# DAWKINS v. STALEY

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · January 27, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10254422

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** January 27, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10254422

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting official capacity claims “represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent”
- explaining that parties have “an obligation to observe [a court] order [to pay child support] until it [is] lawfully changed.”
- rejecting same argument and finding that “Congress’s failure to enact a title into positive law has only evidentiary significance and does not render the underlying enactment invalid or unenforceable”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

MICHAEL DAWKINS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:22-CV-299
)
TWANDA STALEY; FORSYTH COUNTY )
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, Chief District Judge.
Pro se Plaintiff Michael Dawkins brings this lawsuit against
Defendants Twanda Staley and the Forsyth County Department of
Social Services (“DSS”) alleging that they violated his civil
rights in state court proceedings involving his child support
obligations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C §§ 241 and 242,
and the North Carolina Constitution. (Docs. 1, 1-1.) Defendants
have moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Docs. 10, 11). Dawkins
responded in opposition. (Docs. 13, 14, 16.)
While the motion to dismiss was pending, Dawkins filed a
document entitled “Memorandum of Law in Support of the United
States’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.” (Doc. 17.)
Defendants responded in opposition. (Docs. 18, 19.) For the
reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be
granted, and the motion for summary judgment will be denied as
moot.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Dawkins as
the non-moving party, show the following:
Dawkins is a party to an ongoing child support proceeding in
the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, in Forsyth

County, North Carolina. (See Doc. 1-2.)1 On November 27, 2019,
that court ordered Dawkins to pay $488 per month in child support.
(Id. at 2.) Since then, Dawkins has apparently failed to comply
with that order, not having made a single child support payment
since January 19, 2017. (Doc. 1-2 at 2.) As of March 1, 2022, he
owed $24,158.45 in past due support, and $12,096 more in past due
support related to a prior order issued by the same court. (Id.
at 1.)
On March 4, 2022, Defendant Staley - an attorney for Forsyth
County Child Support Enforcement, a component of Defendant DSS -
moved the Forsyth County District Court to order Dawkins “to appear

1 The caption of the state court Order lists a Title IV-D case number
“IV-D # 0007087607.” (Doc. 1-1 at 1.) A Title “IV-D case means a case
in which services have been applied for or are being provided by a child
support enforcement agency established pursuant to Title IV-D of the
Social Security Act as amended and this Article.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 110-
129(7) (2011); see Watauga Cnty. on behalf of McKiernan v. Shell, 826
S.E.2d 739, 741-42 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019). In other words, “[a] Title IV-
D case commonly refers to cases in which the child support enforcement
agency is enforcing the child support order pursuant to Title IV-D of
the Social Security Act.” Williams v. Wayne County Friend of Court,
No. 16-cv-12888, 2017 WL 3944393, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Mich. Jul. 14, 2017).
and show cause” why he should not be held in contempt for his
failure to pay child support. (Id. at 2.) On March 22, 2022, the
court entered an “Order to Appear and Show Cause for Failure to
Comply Support Order and Order to Produce Records.” (Id. at 1.)
In that order, the court found “probable cause to believe [Dawkins
was] in contempt for failure to comply with” the November 27, 2019

child support order and ordered him “to appear in person [before
the court] . . . to show cause why [he] should not be subject to
income withholding or held in contempt of court for failing to
comply with the lawful orders of this Court.” (Id.) The court
further ordered Dawkins to bring with him “all records and
information relating to [his] employment and the amount and source
of [his] disposable income.” (Id.)
On April 18, 2022, two days before his scheduled court
appearance, Dawkins filed this action, alleging that Staley and
DSS violated his civil rights during the child support enforcement
proceedings. (Doc. 1.) Dawkins’s pro se complaint alleges that

DSS and Staley violated his constitutional right to due process
and his rights under the North Carolina Constitution by
“fraudulent[ly]” attempting to enforce the child support order
against him. (Doc. 1-1 at 6-7; see also id. at 3.) Dawkins’s
allegations are conclusory and rambling. In large part, he merely
recites the text of various federal statutes and regulations, as
well as various provisions of the North Carolina Constitution.
And then in conclusory fashion he claims that his rights pursuant
to those provisions have been violated. Much of the complaint,
for example, appears to take aim at Title IV-D of the Social
Security Act, which addresses enforcement of child support
obligations owed by noncustodial parents, 42 U.S.C. § 651,
including collection and disbursements, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669b.

Dawkins’s allegations, liberally construed, contend that the child
support enforcement proceedings initiated against him are
illegitimate because Title IV-D - a joint federal and state program
designed to enforce payment of child support2 - “has never been
passed into Positive Law and therefore imposes no obligation on
anyone who does not volunteer to be subject to it.” (Id. at 4.)
Elsewhere, Dawkins invokes 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 – two federal
criminal statutes - ostensibly to allege that Staley and DSS, by
attempting to enforce the child support order against him, engaged
in an illegal conspiracy meant to deprive him of certain
constitutional rights. (Id. at 4-6.)

Dawkins seeks an order from this court that “all the TITLE
IV-D contracts . . . cease and desist and that the rears [sic]

2 When a state establishes a plan that meets certain Title IV-D
requirements, such as creating programs for locating absent noncustodial
parents, establishing paternity, and obtaining child and spousal
support, see 42 U.S.C. § 652(a)(1), the federal government provides funds
to that state to reimburse its operation of the plan, id.
§§ 655(a)(1)(A), and 655(a)(2)(C). See Hodges v. Shalala, 121 F. Supp.
2d 854, 860 (D.S.C. 2000), aff'd sub nom. Hodges v. Thompson, 311 F.3d
316 (4th Cir. 2002); Hunt v. Hunt, 784 S.E.2d 219, 223 (N.C. Ct. App.
2016).
terminated” and that “STALEY do not contact the plaintiff never
again regarding the Title IV-D schemes.” (Id.) He also asks that
“FORSYTH COUNTY DSS/CPS, STALEY be ordered to pay the cost of court
and restitution fines in the amount of $60,000 for the Title IV-D
Cases that the Defendants fraudulent file [sic] against the
Plaintiff, for depriving the Plaintiff of his right to due process,

Constitutional rights and breaking the Federal laws.” (Id.)3
On August 31, 2022, Defendants moved to dismiss the case
pursuant to both Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) arguing that: (1) Dawkins has failed to state a claim
upon which relief can granted for an alleged violation of his
rights under § 1983; (2) Dawkins’s claims are barred by
governmental immunity; (3) the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; and (4) the court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims under
18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 because “no private civil cause of action
for damages exists” under these statutes. (Doc. 11.) Dawkins

responded in opposition. (Docs. 13, 14, 16.)
On December 9, 2022, while Defendants’ motion to dismiss was

3 In his Amended Response in Opposition, Dawkins embellishes the
conclusory allegations of his complaint by advancing several new
arguments and theories of liability. (Doc. 16.) It is well-established,
however, that “the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in
opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984); accord S. Walk at Broadlands
Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175,
184 (4th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, the court will not consider these new
allegations and contentions.
still pending, Dawkins filed a document entitled "Memorandum of
Law in Support of United States' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.” (Doc. 17.) Defendants responded in opposition by
filing another motion to dismiss, this one seeking “an order
dismissing” Dawkins’s putative summary judgment motion for failing
to comply with this court’s local rules. (Docs. 18, 19.)

The motions are now fully briefed and ready for resolution.
II. ANALYSIS
“When reviewing a pro se complaint, federal courts should
examine carefully the plaintiff's factual allegations, no matter
how inartfully pleaded, to determine whether they could provide a
basis for relief. In addition, in order to determine whether the
claim of a pro se plaintiff can withstand a motion to dismiss, it
is appropriate to look beyond the face of the complaint to
allegations made in any additional materials filed by the
plaintiff.” Armstrong v. Rolm A. Siemans Co., 129 F.3d 1258 (4th
Cir. 1997) (citations omitted) (unpublished table decision).4

However, the liberal construction of a pro se plaintiff's pleading
does not require the court to ignore clear defects in pleading,
Bustos v. Chamberlain, No. 3:09-1760-HMH-JRM, 2009 WL 2782238, at
*2 (D.S.C. Aug. 27, 2009), or to “conjure up questions never

4 Unpublished opinions of the Fourth Circuit are not precedential but
are cited for their persuasive, but not controlling, authority. See
Collins v. Pond Creek Mining Co., 468 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2006).
squarely presented in the complaint,” Brice v. Jenkins, 489 F.
Supp. 2d 538, 541 (E.D. Va. 2007) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Nor does it require that the court become an
advocate for the unrepresented party. Weller v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990); see Warren v. City of
Greensboro, 280 F. Supp. 3d 780, 784 (M.D.N.C. 2017), aff'd sub

nom. Warren v. Tolbert, 717 F. App'x 281 (4th Cir. 2018).
A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine & Younger Abstention
Defendants contend that the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Doc. 11 at 7.)
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a jurisdictional bar that
“prohibits the United States District Courts, with the exception
of habeas corpus actions, from ‘sit[ting] in direct review of state
court decisions.’” See Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122
F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting D.C Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983)). In Exxon Mobil
Corporation v. Saudi Basic Industries Corporation, 544 U.S. 280

(2005), however, the Supreme Court made clear that federal
jurisdiction is not barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine if suit
“was filed before the end of the state courts' appeal process.”
Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1029, 1031-32 (10th Cir. 2006)
(citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 290–91). Here, Dawkins’s state
court proceedings have not concluded; accordingly, the Rooker–
Feldman doctrine does not apply. See Guttman, 446 F.3d at 1031-
32; accord Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir.
2009); Federacion de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones
del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, 410 F.3d 17, 24 (1st Cir. 2005). As
explained below, however, the Younger abstention doctrine
nevertheless obliges the court to abstain from hearing Dawkins’s
claims. See Chapman v. Oklahoma, 472 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir.

2006) (applying Younger abstention rather than Rooker-Feldman
where Plaintiff’s state court proceedings had not yet concluded).5
The Younger abstention doctrine is an exception to the general
rule that federal courts must decide cases within their
jurisdiction. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see Huffman
v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 603–04 (1975) (extending Younger to
pending civil state court proceedings). The doctrine “rests on
the fundamental precepts of equity and comity,” Robinson v. Thomas,
855 F.3d 278, 285 (4th Cir. 2017), and requires that federal courts
dismiss cases rather than intervene in pending state proceedings.
See Nivens v. Gilchrist, 319 F.3d 151, 153 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Nivens

I”).
The Younger inquiry proceeds in two steps. See Sprint
Communications Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 73 (2013); Air Evac
EMS, Inc. v. McVey, 37 F.4th 89, 96, n.2 (4th Cir. 2022) (observing

5 Although abstention was not specifically addressed by the parties, the
court may raise it sua sponte. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143
n.10 (1976).
that “undergoing both steps of the analysis is important.”).
First, the court considers whether the state proceeding at issue
is one of the three types of proceedings that warrant Younger
abstention: (1) an “ongoing state criminal prosecutions,” (2)
“certain ‘civil enforcement proceedings’” that are “‘akin to a
criminal prosecution’ in ‘important respects,’” and (3) “pending

‘civil proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in
furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial
functions.’” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78 (omission in original)
(quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989); Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604); see
McVey, 37 F.4th at 96. Second, if the proceeding fits into one of
these categories, then abstention is appropriate “if there is (1)
an ongoing state judicial proceeding, instituted prior to any
substantial progress in the federal proceeding; that (2)
implicates important, substantial, or vital state interests; and
(3) provides an adequate opportunity for the plaintiff to raise

the federal constitutional claim advanced in the federal lawsuit.”
Moore v. City of Asheville, N.C., 396 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Nivens I, 319 F.3d at 153); see McVey, 37 F.4th at 96
(referring to these as the “Middlesex factors”).
Even if both steps are satisfied, however, extraordinary
circumstances may nevertheless allow federal court intervention if
the state brought the action in bad faith or to harass, where the
state statute is “flagrantly and patently” unconstitutional, or
where other “extraordinary circumstances” exist that present a
threat of immediate and irreparable injury. Younger 401 U.S. at
49–54; see McVey, 37 F.4th at 96; Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d
237, 241 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Nivens II”).
Dawkins’s suit meets the criteria for Younger abstention.

First, this case involves a challenge to Sprint's third category
of proceedings: pending state civil proceedings involving orders
“uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform
their judicial functions.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 73 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “The prototypical examples of
situations falling within this third category are Juidice v. Vail,
430 U.S. 327 (1977), and Pennzoil [Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1
(1987)].” Aaron v. O'Connor, 914 F.3d 1010, 1016 (6th Cir. 2019).
In Juidice, the Supreme Court held that, pursuant to Younger,
federal courts should not interfere in state court proceedings “in
which the State's contempt process is involved,” 430 U.S. at 335,

because the contempt process “stands in aid of the authority of
the judicial system, so that its orders and judgments are not
rendered nugatory,” id. at 336 n.12. In Pennzoil, the Supreme
Court abstained from interfering with the ability of Texas state
courts to require the posting of appeal bonds because of the
“importance to the States of enforcing the orders and judgments of
their courts.” 481 U.S. at 13. Together, Juidice and Pennzoil
establish that pending state proceedings fit within Sprint’s third
category if a federal plaintiff’s demand for relief would “directly
or indirectly thwart state court compliance processes.” Elna
Sefcovic, LLC v. TEP Rocky Mountain, LLC, 953 F.3d 660, 671 (10th
Cir. 2020).
Here, Dawkins’s federal lawsuit falls into Sprint’s third

category because it implicates how North Carolina courts manage
their own child support proceedings – a subject in which the states
have an especially strong interest. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.
415, 435 (1979) (explaining that “[f]amily relations are a
traditional area of state concern.”) On November 27, 2019, the
state court initially ordered Dawkins to pay child support in the
amount of $448 per month (Doc. 1-2 at 2), but after Dawkins failed
to make any payments for more than two years, the court issued
another order to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.
(Doc. 1-2 at 1.) Dawkins filed this suit in federal district court
in an effort to derail and nullify the state court’s efforts,

asking this court to “cease and desist” his “TITLE IV-D contracts,”
to “terminate[]” his past due balance, and to order “STALEY [to]
not contact the plaintiff never again regarding the Title IV-D
schemes.” (Doc. 1-1 at 6.) Both state court orders which Dawkins
seeks to avoid undoubtedly qualify as being “uniquely in
furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial
functions.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78; see Matter of Alamance Cnty.
Ct. Facilities, 405 S.E.2d 125, 129, 137 (N.C. 1991) (citations
omitted)(explaining that the court’s “inherent power” to “do all
things that are reasonably necessary for the proper administration
of justice” includes the power to issue “an order to show cause”);
Massey v. Massey, 323 S.E.2d 451, 454 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)
(explaining that parties have “an obligation to observe [a court]

order [to pay child support] until it [is] lawfully changed.”);
McMiller v. McMiller, 336 S.E.2d 134, 135 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)
(citation omitted)(noting that “[c]ivil contempt proceedings are
a proper method of enforcing orders for payment of child
support.”).
Consequently, this case fits comfortably into Sprint’s third
category of ongoing state proceedings that warrant Younger
abstention. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 14 (cautioning that the
district court should “stay its hand” where there are pending state
proceedings involving the enforcement of orders and judgments out
of “respect for the ability of state courts to resolve federal

questions presented in state-court litigation”); Parker v. Turner,
626 F.2d 1, 8 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting that “the state's interest
in preserving the integrity of its contempt proceedings, as well
as its domestic relations cases, requires us to analyze this case
under Younger”); Gibson v. Lopez, No. 21-CV-02610-WJM-NYW, 2022 WL
2158986, at *6 (D. Colo. Jun. 15, 2022) (finding plaintiff’s
federal challenge to state child support enforcement proceedings
fell within Sprint’s third category and holding that Younger
abstention was appropriate).
The second step of the Younger inquiry requires consideration
of the “additional factors” laid out in Middlesex County Ethics
Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 432
(1982): (1) whether there is “an ongoing state judicial

proceeding”; (2) whether that state proceeding “implicate[s]
important state interests”; and (3) whether that state proceeding
provides “an adequate opportunity ... to raise constitutional
challenges.” Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432; see Sprint, 571 U.S. at
81; McVey, 37 F.4th at 96. Each of these factors is met here.
First, Dawkins is subject to an ongoing child support order,
which is to be monitored by the North Carolina state court system
and is subject to modification at any time. See Catawba Cnty. ex
rel. Rackley v. Loggins, 804 S.E.2d 474, 478 (N.C. 2017) (citation
omitted) (explaining that “[a] judicial decree in a child custody
and support matter is subject to alteration upon a change of

circumstances affecting the welfare of the child and, therefore,
is not final in nature.”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.7(a) (2021)
(“An order of a court of this State for support of a minor child
may be modified or vacated at any time”). Second, states have a
recognized interest in “ordering and enforcing child support
obligations.” Delaney v. District of Columbia, 659 F. Supp. 2d
185, 194 (D.D.C. 2009); see Briggman v. Virginia, Dep't of Soc.
Servs., Div. of Child Support Enf't, 526 F. Supp. 2d 590, 604 (W.D.
Va. 2007) (citations omitted) (“It is well established that child
support matters implicate important state interests.”); McAllister
v. North Carolina, No. 5:10-CV-79-D, 2011 WL 883166, at *5
(E.D.N.C. Mar. 11, 2011) (citations omitted) (“[T]he importance of
the State’s interest in child support matters cannot be

questioned.”). Third, Dawkins has had adequate opportunity to
raise his constitutional claims in state court. The Supreme Court
has made clear that, in the area of domestic relations, “state
processes are [equal] to the task of accommodating the various
interests and deciding the constitutional questions that may arise
in child-welfare litigation.” Moore, 442 U.S. at 435. There is
no reason to depart from that observation here. See Delaney, 659
F. Supp. 2d. at 194 (“[A] party in a child support proceeding can
raise any federal constitutional claims he may have.”);
McAllister, 2011 WL 883166, at *5 (“[B]ecause the Cumberland County
District Court retains jurisdiction over enforcement of the child

support order, McAllister continues to have a venue to assert any
constitutional claim he wishes to raise.”); Price v. Biggs, 846
S.E.2d 781, 785-86 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020) (considering Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment due process challenge in child support
modification action).
Finally, no extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant the
relief Dawkins seeks. Though “federal intervention may be proper
where there is a showing of bad faith or harassment by state
officials,” Robinson, 855 F.3d at 286 (internal quotation marks
omitted), Dawkins’s vague allegations of bad faith are clearly
insufficient to trigger this exception.6 See Weitzel v. Div. of
Occupational & Pro. Licensing of Dep't of Com. of State of Utah,
240 F.3d 871, 877 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (“[I]t is

the plaintiff's ‘heavy burden’ to overcome the bar of Younger
abstention by setting forth more than mere allegations of bad faith
or harassment.”); Crenshaw v. Supreme Ct. of Indiana, 170 F.3d
725, 729 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that mere allegations of bad
faith without supporting facts are insufficient to trigger Younger
bad faith exception). Nor does Dawkins claim that Title IV-D of
the Social Security Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., which
supplies the enforcement mechanism for child support obligations,
is “flagrantly unconstitutional.”7

6 See Doc. 1-1 at 3 (“FORSYTH COUNTY DSS/CPS, STALEY are attempting to
employ one of the four nefarious schemes by fraud, concealment, and
misrepresentation of material facts you are implemented to obtain it.”)
(errors in original); id. at 4-5 (claiming that DSS and Staley “knowingly
failed” to make certain disclosures regarding the Title VI-D program
with the intent to deceive).

7 Dawkins’s only allegation regarding “Title IV-D” of the Social Security
Act is that it “has never been passed into Positive Law and therefore
imposes no obligation on anyone who does not volunteer to be subject to
it.” (Doc. 1-1 at 4.) This is obviously an invalid basis to avoid the
law. See Ryan v. Bilby, 764 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting
same argument and finding that “Congress’s failure to enact a title into
positive law has only evidentiary significance and does not render the
underlying enactment invalid or unenforceable”); Proctor v. Title 4-D,
318 F. Supp. 3d 337, 346, n.7 (D.D.C. 2018).
Accordingly, the court finds that Younger abstention is
appropriate, and Dawkins’s federal claims are therefore dismissed
with prejudice. See Nivens II, 444 F.3d at 247 (“[W]hen a district
court abstains from a case based on Younger, it should typically
dismiss the case with prejudice; not on the merits.”).
B. Even Were Younger Abstention Not Appropriate, Dawkins
Fails to State a Federal Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be
Granted

Alternatively, even if Younger abstention were not
appropriate, Dawkins’s complaint clearly fails to state a federal
claim upon which relief can be granted. Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A
claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) “challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint
considered with the assumption that the facts alleged are true.”
Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, courts may consider
documents attached to either the complaint or the motion to dismiss
without converting the motion into one for summary judgment so
long as the documents are “integral to the complaint and
authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180
(4th Cir. 2009); see Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d
159, 164 (4th Cir. 2016).
First, the § 1983 claims against DSS fail as a matter of law
because Dawkins’s complaint is completely devoid of any

allegations of a municipal policy or custom that caused his
injury.8 See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–
91, 694–95 (1978); Starbuck v. Williamsburg James City Cnty. Sch.
Bd., 28 F.4th 529, 532–33 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (“Monell permits suits against a municipality for a
federal constitutional deprivation only when the municipality
undertook the allegedly unconstitutional action pursuant to an
official policy or custom.”). For the same reason, the same claims
against Staley in her official capacity fail. See Monell, 436
U.S. at 690, n.55 (noting official capacity claims “represent only
another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an

officer is an agent”); Huggins v. Prince George's Cnty., Md., 683
F.3d 525, 532, n.3 (4th Cir. 2012) (treating the “County and the
Officials sued in their official capacities as the County”); Hogan
v. Cherokee Cnty., 519 F. Supp. 3d 263, 283 (W.D.N.C. 2021)

8 For purposes of determining liability under Monell, DSS is treated as
a municipality. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 662, n.4 (explaining that the
New York City Department of Social Services “enjoys the same status as
New York City” for purposes of liability under § 1983).
(finding § 1983 claims against the county-defendant “redundant” of
those made against county employees in their official capacity).
Next, the § 1983 claims made against Staley in her individual
capacity also fail because Dawkins’s factual allegations do not
give rise to the reasonable inference that Staley violated his
constitutional rights. Aside from the vague and cursory suggestion

that Staley “fraudulent[ly]” filed the motion for order to show
cause in Dawkins’s child custody case (Doc. 1-1 at 6), the
complaint is devoid of any factual allegations describing what
occurred, how Staley caused Dawkins’s injury, and what
constitutional harm Dawkins incurred. A well-pleaded complaint,
however, must offer more than “labels and conclusions,” or “naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. And while the court is mindful of Dawkins’s pro se
status, “generosity is not fantasy,” Bender v. Suburban Hosp.,
Inc., 159 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 1998), and the court will not
plead Dawkins’s claim for him by “construct[ing] full blown claims

from sentence fragments,” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d
1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Dawkins also alleges violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242.
(Doc. 1-1 at 4-6.) These claims necessarily fail because “these
are criminal statutes that do not provide for a private right of
action and are thus not enforceable through a civil action.”
Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007) (Gorsuch,
J.); accord Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989);
Tribble v. Reedy, 888 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir. 1989) (unpublished table
decision); Booth v. Henson, 290 F. Appx. 919, 920 (6th Cir. 2008)
(unpublished).
Finally, Dawkins’s remaining claim is one under the North
Carolina Constitution. The court, in its discretion, declines to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that claim now that all
federal claims over which it had original jurisdiction have been
dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . .
if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it
has original jurisdiction.”)
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 10) is
GRANTED and Dawkins’s complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE, except for his state law claims under the North Carolina

Constitution, which is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Dawkins’s motion for summary
judgment (Doc. 17) is DENIED as moot.

/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge

January 27, 2023

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10254422. Public record. Not legal advice.