# WALL v. KIJAKAZI

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · February 21, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10254375

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** February 21, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

STEPHANIE DIENNE WALL, )
Plaintiff,
v. 1:21CV726
KILOLO KIJAKAZI,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Stephanie Dienne Wall (“Plaintiff”) brought this action pursuant to Sections
205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), as amended (42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)
and 1383(c)(3)), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security denying her claims for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) under, respectively, Titles II and XVI of the Act. The parties have
filed cross-motions for judgment, and the administrative record has been certified to the Court
for review.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff protectively filed applications for DIB on August 16, 2019, and SSI on
October 28, 2019, alleging a disability onset date of August 1, 2019 in both applications. (Tr. at
15, 217-24)! Her applications were denied initially (Tr. at 69-90, 120-39) and upon

1 Transcript citations refer to the Sealed Administrative Record [Doc. #6].

reconsideration (I'r. at 91-116, 142-60). ‘Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative
hearing de novo before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (T't. at 161-62.) On November
23, 2020, Plaintiff, along with her attorney and an impartial vocational expert (“VE”), attended
the subsequent telephonic hearing. (Tr. at 15.) The ALJ ultimately concluded that Plaintiff
was not disabled within the meaning of the Act (Tr. at 26), and, on August 5, 2021, the Appeals
Council denied Plaintiffs request for review, thereby making the AL]’s ruling the
Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of judicial review (T'r. at 1-6).
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security Commissionet’s denial of
social security benefits.” Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). However, the
scope of review of such a decision is “extremely limited.” Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144
(4th Cir. 1981). “The courts are not to try the case de novo.” Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d
396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Instead, “a reviewing court must uphold the factual findings of the
ALJ if they ate supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the
cotrect legal standard.” Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation omitted).
“Substantial evidence means ‘such televant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.”” Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)). “It consists of more than a mere
scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Mastro v. Apfel, 270
F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) Gnternal citations and quotation marks omitted). “If there is

evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is
substantial evidence.” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 34 Gnternal quotation marks omitted).
“In reviewing for substantial evidence, the court should not undertake to te-weigh
conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the
[AL]].” Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). “Where
conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the
responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ.” Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472. “The issue before
[the reviewing court], therefore, is not whether [the claimant] is disabled, but whether the
AL)’s finding that [the claimant] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was
teached based upon a cortect application of the relevant law.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585,
589 (4th Cir. 1996).
In undertaking this limited review, the Court notes that “[a] claimant for disability
benefits bears the burden of proving a disability.” Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir.
1981). In this context, “disability” means the ““nability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
petiod of not less than 12 months.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).?

2 “The Social Security Act comprises two disability benefits programs. The Social Security Disability Insurance
Program (SDJ, established by Title II of the Act as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., provides benefits to
disabled persons who have contributed to the progtam while employed. The Supplemental Security Income
Program (SSD, established by Title XVI of the Act as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., provides benefits to
indigent disabled persons. The statutory definitions and the regulations promulgated by the Secretary for
determining disability, see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 (SSDI); 20 CF.R. pt. 416 (SSI), governing these two programs are,
in all aspects relevant here, substantively identical.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 n.1.

“The Commissioner uses a five-step process to evaluate disability claims.” Hancock,
667 F.3d at 472 (citing 20 C.E.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4); 416.920(a)(4)). “Under this process, the
Commissioner asks, in sequence, whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged petiod
of disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an impairment that met or equaled the
requirements of a listed impairment; (4) could return to her past relevant work; and (5) if not,
could perform any other work in the national economy.” Id.
A finding adverse to the claimant at any of several points in this five-step sequence
forecloses a disability designation and ends the inquiry. For example, “[t]he first step
determines whether the claimant is engaged in ‘substantial gainful activity.’ If the claimant is
working, benefits ate denied. The second step determines if the claimant is ‘severely’ disabled.
If not, benefits are denied.” Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).
On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at the first two steps, and if
the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a “listed impairment” at step three, “the claimant
is disabled.” Mastro, 270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant cleats steps one and two,
but falters at step thtee, ie., “fifa claimant’s impairment is not sufficiently severe to equal or
exceed a listed impairment,” then “the AL] must assess the claimant’s residual functional
capacity (RFC’).” Id. at 179.3 Step four then requires the AL] to assess whether, based on

3 “RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the claimant’s] limitations.” Hines, 453 F.3d
at 562 (noting that administrative regulations require RFC to reflect claimant’s “ability to do sustained work-
related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis .. . [which] means 8
hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule” (internal emphasis and quotation marks
omutted)). The RFC tncludes both a “physical exertional or strength limitation” that assesses the clatmant’s
“ability to do sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work,” as well as “nonexettional limitations
(mental, sensory, or skin impairments).” Hall, 658 F.2d at 265. “RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only after
[the ALJ] considers all relevant evidence of a clatmant’s impairments and any related symptoms (e.g, pain).”
Hines, 453 F.3d at 562-63.

that RFC, the claimant can “perform past relevant work”; if so, the claimant does not qualify
as disabled. Id. at 179-80. However, if the claimant establishes an inability to return to prior
work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth step, which “requires the [Government] to prove that
a significant number of jobs exist which the claimant could perform, despite the claimant’s
impairments.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 563. In making this determination, the ALJ must decide
“whether the claimant is able to perform other work considering both [the claimant’s RFC]
and [the claimant’s] vocational capabilities (age, education, and past work experience) to adjust
to a new job.” Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65. If, at this step, the Government cannot carty its
“evidentiary burden of proving that [the claimant] remains able to work other jobs available
in the community,” the claimant qualifies as disabled. Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.
I. DISCUSSION
In the present case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in “substantial gainful
activity” since her amended alleged onset date. The AL] therefore concluded that Plaintiff
met her burden at step one of the sequential evaluation process. (I't. at 17.) At step two, the
ALJ further determined that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments:
essential hypertension, migraine headache with aura, bilateral biceps
tendinopathy, and left shoulder impingement and rotator cuff tear[-]
(Tr. at 18.) The AL] found at step three that none of these impairments, individually or in
combination, met or equaled a disability listing. (Ir. at 19-20.) Therefore, the AL] assessed
Plaintiffs RFC and determined that she could perform light work with further limitations.
Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff can
occasionally operate hand controls, push, and pull with the left upper extremity.
She can never reach overhead, but can reach occasionally in all other directions,
with the left upper extremity. She can frequently climb ramps and stairs, but

never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She can frequently balance, but never
ctawl. She can frequently work around unprotected heights and moving
mechanical parts.
(Tr. at 20.) At step four of the analysis, the AL] determined that all of Plaintiff's past relevant
work exceeded the above RFC. (Tr. at 24.) However, the AL] concluded at step five that,
given Plaintiffs age, education, work experience, and RFC, along with the testimony of the
VE tegarding those factors, Plaintiff could perform other jobs available in the national
economy and therefore was not disabled. (I't. at 25-26.)
Plaintiff now raises two challenges to the AL’s decision. First, Plaintiff argues that she
failed to properly resolve an apparent conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and
the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”). Second, Plaintiff raises constitutional
challenges regarding the structure of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), and also
challenges the validity of the appointment of the ALJ and Appeals Council Judges. After a
thorough review of the record, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs first contention merits remand.
In light of this findings, the Court need not reach Plaintiffs additional argument at this time.
Plaintiff challenges the AL]’s reliance on the vocational expert’s testimony at step five
of the sequential analysis. Specifically, the Plaintiff contends that the Vocational Expert’s
testimony conflicted with the DOT, but that the ALJ failed to obtain a reasonable explanation
for the conflict.
In Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2015), the Fourth Circuit clarified the steps
an ALJ must take to identify and resolve apparent conflicts between a vocational expert’s
testimony and the DOT. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit held that, if an expert’s testimony
apparently conflicts with the DOT, the expert’s testimony can only provide substantial

evidence to support the ALJ’s decision if the AL] received an explanation from the expert
explaining the conflict and determined both (1) that the explanation was reasonable and (2)
that it provided a basis for relying on the expert’s testimony rather than the DOT. Pearson,
810 F.3d at 209-10; see also Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2019).
In the instant case, Plaintiff contends that the vocational testimony on which the ALJ
relied at step five of the sequential analysis conflicted with the DOT as to all of the identified
jobs. Specifically, the ALJ identified three representative jobs available in the national
economy that Plaintiff could perform: Marker (209.587-034), Cashier IT (211.462-010), and
Ticket Seller (211.467-030). (Tr. at 25.) The positions of Marker and Cashier I, as defined
by the DOT, require frequent reaching, with “frequent” further defined as occurting “from
1/3 to 2/3 of the time,” and with “reaching” further defined as “[e]xtending hand(s) and
arm(s) in any direction,’ while the position of Ticket Seller requires constant reaching.
However, both Plaintiffs RFC and the hypothetical question based upon it included a
restriction to no overhead reaching with the left upper extremity and only occasional reaching
in all other directions with the left upper extremity. (Tr. at 20, 59.)
As Plaintiff correctly notes, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Pearson closely mirrors the
facts in the present case. There, “[t]he ALJ found [that the clatmant’s] non-dominant arm
could only occasionally reach upward,” but for all three of the jobs cited by the VE, “the
[DOT] list{ed] frequent reaching as a requirement.” Pearson, 810 F.3d at 210. The Fourth
Circuit further explained that, “[allthough the [DOT] does not expressly state that the
occupations identified by the [VE] require frequent bilateral overhead reaching, the [DOT’s]
broad definition of ‘reaching’ means that they certainly may requite such reaching.” Id. at

211.4 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded the ALJ failed to identify or resolve the
appatent conflict, and remand was required. Id. at 211-12.
In the present case, Defendant seeks to distinguish Pearson, and contends that the AL]
obtained a reasonable explanation from the vocational expert “regarding the conflict between
his testimony and the DOT regarding overhead reaching.” (Def.’s Br. [Doc. #14] at 2.)
Defendant notes that at the close of the vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ and the expert
engaged in the following exchange:
[H]as your testimony been consistent with the DOT and its
companion publications, except, of course, when I asked for your opinion on
absences and off task?
A It, it has, except for, for those things that are not addressed by the
DOT, and those things are—that testimony is based upon my professional
observation and experience.
Q Werte there any other part of my hypothetical, other than the absences
and time off task, that would have been based on observation and experience?
A Overhead reaching and—particularly, I don’t remember. I was not—
Q Does the DOT differentiate between use of the right and left hand
differently?
A No, it does not. It, it does not. It does no—it does, on occasion,
refer to using both hands, but very occasionally. So, you could sort of say that
it, it does refer to that.
(Tr. at 63-64.) The AL]’s decision then included the following analysis and explanation:
Pursuant to SSR 00-04p, the undersigned has determined that the vocational
expert’s testimony is consistent with the information contained in the Dictionary
of Occupational Titles. However, the Dictionary of Occupational Titles does not
differentiate between teaching overhead and reaching in other directions. The

+ As noted in Pearson, “[t]he [DOT] defines reaching as ‘[e]xtending hand(s) and arm(s) in any direction.” 810
F.3d at 210 (quoting Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of
Occupational Titles, App’x C (“Physical Demands”), § 8 (U.S. Dep’t of Labor 1993) (“SCO”).

vocational expert testified that she based her testimony regarding such limitations
on her education and experience in the field.
(T'r. at 25-26.)
In considering the sufficiency of the testimony and AL] explanation on any apparent
conflict, the Court notes that it is helpful to separately consider the two specific restrictions in
the RFC that are at issue here. First, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to never reaching overhead with
the left upper extremity. (Tr. at 20.) Second, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to only occasionally
reaching in all other directions with the left upper extremity. (Tr. at 20.) The AL] explained
that Plaintiffs left shoulder impingement and rotator cuff tear, which required surgery and
was not progressing as expected, resulted in pain and limited range of motion with related
functional limitations. (I'r. at 21-23.)> As a result, the ALJ included the additional limitations
to “never reaching ovethead, but being able to occasionally reach in all other directions” with
the left upper extremity. (Tr. at 23.) The ALJ further noted that “[b]ased on the lack of
improvement and continued reduced range[] of motion noted by her surgeon, occasional
reaching in other directions has been added as a limitation.” (Tr. at 24 (emphasis added).)
Thus, the AL] specifically included both a limitation to no overhead reaching with the left
atm, and also a separate limitation to only occasional reaching in all other directions with the
left arm.
Notably, during the heating, the vocational expert testified that an individual limited to
only occasional use of the left upper extremity for reaching in front and laterally would be

> An MRI prior to Plaintiff's surgery reflected “[cJomplete tear with retraction to 12:00” and “[a]nterior coracoid
impingement.” (Tr. at 365.) Several months after surgery, examination reflected a limited range of motion,
with forward flexion to only 90 degrees, and external rotation to 60 degrees, and a notation that she was “not
progressing as well as expected.” (Tr. at 392.)

precluded from any sedentary work because “that would interfere with her manual dexterity,
and she would not possess manual dexterity without having full use of her left upper extremity.
So, there would be no sedentary work.” (Tr. at 63.) In addition, Plaintiff testified that she was
still using a sling for her left arm three days per week, and the ALJ asked the expert if it would
make any difference in the hypothetical if the individual “had their left, nondominant arm in

a sling; and so, they basically had no use of it during the workday.” (I't. at 61.) The expert
responded that only a small number of positions would be available in the national economy,
and the ALJ concluded that the vocational testimony “would give [her] a basis to find that
there would not be jobs in significant numbers with that set of limitations.” (Tr. at 62.) In
light of all of this testimony, whether substantial evidence supports the vocational expert’s
finding that the jobs identified at step five can, in fact, be performed given Plaintiffs limited,
but not preclusive, ability to use her left arm remains pivotal to the outcome of her disability
claim. The relevant issues ate whether the AL] sufficiently (1) identified the apparent
inconsistency between Plaintiff's RFC and the reaching requirements of the jobs identified at
step five, (2) asked the vocational expert to explain the apparent conflict, and (3) recetved a
“reasonable explanation for any discrepancy.” See Pearson, 810 F.3d at 209.
As noted above, the potential conflicts here relate to two aspects of the RFC: the
limitation to “never teach overhead” with the left arm, and the limitation to “teach
occasionally in all other directions” with the left arm. Ultimately, a comparison of post-
Pearson cases in this District supports the conclusion that the AL] may have sufficiently
identified and resolved the apparent conflict regarding the limitation to “never reach
ovethead,” but did not address or resolve the apparent conflict between the DOT and the

10

limitation to only “reach occasionally in all other directions.” See, e.g., Allen v. Berryhill, No.
1:17CV277, 2018 WL 2025666, at *6 (M.D.N.C. May 1, 2018); Crouse v. Saul, No. 1:18CV269,
2019 WL 4015553, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 2019).
In Crouse, the Court determined that remand was required where “the VE did not
identify the specific conflict in question. Instead, when queried, the VE stated that her
testimony was “somewhat outside the DOT and the companion publications just with the
differentiating with the sit and stand as well as the breakdown of reaching right versus left.”
Id. The expert further stated that her testimony was “consistent with [her] 25 plus years of
doing finaudible], talking with employers, doing jobs, being in the industry.” Id. As the Court
explained in Crouse,
i]t is far from clear what this [language] means. While the quoted testimony
appeats to be an effort on the part of the VE to identify some general conflict
between her testimony and the DOT regarding reaching, such a statement is
simply too vague and ambiguous to fairly constitute an identification of the
specific apparent conflict raised by Plaintiff here. As a result, the Court cannot
determine if the AL]’s step five finding is supported by substantial evidence.
Nor was the VE’s explanation for the unidentified reaching conflict susceptible
to judicial review. As noted, the VE apparently tried to reconcile the fact that
her testimony was “somewhat outside the DOT” as to the “breakdown of
reaching right versus left,” by stating that it was “consistent with [her] 25 plus
years of doing [inaudible], talking with employers, doing jobs, being in the
industry.” (Ir. at 66.) Again, however, it is far from clear what all of this means.
There is no “breakdown” regarding “reaching right versus left” in the VE’s
testimony or in the ALJ’s decision. While a VE may resort to personal
experience to explain why her opinion remains reliable despite an apparent
conflict with the DOT, see, e.g., Allen v. Berryhill, No. 1:17CV277, 2018 WL
2025666, at *6 (M.D.N.C. May 1, 2018) (Auld, M.J.), adopted Slip Op.
(M.D.N.C. May 23, 2018) (Biggs, J.), that explanation must itself be stated
clearly enough to be susceptible to judicial review.
Moreover, the AL] did not provide any analysis to help explain how this
testimony was interpreted and relied upon. In this regard, Pearson requires the
ALJ to determine both (1) that the explanation was reasonable and (2) that it
11

ptovided a basis for relying on the expert’s testimony rather than the DOT.
Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d at 211. Here, the AL] did not address the DOT
conflict at all, and instead found that “the vocational expert’s testimony is
consistent with the information contained in the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles (DDOT).” (Tt. at 24.) Thus, the ALJ did not resolve the ambiguity in the
VE’s testimony, or otherwise identify the conflict and determine that there was
a teasonable basis for relying on the VE’s testimony rather than the DOT.
Crouse, 2019 WL 4015553, at *5.
In the present case, when asked what part of the ALJ’s hypotheticals were answered
based on “observation and experience” rather than the DOT, the VE identified overhead
reaching, but did not mention the limitation to occasional teaching with the left upper
extremity. (Tr. at 64.) The AL] then asked whether “the DOT differentiate[s] between use of
the right and left hand differently,’ and the vocational expert responded, after some
equivocation, that “you could sort of say that it, it does refer to that.” (Tr. at 64.) In other
wotds, the expert nevet identified Plaintiffs ability to teach only occasionally with the left arm

as conflicting with the DOT, let alone resolved the discrepancy between his testimony and the
frequent or constant reaching requirements of the three jobs he identified at step five. In fact,
neither the vocational expert nor the ALJ even mentioned the reaching requirements of the
jobs in question.
Defendant in her Response Brief addresses only the apparent conflict regarding the
limitation to “never teach overhead” with the left arm, but does not address the limitation to
“reach occasionally in all other directions” with the left arm. Defendant argues that the
vocational expert identified the apparent conflict regarding “overhead reaching,” and further
notes that the AL] specifically included an explanation regarding ovethead reaching, explaining
that “the Dictionary of Occupational Titles does not differentiate between reaching overhead

12

and reaching in other directions [and] the vocational expert testified that she based her
testimony regarding such limitations on her education and experience in the field.” (Tr. at 26.)
Defendant’s contentions on this point are reasonable, and if the only limitation in the RFC
were a limitation to overhead reaching, or if the jobs identified by the vocational expert were
otherwise consistent with a limitation to occasional reaching, then no further explanation
would be required. However, the ALJ also included a limitation to only occasional reaching
in any direction with the left arm, but then relied on jobs with frequent or constant reaching
tequirements. The position of Marker requires frequent reaching, handling, and fingering; the
position of Cashier II requires frequent reaching, handling, and fingering; and the position of
Ticket Seller requires constant teaching, handling, and fingering. The vocational expert
testified that an individual limited to only occasional use of the left arm and hand “would not
possess manual dexterity” and could not do any sedentary work, but the vocational expert did
not identify or explain the apparent conflict between the limitation to occasional reaching of
the left arm and the DOT position descriptions involving frequent or constant teaching. As
noted above, the ALJ asked, “Does the DOT differentiate between the use of the right and
left hand differently?” and the vocational expert testified, “No, it does not. It, it does not. It
does not —it does, on occasion, refer to using both hands, but very occasionally. So, you could
sott of say that it, it does refer to that.” (Tr. at 64.) As in Crouse, this explanation is not at all
clear, and the vocational expert never specifically acknowledged the apparent conflict between
the DOT’s descriptions for those jobs as involving frequent or constant reaching in any
direction and the hypothetical’s restriction to only occasional reaching in any direction with
the left arm. Even more importantly, the ALJ did not resolve the ambiguity in the VE’s

13

testimony, or otherwise identify the conflict and determine that there was a reasonable basis
for relying on the VE’s testimony rather than the DOT with respect to the limitation to only
occasionally reaching with the left arm in all directions. The ALJ instead addressed only the
apparent conflict related to never reaching overhead with the left arm. (T'r. at 25-26.) The
Commissionet’s Brief likewise addresses only the limitation to no overhead reaching, so it is
not cleat how the ALJ or the Commissioner would interpret or apply the vocational expert
testimony with respect to the limitation to only occasionally reaching with the left arm in all
directions. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ALJ failed to identify and resolve an
apparent conflict at step five of the sequential analysis, specifically the conflict between the
REC limitation to only occasionally reaching in all directions with the left arm and the DOT
job descriptions requiring frequent or constant reaching in all directions. Therefore, in light
of the Fourth Circuit’s direction in Pearson, and consistent with the similar scenatio in Crouse,
remand is required so that the impact of Plaintiffs limitations in her left arm can be fully
addressed, and the apparent inconsistency with the DOT can be explained and resolved.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner’s decision finding
no disability be REVERSED, and that the matter be REMANDED to the Commissioner
under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(¢). The Commissioner should be directed to remand
the matter to the ALJ for proceedings consistent with this Recommendation. ‘To this extent,
Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. # 13] should be DENIED, and
Plaintiffs Motion for a Judgment Reversing and Remanding the Decision of the
Commissionet of Social Security [Doc. # 8] should be GRANTED. However, to the extent
that Plaintiffs motion seeks an immediate award of benefits, it should be DENIED.

14

This, the 21st day of February, 2023.
/s/ Joi Elizabeth Peake
United States Magistrate Judge

15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10254375. Public record. Not legal advice.