# Engle v. Berryhill

> District Court, W.D. North Carolina · July 10, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10254791

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** July 10, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN
DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. 5:18CV103-GCM
KELLY BRENT ENGLE )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) ORDER
)
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner )
of Social Security, )
)
Defendant. )
THIS MATTER is before the court upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
No. 11) and the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 13). Having carefully
considered such motions and reviewed the pleadings, the court enters the following findings,
conclusions, and Order.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. Administrative History
Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and Disability Insurance alleging a
disability onset date of July 1, 2013. (Tr. 15). Plaintiff’s claim was denied both initially and on
reconsideration; thereafter, Plaintiff requested and was granted a hearing before an administrative
law judge (“ALJ”). (Id.). After conducting a hearing, the ALJ issued a decision which was
unfavorable to Plaintiff, from which Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council. (Tr. 166-69).
Plaintiff’s request for review was denied, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). (Tr. 1). Thereafter, Plaintiff timely filed this
action, seeking review of the Commissioner’s final decision.
II. Factual Background
It appearing that the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, the
undersigned adopts and incorporates such findings herein as if fully set forth. Such findings are
referenced in the substantive discussion which follows.
III. Standard of Review

The only issues on review are whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal
standards and whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir.
1990). Review by a federal court is not de novo, Smith v. Schwieker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir.
1986); rather, inquiry is limited to whether there was “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” Richardson v. Perales, supra. If there is
conflicting evidence, the court may not reweigh it or inquire into credibility, but instead must defer
to the Commissioner’s decision. Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012). Even if the
undersigned were to find that a preponderance of the evidence weighed against the

Commissioner’s decision, the Commissioner’s decision would have to be affirmed if supported by
substantial evidence. Hays v. Sullivan, supra.
IV. Substantial Evidence
A. Introduction
The court has read the transcript of Plaintiff’s administrative hearing, closely read the
decision of the ALJ, and reviewed the extensive exhibits contained in the administrative record.
The issue is not whether a court might have reached a different conclusion had it been presented
with the same testimony and evidentiary materials, but whether the decision of the administrative
law judge is supported by substantial evidence. The undersigned finds that it is.
B. Sequential Evaluation
A five-step process, known as “sequential” review, is used by the Commissioner in
determining whether a Social Security claimant is disabled. The Commissioner evaluates a
disability claim under Title II pursuant to the following five-step analysis:
(1) Whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity;

(2) Whether the claimant has a severe medically determinable impairment, or a
combination of impairments that is severe;
(3) Whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or
medically equals one of the Listings in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1;
(4) Whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform the
requirements of his past relevant work; and
(5) Whether the claimant can do any other work, considering his RFC, age,
education, and work experience.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). In this case, the Commissioner determined Plaintiff’s

claim at the fifth step of the sequential evaluation process.
C. The Administrative Decision
In rendering his decision, the ALJ first concluded that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date. (Tr. 17). At the second step, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: diabetes mellitus, diabetic
neuropathy, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine with radiculopathy, and obesity. (Id.).
At the third step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or medically equaled any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 19).
The ALJ then found that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1567(b) except:
“[he] is able to stand and walk for about two hours and sit for up to six hours in an
eight-hour workday with normal breaks. He can occasionally push and pull with
the left lower extremity. He can occasionally perform foot control operations. He
can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He can occasionally climb ramps or
stairs, and occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. He can frequently
handle, finger, and feel bilaterally. He can have no exposure to extreme heat,
humidity, excessive vibration, unprotected heights, or hazardous machinery.”

(Id.). In making this finding, the ALJ considered all of Plaintiff’s symptoms and the extent to
which these symptoms could reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical
evidence and other evidence, as required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and SSR 96-4p. (Id.) The ALJ
also considered opinion evidence in accordance with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
and SSR 17-2p. (Id.) While the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments could reasonably be
expected to cause the alleged symptoms, he determined that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms were not entirely consistent with the
medical evidence and other evidence in the record. (Tr. 20).
At the fourth step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was no longer capable of performing his
past relevant work. (Tr. 22). At step five, the ALJ determined that in light of Plaintiff’s RFC, age,
education, and work experience, and based on testimony from a vocational expert (“VE”), that
Plaintiff could perform other unskilled jobs existing in significant numbers in the national
economy, such as cashier, hand packager, or inspector. (Tr. 23). Accordingly, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (Id.)
D. Discussion
Plaintiff has made the following assignments of error: (1) the ALJ failed to sufficiently
review and correctly weigh the entire record in determining the severity of his symptoms; 2) the
ALJ failed to adequately explain how he arrived at the RFC limitations; 3) the ALJ failed to
evaluate his obesity properly; and 4) the ALJ failed to properly weigh the opinion of his treating
nurse practitioner. Plaintiff’s assignments of error will be discussed seriatim.
Per 20 C.F.R. § 1529, the ALJ must employ a two-step process to evaluate a claimant’s
symptoms. First, it must be determined whether there is “objective medical evidence showing the

existence of a medical impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the actual pain
[or other symptoms], in the amount and degree, alleged by the claimant.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d
585, 594 (4th Cir. 1996). Then, after finding such a condition, the ALJ must evaluate the alleged
symptoms’ intensity and persistence along with the extent to which they limit the claimant’s ability
to engage in work. Id. SSR 16-3P states that when considering the effects of those symptoms, “[the
ALJ] examine[s] the entire case record, including the objective medical evidence; an individual's
statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms; statements and other
information provided by medical sources and other persons; and any other relevant evidence in the
individual's case record.” 2017 WL 5180304, at *4 (S.S.A.). The ALJ’s findings must “contain

specific reasons for the weight given to the individual's symptoms, be consistent with and
supported by the evidence, and be clearly articulated so the individual and any subsequent reviewer
can assess how the adjudicator evaluated the individual's symptoms.” Id. at *10.
In step one of his analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” (Tr. at 20). Plaintiff
does not challenge this finding. Instead, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s step two finding that his
statements “concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not
entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Id.).
To the extent that Plaintiff argues that the ALJ must cite to every medical procedure or
outcome in the record in making his decision, he overstates the requirements of SSR 16-3p. While
indeed, the “entire case,” must be reviewed to determine severity, “a formalistic factor-by-factor
recitation of the evidence is unnecessary as long as the ALJ ‘sets forth the specific evidence [he]
relies on’ in evaluating the claimant’s subjective symptoms.” Phillips v. Berryhill, No. 8:17-cv-

02423-MGL-JDA, 2018 WL 6980967, at *15 (D.S.C. Dec. 7, 2018), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 8:17-cv-02423-MGL, 2019 WL 134061 (D.S.C. Jan. 7, 2019) (quoting White v.
Massanari, 271 F.3d 1256, 1261 (10th Cir. 2001)) (quotations omitted). The SSR does not require
that the ALJ list out every piece of evidence in the record, but rather consider it in its entirety and
put forth the evidence he finds most dispositive. The ALJ has met this standard.
In his decision on severity, the ALJ explicitly noted that he has considered “all symptoms
and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective
medical evidence and other evidence.” (Tr. 19). He noted that no evidence in the record showed
“an inability to ambulate or with grasping and handling objects.” (Tr. 21). He also noted that there

was record of improvement with interventional treatment, and record evidence of full motor
strength in Plaintiff’s lower extremities. (Id.). He considered the fact that Plaintiff himself testified
that he could drive a car, work on automobiles (including rebuilding carburetors with his hands),
take his daughter to school, prepare simple meals for himself, and shop in stores. (Tr. 20-21).
Of considerable importance is the ALJ’s repeated finding that Plaintiff was non-compliant
in his medical treatments. The ALJ notes that Plaintiff “had not been compliant with his diabetic
diet,” and that there was “evidence in the record of non-compliance with prescribed treatment.”
(Tr. 21-22). As stated in Sias v. Secretary, “[t]he Social Security Act did not repeal the principle
of individual responsibility.” 861 F.2d 475, 480 (6th Cir. 1988). Because the ALJ noted that
Plaintiff has showed improvement with interventional treatment, it was proper for him to discount
further damage caused by a non-compliance with treatment. “If a symptom can be reasonably
controlled by medication or treatment, it is not disabling.” Gross v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1163, 1166
(4th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1530(b) (“If you do not follow the
prescribed treatment without a good reason, we will not find you disabled.”). The Code of Federal

Regulations lists specific, acceptable reasons for treatment non-compliance. Plaintiff’s own claim
of “hard-headed[ness]” because he “couldn’t understand some of the medicines they were giving
[him]” does not qualify as an acceptable reason for non-compliance under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1530(c).
(Tr. 47).
While it may be the case that non-compliance has exacerbated Plaintiff’s diabetic nerve
damage or other symptoms, the Court is unpersuaded by the comparison Plaintiff draws to SSR
13-2p on considering conditions emergent from drug addiction. Drug addiction and alcoholism
can cause a new condition or limitation to manifest. See SSR 13-2p, 2013 WL 621536, at *7
(S.S.A.). Medication, however, is an attempt by a medical doctor and the claimant to limit or erase

a symptom or limitation already present that the claimant is aware of and experiencing. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1530 clearly states that to “get benefits, you must follow treatment prescribed . . . if this
treatment is expected to restore your ability to work.” § 404.1530(a) (emphasis added). The actual
efficacy of the treatment avoided is irrelevant to the need to follow it. What matters, according to
the regulation, is the expectation that the medical regimen will help. The Court declines to allow
Plaintiff to assert, after not following prescribed treatment, that nerve damage he might have
otherwise avoided is disabling, and that even if he had followed the treatment, it would not have
helped anyway.
The ALJ also properly discounted the testimony of Plaintiff’s mother. Both parties agree
that Plaintiff’s mother is a lay witness, not a medical source, and may be used to show the severity
of an impairment. SSR 16-3p. Nevertheless, the ALJ remains entitled to give the lay opinion the
weight he deems proper, so long as adequately explained. The ALJ explained clearly that he
accorded the opinion less weight because she was not “medically trained to make exacting

observations as to dates, frequencies, types, and degrees of medical signs and symptoms”; because
her “statements . . . are simply not consistent with the preponderance of the opinions and
observations by medical doctors in this case”; and because she “cannot be considered a
disinterested third-party witness whose statements would not tend to be colored by affection for
the claimant and a natural tendency to agree with the symptoms and limitations the claimant
alleges.” (Tr. 22). It is clear that the ALJ adequately weighed, considered, and discounted the
testimony of Plaintiff’s mother. See Bettie v. Colvin, No. 2:12-CV-00025-MOC, 2013 WL
5849147, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 30, 2013) (holding as sufficient a near-identical ALJ evaluation of
a third party’s testimony).

Plaintiff also contends that in evaluating the severity of his symptoms, the ALJ failed to
consider the extent he was able to take part in day-to-day activities. “An ALJ may not consider the
type of activities a claimant can perform without also considering the extent to which she can
perform them.” Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Brown v.
Commissioner, 873 F.3d 251, 263 (4th Cir. 2017)). Plaintiff overstates the deficiency in the ALJ’s
decision. The ALJ notes that though Plaintiff works on old cars, he “does not work with smaller
automobile parts.” (Tr. 20). He explains that Plaintiff only prepares “simple meals,” and has
“problems with personal care due to an inability to sit or stand for long periods.” (Id.). While
indeed, the ALJ does not note the exact length of time that Plaintiff spends in the car driving his
daughter to school, the error appears harmless. Plaintiff contends that he only spends “20 minutes
tops” in the car driving his daughter, (Pl.’s Br. at 16), but the ALJ noted elsewhere Plaintiff’s
testimony that he cannot sit for extended periods of time. (Tr. 20). The two appear to overlap; it is
unreasonable to conclude that because the ALJ did not specify that Plaintiff only spent twenty
minutes driving his daughter that he necessarily concluded such task took far longer.

Though the ALJ may not have cited to every medical report or opinion in the record, such
omission does not indicate the ALJ’s inability to consider that evidence in making his decision.
To the extent that Plaintiff wishes this Court to take notice of that evidence and deem it supportive
of the necessity of benefits, the Court declines to do so. As stated, in the presence of conflicting
evidence, a court is not to reweigh it or inquire into credibility, but instead must defer to the
Commissioner’s decision. Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472. Though much of the evidence cited by
Plaintiff could point towards greater severity than that found, the ALJ did not weigh it that way,
and arrived at a different conclusion. It is not the responsibility of the Court to upset his decision
here by reweighing that evidence.

Despite Plaintiff’s “tenderness in his back, decreased sensation in his hands and legs, and
morbid obesity,” this Court finds that the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s symptoms are not as
severe as he claims is supported by substantial evidence. “Mascio only requires a remand when an
ALJ's opinion is ‘sorely lacking’ in a manner that ‘frustrates meaningful review.’” White v. Colvin,
No. 3:15-CV-00197-FDW, 2016 WL 3381265, at *5 (W.D.N.C. June 14, 2016) (quoting Mascio
v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636-37 (4th Cir. 2015)). That demanding standard is not met here. The
ALJ adequately listed, weighed, and explained the evidence he used in reaching the decision that
he did with regard to Plaintiff’s symptom severity.
Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s RFC. He argues that in formulating the RFC, the ALJ
failed to account for the extent to which his medical conditions could limit his ability to perform a
range of sedentary work or manipulate items with his hands frequently. Plaintiff also contends that
the ALJ did not properly consider his morbid obesity, nor properly weigh the opinion of his treating
nurse practitioner.

An RFC assessment must include “a narrative discussion describing how the evidence
supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical
evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 at *4 (S.S.A.). Here,
the ALJ devoted over three pages to a discussion of the medical records relevant to Plaintiff’s
physical impairments and alleged limitations, noting his course of treatment, notes from different
treatment providers, physical examination results, diagnostic test results, daily activities, and
medical opinions. (Tr. 19-22).
Specific to his ability to perform sedentary work, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s allegations of
back pain, an inability to sit or stand for long periods of time, neuropathy and numbness in his

hands and legs, and problems with lifting, squatting, bending, standing, reaching, walking, sitting,
kneeling, stair climbing, completing tasks and concentration. (Tr. 20). However, in determining
the extent to which these allegations were supported by the record, the ALJ noted certain
inconsistencies. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff drove his daughter to school (Id.), had full strength
in his legs and upper extremities (Tr. 21), and did not show any evidence of an inability to
ambulate, grasp, or handle objects (Id.). The ALJ also took note of the fact that Plaintiff worked
on cars and showed improvement with interventional treatment. (Tr. 20). The ALJ cited to a test
in the record showing that Plaintiff “moved all his extremities well,” (Id.), as well as back and
buttock pain that “did not radiate,” (Tr. 21).
Additionally, the ALJ accorded some weight to the opinion of the State agency medical
consultant, who stated that the claimant “could perform a reduced range of light work that included
standing and walking for two hours and occasionally pushing and pulling with the left lower
extremity.” (Id.). The same opinion also stated that Plaintiff could sit for roughly six hours in a
day. (Tr. 85-86). Such evaluating experts are “highly qualified . . . in Social Security disability

evaluation,” 20 C.F.R. § 416.913a(b)(1), even if the ALJ did find that the evidence supported more
substantial restrictions on Plaintiff.
Here, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s alleged limitations considering all the relevant
evidence and properly made a legal determination of a RFC. Because the ALJ properly performed
his duty of determining the degree to which those allegations are supported by the record,
Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ’s analysis of the alleged limitations was inadequate is without
merit. It is the burden of the claimant to demonstrate how his medical impairments impair his
functioning. See Plummer v. Astrue, No. 5:11-cv-00006, 2011 WL 7938431, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Sept.
26, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:11-CV-00006-RLV, 2012 WL 1858844

(W.D.N.C. May 22, 2012), aff'd, 487 F. App'x 795 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The claimant bears the burden
of providing evidence establishing the degree to which her impairments limit her RFC.”) (citations
omitted). Considering the ALJ found nothing in the record to suggest an inability to ambulate or
to grasp and manipulate objects, this Court finds that the ALJ’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence.
With regards to Plaintiff’s obesity, the Court finds the ALJ’s consideration proper. SSR
02-1p instructs adjudicators to consider the effects of obesity not only under the listings but also
when assessing a claim at other steps of the sequential evaluation process, including when
assessing an individual's residual functional capacity. See SSR 02–01p, 2002 WL 34686281
(S.S.A.). The ALJ did, in fact, consider and address Plaintiff’s obesity in his written decision. (Tr.
19, 21-22). The ALJ stated that he considered and assessed the functional effects of obesity
combined with other impairments not only under the listings, but when he assessed the RFC (Tr.
19). Importantly, Plaintiff failed to allege or produce evidence indicating how his obesity worsened
his other impairments or restricted his ability to work beyond those limitations included in the

RFC. The ALJ noted that despite Plaintiff’s obesity, the record indicated that Plaintiff’s walking
ability was not limited, and that he had full strength and motion in his extremities. (Tr. 20-21).
Plaintiff cites to Padgett v. Astrue in support of his contention, but his reliance on the case
is misguided. (Pl.’s Br. at 21). In that case, the court remanded for “more specific findings with
regards to Plaintiff’s obesity.” Padgett v. Astrue, No. 7:11-CV-105-FL, 2012 WL 1884700, at *3
(E.D.N.C. May 2, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 7:11-CV-105-FL, 2012 WL
1884696 (E.D.N.C. May 23, 2012). However, the ALJ in that case did not consider the plaintiff’s
obesity in any capacity, a point conceded by the defendant. That distinguishes Padgett from the
instant case: the ALJ in this decision stated that though Plaintiff was obese, no evidence was

demonstrated that showed it further hindered his ability to walk or to grasp and manipulate objects.
Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in his analysis of Plaintiff’s obesity, and this assignment of error
is without merit.
Last, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of his treating nurse
practitioner. Kenyon Draper, NP-C, APRN, found that Plaintiff’s “chronic low back pain with
lumbar radiculopathy” would “permanently prevent him from work for at least 20 hours per week.”
(Pl.’s Br. at 25). The ALJ gave little weight to this opinion, stating that it is “conclusory and does
not provide a function-by-function analysis explaining what the claimant is able to do or why he
is unable to work.” (Tr. 21-22).
“The Social Security Administration does not consider nurse practitioners to be acceptable
medical sources.” Ward v. Berryhill, No. 5:17-CV-00068-GCM, 2018 WL 6681201, at *2
(W.D.N.C. Dec. 19, 2018) (citation and quotations omitted). Instead, nurse practitioners are
“considered to be other sources.” Martindale v. Astrue, No. 1:09-CV-466, 2011 WL 1103770, at
*5 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 24, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:09-CV-466, 2011 WL

1060975 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 23, 2011) (quotations omitted). Plaintiffs are permitted to submit
evidence from other sources to show the severity of their impairments and ability to work. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1513(d). The ALJ should look to several factors when weighing these opinions,
including: the length of the treatment relationship, the frequency of examinations, the opinion’s
consistency with the record, whether the opinion is adequately supported by presented, relevant
evidence, if the source adequately explains the opinion, and whether the source’s area of expertise
relates to the claimant’s impairment. Martindale, 2011 WL 1103770, at *6 (citations omitted).
Generally, the ALJ “should explain the weight given to opinions from these sources . . . [to] allow[]
a claimant or subsequent reviewer to follow the [ALJ’s] reasoning.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2).

Though phrased clumsily, the ALJ considered the extent to which Nurse Draper’s opinion
was supported by evidence within his report and found this support lacking. The ALJ noted that
Nurse Draper “does not . . . explain[] what the claimant is able to do or why he is unable to work.”
(Tr. 21-22). While Plaintiff is correct that the “function-by-function analysis” is not required of
treating opinions, it remains the case that the ALJ found Nurse Draper’s conclusion unsupported
and unconvincing, an evaluation the ALJ was at liberty to draw.
Beyond that analysis, Plaintiff is correct in noting that the ALJ did not address any other
factors to explain the weight allotted to Nurse Draper’s opinion. (Pl.’s Br. at 25). However, such
error is harmless. A court should not remand for error if the ALJ would not have reached a different
conclusion notwithstanding the error. See, e.g., Mickles v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 918, 921 (4th Cir.
1994). The ALJ still relied considerably on the findings in the report, findings inconsistent with
the report’s conclusion. The ALJ cited Nurse Draper’s report to note that Plaintiff is non-compliant
with his medicine and diet, has no limitation on his ability to walk, grasp, or handle objects, and
can drive and work on automobiles. (Tr. 21-22). The report cited also notes that Plaintiff has no

upper extremity complaints and can move his extremities well. (Tr. 461, 464).
A determination that the claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” is solely within the
purview of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(1). Considering the ALJ’s heavy reliance
on the findings in Nurse Draper’s report, and the fact that such findings appear inconsistent with
Nurse Draper’s conclusion, the Court finds the ALJ’s error harmless.
V. Conclusion
The undersigned has carefully reviewed the decision of the ALJ, the transcript of
proceedings, Plaintiff’s motion and brief, the Commissioner’s responsive pleading, and Plaintiff’s
assignments of error. Review of the entire record reveals that the decision of the ALJ is supported

by substantial evidence. See Richardson v. Perales, supra; Hays v. Sullivan, supra. Finding that
there was “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion,” Richardson v. Perales, supra, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be
denied, the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted, and the decision of
the Commissioner will be affirmed.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that
(1) the decision of the Commissioner, denying the relief sought by Plaintiff, is
AFFIRMED;
(2) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED;
(3) the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; and
(4) this action is DISMISSED.

Signed: July 10, 2019
Lbal tbh
Graham C. Mullen Le
United States District Judge gt

15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10254791. Public record. Not legal advice.