# Murdock v. Ingram

> District Court, W.D. North Carolina · February 1, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10256710

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** February 1, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10256710

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying prisoner mailbox rule to § 1983 case
- applying prisoner mailbox rule to § 1983 case

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 3:18-cv-00050-MR

AJANAKU MURDOCK, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) MEMORANDUM OF
vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER
)
KEVIN INGRAM, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. 59].
I. BACKGROUND
The incarcerated Plaintiff Ajanaku Murdock (“Murdock” or “the
Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
addressing incidents that allegedly occurred at the Lanesboro Correctional
Institution.1 The Plaintiff named as Defendants: Kevin Ingram (“Ingram”), a
unit manager; and John Herring (“Herring”), the facility administrator. The
unverified Amended Complaint passed initial review2 on claims that

1 Now known as Anson Correctional Institution.

2 This case was assigned to Judge Frank D. Whitney at that time. [See Doc. 39].
Defendants Ingram and Herring failed to protect Plaintiff from a stabbing by
other inmates and that Defendant Ingram was deliberately indifferent to a

serious medical need after Plaintiff was stabbed.
The Defendants now move for summary judgment as to all the
Plaintiff’s claims. [Doc. 59].

The Court notified the Plaintiff of the opportunity to respond to
Defendants’ Motion and to present evidence in opposition pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56. [Doc. 64]. The Plaintiff filed a Response3 [Doc. 70] and the
Defendants have filed a Notice of Intent Not to File a Reply [Doc. 71]. Having

been fully briefed, this matter is ripe for disposition.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is
genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

3 Plaintiff’s Response is dated October 9, 2020, the date it was due to be filed. The
Response, however, is post-marked November 30, 2020, and the Court received it on
December 15, 2020. There is no clear indication when the Response was delivered to
prison authorities for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (establishing
the prisoner mailbox rule); see Lewis v. Richmond City Police Dep’t, 947 F.2d 733 (4th
Cir. 1991) (applying prisoner mailbox rule to § 1983 case). As such, the Court cannot
determine on the face of the Response whether it was timely filed. Nevertheless, the
Court will consider the Plaintiff’s Response.
(1986). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under
governing law. Id.

The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)
(internal citations omitted).
Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving

party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not
rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat

a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party
must oppose a proper summary judgment motion with citation to
“depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other

materials” in the record. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). Courts “need
not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or
arguments.” Eastern Shore Mkt., Inc. v. J.D. Assoc.’s, LLP, 213 F.3d 175,

180 (4th Cir. 2000). The nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence
from which “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; accord Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md.,

48 F.3d 810, 818 (4th Cir. 1995).
When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the
evidence and any inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. “‘Where the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving
party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557,
586 (2009) (quoting Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

(1986)).
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties’ forecasts of evidence show the following, which is

undisputed except as otherwise noted.
A. Plaintiff’s Safety
The Plaintiff was recommended for 90 days of modified housing in late
June 2016.4 [Doc. 70-3 at 2: Notice of Action Taken by Classification

Authority]. Six months later, the Plaintiff wrote a letter to Administrator
Herring stating that gang members had targeted the Plaintiff after Plaintiff

4 Defendant Herring did not arrive at Lanesboro C.I. until October 2016 and therefore has
no knowledge of any of the alleged incidents that occurred before that date. [See Doc.
61-2: Herring Decl. at ¶ 16].
came into a large amount of money and “[t]hey’re threatening me … saying
they’ll stab me if I refuse to pay.”5 [Doc. 70-6 at 4: Plaintiff’s Dec. 17, 2016

Letter to Herring]. The letter further states that Plaintiff had been in modified
housing for the required 90-day period; that he was infraction free; that he
had complained to Unit Manager Ingram and two case managers about the

issue; and that Ingram had refused to move the Plaintiff without a justifiable
reason.6 [Id.]. The Plaintiff was subsequently moved to a different housing
pod within the modified housing unit. [Doc. 70-6 at 6: Plaintiff’s Jan. 30, 2017
Letter to Herring].

In a second letter to Herring dated January 30, 2017, Plaintiff states
that he had sent Ingram and Herring numerous requests which were ignored
and that he needed to be moved to another housing unit because gang

members in the neighboring pod were discussing Plaintiff “through the door.”
[Id.]. The letter further states that Ingram refused Plaintiff’s request for

5 Defendant Herring states that he has no knowledge of the incidents alleged in the
Complaint; that he learned of these allegations when he was asked to waive service; that
he does not recall having any direct interactions with the Plaintiff; and that he attempted
to locate any documentation related in any way to the incidents alleged in this action but
was unable to locate any such documentation. [Doc. 61-2: Herring Decl. at ¶¶ 13-18].

6 Defendant Ingram states that he has no knowledge of the incidents alleged in the
Complaint; that he learned of these allegations when he was asked to waive service; and
he attempted to locate any documentation related in any way to the incidents alleged in
this action but was unable to locate any such documentation. [Doc. 61-1: Ingram Decl.
at ¶¶ 13-20].
protective custody because Plaintiff would not provide names of the
individuals who were threatening him and “snitching isn’t an option….” [Doc.

70-6 at 6: Plaintiff’s Jan. 30, 2017 Letter to Herring; see also Doc. 70-5 at 2:
Jan. 26, 2017 Request for Information (advising Mr. Estridge,7 a case
manager, that he is in danger as a “civilian”8 in the cell block, that he needs

to move to a “neutral” block, and that Ingram keeps telling Plaintiff he is
moving but it has not happened)].
The Plaintiff’s brother, Lamerick Blackwell, further states in a
declaration that he and other family members contacted Ingram and others9

about having Plaintiff moved to a safer due to threats from gang members.10
According to Blackwell, these complaints were “met with terse dispositions”
and family members were given the run-around when they asked to speak

with the superintendent and officer in charge. [Doc. 70-1 at 3: Blackwell
Decl.].

7 The Plaintiff did not name Mr. Estridge as a defendant in this action.

8 The Plaintiff explains that a “civilian” is a prisoner who is not part of a gang or other
organization. [Doc. 40 at 3: Amended Complaint].

9 Blackwell appears to identify these individuals as Mr. Victor, a case manager, and
Captain Aaron. The Plaintiff has not named Mr. Victor or Captain Aaron as defendants
in this action.

10 Blackwell asserts that these contacts occurred in September, November and December
2017; this appears to be a typographical error and that Blackwell means to refer to 2016.
The Plaintiff alleges that he was jumped and stabbed by inmates from
the neighboring cell block around May 25, 2017.11 [Doc. 70 at 4: Summary

Judgment Response (alluding to an attack); Doc. 70-5 at 6: July 22, 2017
Request for Information (requesting a transfer from Mr. Victor, stating “I was
stabbed and jumped about a month ago.”); Doc. 70-5 at 8: Aug. 2, 2017

Request for Information (same); Doc. 70-6 at 3: Plaintiff’s Oct. 23, 2017
Letter to Ingram (stating that Ingram “[has] been made aware of me being
assaulted and stabbed on Union 2 E-Block…” yet requests from Plaintiff and
his family to be moved have been ignored)].

The Defendants have submitted an undisputed forecast of evidence
that, in accordance with Department policy and training, if correctional staff
observe a prisoner with apparent injuries such as stab wounds, they must

immediately report the incident to the Officer in Charge and complete an
incident report. [Doc. 61-1: Ingram Decl. at ¶ 21]. The Defendants have
further submitted an undisputed forecast of evidence that there are no
incident reports relating to the Plaintiff for the months of May and June of

11 The Plaintiff alleges in his unverified Amended Complaint that he was stabbed in his
arm and leg on or about May 25, 2017, by inmates housed in the block next door and that
Officer N. Owens opened the cell door for them. [Doc. 40 at 6: Amended Complaint].
The Plaintiff did not name Officer Owens as a defendant in this action.
2017 and that there were no reports of a stabbing or altercation between the
Plaintiff and other offenders during the relevant time.12 [Id. at ¶¶ 18-19].

B. Medical Care
Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Krantz13 noticed his injuries after the
stabbing but that the Plaintiff refused medical treatment “due to shock” and
out of concern for “becoming more of a target.”14 [Doc. 70 at 7: Summary

Judgment Response]. The Plaintiff further alleges that he became
concerned about a possible infection several days later and told Defendant
Ingram about the stabbing, but that Defendant Ingram refused to refer him

for medical treatment. [Doc. 40 at 7: Amended Complaint]. The Plaintiff
further alleges that he received a tetanus shot around June 13, 2017 when
he told a nurse about the stabbing incident during an unrelated sick call.

[Doc. 40 at 7: Amended Complaint]. However, the Plaintiff offers no forecast
of evidence to support these allegations.

12 Ingram further states that he was not personally aware of any incidents or an alleged
stabbing involving Plaintiff in May 2017. [Doc. 61-1: Ingram Decl. at ¶ 20]. Herring states
that he has no knowledge of any of the alleged incidents regarding the Plaintiff. [Doc. 61-
2: Herring Decl. at ¶¶ 13].

13 The Plaintiff did not name Sergeant Krantz as a defendant in this action.

14 The Plaintiff alleges in the unverified Amended Complaint that, after his assailants left
his cell, he cleaned up the blood with shirts then flushed them down the toilet. [Doc. 40
at 7: Amended Complaint]. In his verified Response, however, the Plaintiff denies ever
having said that he flushed bloody clothes down the toilet. [Doc. 70 at 7: Summary
Judgment Response].
By contrast, the Defendants have submitted an unrefuted forecast of
evidence that there are no records or reports in the Department Incident

Management System regarding the Plaintiff during the relevant time period.
[Doc. 61-1: Ingram Decl. at ¶¶ 17-19]. Further, the Defendants have
submitted a forecast of evidence that Department policy and training requires

any correctional staff who observes an offender with apparent injuries (such
as stab wounds) to insist on the offender receiving medical attention and to
document any refusal of medical attention. [Doc. 61-1: Ingram Decl. at ¶ 21].
Further, correctional staff are required to document any apparent injuries to

offenders in an incident report and take photographs of those injuries, and
refer an injured offender to the medical unit for treatment. [Id. at ¶ 22-23].
The Defendants have presented an undisputed forecast of evidence

that the Defendant Ingram never communicated with the Plaintiff about his
concern regarding a possibly infected stab wound or refused him access to
medical care for that issue. [Doc. 61-1: Ingram Decl. at ¶ 14].
Defendants have submitted the declaration of Sergeant Krantz, in

which he denies that he was personally aware of a stabbing incident
involving the Plaintiff or that he spoke with the Plaintiff about being stabbed.
Sergeant Krantz further denies ever noticing that the Plaintiff had any injuries
or that he referred the Plaintiff for medical treatment. [Doc. 61-3: Krantz
Decl. at ¶¶ 11-13].

IV. DISCUSSION
A. Failure to Protect
The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew he was in danger from gang

members who had threatened to stab him and that they failed to protect him
from that risk of harm, which came to pass.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual
punishments” and the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
173 (1976)). To establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment, an inmate
must allege (1) a “sufficiently serious” deprivation under an objective

standard and (2) that prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to
the inmate’s health and safety under a subjective standard. Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294, 297-99 (1991).
This constitutional guarantee imposes a duty on prison officials to

“protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (internal quotations omitted). To obtain
relief on a failure to protect claim, an inmate must show that he is

incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and
that prison officials had a deliberately indifferent state of mind. Id. at 834.
Prison officials who lacked knowledge of a risk cannot be said to have

inflicted punishment, so they may avoid liability by showing, for instance,
“that they did not know of the underlying facts indicating a sufficiently
substantial danger and that they were therefore unaware of the danger, or

that they knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the
risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent.” Id. at 844.
Where prison officials actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or
safety, they may still be found free from liability “if they responded reasonably

to the risk, even if the harm was not averted.” Id.
The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Ingram and Herring knew that the
Plaintiff’s housing assignment exposed him to a substantial risk of serious

harm because the Plaintiff informed them that he was receiving threats from
gang members, and that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to that
risk or harm. The Plaintiff’s forecast of evidence, however, demonstrates
only that that Plaintiff and his family notified Defendants Ingram and Herring

that Plaintiff was receiving threats from gang members in late 2016 and that
Plaintiff had been moved to a different pod by January 2017. The Plaintiff
has not submitted any forecast of evidence from which a jury could find that

the Defendants knew that Plaintiff continued to face a substantial risk of
serious harm after the move to a different pod and deliberately failed to
protect him from that risk of harm. At most, the Plaintiff has presented a

forecast of evidence that the Defendants knew that the Plaintiff did not feel
his new pod was safe enough and that he alleged that gang members in the
neighboring pod were talking about him “through the door.” [Doc. 70-6 at 6:

Plaintiff’s Jan. 30, 2017 Letter to Herring]. There is no forecast of evidence,
however, that the Plaintiff’s continued fear was anything more than
speculative or that the Defendants had any reason to know that the January
move was inadequate to reasonably ensure the Plaintiff’s safety. Indeed,

the Plaintiff admits that protective custody was available to him but that he
decided to forego that placement because he was unwilling to provide names
to prison staff. Assuming that the Plaintiff’s allegation that he was stabbed

about four months after his move to the new pod is true,15 this fails to
demonstrate that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a
substantial risk to Plaintiff’s safety. The Court therefore concludes that the
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to the Plaintiff’s

15 The Court notes that the documentation upon which the Plaintiff relies to support his
allegation that he was stabbed around May 25, 2017 is not contemporaneous to the
alleged incident and in fact post-dates the alleged incident by several months. [See Doc.
70-5 at 6: July 22, 2017 Request for Information; Doc. 70-5 at 8: Aug. 2, 2017 Request
for Information; Doc. 70-6 at 3: Plaintiff’s Oct. 23, 2017 Letter to Ingram].
claims that they failed in their constitutional duty to protect him from violence
at the hands of fellow inmates.

B. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need
The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ingram was deliberately indifferent
to a serious medical need when he refused the Plaintiff’s request for medical

care several days after the alleged stabbing when Plaintiff feared an
infection.
To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need,
a plaintiff must show that he had serious medical needs and that the

defendant acted with deliberate indifference to those needs. Heyer v. United
States Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 210 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Iko v.
Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008)). A “serious medical need” is “one

that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that
is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for
a doctor’s attention.” Iko, 535 F.3d at 241 (internal quotation marks omitted).
To constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, “the

treatment [a prisoner receives] must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate,
or excessive to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental
fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled on

other grounds by Farmer, 511 U.S. at 825.
The Plaintiff alleges in his unverified Amended Complaint that he
became concerned about a possible infection in the days following the

alleged stabbing and told Defendant Ingram, who denied medical care. The
Defendants, however, have presented a forecast of evidence that the
Defendant Ingram never communicated with the Plaintiff about his concern

regarding a possibly infected stab wound and that Defendant Ingram never
refused Plaintiff access to medical care for that issue. The Plaintiff has not
attempted to rebut this forecast of evidence and has only submitted evidence
that he informed Defendant Ingram of a stabbing several months after the

incident.16 As such, no genuine dispute of material fact exists with regards
to the Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
Accordingly, the Defendants will be granted summary judgment on this

claim.
C. Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional
violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably

believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531

16 To the extent that the Plaintiff’s and the Defendants’ forecasts of evidence differ with
regards to Sergeant Krantz’s knowledge of alleged injuries that resulted from the stabbing
and any offer of medical care, such issues have no bearing on the Plaintiff’s deliberate
indifference claim because Sergeant Krantz has not been named as a defendant in this
action.
(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “To determine whether an officer is entitled to
qualified immunity, the court must examine (1) whether the plaintiff has

demonstrated that the officer violated a constitutional right and (2) whether
that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” E.W.
ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The doctrine of qualified immunity “gives government
officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments and
protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
Here, because the Plaintiff has not presented a forecast of evidence
that the Defendants violated the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights with respect

to his safety or medical care, the Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity on these claims. As such, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment based on qualified immunity will be granted.
V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment [Doc. 59].
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. 59] is GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
The Clerk is directed to terminate this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: February 1, 2021

Martifi Reidinger wey
Chief United States District Judge “AES

16

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10256710. Public record. Not legal advice.