# BERMAN v. PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER EDUCATION ASSISTANCE AGENCY

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · March 16, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10254319

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** March 16, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10254319

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining PSLF statutes and regulations and discussing ECFs

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

TODD BERMAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:21CV63
)
PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER )
EDUCATION ASSISTANCE AGENCY )
d/b/a FEDLOAN SERVICING, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
LORETTA C. BIGGS, District Judge.
In this case, Plaintiff alleged four claims: a claim for violation of the North Carolina
Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“UDTPA”), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; a claim for
negligent misrepresentation; and two claims for breach of contract. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 57–109.)
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment regarding certain
elements of these claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. (ECF No. 27.) Also before the Court
is Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment as to all claims, which is likewise brought
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. (ECF No. 31.) For the reasons that follow, the Court will
grant Defendant’s motion and deny Plaintiff’s motion as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
As previously set out in this Court’s order denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,
this case involves the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (“PSLF”) program. (See ECF No. 17
at 1–2.) Pursuant to the PSLF program, the U.S. Secretary of Education will “cancel the
for student borrowers who meet certain conditions. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(1); 34 C.F.R.
§ 685.219. To obtain this forgiveness, a borrower must, among other things, make 120
monthly loan payments while employed by a qualifying “public service organization.” 34
C.F.R. § 685.219(c).
The Department of Education has developed a form that borrowers who believe they

qualify for PSLF forgiveness use to apply for that forgiveness. 73 Fed. Reg. 63232, 63241
(Oct. 23, 2008). This form “include[s] an employer certification section and instructions
regarding supporting documentation that the Department will need to determine the
borrower’s eligibility.” Id. at 63241–42. A borrower “[may] use this form to collect a
certification from his or her employer either annually or at the close of the 120-payment
qualifying period.” Id. at 63242. These forms are generally called “Employer Certification

Forms” or “ECFs.” See Am. Bar Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 370 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11–13 (D.D.C.
2019) (explaining PSLF statutes and regulations and discussing ECFs).
Additionally, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1087f, the Secretary of Education may “enter into
contracts for . . . the servicing and collection of [Federal Direct Loans] . . . [and for] such other
aspects of the direct student loan program as the Secretary determines are necessary to ensure
the successful operation of the program.” It is undisputed in this case that Defendant had

such a contract to service Federal Direct Loans, and that at all times relevant to this action
that contract included provisions addressing loans that might eventually be cancelled under
PSLF. (ECF Nos. 1 ¶¶ 16–18; 38 ¶¶ 16–18.) This contract also included provisions that
obligated Defendant to receive and handle ECFs in specified ways. (See ECF No. 31-3 at 2–
31.) It is also undisputed that prior to the events at issue in this case, Plaintiff obtained two

Federal Direct Loans to finance his education, (ECF Nos. 1 ¶ 19; 18 ¶ 19), and these loans
were transferred to Defendant for servicing pursuant to its contract with the Department of
Education, (ECF Nos. 1 ¶ 28; 18 ¶ 28).
The parties agree that Plaintiff worked for Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina
(“BCBS NC”) from January 12, 2015, to May 18, 2018, (ECF Nos. 1 ¶ 23; 32 at 9), and that
during this period of employment he periodically submitted ECFs to Defendant, (ECF Nos.

1 ¶¶ 34, 44; 32 at 9). In response to Plaintiff’s first ECF, which he submitted in 2016, (ECF
No. 31-4), Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter that stated that “[his] employment qualifie[d] [him]
for participation in the PSLF Program,” (ECF No. 31-7 at 2). However, after Plaintiff
submitted a second ECF in early 2018, (ECF No. 31-5), Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter dated
March 20, 2018, that acknowledged the earlier decision but stated “[a]fter further review, and
after consulting with the Department of Education, we determined that the [earlier approval]

was issued in error because [BCBS NC] does not provide a qualifying service as part of its
primary purpose,” and that “[a]s a result, we are reversing our approval of the periods of
employment associated with [BCBS NC] and revoking credit for any payments made during
periods of employment associated with [BCBS NC],” (ECF No. 31-10 at 2). Over a year later,
Defendant sent Plaintiff another letter that stated that the March 2018 letter was “in error,”
that BCBS NC was a qualifying employer, and that the revoked credit would be reinstated.

(ECF No. 31-12 at 2.)
Based on the foregoing events, Plaintiff brought this action alleging that BCBS NC was
always a qualifying employer and, therefore, Defendant’s March 2018 letter to the contrary
was an affirmative misrepresentation. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) According to Plaintiff, because of
the March 2018 statement that BCBS NC was not a qualifying employer, he left his

employment with BCBS NC and consolidated his government loans into a private loan with
a principal higher than what he had originally taken out. (Id. ¶¶ 52–53.) In his Complaint,
Plaintiff alleged four counts. (Id. ¶¶ 57–109.) In Count I, he alleged that Defendant’s March
2018 communication constituted an unfair and deceptive trade practice in violation of the
UDTPA. (Id. ¶¶ 57–72.) In Count II, he alleged this March 2018 communication was also a
negligent misrepresentation. (Id. ¶¶ 73–87.) In Count III, he alleged that he was a third-party

beneficiary of Defendant’s contract with the Department of Education, and that the March
2018 communication breached that agreement. (Id. ¶¶ 88–98.) Finally, in Count IV, he alleged
that the Department of Education had partially assigned its rights under his loan agreements
to Defendant, and that the March 2018 communication breached those loan agreements. (Id.
¶¶ 99–109.)
II. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Court begins with Defendant’s motion because Defendant contends that this
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over all of claims in this case. Constantine v. Rectors &
Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 479–80 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[A] federal court must
determine that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the case before it can pass on the merits
of that case.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Because the Court finds that

it does lack subject matter jurisdiction over all claims in this case, the action must be dismissed.
A. Standard of Review
Although Defendant has styled its motion as one for summary judgment pursuant to
Rule 56, the Court addresses Defendant’s jurisdictional argument under the standard of review
applicable to motions to dismiss made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Williams v. United States, 50
F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e observe that rather than granting summary judgment
pursuant to Rule 56(c), the district court should have dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction
under Rule 12(b)(1) . . . . The differing procedural standards of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1)
and summary judgment under Rule 56(c) are more than academic . . . .”); see also Polyzen, Inc. v.
RadiaDyne, LLC, No. 14-CV-323, 2017 WL 1167218, at *6 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 2017)
(“Proceeding under the Rule 12(b)(1) framework is appropriate even where neither party has

brought a motion under it.” (citing Williams, 50 F.3d at 301–02, 304)), aff’d, 726 F. App’x 819
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
Under Rule 12(b)(1), a party may seek dismissal based on a court’s “lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) raises the question
of “whether [the claimant] has a right to be in the district court at all and whether the court
has the power to hear and dispose of [the] claim.” Holloway v. Pagan River Dockside Seafood, Inc.,

669 F.3d 448, 452 (4th Cir. 2012). “The plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion if subject
matter jurisdiction is challenged under Rule 12(b)(1),” and “[i]n ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion, the court may consider exhibits outside the pleadings.” Williams, 50 F.3d at 304.
“Indeed, ‘the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its
power to hear the case.’” Id. (quoting Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549, F.2d 884,
891 (3d Cir. 1977)). A court should grant a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) “only if the material

jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of
law.” Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir.
1991).
B. Discussion
Plaintiff has identified only one communication from Defendant—the March 20, 2018,
letter—that he contends made misrepresentations to him and that he relied on to his detriment
thus causing his damages.1 (ECF Nos. 1 ¶¶ 69, 80, 93, 104.) According to Plaintiff, the
misrepresentations made in this letter were that BCBS NC was not a qualifying employer, and
that Plaintiff could not receive PSLF credit for the loan payments he made while employed by
BCBS NC. (ECF No. 37 at 13.) Defendant argues that it is entitled to derivative sovereign
immunity with respect to this letter and its contents because Defendant sent it with the

Government’s authorization. (ECF No. 32 at 13–16.) If Defendant is correct, this Court
lacks jurisdiction over this action in its entirety, as all of Plaintiff’s claims are based on his
allegation that the representations in the March 2018 letter caused his damages. (ECF No. 1
¶¶ 69, 80, 93, 104.)
It is well-established that the United States is immune from private civil actions absent
a waiver of its sovereign immunity. In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 341 (4th Cir.

2014). “[D]erivative sovereign immunity . . . ‘protects agents of the sovereign from liability
for carrying out the sovereign’s will.’” Id. at 341–42 (quoting Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F.
Supp. 2d 702, 736 (D. Md. 2010)). “The concept of derivative sovereign immunity stems from
the Supreme Court’s decision in Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940).” Id.
at 342. The Fourth Circuit has held that “[u]nder Yearsley, a government contractor is not
subject to suit if (1) the government authorized the contractor’s actions and (2) the

government ‘validly conferred’ that authorization, meaning it acted within its constitutional
power.” Id. Although some courts outside the Fourth Circuit have held that derivative

1 Although Plaintiff presently argues that there are two communications at issue—the March 20, 2018,
letter and an earlier January 26, 2018, email, (ECF No. 28 at 7)—Plaintiff’s Complaint specifically
identifies the March 20 letter and only the March 20 letter as the communication containing the
misrepresentations that he relied on and that forms the basis of his four claims, (see ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 69,
80, 93, 104). “It is well-established that parties cannot amend their complaints through briefing or
sovereign immunity is a merits issue rather than jurisdictional, see, e.g., Adkisson v. Jacobs Eng’g
Grp., 790 F.3d 641, 646–47 (6th Cir. 2015), the Fourth Circuit treats such immunity as
jurisdictional, Cunningham v. Gen. Dynamics Info. Tech., Inc., 888 F.3d 640, 649–51 (4th Cir. 2018).2
The Court addresses each prong of the derivative sovereign immunity analysis in turn.
1. The Government Authorized the March 20, 2018, Letter

With respect to the first prong, Defendant contends that the Government authorized
the March 20, 2018, letter. (ECF No. 32 at 14–15.) To support this contention, Defendant
directs the Court to specific language in its contract with the Government that Defendant
contends obligated it handle Plaintiff’s ECF as it did, as well as to email correspondence
between Defendant and representatives of the Department of Education that Defendant
contends show that the Government specifically authorized Defendant to send the letter. (Id.)

According to Defendant, the Government had explicitly told it that BCBS NC was not a
qualifying employer, that Plaintiff’s payments made while employed by BCBS NC would not
count towards PSLF forgiveness, and that Defendant should communicate this to Plaintiff.
(See id. at 11, 14–15.)
Plaintiff does not dispute that the Government told Defendant that BCBS NC was not
a qualifying employer. (See generally ECF No. 37.) Instead, Plaintiff responds that Defendant

is not entitled to immunity from suit because its contract with the Government obligated it to
make independent determinations whether an employer was a qualifying public service

2 Plaintiff argues that this Court should treat derivative sovereign immunity as a merits issue, (ECF
No. 37 at 8–11), and cites, alongside cases from the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, the Supreme Court case
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153 (2016). A reading of Campbell-Ewald demonstrates that the
question of whether derivative sovereign immunity is a merits or a jurisdictional issue was never put
squarely before the Supreme Court, nor did the Supreme Court rule on it. Two years after Campbell-
Ewald, the Fourth Circuit squarely addressed how to treat derivative sovereign immunity, and the
organization, and by merely following the Government’s lead with respect to BCBS NC
without exercising its own judgment to determine the Government was wrong, it breached
that contract. (Id. at 13, 16.) Plaintiff also argues that the contract did not authorize Defendant
to make misrepresentations to borrowers; thus, if the statements in the March 2018 letter were
misrepresentations as Plaintiff contends, then they could not have been authorized by the

contract. (See ECF No. 37 at 13.)
Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and evidence, the Court finds that Defendant’s
argument is persuasive and Plaintiffs’ arguments are not.
The Court begins by assessing what the governing contract between Defendant and
the Government required of Defendant and authorized it to do. In undertaking this analysis,
the Court focuses on the contract’s plain language.3

The contract at issue in this case contains several provisions specific to Defendant’s
obligations with respect to loans that might be forgiven under the PSLF program. (See ECF
Nos. 31-3 at 2–31; 31-1 ¶ 4 (identifying ECF No. 31-3 at 2–31 as a true and correct copy of
the PSLF provisions).) Relevant to the issues here, these provisions include a requirement
that Defendant “be able to: . . . [d]etermine that the borrower has made qualifying payments
while employed in qualifying public service” when it receives an Employer Certification Form

from a borrower. (ECF No. 31-3 at 6.) The contract also contains provisions addressing how

3 Neither party has addressed what body of law governs the interpretation of the contract. The
evidence submitted to the Court shows that contract was made between the United States Department
of Education, with an address in the District of Columbia, and Defendant, with an address in
Pennsylvania. (ECF Nos. 31-2 at 2; 31-3 at 2.) The District of Columbia and Pennsylvania both
follow the rule that the unambiguous plain language of a contract governs its interpretation. Wash.
Defendant should make this determination and what Defendant should do after making it.
(See id. at 7, 23–27.)
Regarding how Defendant must make the determination, the contract requires that
“[Defendant] shall determine whether an employer is a qualifying public service organization,
based on the submitted Employment Certification [F]orm.” (Id. at 7.) The contract also

includes a set of “Instructions for Reviewing a PSLF Employment Certification [F]orm.” (Id.
at 23–27.) These instructions contain a section that addresses how Defendant should use the
Employment Certification Form to determine if a borrower works for a qualifying employer.
(Id. at 24–25.) The instructions break employers into three categories: (1) “Federal, State, local
or Tribal government organization, agency or entity”; (2) “Non-profit 501(c)(3) organization”;
and (3) “Private organization providing public services.” (Id.) For the first two categories, the

instructions state that the Defendant should determine if the employer named on the
Employment Certification Form is qualified based on consulting certain lists available on
Government websites. (Id.) For the last category, which included Plaintiff’s employer BCBS
NC, the instructions state that Defendant should “escalate to the Department [of Education]
for approval.”4 (Id. at 25.)
As for what Defendant is contractually obligated to do after going through the above

procedures to make a determination regarding an employer’s status, the instructions direct
Defendant to “[s]end the Borrower a notification of the outcome of the review,” and, if the
Employment Certification Form was not approved, to “[i]dentify the specific reason the ECF
could not be approved.” (Id. at 26.)

4 The contract also has a provision stating that it is a requirement that “[t]he PSLF servicer shall
escalate to [the Office of Federal Student Aid] cases for which a public service organization cannot be
Plaintiff reads this contract as imposing “[a] requirement that Defendant determine
whether an employer is a qualifying public service organization . . . in accordance with federal
statutes and regulations that define ‘public service organization.’” (ECF No. 37 at 13.) In
Plaintiff’s view, Defendant must make this determination based on its own independent
analysis of the relevant statutes and regulations; while Defendant should consult the

Government for advice, the Government’s pronouncements whether or not an employer is a
qualifying employer are persuasive rather than binding. (Id.) To support this interpretation,
Plaintiff characterizes the phrase “[Defendant] shall determine whether an employer is a
qualifying public service organization,” (id. at 16 (quoting ECF Nos. 27-3 at 18; 31-3 at 7)), as
a “definitive statement placing legal responsibility unambiguously with Defendant alone,” (id.).
Plaintiff also argues that the word “escalate” in the phrase “escalate to the Department” means

“to bring awareness to, and to obtain assistance from someone with more resources,” and
does not imply any relinquishing of decision-making authority. (Id. at 17.) Finally, in his brief
in support of his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that a provision in
another section of the contract that states that “[Defendant] shall meet all legislative and
regulatory requirements for the Direct Loan program,” (ECF No. 8-2 at 63 (cited at ECF No.
28 at 17)), also supports his position.

The Court finds that the plain language of the contract does not support Plaintiff’s
interpretation. The relevant contract provisions do not obligate Defendant to independently
interpret federal statutes and regulations concerning whether private organizations providing
public services are qualifying employers. Instead, these provisions obligate Defendant to
implement the Government’s decisions regarding which employers do and do not qualify. The

Electronic Certification form instructions regarding private organizations providing public
services do not tell Defendant to seek input from the Government and then perform
independent regulatory interpretation, rather, they require Defendant to “escalate to the
Department for approval.” (ECF No. 31-3 at 25 (emphasis added).) This language assigns
authority to make the ultimate decision whether an employer qualifies to the Government, not
to Defendant. The surrounding provisions in the instructions that direct Defendant to simply

consult a Government-made list when presented with other kinds of employers bolster this
interpretation of the contract. In all cases, Defendant is to defer to the Government’s decision
regarding whether an employer is a qualifying employer.
Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. Plaintiff’s narrow emphasis
on the phrase “[Defendant] shall determine” and Plaintiff’s focus on the definition of
“escalate” while failing to account for the phrase “for approval” violate a basic rule of contract

interpretation—a contract must be construed as a whole.5 Similarly, the statement in the
contract that Defendant must meet the legislative and regulatory requirements for the Direct
Loan program, (ECF No. 8-2 at 63), does not alter the Court’s interpretation of Defendant’s
obligations as specific provisions take priority over general ones.6
Having addressed what the contract obligated and authorized Defendant to do with
respect to PSLF loans, Employment Certification Forms, and employer qualification

5 Binswanger of Pa., Inc. v. TSG Real Estate, LLC, 217 A.3d 256, 262 (Pa. 2019) (“[T]he entire agreement
must be taken into account in determining contractual intent.”); Carlyle Inv. Mgmt., LLC. v. Ace Am.
Ins. Co., 131 A.3d 886, 895 (D.C. 2016) (“The writing must be interpreted as a whole, giving a
reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all its terms, and ascertaining the meaning in light of all
the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time the contract was made.” (quoting Debnam v.
Crane Co., 976 A.2d 193, 107 (D.C. 2009)).

6 Abdelrhman v. Ackerman, 76 A.3d 883, 891 (D.C. 2013) (“Moreover, ‘we apply a familiar principle of
contract interpretation, that specific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than general
language.’” (quoting Washington Auto. Co. v. 1828 L St. Assocs., 906 A.2d 869, 880 (D.C. 2006))); Baltic
determinations, the Court now turns to whether the evidence in this case shows that the March
2018 letter was sent in compliance with the contract. The Court finds the letter was sent in
compliance with the contract.
The evidence submitted by Defendant shows that nearly a year before the challenged
March 20, 2018, letter to Plaintiff, Defendant asked the Government whether Blue Cross Blue

Shield of Rhode Island (“BCBS RI”) was a qualifying employer. (ECF No. 31-8 at 2.) At the
time Defendant asked this question, Defendant was treating this BCBS RI as a qualifying
employer because the Government had previously approved it as such. (Id.) However,
Defendant was concerned that the Government had recently rescinded qualifying employer
status for similar organizations and sought guidance regarding BCBS RI. (Id.) In response to
Defendant’s question, the Government replied that it “need[ed] to do a retraction” regarding

BCBS RI, and additionally requested that Defendant “comb through those organizations that
[the Government had] approved under ‘public health’ and provide [the Government] a list.”
(Id.) According to a declaration of the employee who received this directive from the
Government, “as a result of the [Government’s] directive regarding BCBS RI, [Defendant]
placed BCBS NC on hold as a qualifying employer pending the Department’s directive to issue
a retraction.” (ECF No. 31-1 ¶ 26.)

The evidence also shows that on February 20, 2018, in response to an inquiry made by
Plaintiff, the Government reached out to Defendant via email to request information
regarding his account and his employer. (ECF No. 31-9 at 4.) After some additional email
correspondence regarding Plaintiff and his employer, the Government told Defendant that
Defendant was “approved to retract Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina,” and to “send

us a copy of the letter to review before mailing.” (Id. at 2.) This email with the retraction
approval was sent on February 22, 2018, that is, approximately a month before Defendant
sent Plaintiff the March 20 letter that he claims falsely represented that BCBS NC was not a
qualifying employer.
The Court finds that the communications described above demonstrate that at the time
that Defendant sent the March 20 letter to Plaintiff, the Government did not consider

organizations such as and including BCBS NC to be qualifying employers. Moreover, the
February 22 email from the Government explicitly authorized the relevant statements in the
March 20 letter—that is, the statements that BCBS NC was not a qualifying employer and the
earlier loan payments made by Plaintiff during his BCBS NC employment would not count
towards Plaintiff’s goal of 120 qualifying loan payments. Indeed, the February 22 email even
shows that the Government had a hand in the content of the March 20 letter—which was sent

to Plaintiff on joint FedLoan Servicing/United States Department of Education letterhead.
(ECF No. 31-10 at 2.) Thus, the March 20 letter—sent pursuant to Defendant’s contractual
obligation to review Plaintiff’s Employer Certification Form, determine whether Plaintiff’s
employer qualified as a public service organization by escalating the issue to the Government
for approval, and then notify Plaintiff of the determination—was authorized by the
Government. See Cunningham, 888 F.3d at 647–48 (holding that a defendant that placed

automated calls to consumers acted with Government authorization because the Government
had instructed defendant which numbers to call and had provided a script to use for the calls).
Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s remaining argument related to this issue—that
Defendant was not authorized to say that BCBS NC was not a qualifying employer because
that statement was a misrepresentation and Defendant had no authorization to make

misrepresentations, (ECF No. 37 at 12–13)—is unpersuasive. This argument attempts to
focus the inquiry on whether the alleged acts were wrongful instead of whether they were
authorized. However, derivative sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional issue in the Fourth
Circuit, and the Fourth Circuit has observed that “[t]he purpose of Yearsley immunity is to
prevent a government contractor from facing liability for an alleged violation of law, and thus,
it cannot be that an alleged violation of law per se precludes Yearsley immunity.” Cunningham,

888 F.3d at 648–49. Thus, the first prong of the derivative immunity analysis asks only
“[whether] the government authorized the contractor’s actions.” In re KBR, 744 F.3d at 342.
Here, the evidence shows that the Government directed the specific statements at issue in the
March 20 letter—that BCBS NC was not a qualifying employer and prior approval was
retracted. Regardless of how these statements are characterized, whether as
misrepresentations or mistakes or something else, the Government authorized them.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the first prong of the derivative sovereign immunity
analysis is satisfied.7
2. The Government’s Authorization Was Validly Conferred
The second prong of the analysis asks whether “the government validly conferred” the
foregoing authorization, “meaning it acted within its constitutional power.” Cunningham, 888
F.3d at 646 (quoting In re KBR, 744 F.3d at 342). This prong does not ask “whether [a

defendant’s specific act] violated the law, but rather whether Congress had the authority to
assign [the defendant] to complete the task.” Cunningham, 888 F.3d at 648.

7 Plaintiff has also argued that “[a]ssuming arguendo that Defendant accurately relayed to [Plaintiff] the
[Government’s] view that [BCBS NC] was not a qualifying employer, it is not a material fact,” as,
according to Plaintiff, the Defendant’s contract obligated it to independently determine that BCBS
NC was still a qualifying employer and to communicate its view to Plaintiff, regardless of the
Defendant argues that this prong is satisfied, (ECF No. 32 at 16), because 20 U.S.C.
§ 1087f authorizes the Secretary of Education to enter into contracts for “servicing” loans and
for “such other aspects of the direct student loan program as the Secretary determines are
necessary to ensure the successful operation of the program.”
Plaintiff has not offered any argument against this position, and indeed has stated in

his brief that “[t]he Department had express statutory authority to contract with Defendant to
service federal student loans, which includes [making] employer eligibility determinations”
under § 1087f. (ECF No. 37 at 19.)
Having reviewed 20 U.S.C. § 1087f, the Court finds that the second prong of the
derivative sovereign immunity analysis is likewise satisfied.
Because the Court has found that the March 20, 2018, letter was sent pursuant to validly

conferred Government authorization, Defendant enjoys derivative sovereign immunity from
claims predicated on this letter. As all Plaintiff’s claims turn on his allegation that this letter
misrepresented BCBS NC’s status as a qualifying employer for PSLF, this Court therefore
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over all claims in this action. Because this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over these claims, it must grant Defendant’s motion and deny Plaintiff’s
motion as moot.

For the reasons stated herein, the Court enters the following:
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Pennsylvania Higher Education
Assistance Agency d/b/a/ FedLoan Servicing’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF
No. 31), construed as a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Todd Berman’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment is DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice.
A Judgment will be filed contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion and
Order.

This, the 16th day of March 2023.
/s/ Loretta C. Biggs
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10254319. Public record. Not legal advice.
