# MANIS v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · April 24, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10254520

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** April 24, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

JOE MANIS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF )
AGRICULTURE; THOMAS JAMES )
VILSACK, in his official ) 1:24-cv-175
capacity as the Secretary )
of Agriculture; MICHAEL )
WATSON, in his official )
capacity as Administrator )
of the Animal and Plant )
Health Inspection Service, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge
Before this court is a Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction with Request for Oral Argument
filed by Plaintiff Joe Manis. (Doc. 7.) Plaintiff requests that
Defendants the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”),
Thomas Vilsack, United States Secretary of Agriculture, and
Michael Watson, Administrator of the USDA’s Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”) be enjoined from enforcing
the Horse Protection Act (“HPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1821 et seq.,
against Plaintiff through the USDA’s administrative adjudication
process. For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s motion for
preliminary injunction will be denied.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is “a retired North Carolina businessman who has
been involved with Tennessee Walking Horses for the last 50
years, active in the North Carolina Walking Horse Association
(‘NCWHA’) for the last 30 years, and who owns walking horses,
one of which is regularly shown in competitions across the
southeast.” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 1.) On May 19, 2023, the USDA’s

APHIS filed a complaint against Plaintiff “alleging that he
violated the HPA by allowing the entry of a horse he owned into
a Virginia horse show while the horse was allegedly sore.”1 (Id.
¶ 68.)
When the assigned Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) proposed
scheduling a hearing on the matter, Plaintiff “moved to dismiss
on the grounds that the USDA’s internal adjudication process is
unconstitutionally structured.” (Id. ¶¶ 71–72.) Plaintiff also
requested that any hearing before the ALJ be postponed in light
of his motion to dismiss “and the anticipated filing of this
Complaint.” (Id. ¶ 74.) The ALJ declined to issue a stay in the

1 Though Plaintiff denies this allegation, (see Compl.
(Doc. 1) ¶ 70), the merits of the USDA’s complaint against
Plaintiff are not at issue in this case, (see id. ¶ 97
(“[Plaintiff’s] constitutional challenges are irrelevant to the
merits of the allegation against him.”)).
proceedings, (id. ¶¶ 75–76), and Plaintiff filed his Complaint
in this court alleging the same claims, (see generally id.).
“In sum,” Plaintiff alleges that the USDA’s “enforcement
scheme subjects [him] to an unconstitutional hearing,
(1) without a jury as required by the Seventh Amendment, (2) in
violation of Article III of the Constitution, (3) before an ALJ,
who is improperly supervised, and whose dual-layer tenure
protection violates the separation of powers, and (4) whose
decision can only be appealed to a Judicial Officer who is

improperly wielding principal-officer power.” (Id. ¶ 94.)
A. Seventh Amendment Jury Requirement and Article III
Violation
Plaintiff contends that “[t]he pending allegation against
[him] is effectively a suit at common law with a legal remedy
for which he is entitled to a jury trial that is not available
in the USDA adjudication process.” (Id. ¶ 88.) Plaintiff also
argues that “[i]f a statutory claim ultimately adjudicates a
private right, it must be adjudicated by an Article III court.”
(Id. ¶ 171.) This is because, in Plaintiff’s view, “[t]he HPA
effectively codifies private right claims for fraud and breach
of contract,” therefore that statute must be “adjudicated by an
Article III court.” (Id. ¶¶ 171, 173.)
B. Improperly Supervised ALJs with Unconstitutional Dual-
Layer Removal Protection
The USDA ALJs, who are appointed by the Secretary of the
USDA, “make the initial decision in each adjudication.” (Id.
¶¶ 47–48 (citing 7 C.F.R. § 2.27(a)(1)).) ALJs “are empowered to
rule upon motions and requests, conduct conferences and
hearings, administer oaths and affirmations, issue subpoenas,
hear oral argument on facts or law, and take other significant
actions during the course of the administrative hearing.” (Id.
¶ 52 (citing 7 C.F.R. § 1.144(c)).) Once the initial
adjudication process is complete, the ALJs “issue an initial
decision that ‘become[s] final without further proceedings
unless there is an appeal to the Secretary,’” who, as explained
in more detail below, has delegated his authority to hear such
appeals to the Judicial Officer. (Id. ¶¶ 53–54 (citing 7 C.F.R.
§ 2.27; 5 U.S.C. § 557; 7 C.F.R. § 1.145(a)).)

Plaintiff argues that USDA ALJs “enjoy two layers of
protection from removal by the President,” which violates the
separation of powers. (Id. ¶ 49.) ALJs “can be removed ‘only for
good cause established and determined by the Merit Systems
Protection Board’ (‘MSPB’).” (Id. ¶ 50 (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 7521(a)).) In turn, the members of the MSPB may only “be
removed by the President . . . for inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office.” (Id. ¶ 51 (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 1202(d)).) Plaintiff argues that “[t]he President’s ability to
remove executive officers is central to the President’s
executive power,” yet he cannot exercise this power over ALJs
because both ALJs and the MSPB can only be removed for cause.
(See id. ¶¶ 130–39.)
C. ALJs’ Decisions Can Only Be Appealed to the Judicial
Officer, Who Improperly Wields Principal-Officer Power
Under the 1940 Schwellenbach Act, the Secretary of the USDA
“delegated his authority to impose civil penalties for
violations of the HPA to USDA’s Judicial Officer, a position
created by the Secretary.” (Id. ¶¶ 44–45 (citing 7 U.S.C.
§ 2204-2; 7 C.F.R. § 2.35; 10 Fed. Reg. 13769 (Nov. 9, 1945)).)
“In an appeal of an initial decision by an ALJ, the Judicial
Officer reviews the parties’ briefs, presides over oral
argument, and issues a final decision for the Department.” (Id.
¶ 55 (citing 7 C.F.R. §§ 1.145, 2.35(a)).) Therefore, through

this delegation, “[t]he Judicial Officer exercises the final
decision-making power of USDA in the adjudication.” (Id. ¶ 56
(citing 7 C.F.R. § 2.35).)
However, the Judicial Officer “was not appointed by the
President” or “confirmed by the Senate,” and Plaintiff alleges
that the Judicial Officer “does not hold any office created by
law.” (Id. ¶¶ 57–59.) “No statute or regulation permits the
Secretary to affirm, reverse, or otherwise review the decision
of the Judicial Officer,” and though the Secretary can revoke
his delegation to the Judicial Officer, he cannot do so
retroactively. (Id. ¶¶ 61, 63 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2204-3).) “As a
result, the Secretary is prohibited from reviewing, affirming,
modifying, or reversing the Judicial Officer’s decision after it
is made.” (Id. ¶ 64.)
Plaintiff alleges that this structure violates the
Appointments Clause because the Judicial Officer “functions as a
principal officer” by exercising “the final decision-making

authority in USDA’s adjudications,” without being “appointed by
the President and confirmed by the Senate as required by the
Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 2, cl.
2.” (Id. ¶¶ 66–67.)
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on March 1, 2024. (Compl.
(Doc. 1).) On March 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with
Request for Oral Argument, (Pl.’s Mot. for a TRO and Prelim.
Inj. with Request for Oral Argument (“Pl.’s Mot.”) (Doc. 7)),
and a brief in support, (Br. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for TRO and
Prelim. Inj. with Request for Oral Argument (“Pl.’s Br.”) (Doc.

8)). The court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order on March 27, 2024. (Doc. 16.) Defendants
responded to Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction on
March 27, 2024, (Defs.’ Mem. in Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim.
Inj. (“Defs.’ Resp.”) (Doc. 18)), and Plaintiff replied on April
2, 2024, (Reply in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“Pl.’s
Reply”) (Doc. 19)). The court heard oral argument from the
parties on April 17, 2024, after which it took Plaintiff’s
motion under advisement. The motion is now ripe for ruling.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Preliminary injunctive relief and TROs are not remedies

‘awarded as of right,’ but ‘[a]s a matter of equitable
discretion[.]’” Scottsdale Cap. Advisors Corp. v. Fin. Indus.
Regul. Auth., Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 88, 100 (D.D.C. 2023)
(quoting Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. 155, 158 (2018)). “A
plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish” four
prongs: “that [1] he is likely to succeed on the merits, that
[2] he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that [3] the balance of equities tips in his
favor, and that [4] an injunction is in the public interest.”
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
“Courts considering whether to impose preliminary injunctions
must separately consider each Winter factor.” Di Biase v. SPX

Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017). “A preliminary
injunction is an extraordinary remedy intended to protect the
status quo and prevent irreparable harm during the pendency of
the lawsuit,” and the moving party bears the burden of “clearly
establish[ing] entitlement to the relief sought.” Id.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction “need not
establish a ‘certainty of success,’ but must make a clear
showing that he is likely to succeed.” Di Biase, 872 F.3d at 230

(citation omitted). “[T]he burden placed upon Plaintiff[] to
show that each requirement of a preliminary injunction is met is
high. Consequently, merely ‘providing sufficient factual
allegations to meet the [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure]
12(b)(6) standard of Twombly and Iqbal’ does not show a
likelihood of success on the merits.” J.O.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 338 F.R.D. 33, 60 (D. Md. 2020) (citation
omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that the “USDA’s in-house adjudication
process imposes a here-and-now constitutional injury on
[Plaintiff] — namely, (1) the absence of a principal officer to

issue a final decision in the case and supervise the inferior
officer ALJs, (2) the lack of ALJs properly accountable to the
President, (3) the absence of a jury as required by the Seventh
Amendment, and (4) the unlawful attempt to adjudicate private
rights outside of an Article III court.” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 89.)
1. The USDA Judicial Officer Exercises Principal
Officer Power Without a Constitutional Appointment
to Do So
“The Appointments Clause requires that the President ‘shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint . . . [principal] Officers of the United
States.’”” In re Palo Alto Networks, Inc., 44 F.4th 1369, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting Art. II, § 2, cl. 2). “Thus, ‘[the
President] may be assisted in carrying out [executive]
responsibility by officers nominated by him and confirmed by the
Senate, as well as by other officers not appointed in that
manner but whose work . . . must be directed and supervised by
an officer who has been.’” Id. (quoting United States v.
Arthrex, 594 U.S. 1, 6 (2021)).
Plaintiff argues that the Judicial Officer
unconstitutionally exercises principal officer power without a
proper appointment under the Appointments Clause because “[t]he
Secretary cannot review the Judicial Officer’s decisions because
of the statutory bar on the retroactive revocation of a
delegation.” (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 8) at 6 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2204-
3).)2 Therefore, the Judicial Officer is not supervised by a
principal officer, so the Judicial Officer wields principal
officer power without a proper appointment in violation of the
Appointments Clause. (Id.) However, Defendant argues that the
Judicial Officer is sufficiently supervised by the Secretary and
“is an inferior officer because his delegation may be revoked,
his decisions are subject to the Secretary’s review, and he may
be terminated at will.” (Def.’s Resp. (Doc. 18) at 8.)
In Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997), the

Supreme Court enumerated the factors to be considered in
evaluating whether an officer is principal or inferior: “whether
(1) the officer is bound to follow regulations promulgated by an
agency head, (2) the officer can be removed at will and without
cause by the agency head, and (3) the agency head can review the
decisions of the officer.” McConnell v. USDA, 4:23-cv-24, 2023
WL 5963782, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 13, 2023) (citing Edmond,
520 U.S. at 661).
Despite Plaintiff’s assertion that the Secretary has no
control over the Judicial Officer, there are certain mechanisms
of control in place:

2 All citations in this Memorandum Opinion and Order to
documents filed with the court refer to the page numbers located
at the bottom right-hand corner of the documents as they appear
on CM/ECF.
The Secretary may promulgate regulations which the
Judicial Officer must follow. 15 U.S.C. § 1828; 7
C.F.R. § 1.131 . . . . Furthermore, the Judicial
Officer is removable at will, and the Secretary may
revoke his delegation of authority to the Judicial
Officer at any time. 7 U.S.C. § 2204-2.

McConnell, 2023 WL 5963782, at *3. Plaintiff argues that because
this delegation cannot be revoked retroactively, and the
Secretary cannot review decisions already made by the Judicial
Officer, the Secretary does not adequately supervise the
Judicial Officer. (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 8) at 13–14.) However, “the
fact that the Secretary cannot review the Judicial Officer’s
decisions does not defeat inferior-officer status” because the
Edmond analysis requires examination of all three factors, not
solely whether the Secretary can review the Judicial Officer’s
decisions.3 See McConnell, 2023 WL 5963782, at *4 (citing
Varnadore v. Secretary of Labor, 141 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1998)).
Though the Secretary cannot retroactively override the
Judicial Officer’s decisions, which are final decisions of the
USDA, the Secretary exercises control over the Judicial Officer

3 Plaintiff argues that under Arthrex, “[t]he test for
distinguishing an inferior officer from a principal officer is
supervision.” (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 8) at 11 (citing United States v.
Arthrex, 594 U.S. 1, 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1980 (2021)).) However,
the Arthrex Court specifically stated: “we do not attempt to
‘set forth an exclusive criterion for distinguishing between
principal and inferior officers for Appointments Clause
purposes.’” Arthrex, 594 U.S. at 23. Instead, the Court
“reaffirm[ed] and appl[ied] the rule from Edmond.” Id. at 27.
both in his ability to promulgate regulations the Judicial
Officer must follow as well as remove the Judicial Officer from
his position should the Secretary choose to do so. These
restrictions on the Judicial Officer are significant, and do not
appear to permit the Judicial Officer to have the sort of
unfettered discretion typical of a principal officer. The court
declines to assume, based on the limited4 record at this stage,
that these mechanisms are insufficient to render the Judicial
Officer’s decisions actions that may be undertaken only by a

principal officer duly appointed under the Appointments Clause.
Accordingly, Plaintiff does not demonstrate a likelihood of
success on the merits of his claim that the Judicial Officer
unconstitutionally exercises principal officer power in
violation of the Appointments Clause.

4 By “limited record,” this court is referring to the
absence of an in-depth recounting of the applicable regulations
by either party. The Government points to regulations such as 7
C.F.R. § 2.12, 7 C.F.R. § 1.132, 9 C.F.R. §§ 11.1 et seq., and
60 Fed. Reg. 8446 (Feb. 14, 1995), (Defs.’ Resp. (Doc. 18) at
9), all of which, when considered in tandem with 7 U.S.C.
§ 2204-2, suggest there may be adequate supervision even though
the Judicial Officer’s decision is final agency action. For
purposes of a preliminary injunction, this court finds that
Plaintiff has established a plausible, and perhaps possible,
chance of success but falls short of establishing a likelihood
of success on the merits.
2. The USDA Judicial Officer is an Improperly Appointed
Inferior Officer and His Status as an Inferior
Officer Leaves USDA ALJs without Adequate Principal
Officer Supervision
Plaintiff argues that, even if the Judicial Officer is an
inferior, rather than a principal officer, “he still cannot
exercise that authority because Congress did not create an
office for the Judicial Officer.” (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 8) at 15.)
Plaintiff further contends that “if the Judicial Officer is only
an inferior officer, . . . [t]he ALJs, whom the Judicial Officer
supervises, lack oversight from a properly appointed officer.”
(Id. at 17.)
a. The Creation of the Judicial Officer
Plaintiff contends that the Judicial Officer’s office is
not established by law in violation of the Appointments Clause
because “the Judicial Officer holds no office established by
Congress.” (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 8) at 15.)
The USDA Secretary is authorized by 7 U.S.C. § 2204-2 to
delegate “the whole or any part of any regulatory function which
the Secretary is . . . required or authorized to perform” if the
Secretary “deems that the delegation . . . will result in the
more expeditious discharge of the duties of the Department of
Agriculture.” 7 U.S.C. § 2204-2. The Secretary is authorized to
both designate “officers or employees” to receive delegations of
his authority, and to “assign appropriate titles to such
officers or employees.” Id. Pursuant to this statutory
authorization, the Secretary created the office of Judicial
Officer to “act as final deciding officer” in several enumerated
adjudicatory proceedings conducted by the USDA. See 7 C.F.R. §
2.35; see also 7 C.F.R. § 2.4.
Though Congress itself did not explicitly create the office
of Judicial Officer, it did explicitly grant the Secretary
authority to do so. 7 U.S.C. § 2204-2. The fact that the
Judicial Officer’s position was created by the Secretary through

regulations pursuant to a statutory authorization, rather than
directly through a statute, does not mean that the Judicial
Officer’s office was not statutorily authorized. In fact, as
Plaintiff states in his brief, the Appointments Clause itself
“permits inferior officers to be appointed by a head of
department if Congress ‘vest[ed]’ that authority in him ‘by
Law.’” (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 8) at 16 (citing U.S. Const. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 2).) It is not clear to the court how the appointment
process for the Judicial Officer described above fails to
comport with the Appointments Clause. Therefore, Plaintiff does
not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his
claim that the Judicial Officer cannot be an inferior officer

because his position was not established by law.
b. ALJ Supervision
Plaintiff argues that if the Judicial Officer is an
inferior officer, the USDA ALJs are not properly supervised
because they are supervised by the Judicial Officer, an inferior
officer, rather than the Secretary himself, a principal officer.
He asserts that because “[t]he Judicial Officer is the exclusive
avenue for review of USDA ALJs’ initial decisions,” the ALJs are
not adequately supervised by a principal officer. (Pl.’s Br.
(Doc. 8) at 17.) However, as discussed above, the Secretary can

revoke his delegation of authority to the Judicial Officer at
will at any time, and the Secretary can also take on the
Judicial Officer’s authority without revoking that delegation.
“This means that the Secretary can step in and review the
decisions of an ALJ before it is reviewed by the Judicial
Officer,” which is a powerful method of supervision. McConnell,
2023 WL 59637, at *5 (citing Fleming v. USDA, 987 F.3d 1093,
1103 (D.C. Cir. 2021)). Therefore, the Secretary “has
considerable influence over whether an ALJ’s decision becomes
the final decision of the agency,” because he may, “at his
election, step in and act as final appeals officer in any case.”
Fleming, 987 F.3d at 1103. Additionally, as Defendants explain,

the USDA ALJs “must follow the Secretary’s procedural and
substantive regulations.” (Defs.’ Resp. (Doc. 18) at 13 (citing
Fleming, 987 F.3d at 1103).)
Plaintiff contends that “[t]he Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment does not permit the Secretary to intervene at
will to review an ALJ’s decision himself.” (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 8)
at 18 (citing Utica Packing Co. v. Block, 781 F.2d 71, 78 (6th
Cir. 1986).) In Utica Packing, the Secretary of Agriculture
replaced a judicial officer after the judicial officer had
already rendered a final decision in a case, then the Secretary

petitioned the judicial officer’s replacement for
reconsideration of the case to achieve an outcome favorable to
the Secretary. 781 F.2d at 75–78. The facts and circumstances in
Utica Packing were so unique that the court does not find that
case to stand for the general proposition that a party’s due
process rights are violated each time the Secretary chooses to
exercise the authority delegated to the Judicial Officer.
Further, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that “the
Appointments Clause was intended to prevent unappointed
officials from wielding too much authority, not to guarantee
procedural rights to litigants.” In re Palo Alto Networks, Inc.,
44 F.4th 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting Piano Factory

Grp., Inc. v. Schiedmayer Celesta GmbH, 11 F.4th 1363, 1374
(Fed. Cir. 2021)). Accordingly, because the ALJs are “at some
level [] subject to the direction and supervision of an officer
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate,”
Arthrex, 594 U.S. at 27, Plaintiff does not demonstrate a
likelihood of success on the merits of this claim.
3. The USDA ALJs’ Removal Protection
Plaintiff argues that “USDA ALJs enjoy two layers of tenure
protection through the MSPB. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a); 5 U.S.C.
§ 1202(d). But they ‘exercise significant executive power’ such
that the President’s removal authority cannot be restricted by

two layers of tenure protection.” (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 8) at 20
(citing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561
U.S. 477, 514 (2010)).) Defendants argue that Free Enterprise
should not be applied here because that case dealt with a highly
unique set of facts, (Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 18) at 15), which led the
Court to clarify that its holding “does not address that subset
of independent agency employees who serve as administrative law
judges,” Free Enter., 561 U.S. at 507 n.10.
As the Fourth Circuit has explained, there is a circuit
split as to whether the removal scheme for ALJs is
constitutional — the Ninth Circuit has declared the scheme
constitutional, while the Fifth Circuit has deemed it

unconstitutional. See K & R Contractors, LLC v. Keene, 86 F.4th
135, 148 (4th Cir. 2023). The Fourth Circuit did not ultimately
provide a resolution to the question of whether a scheme in
which ALJs can only be removed for cause, as determined by the
MSPB, whose members can also only be removed for cause, is
constitutional. See K & R Contractors, 86 F.4th at 148–49.
However, the “good cause” standard applicable to ALJs includes
“all matters which affect the ability and fitness of the ALJ to
perform the duties of office.” Abrams v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 703
F.3d 538, 543 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (deferring to agency’s reasonable
construction of “good cause” under Chevron deference). In turn,

a member of the MSPB can be removed for “inefficiency, neglect
of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d). These
restrictions on removal do not appear to “tie[] the President’s
hands and hinder[] his control over his subordinates.” Decker
Coal Co. v. Pehringer, 8 F.4th 1123, 1133 (9th Cir. 2021).
Because of inconsistencies in the caselaw and the lack of
available precedent, Plaintiff does not demonstrate that he is
likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that the ALJs’
removal mechanism is unconstitutional.
4. Plaintiff’s Right to a Trial by Jury in an Article
III Court
Plaintiff argues that the “HPA violation [he] is alleged to
have committed is essentially a common-law claim involving
private rights for which [he] is entitled to a jury trial.”
(Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 8) at 20.) This is, according to Plaintiff,
because “[a]ny claims in federal court that seek legal remedies
such as civil monetary penalties require a jury trial,” and “the
HPA empowers APHIS to seek and collect civil monetary penalties
— a legal remedy — through USDA’s in-house adjudication
process.” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 149, 150 (citing Tull v. United
States, 481 U.S. 412, 418–23 (1987); 15 U.S.C. § 1825(b)).)
Defendant responds that “[u]nder the public-rights framework,
USDA adjudications under the HPA involve public rights that
Congress has created and, thus, are beyond the scope of the

Seventh Amendment.” (Defs.’ Resp. (Doc. 18) at 18.)
The Seventh Amendment states that “[i]n Suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.” U.S. Const.
amend. VII. However, “when Congress properly assigns a matter to
adjudication in a non-Article III tribunal, ‘the Seventh
Amendment poses no independent bar to the adjudication of that
action by a nonjury factfinder.’” Oil States Energy Servs. LLC
v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 584 U.S. 325, 345 (2018) (quoting
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53–54 (1989)).
That said, “[a] jury trial may be required for claims created by
statute when the action is ‘analogous to “Suits at common

law.”’” McConnell, 2023 WL 59637, at *6 (quoting Tull v. United
States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987)).
“A statutory claim is analogous to a common law claim if:
(1) it is sufficiently similar to ‘18th-century actions brought
in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of
law and equity,’ and (2) it provides a legal (monetary) remedy.”
Id. (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 417–18). Plaintiff argues that an
HPA enforcement proceeding is not only “an action for civil
monetary penalties, but it is also effectively a common law
fraud claim” because “[o]wners of horses are prohibited from
allowing one of their horses to be entered into a horse show

while sore to prevent owners from gaining an unfair advantage in
the competition and harming fellow competitors.” (Pl.’s Br.
(Doc. 8) at 24–25.) However, this court concurs with the court
in McConnell that the HPA is not analogous to common-law fraud,
but is instead “a distinct cause of action created by Congress
and properly assigned to a federal agency to administer within
its area of expertise.” McConnell, 2023 WL 59637, at *6. This is
because the HPA “does not require any false statements or
misrepresentation, nor does it require any injury to a third
party. Simply because it is possible to commit both common law
fraud and violate the HPA at the same time does not mean the
claims are analogous.” Id.

Further, even if the HPA can be analogized to a common-law
fraud claim, “the ‘public-rights’ doctrine may still allow the
claim to be heard before an administrative agency without a
jury.” McConnell, 2023 WL 59637, at *6 (citing Granfinanciera,
492 U.S. at 42, 51). The Court in Granfinanciera held that “when
Congress creates new statutory ‘public rights,’ it may assign
their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury
trial would be incompatible, without violating the Seventh
Amendment’s injunction that jury trial is to be “preserved” in
“suits at common law.”’” Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 51. “Public
rights” actions, as opposed to disputes between private

citizens, “aris[e] between the Government and persons subject to
its authority in connection with the performance of the
constitutional functions of the executive or legislative
departments.” Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 489 (2011).
Here, the USDA’s enforcement of the HPA “clearly involves
statutory public rights.” Sasser v. Administrator, U.S. E.P.A.,
990 F.2d 127, 130 (4th Cir. 1993). While the HPA does not have a
clear congressional declaration of purpose like the Clean Water
Act at issue in Sasser did, the HPA statute is clear that its
goals were to prevent “the movement, showing, exhibition, or
sale of sore horses in intrastate commerce” which “adversely
affects and burdens interstate and foreign commerce,” and that

“regulation under this chapter by the Secretary is appropriate
to prevent and eliminate” these burdens. See 15 U.S.C. §
1822(3), (5).5 These goals reflect Congress’s “authority in
connection with the performance of the constitutional functions
of the executive or legislative departments,” see Stern, 564
U.S. at 489, rather than legislation regarding typical disputes
between private citizens.
Plaintiff does not carry his burden of clearly
demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim
that HPA violations must be adjudicated through a jury trial in
an Article III court.6

Because Plaintiff fails to show a likelihood of success on
the merits of each of his claims, this court will not evaluate
the remaining Winter factors.

5 The USDA’s HPA Fact Sheet states that “USDA has two goals
in administering the Horse Protection Act: eliminate the cruel
and inhumane practice of soring,” and “promote fair
competition.” USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service,
The Horse Protection Act, https://www.aphis.usda.gov/sites/
default/files/bro-horse-protection-act.pdf (last accessed Apr.
22, 2024).
6 “The same private rights analysis for the availability of
a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment is applicable to
whether Congress can ‘assign adjudication of that cause of
action to a non-Article III tribunal.’” (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 170
(quoting Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 53).)
Vv. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion fora
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with
Reguest for Oral Argument, (Doc. 7), is DENIED.
This the 24th day of April, 2024.

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ls Akinun Lb. Webi, Vi
United States District Jyape

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10254520. Public record. Not legal advice.