# BROWN v. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · May 24, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10254489

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** May 24, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ANGELICA ROSE BROWN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA ) 1:22-cv-717
AT CHAPEL HILL; SHIMUL MELWANI )
(in her individual capacity); )
SHREEDHARI DESAI (in her )
individual capacity); MICHAEL )
CHRISTIAN (in his individual )
capacity); BOARD OF GOVERNORS )
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH )
CAROLINA, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge
Before this court is a Motion for Reconsideration of the
District Court’s Order Dismissing Counts I and II of Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint. (Doc. 39.) For the reasons stated herein, the
motion will be denied.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
For an overview of the factual allegations in this case,
see the court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order entered October 20,
2023. (Mem. Op. and Order (Doc. 37) at 2–21.)1
On October 29, 2023, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of
this court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order. (Pl.’s Mot. for
Recons. of the District Court’s Order Dismissing Counts I and II
of Pl.’s Am. Compl. (“Pl.’s Mot.”) (Doc. 39).) Plaintiff
attached a brief in support. (Mem. Br. in Supp. of Mot. for

Recons. Regarding the Dismissal of Counts I and Count II of the
Am. Compl. Against the Individual Defs. (“Pl.’s Br.”) (Doc. 39-
1).) Defendants filed a response on November 20, 2023, (Defs.’
Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. (“Def.’s Resp.”) (Doc. 43)), and
Plaintiff replied on November 22, 2023, (Reply Br. in Supp. of
Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. Regarding the Dismissal of Counts I and
Count II of the Am. Compl. Against the Individual Defs. (“Pl.’s
Reply”) (Doc. 44)).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) allows for any
interlocutory order to “be revised at any time before the entry

1 All citations in this Memorandum Opinion and Order to
documents filed with the court refer to the page numbers located
at the bottom right-hand corner of the documents as they appear
on CM/ECF.
of a judgment.” There are only three circumstances where a court
may revise an interlocutory order under Rule 54(b): “(1) ‘a
subsequent trial produc[ing] substantially different evidence’;
(2) a change in applicable law; or (3) clear error causing
‘manifest injustice.’” Carlson v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 856 F.3d 320,
325 (4th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Am. Canoe
Ass’n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 515 (4th Cir. 2003)).
“However, when assessing a Rule 54(b) motion for
reconsideration, these standards are not applied with the same

strictness as when they are used under Rule 59(e).” Mobley v.
Greensboro City Police Dep’t, No. 1:17-cv-114, 2018 WL 6110997,
at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 21, 2018); accord Carlson, 856 F.3d at 325
(“Compared to motions to reconsider final judgments pursuant to
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b)’s
approach involves broader flexibility to revise interlocutory
orders before final judgment as the litigation develops and new
facts or arguments come to light.”).
“Despite this flexible approach[,] . . . the discretion
Rule 54(b) provides is not limitless.” Carlson, 856 F.3d at 325.
Indeed, “such discretion is ‘subject to the caveat that where
litigants have once battled for the court’s decision, they

should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted,
to battle for it again.’” U.S. Tobacco Coop. Inc. v. Big S.
Wholesale of Va., LLC, 899 F.3d 236, 257 (4th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Off. Comm. of the Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile,
Inc. v. Coppers & Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 167 (2d Cir.
2003)). Motions for reconsideration2 “may not be used . . . to
raise arguments which could have been raised prior to the
issuance of the judgment, nor may they be used to argue a case
under a novel legal theory that the party had the ability to
address in the first instance.” Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire
Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998); see also Madison

River Mgmt. Co. v. Bus. Mgmt. Software Corp., 402 F. Supp. 2d
617, 619 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (“A motion to reconsider is appropriate
when the court has obviously misapprehended a party’s position
or the facts or applicable law, or when the party produces new
evidence that could not have been obtained through the exercise
of due diligence.”).

2 Although the Fourth Circuit has not specifically
articulated the standard for evaluating a motion for
reconsideration under Rule 54(b), see Am. Canoe Ass’n, 326 F.3d
at 514–15, district courts in the Fourth Circuit routinely look
to the standards governing the reconsideration of final
judgments under Rule 59(e) for guidance in considering a motion
for reconsideration of an interlocutory order under Rule 54(b).
See Dhruva v. CuriosityStream Inc., No. SAG-23-2265, 2024 WL
712467, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 21, 2024); Volumetrics Med. Imaging,
LLC v. Toshiba Am. Med. Sys. Inc., No. 1:05CV955, 2011 WL
6934696, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 30, 2011) (unpublished).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that this court committed clear error in
two respects: “(1) rejecting her disparate treatment and
retaliation claims arising under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 on the
incorrect grounds that Section 1981 requires an underlying
employment relationship; and (2) dismissing the claims in Count
I under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
when the individual Defendants never moved to dismiss said
claims, which represents a plausible basis for relief under

existing authority, and the Court did not provide notice of its
intent to rule sua sponte.” (Pl.’s Mot. (Doc. 39) at 1–2.)
A. Section 1981
First, Plaintiff argues that “the Court fundamentally erred
in its analysis that Section 1981 liability is limited to
adverse employment-based actions.” (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 39-1) at 2.)
Plaintiff’s statement that “[t]here is also no indication in the
Memorandum Opinion that the Court’s dismissal of the Section
1981 discrimination and retaliation claims was rooted in any
rationale other than the assumption that Section 1981 requires

the assertion of an employment relationship” is incorrect. (Id.
at 10.) As Plaintiff recites, Section 1981 protects her right to
“make and enforce contracts,” which includes “the making,
performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of
the contractual relationship.” (See id. at 7 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981(b)).)
The court understood the scope of Section 1981 when it
considered Plaintiff’s claims. (See Mem. Op. and Order (Doc. 37)
at 33–35.) However, Plaintiff failed to plead any semblance of a
contract other than an employment contract between herself and
Defendant UNC-CH in the context of her job as a graduate
research assistant. There is simply an absence of factual

allegations or legal argument as to the existence of a
contractual relationship between Plaintiff and UNC-CH in the
context of her enrollment as a student in the Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff now attempts to raise such factual assertions and
legal arguments in her motion for reconsideration, which is not
permissible. See Pac Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403 (A motion for
reconsideration “may not be used . . . to raise arguments which
could have been raised prior to the issuance of the judgment,
nor may they be used to argue a case under a novel legal theory
that the party had the ability to address in the first
instance.”). Section 1981 governs the right to make and enforce
contracts. In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff included only

sparse allegations alluding to the existence of an employment
contract between herself and UNC-CH that did not survive a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) analysis. Plaintiff did
not previously allege facts or provide any legal argument
supporting the existence of a contract between herself and UNC-
CH relating to her enrollment as a student and cannot do so now.
B. Equal Protection Claims Against Individual Defendants
Second, Plaintiff argues that “the Court erred in
dismissing [her] Equal Protection Claim against each Individual
Defendant in Count I” because “[a]t no point in their briefing

in support of their motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint did
the Individual Defendants ever actually move to dismiss the
Equal Protection claims.” (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 39-1) at 2.)
Plaintiff correctly states that “the Court did not review the
Equal Protection claim [in Count I] as an independent cause of
action.” (Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 39-1) at 14.) This is because
Plaintiff failed to clearly delineate an independent Equal
Protection claim in Count I. Accordingly, the parties did not
brief the issue, (see id.), and the court did not consider such
a claim in its Memorandum Opinion and Order.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a

complaint set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Labram v.
Havel, 43 F.3d 918, 920 (4th Cir. 1995). “The essential purpose
of Rule 8 is to afford ‘the opposing party fair notice of the
nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general
indication of the type of litigation involved.’” Burlington
Indus. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380, 390 (4th Cir. 1982)
(quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1215, at 109–10 (1971)).
In her Amended Complaint, the only reference whatsoever
that Plaintiff makes to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause is a boilerplate recitation that “Defendants
Melwani, Desai and Christian’s violations of Plaintiff’s rights

occurred while they were acting under color of state law, and
local ordinances, regulations, and customs of North Carolina in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, thus entitling Plaintiff to all appropriate relief
provided under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.” (Am. Compl. (Doc. 26) ¶¶
143, 151.) This paragraph appears under the subheadings “Count I
Disparate Treatment Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983”3 and “Count
II Unlawful Retaliation Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983,”
respectively. (See id. ¶¶ 19, 21.) Plaintiff does not identify
how Individual Defendants acted under color of state law, or
identify the local ordinances, regulations, and customs pursuant

3 Plaintiff clearly states that her “claims against
Defendants Melwani, Desai, and Christian pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1981 are effectuated by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.” (See Am. Compl.
(Doc. 26) ¶¶ 142, 150.)
to which Individual Defendants acted. These two scant paragraphs
did not serve to provide Individual Defendants, or the court
itself, with “fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of”
the Equal Protection claim that Plaintiff now seeks to
retroactively assert through a motion for reconsideration.
Accordingly, this court did not commit clear error when it
dismissed Count I in its entirety.
Iv. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration of the District Court’s Order Dismissing Counts I
and II of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, (Doc. 39), is DENIED.
This the 24th day of May, 2024.

bw Mi hun L. Mibu, AL~
United States District a

=_ 9 =_

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10254489. Public record. Not legal advice.