in its
official capacity. [Doc. 1 at 2]. He appear to assert a § 1983 claim for
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, and a medical malpractice
claim under North Carolina law. [Id. at 14]. He admits that he did not file

1 The Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the Marion Correctional Institution.
grievances addressing the concerns raised in the Complaint. [Id. at 17-18].
He explains that he did not do so “because [he] shouldn’t ha[ve] to question

about [his] meds” and because it is in the statewide computer system “so it’s
really … common sense.” [Id. at 19]. He seeks compensatory damages and
attorney’s fees. [Id. at 14].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must
review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the
grounds that it is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see 28 U.S.C. §
1915A (requiring frivolity review for prisoners’ civil actions seeking redress

from governmental entities, officers, or employees).
In its frivolity review, a court must determine whether the Complaint
raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly
baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se
complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his complaint which set
forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was
“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).
A. Individuals Not Named as Parties
The body of the Complaint contains allegations against individuals who

are not named as defendants in the caption as required by Rule 10(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This failure renders these allegations
nullities. See, e.g., Londeree v. Crutchfield Corp., 68 F.Supp.2d 718 (W.D.

Va. Sept. 29, 1999) (granting motion to dismiss for individuals who were not
named as defendants in the compliant but who were served). The
allegations directed at individuals not named as Defendants are therefore
dismissed without prejudice.

B. Mountain View CI
The Plaintiff names as the sole Defendant the Mountain View CI.
However, “neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are

‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
71 (1989). Thus, NCDPS facilities are not “persons” under § 1983. See Fox
v. Harwood, 2009 WL 1117890 at *1 (W.D.N.C. April 24, 2009). Accordingly,

the Plaintiff’s claims against Mountain View CI are dismissed with prejudice.
C. Exhaustion
The Plaintiff admits on the face of the Complaint that he did not file any

grievances addressing the incidents described in the Complaint.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires a prisoner to
exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a § 1983 action. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a). The PLRA provides, in pertinent part: “[n]o action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or
any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.” Id. The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate
suits about prison life. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
Exhaustion is mandatory. Id. at 524 (citation omitted); Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 211 (2007). Exhaustion must take place before the

commencement of the civil action in order to further the efficient
administration of justice. Id. A prisoner is not entitled to exhaust
administrative remedies during the pendency of an action. Cannon v.

Washington, 418 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir. 2005); Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d
641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999). The PLRA requires “proper” exhaustion, that is,
“using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the

agency addresses the issues on the merits.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,
90 (2006) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)).
A court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint when the alleged facts in the

complaint, taken as true, prove that the inmate failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Custis v. Davis, 851 F.3d 358, 361 (4th Cir. 2017).
It is plain on the face of the Complaint that the Plaintiff failed to exhaust
his claims because, as he states, he did not feel he should be required to

address these matters in grievances. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claims are
unexhausted and will be dismissed without prejudice.
D. Supplemental Jurisdiction

The Plaintiff appears to assert a claim of medical malpractice under
North Carolina law. [Doc. 1 at 14].
Federal district courts may entertain claims not otherwise within their
adjudicatory authority when those claims “are so related to claims ... within

[federal-court competence] that they form part of the same case or
controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). To exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a
court must find that “[t]he state and federal claims ... derive from a common

nucleus of operative fact” where a plaintiff “would ordinarily be expected to
try them all in one judicial proceeding.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). When a district court dismisses all claims

independently qualifying for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it “ordinarily
dismiss[es] all related state claims.” Artis v. Dist. of Columbia, 138 S.Ct. 594,
595 (2018); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). A district court may also dismiss

the related state claims if there is a good reason to decline jurisdiction. See
§ 1367(c)(1), (2), and (4).
No federal claim has passed initial review, and the Plaintiff has failed
to identify a Defendant against whom such a claim could proceed.

Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
Plaintiff’s North Carolina medical malpractice claim at this time.
IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against any Defendant.
The Court will dismiss Mountain View CI with prejudice. The remaining
claims are dismissed without prejudice. The Court will allow Plaintiff thirty
(30) days to amend his Complaint, if he so chooses, to show that his claims

are not unexhausted and to otherwise properly state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Should the Plaintiff fail to timely amend his Complaint,
this action will be dismissed without prejudice and without further notice to

the Plaintiff.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. The Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE except for
the claims against Defendant Mountain View Cl, which are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2. The Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in which to amend his
Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order. If the Plaintiff
fails to amend the Complaint in accordance with this Order and
within the time limit set by the Court, this action will be dismissed
without prejudice and without further notice to the Plaintiff.
3. The Clerk is respectfully instructed to mail Plaintiff a blank § 1983
form.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: January 3, 2022

Martifi Reidinger ee
Chief United States District Judge AS

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10258027. Public record. Not legal advice.
