# Burchette v. Brown

> District Court, W.D. North Carolina · March 25, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10255645

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** March 25, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
5:19-cv-00080-FDW

KEVIN DREW BURCHETTE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) ORDER
)
)
ERIK A. HOOKS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
_________________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. 26]. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a), 1915A.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 7, 2019, Plaintiff Kevin Drew Burchette (“Plaintiff”), who is currently
incarcerated at Ashe County Detention Center in Jefferson, North Carolina, filed a Complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against eleven defendants. [Doc. 1]. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved to amend
his Complaint, but failed to include a proposed amended complaint with that motion. [Doc. 21].
Plaintiff indicated that he would be “seeking to make this a class action suit and change the
defendants, add some plaintiffs and change the legal claim please.” [Id.]. The Court denied
Plaintiff’s motion without prejudice and advised Plaintiff of the requirements under Rules 18(a)
and 20(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding joinder of claims and joinder of
parties should he choose to file an amended complaint. [Doc. 22].
On December 23, 2019, Plaintiff filed a proposed Amended Complaint [Doc. 23], which
the Court also construed as a motion to amend. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint purported to be
brought on behalf of Plaintiff, Ethan B. Chambers (“Plaintiff Chambers”), Skylar Branson
(“Plaintiff Branson”), and “Multitude of John Doe’s/Supervisee’s/Victims” (“John Doe
Plaintiffs”). [Doc. 23 at 2, 12]. Plaintiff identified Plaintiffs Chambers and Branson as inmates at
the Ashe County Detention Center. [Id. at 12]. Plaintiff named the following individuals as
Defendants in this matter: (1) Erik A. Hooks, identified as the Secretary of the Department of
Public Safety; (2) Willis J. Fowler, identified as Chairman of the Commission; (3) Graham H.

Atkinson, identified as Commissioner for Commission; (4) Eric A. Montgomery, identified as
Commissioner for Commission; (5) Angela R. Bryant, identified as Commissioner for
Commission; (6) Barry W. Cox, identified as “CPPO;” (7) Jake J. Brown, identified as “P/PO;”
(8) Lisa J. Hunt, identified as “CPPO;” and (9) Kevin G. Gallimore, identified as “P/PO.” [Doc.
23 at 2-3, 12-13].
Plaintiff generally claimed violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, which he described as “ultimately deprivation of life.”
[Doc. 1 at 3]. As grounds under § 1983, Plaintiff stated, “conversion of legislative mandates into
excessive false imprisonment terms.” [Id. at 4]. Plaintiff alleged that the incompetence of the

Department of Public Safety has “victimized a multitude of citizens or defendants, making for
disproportionate and excessive imprisonment terms.” [Id. at 14]. Plaintiff alluded to
“manipulate[ion of] the statutory mandates imposed” for post-release supervisees. [Id.]. As for
facts particular to Plaintiff, he alleged that he was in the custody of the Ashe County Detention
Center, serving two presumably consecutive terms of incarceration. He claimed his custodial
sentence should have ended on April 13, 2018. [Id. at 15]. Plaintiff further alleged as follows:
Now on April 14, 2018 I was falsely and wrongfully imprisoned and
“deprived my liberty and life” because of this mis-application. This
imprisonment term was to terminate at maximum imposed April 13
2018 per commencement of the post-release supervision which is a
9 month 270 day term post the maxima. Then on July 7, 2018 I was
falsely arrested on a Commission Warrant and then falsely and
wrongfully imprisoned for 366 days or until July 8, 2019 without
even a bond.

[Doc. 1 at 15]. Ultimately, Plaintiff claimed he “was detained without bond for 366 days in
relations to this misadministration.” [Id. at 4]. Plaintiff made no particular allegation relative to
any named Defendant, other than his allegation that “[i]t’s the Secretary of Public Safety’s
responsibility as to the control and custody of all prisoners or defendants serving an imprisonment
term.” [Id. at 15].
For relief, Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as $108,000 in damages
for himself and $150 million in damages for the class of victims he intends to name but has not
yet identified. [Doc. 1 at 5]. The Court conduct initial review of Plaintiff’s amended complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. On initial review, Plaintiff’s amended complaint
failed for several reasons. In short, these include that it was barred by Heck v. Humphries, 512
U.S. 477 (1994), and that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted against
any Defendant. The Court also noted that Plaintiff’s claims may be barred by the Younger
abstention doctrine, in any event. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971). The Court also
advised Plaintiff that even if he had stated a claim, the Court would not allow the lawsuit to proceed
as a class action. The Court allowed Plaintiff yet another opportunity to amend his complaint.
[Doc. 24].
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint, which is now before the Court
for review. In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff again names Defendants Brown, Cox,

Fowler, and Hooks, but excludes the remaining Defendants that he named in is amended
complaint. [Doc. 26, see Doc. 25]. Plaintiff claims his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as his “inalienable human rights” have
been violated. [Doc. 26 at 3]. For relief in his second amended complaint, Plaintiff seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages. [Id. at 5].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must review Plaintiff’s second amended complaint to determine whether it is
subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, § 1915A requires an initial
review of a “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental

entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” and the court must identify cognizable
claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief.
In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the second amended complaint
raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual
contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28
(1989). Furthermore, a pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district court to
ignore a clear failure to allege facts which set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law.

Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION
In Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, Plaintiff sets out his allegations with some
amount of additional clarity. Plaintiff, however, despite the Court’s explicit instructions, failed to
show that his complaint is not barred by Heck. [See Doc. 24, 26]. Plaintiff simply offers the bare
assertion that “this Complaint has no baren [sic] for pending Charges,” [Doc. 26 at 4] yet all
indications are that it is, in fact, barred by Heck. Because, under Heck, the Court lacks jurisdiction
over this case, it must be dismissed. Because the Court has allowed Plaintiff the opportunity to
amend his complaint already, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's second amended complaint with
prejudice. See Green v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 790 Fed. App’x 535, 536 (4th Cir. 2020).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's second amended complaint is dismissed with
prejudice.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint [Doc. 26] is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
2. The Clerk is respectfully instructed to terminate this action.
Signed: March 25, 2020

Frank D. Whitney
Chief United States District Judge ~“#*"

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10255645. Public record. Not legal advice.