# BYRD v. NC DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH and HUMAN SERVICES

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · February 14, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10254504

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** February 14, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10254504

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “[Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allow[s] Congress to abrogate [Eleventh Amendment] immunity”
- noting that “prospective patients [of a drug treatment facility] satisfied . . . definition of disability under the ADA”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
AUSTIN WAYNE BYRD, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:23CV320
)
NC DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH )
AND HUMAN SERVICES, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge on Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District
Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Docket Entry 1) (the
“Application”), filed in conjunction with his pro se Complaint
(Docket Entry 2). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned
will grant the Application for the limited purpose of recommending
dismissal of this action.
RELEVANT STANDARDS
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892
[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee
that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because
his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the
costs.” Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th
Cir. 1995) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Dispensing with filing fees, however, [is] not without its
problems. . . . In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis
d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining
relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.
Federal Med. Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004). To
address this concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that
“the [C]ourt shall dismiss the case at any time if the [C]ourt
determines that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A plaintiff “fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted” id., when the complaint does not “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face,’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are
merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of
the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Id. In other words, “the tenet that a court must

accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the

2
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id.!
BACKGROUND
Asserting claims under Section 1983 via the Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) (see Docket
Entry 2 at 3),* Plaintiff initiated this action against the North
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (“Defendant”) (see
id. at 2). According to Plaintiff’s Complaint:
“[Defendant] denied [Plaintiff] benefits on multiple occasions
due to a drug charge in Georgia.” (Id. at 4.)° Specifically,

' Although “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine
Twombly’s requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and
conclusions,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (dismissing pro se
complaint); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Off. of the
Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A pro se complaint
- . . ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ But even a pro se complainant must
plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than
the mere possibility of misconduct.’” (first quoting Erickson, 551
U.S. at 94; then Igbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).
* Docket Entry page citations utilize the CM/ECF footer’s
pagination.
> For legibility reasons, this Memorandum Opinion uses
standardized capitalization in all quotations from Plaintiff’s
materials.

[Plaintiff] applied for food stamps in March of 2019
while at the TROSA Residential Substance Abuse Program in
Durham[, North Carolina,] and was denied
[benefits]. . . . [Plaintiff] applied for the
Supplemental Nutritition [sic] Assistance Program to try
to receive benefits and was told [he] was not eligible
due to an out of state drug charge. [Defendant] informed
[Plaintiff] that a Class G or higher drug related
conviction is grounds for denial. . . . Denial due to
any possession or possession with intent to sell/deliver
drug charge is a violation of constitutional rights and
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.
Substance possession is the direct result of a disability
listed in the ADA of 1990.
(Id.) Additionally, the Complaint asserts:
[The] ADA of 1990 lists a substance abuse addiction as a
disability. Not providing food and nutrition benefits to
someone who has a drug charge is discrimination. A drug
charge is a direct and unfortunate result of a person
with a disability. Using their disability against them
is a violation of constitutional rights.
(Id. at 5.)
The Complaint requests relief in the form of $100,000 in
damages and an injunction providing for “any North Carolina law[’s]
revis[ion] to allow people convicted of any class felony drug
charge to receive food and nutrition benefits.” (Id.)
DISCUSSION
I. Section 1983 Claims
To state a claim for relief under Section 1983, Plaintiff must
allege factual matter showing “that [he was] deprived of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that
the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50
4
(1999); see also Jones v. Chandrasuwan, 820 F.3d 685, 691 (4th Cir.
2016) (“Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights,
but rather provides a method for vindicating federal constitutional
and statutory rights.”). To the extent the Complaint seeks relief
under Section 1983 for violations of the ADA (rather than the
United States Constitution), such claim merges with the private
cause of action under the ADA. Accordingly, this Memorandum
Opinion first analyzes any constitutional claim under Section 1983
and then addresses relief under the ADA.
A. Damages Under Section 1983
Because “Congress did not exercise its power to abrogate a
state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,” Coffin v. South Carolina Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 562 F.
Supp. 579, 585 (D.S.C. 1983), “a State is not a person within the
meaning of § 1983,” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 64 (1989). Accordingly, as a state agency, Defendant does
not constitute a person under Section 1983. See Will, 491 U.S. at

71. For that reason, Plaintiff fails to state a proper claim for
damages against Defendant under Section 1983.
Nor could Plaintiff remedy this deficiency by naming the
official in charge of Defendant in his or her official capacity,4
because “a suit against a state official in his or her official

4 The Complaint alleges no facts that could support an
individual capacity suit against any official.
5
capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit
against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from a
suit against the State itself.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
“[I]t follows that state officials acting in their official
capacities cannot be sued for damages under [Section 1983].” Allen
v. Cooper, No. 1:19cv794, 2019 WL 6255220, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 22,
2019).
The Court thus should dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983
claim(s) for damages for failure to state a claim under Section
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
B. Injunctive Relief Under Section 1983
Unlike claims for damages, “the Eleventh Amendment permits
suits for prospective injunctive relief against [state agencies
through] state officials acting in violation of federal law.” Frew
ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004). “Plaintiff does
request [a] certain form[] of injunctive relief in his Complaint.
However, as discussed in further detail below, [the requested

relief is] not even [a] potentially viable request[].” Carroll v.
Dosier, No, 1:12cv1176, 2012 WL 7963126, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 13,
2012).
Plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief reaches far too
broadly. To the extent the Complaint requests anything beyond
injunctive relief specific to Plaintiff’s claims, “it is subject to
denial for exceeding the scope of Plaintiff’s Complaint.” Santiago
6
v. Southern Health Partners, No 1:15cv589, 2015 WL 8179617, at *1
(M.D.N.C. Dec 7, 2015). “Injunctive relief . . . must be tailored
to remedy the specific harm alleged.” Stormans, Inc. V. Selecky,
586 F.3d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009). In this case, Plaintiff asks
the Court to enjoin enforcement of “North Carolina law . .. to
allow people convicted of any class felony drug charge to receive
food and nutrition benefits.” (Docket Entry 2 at 5.) Defendant
denied Plaintiff “benefits on multiple occasions due to a drug
charge [in Georgia]” (id. at 4). Accordingly, the requested relief
goes “beyond the scope of the [C]lomplaint,” Church of Holy Light of
Queen v. Holder, 443 F. App’x 302, 303 (9th Cir. 2011), because it
requests relief that applies beyond Plaintiff’s individual
Situation.
Under the circumstances, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s
Section 1983 claim(s) against Defendant for “fail[ure] to state a
claim on which relief may be granted,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 (e) (2) (B) (ii). See PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co.,
639 F.3d 111, 128 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[The Fourth Circuit] will
vacate an injunction if it . . . does not carefully address only
the circumstances of the case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis added)).°

° To the extent the Court construed the Complaint to request
only injunctive relief for Plaintiff, the Complaint still fails to
show entitlement to relief because of the fatal deficiency noted in
Footnote Seven.

II. ADA Claims
The Complaint also alleges that Plaintiff applied for “food
stamps” and benefits from the “Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program,” but “[Defendant] denied [Plaintiff] benefits on multiple
occasions due to a drug charge [he incurred] in Georgia,” and this
denial violated his rights under the ADA. (Docket Entry 2 at 4.)
The Complaint characterizes “[s]ubstance possession [a]s the direct
result of [substance abuse addiction, which is a] disability listed
in the ADA.” (Id.)
A. Damages Under The ADA
An ADA claim for damages raises complex issues regarding
Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Eleventh Amendment states that
“[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted

against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend.
XI. This language generally bars suits against a state in federal
court without the state’s consent. See Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). This immunity
“applies not only to the state itself but extends also to state
agents and state instrumentalities . . . or stated otherwise to
arms of the State.” Zemedageghu v. Arthur, No. 1:15cv57, 2015 WL
1930539, at *7 (E.D. Va. Apr. 28, 2015) (internal quotation marks
and brackets omitted). In some instances, however, state agencies
8
remain “subject to suit if . . . Congress, acting under powers
granted to it in [S]ection [F]ive of the Fourteenth Amendment, has
clearly abrogated [their] immunity.” Id.; see also Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (holding that “[Section]
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allow[s] Congress to abrogate
[Eleventh Amendment] immunity”). To make this determination, the
Court “must resolve two predicate questions: first, whether
Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate that
immunity; and second, if it did, whether Congress acted pursuant to
a valid grant of constitutional authority.” Tennessee v. Lane, 541
U.S. 509, 517 (2004).
“The first question is well-settled.” Zemedageghu, 2015 WL
1930539, at *8. Title II of the ADA provides that “[a] State shall
not be immune under the [E]leventh [A]mendment to the Constitution
of the United States from an action in [a] Federal or State court
of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter.” 42
U.S.C. § 12202. Accordingly, “Congress unequivocally expressed its
intent under Title II to abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity.” Zemedageghu, 2015 WL 1930539, at *8.

The remaining question concerns “whether Congress enacted
Title II pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority,
i.e. the enforcement power in Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Id. The Supreme Court confirmed that Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment “authorizes Congress to create a cause of
9
action through which the citizen may vindicate his Fourteenth
Amendment rights.” United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158
(2006). “Insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for
damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the
Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign
immunity.” Id. at 159 (emphasis added). A determination of
whether Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity thus
requires a claim-by-claim analysis of: “(1) which aspects of
[Defendant’s] alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent
such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3)
insofar as such misconduct violated Title II but did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s purported abrogation
of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless
valid.” Id.
Accordingly, “[t]he first step of the Georgia inquiry requires
the [Court] to assess whether Defendant[’s] alleged conduct forms
the basis for a Title II claim.’” Holly Hill Nursing LLC v.
Padilla, No. 8:17cv3554, 2018 WL 5013826, at *8 (D. MD. Oct. 16,

2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Title II of “[t]he ADA[]
mandates that ‘no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.’” Davis v. Doe, No. 1:14cv373, 2014 WL 1835853, at *3
10
(M.D.N.C. May 8, 2014) (brackets omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132). “In order to establish a violation of Title II [of the
ADA], [Plaintiff] must allege that,” id., “(1) he has a disability,
(2) he is otherwise qualified to participate in the [public
benefit], and (3) he was excluded from the [public benefit] on the
basis of his disability,” Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health
Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 461 (4th Cir. 2012) (footnote omitted).
As to the first of these elements, “[u]nquestionably, drug
addiction constitutes an impairment under the ADA.” A Helping
Hand, LLC v. Baltimore Cnty., 515 F.3d 356, 367 (4th Cir. 2008);
see also Regional Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of
Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 46 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that “physical
or mental impairment includes drug addiction and alcoholism”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The Complaint does not allege
that Plaintiff ever received a diagnosis of substance abuse
addiction (see Docket Entry 2 at 1-6); however, the Complaint does
allege that he attended “TROSA Residential Substance Abuse Program”
in 2019 (id. at 4). Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations suffice to
demonstrate that, at the time of the benefits denial, he suffered
from “substance abuse addiction” under Title II of the ADA. See
Start, Inc. v. Baltimore Cnty., 295 F. Supp. 2d 569, 577 (D. Md.
2003) (noting that “prospective patients [of a drug treatment
facility] satisfied . . . definition of disability under the ADA”).

11

Next, Plaintiff must demonstrate “he is otherwise qualified to
participate in the [public benefit].” Halpern, 669 F.3d at 461.
Plaintiff qualifies to participate in the public benefit if he,
“without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or
practices, . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements for
the receipt of services . . . provided by a public entity.” 42
U.S.C. § 12131(2) (emphasis added). The federal statute
establishing eligibility requirements for food stamp benefits
states:
An individual convicted (under Federal or State law) of
any offense which is classified as a felony by the law of
the jurisdiction involved and which has as an element the
possession, use, or distribution of a controlled
substance shall not be eligible for . . . benefits under
the supplemental nutrition assistance program or any
State program carried out under th[e Food and Nutrition
Act of 2008, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2012].
21 U.S.C. § 862a(a) (parentheses omitted) (emphasis added). The
corresponding North Carolina regulation similarly provides that
“Controlled Substance Felons [] are permanently disqualified from
receiving F[ood and ]N[utrition ]S[ervices] benefits.” North
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services
Food and Nutrition Services Manual, FNS 270 Eligibility
Requirements: Controlled Substance Felons, Section 270.01(A):
Requirement for Controlled Substance Felons, https://policies.ncd
hhs.gov/divisional/social-services/food-and-nutrition-services/po
licy-manuals/fns-270-controlled-substance-felons.pdf (last visited
12
Feb. 12, 2024).° Acting pursuant to that rule, Defendant informed
Plaintiff that “[he] was not eligible [for food stamp benefits] due
to an out of state drug charge. (Docket Entry 2 at 4.) Thus,
Plaintiff does not meet the requirements to receive food stamps or
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits under Section
(a).
Even if Plaintiff met the requirements to receive benefits, he
would not establish a valid ADA claim against Defendant because he
cannot show that “he was excluded from the [public benefit] on the
basis of his disability.” Halpern, 669 F.3d at 461. “Plaintiff’s
disability must constitute a ‘motivating cause’ of the exclusion
from the public benefit.” Brooks v. Diaz, No. 1:14cv794, 2014 WL
5390575, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 22, 2014) (citing Halpern, 669 F.3d
at 462). The Complaint contains no factual matter to support an

® Section 862a carves out an exception where “[a] state
may .. . exempt any or all individuals domiciled in the State from
the application of [Section 862a(a)].” 21 U.S.C. § 862a(d) (1) (A).
Accordingly, North Carolina crafted such an exception under which,
“La]n individual convicted of a Class H or I felony that involved
possession, use, or distribution of a controlled substance
committed on or after August 23, 1996, in North Carolina may
reestablish eligibility for F[ood and |N[utrition |S[ervices]
benefits if they meet [additional conditions].” North Carolina
Department of Health and Human Services Food and Nutrition Services
Manual, FNS 270 Eligibility Requirements: Controlled Substance
Felons, Section 270.02 (A): Exceptions to Permanent
Disqualification, https://policies.ncdhhs.gov/divisional/social-s
ervices/food-and-nutrition-services/policy-manuals/fns-270-contro
lled-substance-felons.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2024). Plaintiff
fails to meet the criteria for this North Carolina exception as his
felony drug conviction occurred in Georgia not North Carolina.
(See Docket Entry 2 at 4 (“[Plaintiff] was charged with a simple
possession drug charge in the State of Georgia ... .”).)
13

inference that his disability, substance abuse addiction, acted as
a motivating cause for his denial of benefits. (See Docket Entry
2 at 1-6.) In fact, “[Defendant] informed [Plaintiff] that
a... drug related conviction is grounds for denial” and that
“The] was not eligible due _ to an out of state drug charge.” (Id.
at 4 (emphasis added) .)
Under these circumstances, the Complaint does not allege a
valid Title II ADA claim against Defendant and therefore does not
satisfy the first prong of the Georgia inquiry. As a result,
Plaintiff has not established a valid abrogation of sovereign
immunity, and the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA claim for
damages for failure to state a viable claim under Section
1915 (e) (2) (B) (ii). See Mary Jo C. v. New York State & Loc. Ret.
sys., 707 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting at the first step of
the Georgia inquiry that, “if a plaintiff cannot state a Title II
claim, th[is] [C]ourt’s sovereign immunity inquiry is at an end”).’

’ Tf Plaintiff alleged a valid ADA claim, the Court would move
onto the second prong of the Georgia inquiry and evaluate “to what
extent [Defendant’s] misconduct also violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159. “Because [Plaintiff’s
claim] does not implicate any fundamental rights or involve any
suspect classifications,” Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 424
(7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted), the question before
the Court would become whether “there is any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification,” Federal Commc’ns Comm’n v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc.,
508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). In this case, Defendant’s denial of
Plaintiff’s benefits claim due to a previous out-of-state drug-
related felony conviction could have three rational bases
“(1) deterring drug use; (2) reducing fraud in the food stamp
(continued...)
14

B. Injunctive Relief Under The ADA
Finally, Plaintiff requests injunctive relief under the ADA
and asks that “any North Carolina law [be] revised to allow people
convicted of any class felony drug charge to receive food and
nutrition benefits.” (Docket Entry 2 at 95.) However, as
previously mentioned, the Complaint does not state a plausible
Title II ADA claim. Moreover, the governing North Carolina
regulation on this issue, see FNS 270.01(A), simply implements a
federal statute, see 21 U.S.C. § 862a(a). Defendant lacks
authority to alter federal law and thus Plaintiff’s request for
injunctive relief fails as a matter of law for that reason as well.
See Carroll, 2012 WL 7963126, at *l.
CONCLUSION
This action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted,” 28 U.S.C. § 1913 (2) (B) (11).

‘(...continued)
program; and (3) curbing welfare spending.” Turner, 207 F.3d at
424, “[T] here is a rational connection between the
disqualification of drug felons from eligibility for food stamps
and... the government’s desire to deter drug use.” Id. at 425.
“This is all that is required to sustain a classification in the
face of an equal protection challenge when the challenged
classification is subject to rational basis review.” Id. Asa
result, Plaintiff also would fall short on the second step of the
Georgia inquiry, thereby requiring a finding that no abrogation of
sovereign immunity occurred as to his damages claim under the ADA.

15

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application (Docket
Entry 1) is GRANTED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE COURT
TO CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failing to state a claim.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
February 14, 2024

16

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10254504. Public record. Not legal advice.