# Jerman v. AT&T Corporation

> District Court, W.D. North Carolina · June 18, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10257199

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** June 18, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10257199

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a claim must be facially plausible in order to survive a motion to dismiss

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:20-cv-384-MOC-DSC

MELVIN MCCOY JERMAN, )
)
Plaintiff, pro se, )
)
vs. ) ORDER
)
AT&T CORPORATION, )
)
Defendant. )
___________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings, (Doc. No. 19), and on Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings, (Doc. No. 22).
I. BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Melvin McCoy Jerman filed this action against Defendant AT&T on July
12, 2020, seeking $6 million in damages. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff alleges federal jurisdiction under
15 U.S.C. § 1592, which is part of the Tariff Act of 1930, and attempts to assert one or more
common law claims under North Carolina law. (Id.).
The following allegations are taken as true for the purposes of the motion for judgment
on the pleadings. Sometime before this suit, Plaintiff opened a DirecTV account. (Doc. No. 1 at
p. 4). In July 2017, he “cancelled his authorized services with DirecTV, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of AT&T Corporation, after he was informed, that DirecTV was not authorized to
offer customers the service deal he had accepted.” (Id.). He further contends he “was informed
he needed to return all devices in order to cancel his services, and not be charged any fees.” (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges he “returned all devices” and “received a statement from DirecTV, showing his
total amount due was $0.00…” He then alleges “[u]nknown to Plaintiff and unauthorized,
Defendant opened an AT&T account, and sent a bill…for $501.56, asking for payment in full by
09/25/2017.” (Id.).
Plaintiff did not pay the bill and AT&T assigned the defaulted amount to Sunrise Credit
Services, Inc. for collection. (Id. at 6). Despite being called by Sunrise Credit Services regarding

the account, Plaintiff never paid the bill. (Id. at 7). Instead, he contacted the Federal
Communication Commission and the North Carolina Department of Justice and filed a fraud
report with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department. (Id.).
On March 19, 2021, Defendant filed the pending motion for judgment on the pleadings.
(Doc. No. 19). On the same day, the Court issued a notice to Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s right to
respond the motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Doc. No. 20). On April 30, 2021, Plaintiff
filed the pending motion to strike Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Doc. No.
22). Defendant has responded to Plaintiff’s motion to strike, and this matter is ripe for
disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) allows a party to move for judgment on the
pleadings when it would not delay trial. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(c). “A motion for judgment on the
pleadings under Rule 12(c) is assessed under the same standards as a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6).” Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 115 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Edwards v.
City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). Therefore, under Rule 12(c), a claim must
be dismissed when a claimant’s allegations fail to set forth a set of facts which, if true, would
entitle the claimant to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (holding that a claim must be facially plausible in order to
survive a motion to dismiss). When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court is “obliged to
accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the plaintiffs.” Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 685 (4th Cir. 2018).
“However, the court need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts, and need not
accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Monroe v. City

of Charlottesville, Va., 579 F.3d 380, 385–86 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
Additionally, “[f]ederal courts are obliged to liberally construe filings by pro se litigants.”
U.S. v. Brown, 797 Fed. Appx. 85, 89 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972)). However, even a pro se litigant’s complaint should be dismissed when “it appears
beyond doubt that the litigant can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle
him to relief.” Barefoot v. Polk, 242 Fed. Appx. 82, 83 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Gordon v. Leeke,
574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978)).
III. DISCUSSION

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the Court has jurisdiction under 19 U.S.C. § 1592. (Doc.
No. 1 at p. 3). This statute identifies penalties for fraud, gross negligence, and negligence under
the Tariff Act of 1930. It is well established that the Tariff Act of 1930 “does not provide for a
private right of action.” Potter v. Toei Animation Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 49, 53 (D.D.C. 2012). As
Plaintiff attempts to bring his claims under a statute that does not provide for a private right of
action, his claim under 19 U.S.C. § 1592 is dismissed with prejudice.
Next, liberally construing Plaintiff’s Complaint, it appears that Plaintiff is also attempting
to bring claims for common law negligence, gross negligence, fraud, and potentially breach of
contract. Given that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and given the lenient pleading standards of
Iqbal and Twombly, the Court will deny Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to
Plaintiff's remaining claims at this time.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (Doc. No. 19), is
GRANTED as to Plaintiff's claim under 19 U.S.C. § 1592 and DENIED as
to Plaintiff's remaining claims.
2. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings, (Doc. No. 22), is DENIED.
Signed: June 18, 2021

i )
pr-ervrnca
Max O. Cogburn i yg
United States District Judge Fe gat

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10257199. Public record. Not legal advice.
