# McClure v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education

> District Court, W.D. North Carolina · February 2, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10258005

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** February 2, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-00005-KDB-DCK
Elijah McClure, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) ORDER
)
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of )
Education,
)
Defendant. )
)

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 12),
the Memorandum and Recommendation of the Honorable Magistrate Judge David C. Keesler
(“M&R”) entered March 19, 2021, (Doc. No. 33), and Defendant’s Objection to the M&R (Doc.
No. 34). The Court has reviewed this motion, the parties’ briefs, and other pleadings of record.
As discussed below, the Court determines after its de novo review that the recommendation to
deny in part and grant in part Defendant’s motion is partially correct and in accordance with law.
Therefore, the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge will be ADOPTED in part,
MODIFIED in part, and the Motion to Dismiss will be DENIED in part and GRANTED in
part. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under the North
Carolina Constitution. However, the negligence and gross negligence claims will be allowed to
proceed.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
A district court may designate a magistrate judge to “submit to a judge of the court
proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition” of certain pretrial matters,
including motions to dismiss. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may object to the magistrate
judge’s proposed findings and recommendations, and the court “shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Objections to the
magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations must be made “with sufficient specificity
so as reasonably to alert the district court of the true ground for the objection.” United States v.
Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 622 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1157 (2007). Yet the Court does
not perform a de novo review when a party makes only “general and conclusory objections that
do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and
recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). After reviewing the
record, the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) seeks to dismiss a complaint for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The plaintiff has the burden of proving that
subject-matter jurisdiction exists. See Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United
States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a
threshold issue the court must address before considering the merits of the case. Jones v. Am.
Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1999). “The subject matter jurisdiction of
federal courts is limited, and the federal courts may exercise only that jurisdiction which
Congress has prescribed.” Chris v. Tenet, 221 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
When a defendant challenges subject-matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1),
“the district court is to regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue and may consider
evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary

judgment.” Richmond, 945 F.2d at 768. The district court should grant the Rule 12(b)(1) motion
to dismiss “only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is
entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Id.; see also Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642,
647 (4th Cir. 1999).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) seeks to dismiss a complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). A party invoking federal court jurisdiction has the
burden of establishing that personal jurisdiction exists over the defendant. New Wellington Fin.
Corp. v. Flagship Resort Dev. Corp., 416 F.3d 290, 294 (4th Cir. 2005); Combs v. Bakker, 886
F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989). “Mere allegations of in personam jurisdiction are sufficient for a

party to make [a] prima facie showing.” Barclays Leasing, Inc. v. Nat’l Bus. Sys., Inc., 750 F.
Supp. 184, 186 (W.D.N.C. 1990). The plaintiff, however, “may not rest on mere allegations
where the defendant has countered those allegations with evidence that the requisite minimum
contacts do not exist.” IMO Indus., Inc. v. SEIM S.R.L., 2006 WL 3780422, at *1 (W.D.N.C.
Dec. 20, 2006). “Rather, in such a case, the plaintiff must come forward with affidavits or other
evidence to counter that of the defendant…factual conflicts must be resolved in favor of the
party asserting jurisdiction…” Id. (internal citations omitted).
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted” tests whether the complaint is legally and factually
sufficient. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187,
190 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd, 566 U.S. 30 (2012). A court need not accept a complaint's “legal
conclusions, elements of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir.

2009). The court, however, accepts all well-pled facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences
in Plaintiff’s favor. See Conner v. Cleveland Cty., N. Carolina, No. 19-2012, 2022 WL 53977, at
*1 (4th Cir. Jan. 5, 2022); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435,
440 (4th Cir. 2011). In so doing, the Court “must view the facts presented in the pleadings and
the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pa.
Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Beach Mart, Inc., 932 F.3d 268, 274 (4th Cir. 2019). Construing the
facts in this way, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Pledger v. Lynch, 5 F.4th 511, 520 (4th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678). Thus, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) determines

only whether a claim is stated; “it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a
claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.
1992).
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for injuries sustained during an October 2015 fight
between students at Hopewell High School. Plaintiff has filed claims for (1) negligence and
gross negligence under North Carolina tort law; (2) violations of his clearly established rights
under the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) violations of his rights
under Article I, §§ 15 and 19 and Article IX, § 1 of the North Carolina Constitution. In its
Motion to Dismiss, Defendant moves to dismiss all the claims, and now objects to the Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation that the motion be denied in part and granted in part.
Defendant offers two grounds for its objection. First, it claims that Defendant’s purchase
of an excess insurance policy for its law enforcement activities does not waive governmental
immunity, and it is therefore immune from claims for negligence and gross negligence. Second,

Defendant claims Plaintiff’s sole remaining 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging a constitutional
deprivation of adequate medical care and deliberate indifference to medical needs should be
dismissed because the Eight Amendment is inapplicable to the Plaintiff and a claim cannot
proceed under the Fourteenth Amendment because Plaintiff has not shown either a “special
relationship” between the Plaintiff and Defendant or a “state created danger” as required for such
claims.
A. Negligence Claims (Governmental Immunity)
Defendant’s first argument is that it is entitled to governmental immunity from liability
for Plaintiff’s negligence and gross negligence claims and thus this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction.1 Under North Carolina law, “boards of education are entitled

to governmental immunity from lawsuits that allege tortious or negligent conduct unless the
Board waived governmental immunity.” RM by and through MM v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Cty.
Bd. of Educ., 2017 WL 2115108, at *3 (W.D.N.C. May 15, 2017); see also Magana v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 645 S.E.2d 91, 92 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (“a county board of
education is a governmental agency and is therefore not liable in a tort or negligence action

1 The assertion of governmental immunity “presents a question of jurisdiction,” although “North
Carolina courts have not resolved whether the sovereign immunity defense challenges personal
jurisdiction or subject-matter jurisdiction.” Frye v. Brunswick Cty. Bd. of Educ., 612 F. Supp. 2d
694, 700-01 (E.D.N.C. 2009); accord Medina v. United States, 259 F.3d 220, 223 (4th Cir.
2001).
except to the extent that it has waived its governmental immunity pursuant to statutory
authority”). Waiver of this immunity occurs “by the act of obtaining” insurance, but “only to the
extent that said board of education is indemnified by insurance for such negligence or tort.” N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 115C-42.
Further, the purchase of excess policy insurance alone does not waive governmental

immunity. See Magana., 645 S.E.2d at 92-93; Irving v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
2013 WL 5508370, at *2-*3 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 2013) (“because the school board had not
purchased liability insurance for any amount below the $1,000,000 coverage limit, it had not
waived its immunity for any damages under $1,000,000”).
Defendant has several insurance policies that are relevant to this issue. For claims above
$1,000,000, Defendant has two “excess liability policies,” the Genesis Policy and the Great
American Policy. These policies provide coverage “for personal injury or property damage… if
CMS becomes liable for, and pays, the first $1,000,000 for an occurrence.” (Document No. 12-2,
p. 2). The Genesis Policy provides coverage up to $5,000,000 and the Great American Policy

provides coverage if the claim is more than $6,000,000. Id. The Genesis policy specifically states
that it “is not intended by the Insured to waive its governmental immunity.” (Document No. 12-
3, p. 19). However, Defendant also has a $1,000,000 policy– the “Indian Harbor” policy – that
can be used to pay the “retained limit” on claims arising out of the Defendant’s “law
enforcement duties.” (Document No. 14, p. 3-4). The parties dispute whether the Indian Harbor
policy is an underlying or excess policy. Accordingly, governmental immunity hinges on
whether the Indian Harbor policy is an underlying policy and therefore provides indemnification
to the Board or whether it is merely an excess policy. If the Indian Harbor policy is triggered, it
would waive the Board’s immunity. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-42.
The Plaintiff contends schools are tasked with performing law enforcement functions,
which include “protecting students from harm.” Thus, Plaintiff argues that because this matter
arises, at least in part, out of Defendant’s negligent and or reckless law enforcement duties, the
Indian Harbor policy was triggered as it covers the Board for claims “arising out of the Insured’s
law enforcement duties.” (Doc. No. 14 p. 4-5). Defendant responds that the Indian Harbor Policy

is simply an excess policy, which only covers the Board’s sworn law enforcement officers, (see
Doc. Nos. 12, 34), and because no sworn law enforcement officers were at Hopewell High
School during the incident, the policy is not triggered. (Doc. No. 15).
Yet, the language of the Genesis policy suggests that the Indian Harbor policy may be an
underlying policy. It states the Indian Harbor policy “may be used to pay the retained limit
caused by an occurrence or claim during this policy period arising out of the Insured’s law
enforcement duties.” (Document No. 12-3, p. 18). Again, Defendant disputes this argument,
providing an affidavit from the Board’s insurance plan administrator who insists that “the [Indian
Harbor] policy does not provide insurance coverage for any claimed self-insured retainage.”

(Doc. No. 15-1 p. 1-2). Still, this affidavit does not change the plain language of the Indian
Harbor policy and the Genesis policy, which taken together seem to contradict the
administrator’s assertion. In any event, at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must construe all
reasonable inferences from the disputed facts in favor of the Plaintiff’s allegation of jurisdiction.
Therefore, the Court adopts the M&R’s recommendation that Defendant’s motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s negligence and gross negligence claims be denied.
B. Section 1983 Claim
Second, Defendant argues the M&R erroneously concluded that Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. §
1983 claim alleging a constitutional deprivation of adequate medical care and deliberate
indifference can proceed.2 The Supreme Court has held that “a [s]tate's failure to protect an
individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process
Clause.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197, 103 L. Ed. 2d
249, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989). There are, however, two recognized exceptions to this general rule.
See Stevenson v. Martin Cty. Bd. of Educ., 3 F. App'x 25, 30 (4th Cir. 2001). First, when a state

has a special relationship with an individual, it has an affirmative duty to protect the individual
from harm inflicted by third parties. The Supreme Court has defined a “special relationship” as:
When the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's
liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to
provide for his basic human needs -- e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
and reasonable safety -- it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by
. . . the Due Process Clause. . .. It is the State's affirmative act of restraining the
individual's freedom to act on his own behalf -- through incarceration,
institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty -- which is the
"deprivation of liberty" triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not
its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by other
means.

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200. With respect to public school students, the Fourth Circuit has held
“[w]hen a student attends public school, his liberty is not restrained to the extent contemplated in
DeShaney [because] [a]ttending school is not the equivalent of incarceration or
institutionalization.” Stevenson, 3 F. App'x at 31 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 73
L. Ed. 2d 28, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982) (Fourteenth Amendment imposes a duty upon the state to
protect involuntary committed, mentally ill patients)). Thus, although Courts have found that a
school acts in a “parental role” while a student attends school, the school has not assumed full-
blown responsibility for the student’s care. Id. Parents retain the capacity to provide care for the
child, and that child can seek their help and protection. Id (citing Doe v. Claiborne Cty., 103 F.3d

2 The M&R’s dismissal of the other claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has not been challenged. (See
Doc. No. 35 p. 8).
495, 509 (6th Cir. 1996)). As a result, the state is not constitutionally liable for preventing
student-on-student violence just because it operates the school at which the violence takes place.
Id.
The second exception to the general rule that a state is not responsible for private
violence is that a state will be liable for the acts of third parties when the state itself creates the

danger. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201. The M&R correctly noted that, under established Fourth
Circuit precedent, “[a] key requirement for liability under the state-created danger doctrine is that
the state actor increase or create the danger through affirmative conduct.” Doe v. Rosa, 795 F.3d
429, 440 (4th Cir. 2015). The creation or increase of danger through affirmative conduct is a
high burden for liability. It requires that “[t]he state, through its affirmative acts, must ‘itself
create [] the dangerous situation that resulted in a victim’s injury,’ such that it becomes much
more akin to an actor itself directly causing harm to the injured party.’” Id. (quoting Pinder v.
Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1177 (4th Cir. 1995)). Liability does not arise when the state does
nothing in the face of danger. See id. at 203. Therefore, simply failing to provide protection from

danger does not implicate the state in the harm caused by third parties. See Pinder, 54 F.3d at
1175. For example, in Pinder, the Fourth Circuit found an officer’s “affirmative” promise that a
woman’s ex-boyfriend would spend the night in jail, a promise which turned out to be false and
led to the death of the woman’s three children, was purely a claim resting on an “omission”
rather than an affirmative act and thus not a cognizable constitutional claim. Pinder, 54 F.3d at
1176. Keeping this high standard in mind, Plaintiff’s allegation that the school imprudently
released students into a parking lot at a standard dismissal time after breaking up an in-school
fight and then allowed Plaintiff to board the bus with his injuries from the subsequent fight does
not rise to the level of affirmative action required to trigger liability under the state-created
danger doctrine.
Furthermore, Courts have held that the Eighth Amendment’s protection of providing
adequate medical care applies only to those who are incarcerated, detained, or being punished by
the government. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (Elementary principles of the

Eighth Amendment “establish the government’s obligation to provide medical care for those
whom it is punishing by incarceration.”) see also, DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200 (“The affirmative
duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its
expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which [the state] has imposed on his
freedom to act on his own behalf.”).
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to establish either exception to the general rule that a state's
failure to protect an individual against private violence does not create a constitutional violation.
Moreover, he has failed to show why the right to adequate medical care under the Eighth
Amendment is applicable. Thus, Plaintiff’s remaining 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim will be dismissed.

III. ORDER
NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 12) is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part;
2. Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.SC. § 1983 are dismissed;
3. Plaintiff’s claims under Article I, §§ 15 and 19, and Article IX, § 1 of the North
Carolina Constitution are dismissed;
4. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ negligence and gross negligence claims
is denied; and
5. This case shall proceed towards a resolution of the merits of Plaintiffs’ remaining
claims in the absence of a voluntary resolution of the dispute among the parties.
SO ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED

“tga
Kenneth D. Bell ey,
United States District Judge % ie of

Signed: February 1, 2022

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10258005. Public record. Not legal advice.
