# WHITE v. THE CITY OF GREENSBORO

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · August 5, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10254073

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** August 5, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10254073

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that Rule 20 “should be construed in light of its purpose, which is to promote trial convenience and expedite the final determination of disputes, thereby preventing multiple lawsuits” (citation omitted)

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

WILLIAM Z. WHITE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:18-cv-00969
)
THE CITY OF GREENSBORO, et )
al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, Chief District Judge.
This lawsuit arises out of the arrest and firing of
Plaintiff William White, a former Greensboro Police Department
officer, after he was investigated for illegal activity stemming
from the theft of several commercial-grade lawn mowers. After
the criminal charges against White were dismissed, he brought
this case alleging numerous violations of both federal and North
Carolina law against multiple Defendants across four law
enforcement agencies. The court has resolved several
dispositive motions (Docs. 82, 161, 228, and 251) and as a
result the claims have been substantially narrowed. What remain
are White’s claims alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
North Carolina trespass law against officers of the Greensboro
Police Department (“GPD”) -- Johnny Raines, Jr., William Barham,
and Brian Williamson (“Greensboro Defendants”) -- for a
warrantless search of his home on March 6, 2017; trespass
against Defendant James Stalls for his entry into White’s garage
and view of a mower covered with a tarp on September 3, 2016;
and trespass against Defendant City of Reidsville (“Reidsville”)

for Reidsville Police Department Sergeant Lynwood Hampshire’s
“knock and talk” at White’s house door inside his garage on
November 2, 2016. (Doc. 81.) Before the court are multiple
pre-trial motions in limine filed by the parties in anticipation
of trial. For the reasons set forth below, the motions will be
granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
The background of this case is extensively set out most
recently in this court’s prior amended memorandum opinion and
order. White v. City of Greensboro, 532 F. Supp. 3d 277
(M.D.N.C. Apr. 5, 2021). Relevant facts will be discussed as

pertinent to these motions.
In short, White was a police officer for the GPD from April
2009 until March 6, 2017. (Doc. 111-1 ¶ 3.)1 On August 22,
2016, the Reidsville Police Department (“RPD”) received a report
that several commercial-grade lawn mowers were stolen from
Scott’s Tractor, an equipment dealer in Reidsville, North

1 All citations to the record are to ECF docket page or paragraph
number except for testimony, which is cited to the deposition
transcript page and line.
Carolina. (Doc. 140-1.) RPD Lieutenant Shannon Coates
responded to the report and assigned RPD Sergeant Lynwood
Hampshire to investigate. (Id.; Doc. 140-2 at 16:16-20.)

Hampshire would serve as the lead investigator for the duration
of the investigation. (Doc. 140-2 at 17:1-3.)
1. September 3, 2016 alleged trespass by Stalls
On September 3, 2016, Defendant James Stalls -- who is
Plaintiff’s step-brother as well as brother-in-law, and a deputy
with the Guilford County Sheriff’s Office (“GCSO”) -- and his
wife, Brittany, went to the Whites’ house to care for the
Whites’ dogs while the Whites were away. (Doc. 128-2 at 23:21-
24:18.) Upon entering the garage where the dog food was kept,
Stalls noticed a John Deere mower with a sheet over the seat.
(Id. at 23:5-11, 25:25-26:5.) He removed the sheet, sat on the
seat, and photographed the mower’s vehicle identification

number, also known as the serial number. (Id. at 26:6-27:8;
Doc. 128-3 at 5.)
Several days later, and suspecting the mower might be
stolen, Stalls checked the mower’s model number against a police
database. (Doc. 128-3 ¶ 7.) Stalls says he did this because
White told him he got it from another police officer, the mower
looked brand new, and the asking price was half the mower’s
value. (Doc. 128-2 at 29:4-23.) Stalls’s research reflected
that the mower had been reported stolen by the RPD. (Id. at
30:3-6.) Stalls then called his stepmother, Anita Holder -- who
is White’s mother and a former GPD police officer, including
interim chief of police -- for guidance. (Id. at 30:8-9; Doc.

111-2 ¶¶ 7-10.) Holder told Stalls to confront White about the
mower, which Stalls did via text message and a phone
conversation on September 19. (Docs. 128-2 at 30:11-31:5; 128-3
¶¶ 7-9.)
2. October 7, 2016 alleged trespass by Hampshire
On October 7, Hampshire received a call from a couple, the
Terrys, who reported they had recently bought a mower from White
and who expressed concern about the possibility it had been
stolen. (Doc. 140-3 at 1.) On November 2, Hampshire went to
the GCSO headquarters to meet GCSO Deputy Homer Wilkins, who had
been directed by his supervisor to assist, so the two of them
could investigate by conducting a “knock and talk” at White’s

house to speak with him informally. (Id. at 2; Doc. 128-7
¶ 12.) Upon arriving at White’s house, Hampshire and Wilkins
knocked on the front door, but no one answered. (Doc. 140-2 at
79:14-18.) Hampshire testified that he noticed cobwebs on the
front door and believed it “[did] not look like the primary way
they go in and out of the house,” so he saw the open garage door
and what he viewed as a “clear path” to another door to the
house that was “well used,” knocked on that door, and again no
one answered. (Id. at 79:18-80:14.) He pushed what he thought
was a doorbell, only to learn it was a garage door button, so he
pushed it again to maintain the open garage door, left his
business card on the door inside the garage, and left. (Id.)

During this time, Wilkins stayed on the driveway and did not
enter the garage. (Id. at 134:18-22.) According to White and
his wife, Christina, the Whites do not ordinarily use the garage
door to enter or exit their home. (Docs. 151-1 at 110:23-24;
151-2 at 77:3-6.)
Prior to conducting a knock and talk at White’s residence,
Hampshire learned that White was a GPD police officer. (Docs.
140-2 at 18:3-9; 140-9 at 27:16-28:22.) Hampshire later spoke
with Lieutenant Coates, his supervisor, who advised him to
contact the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation (“SBI”)
and GPD’s Professional Standards Division. (Doc. 140-2 at 18:3-
9.) The SBI was contacted because it is standard practice for

the SBI to be involved when a police officer is a suspect in an
investigation. (Doc. 140-8 at 170:5-171:3.)
3. March 6, 2017 GPD search Greensboro Defendants
Several months later on March 5, 2017, following an
investigation, Hampshire applied for and obtained a warrant from
a state magistrate to search two of White’s residences. (Doc.
140-12.) Also on March 5, the investigating agencies2 informed

2 Chief Scott’s declaration did not identify which agencies informed
GPD Chief Wayne Scott that they had probable cause to arrest
White for felony possession of stolen property and felony
obtaining property by false pretenses, that the agencies were in

the process of obtaining search warrants for White’s residences,
and that they planned to arrest White on March 6. (Doc. 103-1
¶ 9.) The investigating agencies had updated Scott during their
investigation, and GPD’s Professional Standards Division was
also investigating White’s possible involvement in the mower
thefts. (Id. ¶ 6.) Scott agreed that the agencies had probable
cause to arrest White and decided to terminate White’s
employment with GPD. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.)
On the morning of March 6, Hampshire conducted a briefing
at SBI’s Greensboro office prior to executing the search
warrants. Present were members from the SBI, Burlington Police
Department (“BPD”), GCSO, and the Randolph County Sheriff’s

Office. (Doc. 140-13 at 1.) Hampshire had prepared an
operations plan, which was reviewed by his supervisor,
Lieutenant Coates, outlining the execution of the search
warrants. (Docs. 140-2 at 89:19-23; 139.) Also that morning,
White was arrested at work, charged with various crimes, and
terminated from his employment with GPD as a result. (Doc. 103-
1 ¶¶ 18-19.)

him that probable cause existed to arrest White.
At about 8:00 a.m., the RPD and SBI executed the search
warrant at White’s primary residence. Present at the start of
the search were two agents from the RPD, including Hampshire as

the officer in charge, and two agents from the SBI. (Doc. 139
at 7.) When the officers arrived at White’s house, the only
persons present in the home were White’s wife Christina, the
Whites’ daughter, and Holder. (Doc. 137-7 at 7:23-8:10.)
Hampshire allowed Holder to leave with the Whites’ daughter.
(Id.; Doc. 140-2 at 95:22-96:9.) The search officers proceeded
to search the residence. They discovered a John Deere Gator and
trailer in White’s garage. The Gator was reported as stolen
from Wake County, North Carolina, in November 2016. (Doc. 140-
13 at 2, 11.) The officers were unable to find a vehicle
identification number for the trailer, which appeared to have
been scratched off. (Id.) Both the Gator and trailer were

seized and towed to the RPD impound lot. (Id.)
Hampshire’s operations plan directed that, upon discovery
of any GPD equipment or property, Hampshire was to notify RPD
Lieutenant Coates, who would in turn notify the GPD to come to
White’s house to retrieve the property. (Docs. 139 at 11; 140-2
at 87:13-23.) And that is what happened. The investigating
officers discovered GPD equipment at White’s house, Hampshire
notified Lieutenant Coates, and Coates notified the GPD to come
to collect the property. (Docs. 139-1 at 3; 140-2 at 87:13-18.)
At about 10:00 a.m., Defendant Johnny Raines, GPD
Lieutenant, was directed by a superior to go to White’s house to
pick up GPD-issued equipment. (Doc. 137-10 at 15.) Raines was

a member of Resource Management, the GPD division that keeps
track of GPD equipment. (Doc. 137-11 at 79:3-9.) According to
several GPD Defendants, it is standard practice for GPD to
attempt to collect issued equipment as soon as possible after an
officer leaves the department. (Docs. 137-10 at 15; 137-12 at
3.) Raines directed Defendant William Barham, GPD Sergeant, to
accompany him. (Doc. 137-12 at 3.) When both officers arrived,
Raines looked into an open garage and noticed what appeared to
be GPD equipment. (Doc. 137-10 at 15.) Officers from the SBI
and RPD escorted Raines and Barham to the master bedroom where
they both observed additional GPD equipment. (Id.; Doc. 137-12
at 4.) Sometime thereafter, Raines went to the living room

where Christina White was sitting and asked her if they could
collect GPD property.3 (Doc. 137-10 at 16.) While Raines says
Christina White “stated that we could collect and remove the
property,” (id.), Christina White testified that she never gave
Raines permission to look for GPD equipment and that he was

3 Barham believes the conversation between Raines and Christina White
may have occurred prior to Raines and Barham entering the master
bedroom. (Doc. 236-2 at 22:13-18, 24:3-6.) That contradicts Raines’s
account. (See Doc. 234-2 at 22:15-21, 23:5-9; Doc. 157-1 ¶ 9.)
already searching for the equipment before he spoke to her (Doc.
152-2 at 17:21-18:3).
Shortly thereafter, Defendant Brian Williamson, GPD

Sergeant, arrived at White’s house. (Docs. 137-10 at 16; 137-14
at 4.) Williamson was the team leader for GPD’s Special
Response Team (“SRT”), of which White was a member prior to his
termination. (Doc. 137-14 at 3.) Because it was unlikely that
a non-SRT member could identify SRT equipment, Williamson
reported to White’s house to identify GPD’s SRT equipment.4 (Id.
at 4.) While looking for White’s uniform, Williamson overheard
that RPD could not open a floor safe in the master bedroom.
(Doc. 238-2 at 19:5-17; Doc. 137-14 ¶ 9.) Williamson asked
Christina White for the combination, but she said she did not
know it. (Doc. 238-2 at 20:9-25.) Williamson then called a
former instructor who was a master locksmith who provided

Williamson with the factory combination to open the safe. (Id.)
During the search, apparently after Raines found a GPD vest
with his wife’s name on it and knowing that his wife had left
the GPD, Raines believed “[t]here was credible evidence that
[White] had GPD property that he should not possess.” (Doc.
137-12 at 4.) Unnamed GPD officers reviewed Hampshire’s search

4 Williamson subsequently ordered GPD Detective Jason Lowe, who was the
sniper team lead on GPD’s SRT, to come to White’s house to identify
any SRT sniper equipment White may have had. (Doc. 137-15 at 4.)
warrant and concluded it would cover their equipment to permit
them to proceed. (Doc. 140-2 at 124:2-14.) Raines informed the
SBI and RPD and contacted his command staff to notify them that

he believed White may have stolen GPD property. (Doc. 137-10 at
17.) In response, GPD’s Property Crimes division ordered more
GPD officers to arrive throughout the morning. (Docs. 137-18
¶ 9; 137-20 ¶ 5; 137-21 ¶ 9.)
Eventually, all criminal charges against White, pending in
Alamance and Guilford Counties as well as in this federal court,
were dismissed. (See Doc. 81 ¶ 98.)
B. Procedural History
The case is set for trial in September 2022, and the
parties filed several motions in limine. (See Docs. 182, 185,
192, 197, 199, 201, 203.) The court directed the parties to
meet and confer to resolve or narrow their evidentiary disputes.

(Doc. 252 at 1.) The parties responded, noting resolution of
some motions. (See id. at 2-5.) Additionally, on July 26, the
Greensboro Defendants withdrew their previous motion in limine
(Doc. 197) in order to file a replacement motion in limine (Doc.
255) that advances the same arguments but also includes the
§ 1983 Fourth Amendment claim the court re-instated in the
interim. (Doc. 257.) Because this motion advances the same
arguments as the previous motion, response and reply briefs are
not necessary for decision. See, e.g., Baucom v. Doall Co., No.
317CV00242MOCDSC, 2017 WL 11578197, at *1 n.1 (W.D.N.C. July 5,
2017); Green v. Cafe, No. 4:04CV111H(2), 2008 WL 7871054, at *1
(E.D.N.C. Dec. 1, 2008), aff’d sub nom., Green v. Maroules, 328

F. App’x 868 (4th Cir. 2009) (“The court finds that defendants’
response is not necessary to the court’s adjudication of these
motions and, therefore, issues its ruling prior to expiration of
defendants’ response time.”).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Motions to Sever
Defendants Stalls and Reidsville separately move for
separate trials pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20,
21, and 42. (Docs. 182, 185.) White has responded to each
motion (Docs. 218, 222), and Defendants have replied (Docs. 229,
231).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) governs permissive

joinder of parties. Rule 20(a)(1) permits persons to be joined
as plaintiffs if “they assert any right to relief jointly,
severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out
of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions
or occurrences;” and “any question of law or fact common to all
plaintiffs will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1).
Similarly, Rule 20(a)(2) provides that persons may be joined as
defendants in one action if “(A) any right to relief is asserted
against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with
respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question
of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the

action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). “The United States Supreme
Court has articulated that ‘the impulse is toward the broadest
possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the
parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly
encouraged.’” Todd v. Cary’s Lake Homeowners Ass’n, 315 F.R.D.
453, 456 (D.S.C. 2016) (quoting United Mine Workers of America
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966)). Further, the Fourth
Circuit has explained that “Rule 20 gives courts wide discretion
concerning the permissive joinder of parties.” Aleman v.
Chugach Support Services, Inc., 485 F.3d 206, 218 n.5 (4th Cir.
2007); see Saval v. BL Ltd., 710 F.2d 1027, 1031 (4th Cir. 1983)
(explaining that Rule 20 “should be construed in light of its

purpose, which is to promote trial convenience and expedite the
final determination of disputes, thereby preventing multiple
lawsuits” (citation omitted)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 addresses misjoinder of
parties and provides that the court “may . . . sever any claim
against a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. Commonly, Rule 21 is
invoked to sever parties improperly joined or where “venue is
improper as to some but not all defendants.” See C.L. Ritter
Lumber Co., Inc. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 283 F.3d 226 (4th
Cir. 2002); Sehler v. Prospect Mortgage, LLC, 2013 WL 6145705,
at *2 (E.D. Va. Nov. 21, 2013); see also 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1689 (3d ed. 2022).

“However, even where the parties are appropriately joined and
venue is proper, a court may sever any claim and proceed with it
separately or transfer it to a more convenient forum.” RAI
Strategic Holdings, Inc. v. Altria Client Services LLC, No.
1:20-CV-00393-LO, 2020 WL 6882646, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 3,
2020); see Sykes v. Bayer Pharmaceuticals Corp., 548 F. Supp. 2d
208, 218 (E.D. Va. 2008) (“[A] court may ‘deny joinder if it
determines that the addition of the party under Rule 20 will not
foster the objectives of the rule, but will result in prejudice,
expense, or delay.’” (quoting Aleman, 485 F.3d at 218 n.5)).
Courts in the Fourth Circuit weigh multiple factors to determine
whether to sever claims under Rule 21:

(1) whether the issues sought to be tried separately
are significantly different from one another; (2)
whether the separable issues require different
witnesses and different documentary proof; (3) whether
the party opposing severance will be prejudiced if it
is granted; and (4) whether the party requesting
severance will be prejudiced if the claims are not
severed.

Altria Client Services, 2020 WL 6882646, at *2 (citing Equal
Rights Center v. Equity Residential, 483 F. Supp. 2d 482, 489
(D. Md. 2007)) (collecting cases). Additionally, courts
consider “(5) fundamental fairness, (6) judicial economy, (7)
undue delay, and (8) the dual threat of duplicative litigation
and inconsistent verdicts.” Moulvi v. Safety Holdings, Inc.,
No. 3:20CV595, 2021 WL 4494191, at *6 (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2021)

(citation omitted). Because “Supreme Court precedent and
pertinent cases within the Fourth Circuit establish that courts
should favor joinder of parties within a single case[,] . . .
Rule 21 discretion to sever should be exercised sparingly.” Id.
(citations omitted); Altria Client Services, 2020 WL 6882646, at
*2 (collecting cases); see United Mine Workers of America v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966).
Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) permits
a court, for convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and
economize, to separate issues to be presented at trial. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 42(b). “[T]he granting of separate trials is within the
sound discretion of the trial judge.” Bowie v. Sorrell, 209

F.2d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1953); see White v. Bloomberg, 501 F.2d
1379, 1385 (4th Cir. 1974) (“We hold that the district courts
are free to tailor an appropriate procedure to fit the facts and
the pleadings and to select what seems best for a given case.”).
Because “a single trial will be more expedient and efficient,” F
& G Scrolling Mouse, L.L.C. v. IBM Corp., 190 F.R.D. 385, 387
(M.D.N.C. 1999), “[i]n civil cases, bifurcation is the
exception, not the rule,” Gonzalez v. SeaWorld Parks &
Entertainment LLC, No. 4:20CV27 (RCY), 2021 WL 3173574, at *1
(E.D. Va. July 27, 2021) (quoting Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Adell
Plastics, Inc., Civ. No. JKB-17-00252, 2019 WL 2360929, at *3
(D. Md. June 4, 2019)); see Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco

Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1323-24 (5th Cir. 1976)
(“[S]eparation of issues [under Rule 42(b)] is not the usual
course that should be followed.” (citation omitted)).
Ultimately, the moving party bears the burden of convincing the
court that bifurcation “will (1) promote greater convenience to
the parties, witnesses, jurors, and the court, (2) be conducive
to expedition and economy, and (3) not result in undue prejudice
to any party.” F & G Scrolling Mouse, 190 F.R.D. at 387; accord
Toler v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 309 F.R.D. 223, 225
(S.D. W. Va. 2015).
“[B]ifurcation may be appropriate where . . . the
litigation of the first issue might eliminate the need to

litigate the second issue, or where one party will be prejudiced
by evidence presented against another party.” Amato v. City of
Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 316 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations
omitted); see Saint John’s African Methodist Episcopal Church v.
GuideOne Specialty Mutual Insurance Co., 902 F. Supp. 2d 783,
788 (E.D. Va. 2012) (bifurcating insurance coverage and bad
faith claims because “[a]ny reference to [insurer’s] alleged bad
faith in denying [insured’s] insurance claim or failing to pay
[insured] under the insurance policy, as well as any evidence
offered solely to establish such bad faith, would serve only to
prejudice the jury”). “Merely presenting some proof which
supports bifurcation is not enough” to satisfy this burden. F &

G Scrolling Mouse, 190 F.R.D. at 387. “In addition, at least
one other Circuit has cautioned that a ‘court should not
bifurcate claims unless the issue to be tried separately is so
distinct and separate from the others that a trial of it alone
may be had without injustice.’” Light v. Allstate Insurance
Co., 182 F.R.D. 210, 213 (S.D.W. Va. 1998) (quoting McDaniel v.
Anheuser–Busch, Inc., 987 F.2d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 1993)).
Both Stalls and Reidsville argue that the court should hold
separate trials pursuant to Rules 20, 21, and 42. (See Doc. 183
at 1 (arguing that the court should order separate trials
pursuant to Rules 20(b) and 42(b)); Doc. 186 at 9-21 (arguing
that the “parties are not properly joined” for trial and the

court should sever Reidsville’s trespass claim “pursuant to
Rules 20, 21, and 42”); see Doc. 231 (Defendant Reidsville:
arguing for separate trials without relying on a particular
rule).) However, there is a significant distinction between
severing claims into separate actions under Rule 21 and ordering
separate trials for different claims or issues under Rule 42(b).
See Gaffney v. Riverboat Services of Indiana, Inc., 451 F.3d
424, 441-42 (7th Cir. 2006). Severing claims under Rule 21
“creates two discrete, independent actions, which then proceed
as separate suits for the purpose of finality and
appealability.” Id. at 441; Herklotz v. Parkinson, 848 F.3d
894, 898 (9th Cir. 2017) (“When a claim is severed, it becomes

an entirely new and independent case.”); E.S. v. Independent
School District, No. 196 Rosemount-Apple Valley, 135 F.3d 566,
568 (8th Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. O’Neill, 709 F.2d
361, 368 (5th Cir. 1983) (same). In contrast, ordering separate
or joint trials under Rule 42 has no bearing on whether claims
are severed into separate actions or joined into one action.
See McDaniel, 987 F.2d at 304 n.19 (noting that “this
distinction, clear enough in theory, is often obscured in
practice since at times the courts talk of separate trial and
severance interchangeably” (citation omitted)).
Generally, district courts should bifurcate claims under
Rule 42(b), rather than sever them under Rule 21, when they “are

factually interlinked, such that a separate trial may be
appropriate, but final resolution of one claim affects the
resolution of the other.” Gaffney, 451 F.3d at 442. In
contrast, courts sever claims under Rule 21 where the claims are
“discrete and separate” and “one claim must be capable of a
resolution despite the outcome of the other claim.” Id.; see,
e.g., Reinholdson v. Minnesota, 346 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir.
2003) (holding that, because the “trials of [the] individual
claims may expose issues of systemic violation that would cause
the district court to reconsider its decision to dismiss
plaintiffs’ claims against the State defendants in their
entirety,” severance under Rule 21 was inappropriate; instead

construing the district court’s order as an order for separate
trials under Rule 42(b), such that the individual claims may not
be appealed until “a final judgment has been rendered in the
entire action”).
Stalls and Reidsville each contend that they will suffer
from undue prejudice, jury confusion, and delay without
severance. (Doc. 183 at 3-8; Doc. 186 at 16-21.) Reidsville
further argues that White’s trespass claims against it is
improperly joined because the claims do not arise out of the
same transaction or occurrence as the other claims and the
claims do not involve common questions of law or fact. (Doc.
186 at 9-16.) In response, White argues that severance would

harm judicial economy and be prejudicial. (Doc. 218 at 6-9;
Doc. 222 at 8-11.) Additionally, in response to Reidsville,
White contends that the claims constitute the “same transaction
or occurrence,” and have common questions of law and fact,
because they are all trespass claims related to the criminal
investigation into him. (Doc. 222 at 6-7.) In reply, Stalls
and Reidsville maintain that there is no “evidentiary overlap”
or “cohesive story” tying the remaining claims together, as
White’s conspiracy claims were dismissed and they will be
prejudiced by unrelated damages claims and jury confusion.
(Doc. 229 at 2-7; Doc. 231 at 2-6.)
The court will first address Reidsville’s motion for

severance under Rule 21.
1. Reidsville’s Rule 21 motion for severance
Upon weighing the relevant factors governing severance
under Rule 21, the court will deny Reidsville’s motion to sever
the claims into separate actions.
The first factor, “whether the issues sought to be tried
separately are significantly different from one another,” Altria
Client Services, 2020 WL 6882646, at *2 (citation omitted),
weighs against severance. The present case involves three sets
of Defendants (Stalls, Reidsville, and the Greensboro
Defendants). Although the claims against each arise from
different conduct on different dates from different individuals,

they all relate to alleged trespass on White’s property, and
thus the issues sought to be tried do not “significantly” differ
from one another. For example, Stalls and the Greensboro
Defendants both rely on a defense of consent from the Whites to
enter their home, and Reidsville and the Greensboro Defendants
both present factual questions involving actions by police
officers. In addition, two of these events occurred during the
pendency of a criminal investigation into White. And while the
details of the criminal claims will not be relevant to this
case, the fact that there was a criminal investigation during
the November 2, 2016 and March 6, 2017 incidents is potentially
relevant to the actions of more than one Defendant. For

example, the jury will need to understand in a general way why
Hampshire was interested in conducting a “knock and talk” on
November 2, 2016, and why the SBI and RPD were conducting a
search of White’s home on March 6, 2017, while the GPD officers
were present.5
The next factor, “whether the separable issues require
different witnesses and different documentary proof,” id.,
weighs in favor of severance. While some witnesses, such as the
Whites, and evidence, such as details about their home, overlap
across claims, the claims also involve totally unrelated
evidence and witnesses and cover events that took place on
separate occasions.

The third factor, “whether the party opposing severance
will be prejudiced if it is granted,” id., weighs against
severance. Severance would require White to try three separate
cases, forcing him to rehash similar evidence and arguments, and
would impose unnecessary separate timelines for case deadlines.
Relatedly, the fourth factor, “whether the party requesting
severance will be prejudiced if the claims are not severed,”

5 Plaintiff will not be permitted to seek to put before the jury the
details of his conspiracy and other claims the court has dismissed.
id., also weighs against severance. Reidsville has not
demonstrated that it will suffer significant prejudice by trying
its claims with any other Defendant. Further, Reidsville’s

argument regarding the potential for juror confusion is not
persuasive. Courts regularly oversee cases involving far more
numerous parties, more complex facts, and even more dissimilar
issues among the parties. This case involves only one
Plaintiff, five remaining Defendants (including the three
Greensboro Defendants), and four remaining claims (two of which
seek federal and state liability founded on the same conduct)
that present relatively simple questions for the jury.
Finally, the remaining factors do not support severance.
“As a general rule, holding multiple trials when claims could be
consolidated in one trial is not conducive to judicial economy.”
Altria Client Services, 2020 WL 6882646, at *6 (citation

omitted). Separate trials would require different jury
selections and multiple trials spread out over multiple days,
burdening the court’s docket and forcing White to repeatedly
argue many of the same legal concepts, such as North Carolina
trespass law. Thus, the court finds, in light of “Supreme Court
precedent and pertinent cases within the Fourth Circuit [that]
establish that courts should favor joinder of parties within a
single case,” Moulvi, 2021 WL 4494191, at *6, the adjudication
of White’s claims in a single case will best conserve scarce
judicial resources, promote fundamental fairness, and prevent
undue delay.
2. Rule 42 motions for separate trials

Defendants’ motion for separate trials under Rule 42(b)
fail for largely the same reasons. Here, separate trials would
be a judicially inefficient use of the court’s docket
management. As discussed above, separate trials would require
different juries and multiple trials spread out over several
days. Additionally, Defendants’ arguments regarding jury
confusion is unpersuasive, as what remains are relatively simple
claims, and determining whether each Defendant violated North
Carolina trespass law when they entered White’s home on separate
occasions will not be difficult for a jury to assess. Further,
separate trials would cause undue prejudice to White for the
reasons discussed above.

In sum, the court finds that the Defendants have failed to
carry their burden under either Rule 42 or Rule 21 and have not
shown that separate trials or severance of claims is warranted.
What remains in this case for trial are straightforward and
relatively simple questions of trespass and an associated
claimed violation of a constitutional right. This case does not
warrant the transactional and administrative burdens of separate
trials. Therefore, the court will deny Reidsville’s motion to
sever and Defendants’ motions for separate trials, and this
action will proceed in a single trial.
B. Motions to Exclude Evidence of Damages
Stalls, Reidsville, and the Greensboro Defendants each move

to exclude evidence of White’s alleged compensatory and punitive
damages. (See Docs. 192, 203, 255.)
1. Compensatory damages
Each Defendant argues that White should be precluded from
introducing evidence of damages for trespass relating to civil
claims this court has dismissed and criminal charges against him
dismissed by other courts. (Doc. 193 at 2-12, 16-20; Doc. 204
¶¶ 6-10; Doc. 256 at 7-12.) Such evidence includes evidence
related to the criminal investigation into White, his arrest,
the outcome of his criminal charges, criminal defense costs,
child custody litigation expenses, his alleged conspiracy by the
Defendants, emotional distress suffered as a result of his

arrest and termination of his employment, and his lost wages,
backpay, and other benefits from losing his employment. In
response, White argues that the trespasses were the genesis of
the subsequent criminal investigation, which caused the damages
at issue. (Doc. 219 at 7-11; Doc. 220 at 6-8, 10-11; Doc. 221
at 6-8.)
“North Carolina courts have concluded that a trespasser ‘is
liable for all damage proximately resulting from his wrongful
entry and, at least, for nominal damages.’” Food Lion, Inc. v.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 960 (M.D.N.C. 1997)
(quoting Smith v. VonCannon, 197 S.E.2d 524, 528 (N.C. 1973));
see Owens v. Blackwood Lumber Co., 193 S.E. 219, 223 (N.C. 1937)

(measuring the “actual loss” of a trespass claim as “[t]he
decreased value of the property” (citation omitted)); Bishop v.
Reinhold, 311 S.E.2d 298, 302-03 (N.C. App. Ct. 1984) (measuring
trespass damages as the difference in fair market value before
and after the trespass or the rental value of the trespassed
property). North Carolina courts have defined proximate cause
as
a cause which in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any new and independent cause, produced
the plaintiff’s injuries, and without which the
injuries would not have occurred, and one from which a
person of ordinary prudence could have reasonably
foreseen that such a result, or consequences of a
generally injurious nature, was probable under all the
facts as they existed.

Hampton v. Hearn, 838 S.E.2d 650, 655 (N.C. Ct. App.), review
denied, 840 S.E.2d 787 (N.C. 2020) (citation omitted); see Adams
v. Mills, 322 S.E.2d 164, 173 (N.C. 1984) (“An efficient
intervening cause is a new proximate cause. It must be an
independent force which entirely supersedes the original action
and renders its effect in the chain of causation remote.”).
Proximate cause is generally a question of fact for the jury,
Hampton, 838 S.E.2d at 655 (“It is to be determined as a fact,
in view of the circumstances of fact attending it.” (quoting
Conley v. Pearce-Young-Angel Co., 29 S.E.2d 740, 742 (N.C.
1944))), however “[i]f the evidence be so slight as not
reasonably to warrant the inference [of causation], the court

will not leave the matter to the speculation of the jury,” id.
(quoting Conley, 29 S.E.2d at 742); Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics
and Gynecology Associates, P.A., 365 S.E.2d 909, 915 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1988), aff’d, 395 S.E.2d 85 (N.C. 1990) (recognizing that
“where it is contended that plaintiff’s injuries are too remote
as a matter of law, the trial court may be required to decide
whether the tortfeasor was legally exempt from foreseeing
plaintiff’s injuries in the first place”); People’s Center, Inc.
v. Anderson, 233 S.E.2d 694, 696 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (“It is an
elementary principle that all damages must flow directly and
naturally from the wrong, and that they must be certain both in
their nature and in respect to the cause from which they

proceed.” (quoting Johnson v. Railroad, 113 S.E. 606, 608 (N.C.
1922))). In other words, “no recovery is allowed when resort to
speculation or conjecture is necessary to determine whether the
damage resulted from the unlawful act of which complaint is made
or from some other source.” Anderson, 233 S.E.2d at 696
(citation omitted).
Similarly, as to the § 1983 claim against the Greensboro
Defendants, the court has already addressed the scope of damages
available. (Doc. 251 at 29-37.) As the court noted there,
§ 1983 creates tort liability “in favor of persons who are
deprived of rights, privileges, or immunities secured to them by
the Constitution.” Memphis Community School District v.

Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305–06 (1986) (quoting Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978)). Section 1983 damages are intended to
compensate an individual for the injuries suffered as a result
of a constitutional violation. Id. at 306. “Where no injury
[is] present, no ‘compensatory’ damages [can] be awarded.” Id.
at 308.
“The goal of the Court’s § 1983 jurisprudence has been to
tailor liability to fit the interests protected by the
particular constitutional right in question.” Townes v. City of
New York, 176 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Carey, 435
U.S. at 258-59). There is a “gross disconnect” between a
claimed constitutional violation involving an unreasonable

search and seizure and alleged damages related to post-
indictment proceedings. Id. Indeed, “[t]he evil of an
unreasonable search or seizure is that it invades privacy, not
that it uncovers crime, which is no evil at all.” Id. Where
there are intervening and superseding events, such as a
prosecutor’s decision to charge or inculpatory acts that support
a finding of probable cause, they break any alleged causal chain
of proximate cause. (Doc. 251 at 30, 35-37.) Further, as this
court has already held, “it is clear that the exclusionary rule
and the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine simply do not apply
in civil cases.” (Doc. 82 at 21-22.) Thus, as a victim of an
unreasonable search or seizure, White “may recover damages . . .

for physical injury, property damage, injury to reputation,
etc.” but he “cannot be compensated for injuries that result
from the discovery of incriminating evidence and consequent
criminal prosecution.” Townes, 176 F.3d at 148.
Here, there is no evidence in the record that the alleged
trespasses proximately caused the compensatory damages related
to White’s criminal charges. Rather, the court has held that
the alleged trespass by Stalls, who is White’s brother-in-law as
well as step-brother, occurred in his personal capacity,
disconnected from any criminal investigation. While the
trespasses by Reidsville and the Greensboro Defendants occurred
in relation to the investigation into White, the costs related

to White’s criminal defense and the termination from his job do
not flow “directly and naturally from the wrong” of trespass.
See id. Instead, the alleged damages at issue were the result
of “[a]n efficient intervening cause,” the criminal
investigation itself, including the decisions to fire White and
charge him with criminal conduct, “which entirely supersedes”
each Defendant’s trespass and “renders its effect in the chain
of causation remote.” See Adams, 322 S.E.2d at 173. Even if
the Defendants could have reasonably foreseen the ultimate
consequences of trespassing in relation to a potential criminal
matter, “the rest of the evidence generally shows that the
investigation into White was proceeding upon an independent

basis separate from any [trespassory] actions Stalls [and the
other Defendants] may have taken.” (Cf. Doc. 161 at 52.) The
court will therefore grant Defendants’ motions to exclude
evidence as to previously dismissed claims, and all counsel and
witnesses are precluded from referring to these alleged damages.
2. Punitive damages
Defendants also move to preclude White from introducing
evidence or arguments relating to an award of punitive damages.
(See Doc. 193 at 12-16; Doc. 204 ¶ 8 (motion to exclude evidence
of Judge Biggs’s written opinion in White’s criminal matter);
Doc. 256 at 12-15.) In response, White argues that the jury
could find that the Defendants “acted willfully and wantonly

when they intentionally trespassed on Plaintiff’s property.”
(Doc. 220 at 9-11; Doc. 219 at 8-9; Doc. 221 at 8-9.)
To recover punitive damages under North Carolina law, the
claimant bears the burden of showing by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant is liable for compensatory damages
and that “one of the following aggravating factors was present
and was related to the injury for which compensatory damages
were awarded: (1) Fraud. (2) Malice. (3) Willful or wanton
conduct.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D–15(a). Willful or wanton
conduct “means more than gross negligence” and entails “the
conscious and intentional disregard of and indifference to the
rights and safety of others, which the defendant knows or should

know is reasonably likely to result in injury, damage, or other
harm.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-5(7). The North Carolina Court of
Appeals has further defined conduct as “willful” where there
exists a “deliberate purpose not to discharge a duty . . .
necessary for the safety of the person or property of another”
and conduct as “wanton” when “done needlessly, manifesting a
reckless indifference to the rights of others.” Cockerham–
Ellerbee v. Town of Jonesville, 660 S.E.2d 178, 180 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2008) (citations omitted).
As to the federal claim, punitive damages may be awarded in
a § 1983 action against an official in his individual capacity.
However, there must be sufficient evidence that the defendant’s

conduct was “motivated by evil motive or intent, or . . .
involve[d] reckless or callous indifference to the federally
protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56
(1983); Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 948 (4th Cir. 1987). “The
callous indifference required for punitive damages is
essentially the same as the deliberate indifference required for
a finding of liability on [a] § 1983 claim.” Cooper, 814 F.2d
at 948.
Whether White can establish that Defendants “acted
willfully and wantonly when they intentionally trespassed on
Plaintiff’s property” or, in the case of the federal claim -
with reckless or callous disregard, is generally a question of

fact for the jury. As discussed in this court’s prior order,
there is evidence that Stalls was aware he was not welcome in
the Whites’ home or garage to take care of their dogs but
nevertheless entered. (See Doc. 161 at 45-46.) Moreover, even
if he were permitted access, a jury could find that Stalls
exceeded that scope by purposefully peering under a sheet
covering a commercial mower to gain access to the serial number.
Additionally, as to Reidsville, the court previously held that
“there is at least a genuine dispute, on the facts of this case,
as to whether a reasonable officer would believe it appropriate
to knock on the door inside White’s garage.” (Id. at 105; see
id. at 103-105.) Further, the court has previously denied the

Greensboro Defendants’ summary judgment motions on the basis of
qualified immunity and public official immunity, as there is
evidence that their conduct “violated White’s clearly
established Fourth Amendment right to privacy.” (See Doc. 253
at 19, 23; Doc. 228 at 36-39.) Given this, the court will defer
ruling on the motion in limine to exclude evidence of punitive
damages as premature pending the presentation of evidence. It
will be up to White to produce sufficient evidence to meet the
standard for seeking punitive damages. Until then, the parties
shall not mention punitive damages to the jury in argument or
otherwise.
In his response, White argues that Judge Biggs’s judicial

opinion (granting a motion to suppress in White’s prior federal
criminal case) is relevant to whether the jury should award
punitive damages related to Hampshire’s conduct during the
criminal investigation. (Doc. 219 at 8-9.) White does not
argue that this opinion is evidence of malice or willful or
wanton conduct in relation to his trespass claim against
Reidsville. Moreover, a judicial opinion is generally
inadmissible. See, e.g., Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 265 (4th
Cir. 1994) (affirming the exclusion of a judicial opinion
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because it “decided the
precise issue before the jury” and its probative value was
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, noting

“[j]udicial findings of fact ‘present a rare case where, by
virtue of their having been made by a judge, they would likely
be given undue weight by the jury.’” (quoting Nipper v. Snipes,
7 F.3d 415, 418 (4th Cir. 1993))); Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d
1184, 1192 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting the admission of prior
judgments or findings of fact under Federal Rule of Evidence
803(8) is questionable because “[j]uries are likely to give
disproportionate weight to such findings of fact because of the
imprimatur that has been stamped on them by the judicial
system”); Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc., 5 F.3d 1557, 1566–70
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (affirming exclusion of evidence of prior
decision in subsequent related litigation pursuant to Rule 403).

Therefore, Reidsville’s motion to exclude evidence of Judge
Biggs’s written judicial decision on White’s criminal charges
will be granted.
C. Motion to Exclude Evidence of Text Messages
Stalls challenges the admissibility of evidence of “emails
and text messages allegedly exchanged between Brittany Stalls
and Christina White or their mother Mrs. Ross.” (Doc. 193 at
21-22.) Stalls argues that the “messages are hearsay and that
some lack authentication.” (Id.) He also argues that the
messages are not relevant to the trespass claim, or whether
Stalls had authorization to enter White’s home, and would cause
prejudice and confuse the jury as they post-date the date of the

alleged trespass. (Id.) In a short response, White contends
the messages demonstrate malice and “a lack of permission for
Defendant Stalls” to be on his property. (Doc. 220 at 11.) He
also argues that the messages “can be authenticated” and may be
used for purposes such as impeachment. (Id.)
The text and email messages are hearsay that fail to meet a
readily apparent exception. “Out-of-court statements constitute
hearsay only when offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted. A statement that would otherwise be hearsay
may nevertheless be admissible if it is offered to prove
something other than its truth, and this includes statements
used to charge a party with knowledge of certain information.”

In re C.R. Bard, Inc., MDL. No. 2187, Pelvic Repair System
Products Liability Litigation, 810 F.3d 913, 925–26 (4th Cir.
2016) (citation omitted). White does not dispute that the
messages are hearsay or explain how the messages “show malice.”
While such evidence could be admissible for proof of a
declarant’s state of mind under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3),
Stalls correctly points out that the messages on their face
post-date the alleged trespass on September 3, 2016, and are
thus are not evidence of state of mind at the time of the
trespass. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(3) (granting a hearsay
exception for “then-existing state of mind . . . but not
including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact

remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or
terms of the declarant’s will”); United States v. Lentz, 282 F.
Supp. 2d 399, 411 (E.D. Va. 2002), aff’d, 58 F. App’x 961 (4th
Cir. 2003) (“The statement should not look backward or describe
a declarant’s past memory or belief about another’s conduct.”
(citing United States v. Carmichael, 232 F.3d 510, 521 (6th Cir.
2000))).
As a result, it is not entirely clear how White intends to
use this evidence for impeachment. Thus, the court will reserve
ruling on the question whether White may be permitted to use the
messages for that purpose. See Fed. R. Evid. 613(b). “For a
statement to qualify as a witness’[s] prior inconsistent

statement under Rule 613(b), the statement must be one that the
witness has made or adopted, or to which the witness otherwise
has subscribed.” Carnell Construction Corp. v. Danville
Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 745 F.3d 703, 718-19 (4th
Cir. 2014). Whether the evidence is admissible at trial will
also depend on if it satisfies Rule 403. See id. at 719-21.
For these reasons, the motion to exclude evidence of text
messages between Brittany Stalls and Christina White or their
mother, Mrs. Ross, will be granted to the extent they were
offered as direct evidence, and the court reserves as to whether
they may be admitted for impeachment purposes.
D. Motion to Exclude Testimony of Anita Holder

Defendant Reidsville moves to exclude expert testimony of
Anita Holder.6 (Doc. 203 at 2.) Reidsville argues her testimony
should be excluded for the reasons stated in Defendants’ joint
motion to exclude her testimony (Doc. 166). (Doc. 204 ¶ 12.)
The court previously ruled on Defendants’ motion to exclude
expert testimony or evidence from Holder. (Doc. 161 at 25-36;

6 Defendant Stalls also moved to exclude expert testimony from Anita
Holder (Doc. 192 at 2), but the parties have agreed that motion should
be granted (Doc. 252 at 3).
Doc. 228 at 12-20 (finding that “Holder’s expert testimony would
not assist the trier of fact to determine a fact in issue
relevant to the claim against Reidsville as to Hampshire’s knock

and talk”).) Thus, for the reasons discussed at length already,
Reidsville’s motion to exclude Holder’s expert testimony is
granted in part and denied to the limited extent noted
previously; namely, whether she would be permitted to testify
will depend on whether Raines, Barham, and/or Williamson
contends they did not know they could not enter White’s home
without a warrant, consent, or exigency. (See Doc. 228 at 20.)
If any of them makes that contention, then the court will
consider permitting her to testify as to an officer’s
expectation, based on training, in that regard.
E. Undisputed Matters
On July 5, 2022, the parties filed a joint notice of status

of the pending motions in limine. (Doc. 252.) Based on the
filing, the parties have agreed not to mention or ask about the
following:
1) Evidence of the court’s denial of Stalls’s motion for
summary judgment on the trespass claim (Doc. 192 at
2);
2) Evidence of the GCSO’s internal investigation into
Stalls (id.);
3) Evidence of expert testimony by Anita Holder as to
Stalls (id.);
4) Evidence of an alleged extra-marital affair between
Stalls and GCSO Deputy Buskirk (id.);
5) Evidence of the sheriff’s surety bond (id.);
6) The existence of liability insurance (Doc. 203 at 1);

7) Reidsville’s ability to pay any judgment rendered
(id.);
8) Other claims or lawsuits involving Reidsville and its
employees (id.);
9) Personnel matters involving RPD Sergeant Lynwood
Hampshire (id.);
10) Evidence related to any settlement offers (id.);
11) Evidence of the court’s ruling on Reidsville’s motion
for summary judgment (id. at 2.);
12) Evidence that the city of Greensboro is paying defense

costs for the Greensboro Officers and has a qualified
duty to indemnify them for any judgment against them
in this matter (Doc. 201);
Additionally, the court will deny as moot the motion to
exclude evidence of malice towards White by Officer Schwochow
(Doc. 199) who is no longer a Defendant in the case.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1. Stalls’s motion for a separate trial (Doc. 182) and
Reidsville’s motion to sever (Doc. 185) are DENIED.
2. Stalls’s motion in limine (Doc. 192) is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part as follows:
a. The motion to exclude evidence of compensatory
damages related to White’s criminal defense
costs, lost income and benefits, Christina
White’s lost income, child custody litigation
expenses, miscellaneous personal property items,
tuition expenses, and pain and suffering or
emotional distress related to his arrest or
termination of his employment is GRANTED.
b. The motion to exclude evidence of punitive
damages is DENIED as premature.
c. The motion to exclude evidence of the criminal

investigation as related to Stalls, Stalls’s
participation in an alleged conspiracy, and the
outcome of White’s criminal charges is GRANTED.
d. The motion to exclude evidence of the court’s
denial of Stalls’s motion for summary judgment on
the trespass claim is GRANTED.
e. The motion to exclude evidence of the GCSO’s
internal investigation into Stalls is GRANTED.
f. The motion to exclude evidence of expert
testimony by Anita Holder as to Stalls is
GRANTED.
g. The motion to exclude evidence of an alleged

extra-marital affair between Stalls and GCSO
Deputy Buskirk is GRANTED.
h. The motion to exclude evidence of the sheriff’s
surety bond is GRANTED.
i. The motion to exclude evidence of emails and text
messages allegedly exchanged between Brittany
Stalls and Christina White or their mother, Mrs.
Ross, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as
noted above.
3. The motion to exclude evidence of malice toward White
by Officer Schwochow (Doc. 199) is DENIED as moot.
4. The motion to exclude evidence that the city of

Greensboro is paying defense costs for the Greensboro
Defendants and has a qualified duty to indemnify them
for any judgment against them in this matter (Doc.
201) is GRANTED.
5. Reidsville’s motion in limine (Doc. 203) is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part as follows:
a. The motion to exclude the existence of liability
insurance is GRANTED.
b. The motion to exclude evidence of Reidsville’s
ability to pay is GRANTED.
c. The motion to exclude evidence of other claims or
lawsuits involving Reidsville and its employees

is GRANTED.
d. The motion to exclude evidence of personnel
matters involving RPD Sergeant Lynwood Hampshire
is GRANTED.
e. The motion to exclude evidence related to any
settlement offers is GRANTED.
f. The motion to exclude evidence of previously
dismissed claims including the criminal
investigation against White, White’s subsequent
arrest and the outcome of his criminal charges,
White’s employment termination, White’s alleged
conspiracy between the Defendants, emotional

distress related to his arrest or termination of
his employment, lost wages, backpay, or other
damages associated with his employment
termination from the City of Greensboro, and
damages related to the criminal charges brought
against White is GRANTED.
g. The motion to exclude evidence of Hampshire’s
criminal investigation into White is GRANTED;
provided that the jury may be informed of the
fact that Hampshire was present for the “knock
and talk” for a lawful purpose related to an
ongoing investigation.
h. The motion to exclude evidence of Judge Biggs’s

written judicial opinion on White’s motion to
suppress related to his federal criminal charges
is GRANTED.
i. The motion to exclude evidence of damages arising
from White’s arrest and criminal charges is
GRANTED.
j. The motion to exclude evidence of damages related
to the termination of White’s employment is
GRANTED.
k. The motion to exclude evidence of the court’s
ruling on Reidsville’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED.
l. The motion to exclude expert testimony of Anita
Holder GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as
noted herein.
6. The Greensboro Defendants’ motion to exclude evidence
of compensatory and punitive damages (Doc. 255) is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as noted above;
provided that the jury may be informed of the fact
that the Greensboro Defendants were present during the
lawful search of White’s home by other agencies
related to an ongoing investigation.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel shall instruct all

witnesses of these rulings, and neither counsel nor witnesses
shall mention these subjects to the jury without prior court
approval.

/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder
August 5, 2022 United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10254073. Public record. Not legal advice.