# NICHOLSON v. ZIMMERMAN

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · February 22, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10253707

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** February 22, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10253707

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “only public entities, and not individual public employees, .. . may be held liable under the ADA” and that “no individual .. . may be held liable under Title II of the ADA”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
JOSHUA NICHOLSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:19cv585
)
JULIE ZIMMERMAN, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the Court on “Plaintiff’s Motion for
Default Judgment as to Worldwide Staffing Resources, Inc.” (Docket
Entry 64) (the “Motion”). For the reasons that follow, the Court
should deny the Motion.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Alleging violations of his constitutional and statutory rights
during his incarceration with the North Carolina Department of
Public Safety (the “NCDPS”) in the summer of 2016, Joshua Nicholson
(the “Plaintiff”) initiated a lawsuit against various defendants,
including Robin Caison (“Caison”) and Worldwide Staffing Resources,
Inc. (“Worldwide,” and collectively with Caison, the “Worldwide
Defendants”) (Docket Entry 1 (the “Complaint”), ¶¶ 6-7). (See
generally Docket Entry 1.) After certain defendants moved to
dismiss the Complaint, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (see
Docket Entry 23) (the “Amended Complaint”), which largely
reiterated the Complaint’s allegations (compare Docket Entry 1,
with Docket Entry 23). Plaintiff thereafter filed an affidavit of
service, indicating that Plaintiff served Worldwide with the
Amended Complaint through the North Carolina Secretary of State.
(See Docket Entry 30 at 1-2.) Plaintiff subsequently moved for
entry of default against Worldwide (see Docket Entry 58), which the
Clerk granted (see Docket Entry 59). Plaintiff then dismissed
Caison from the lawsuit (see Docket Entry 63), and has now moved
for entry of default judgment against Worldwide (see Docket Entry
64). Specifically, Plaintiff seeks “a judgment on all of his
claims against Worldwide in the amount of $1,000,000.00, or in the
alternative, . . . a hearing to determine the measure of damages.”
(Id. at 1.)
DISCUSSION
I. Default Judgment Standards

As this Court (per Chief United States District Judge Thomas
D. Schroeder) recently explained:
A clerk’s entry of default does not entitle a party
to default judgment as a matter of right. Even where a
motion for default judgment is unopposed, the [C]ourt
must exercise sound judicial discretion to determine
whether default judgment should be entered.
Default is not considered an absolute confession by
the defendant of his liability and of the plaintiff’s
right to recover. Rather, a defaulted defendant is
considered to have admitted the factual allegations — but
not the conclusions of law — contained in the complaint.
Ultimately, the [C]ourt must determine whether the
well-pleaded allegations in [the plaintiff’s] complaint
support the relief sought in [the] action.
2
In order to impose default judgment, the moving
party must first show that the defaulted party was
properly served. Second, the [C]ourt must evaluate the
complaint to ensure that it states a legitimate cause of
action. If the [C]ourt determines that liability is
established, the [C]ourt must then determine the
appropriate amount of damages. The [C]lourt does not
accept factual allegations regarding damages as true, but
rather must make an independent determination regarding
such allegations.
Superior Performers, Inc. v. Thornton, No. 1:20-cv-123, 2020 WL
6060978, at *4-5 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 14, 2020) (certain brackets in
original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Moreover, where “the well-pleaded factual allegations in [the
c]omplaint do not support the relief sought in this action,” the
Court “need not determine whether [the p]laintiff[] ha[s] met the
other requirements for entry of default judgment.” Victoria Select
Ins. Co. v. R&G Transp., No. 3:l6cv624, 2017 WL 5158684, at *4
(E.D. Va. Sept. 7, 2017). Instead, in that circumstance, the Court
“must dismiss the [claims against the pertinent defendant] for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Id.
II. Plaintiff’s Allegation
This action arises from Plaintiff’s alleged sexual assault by
his cellmate at “Mountain View” (Docket Entry 23, 97 22)' in August
2016. (See id., TI 13-39.) Asserting claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (id. at 14), 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (id. at 15), and 42 U.S.C.

1 Presumably, Mountain View Correctional Institution. See
https://www.ncdps.gov/adult-corrections/prisons/prison-facilities
(last visited Feb. 22, 2021).

§ 12101 (id. at 17), Plaintiff sued Worldwide and its alleged
employee Caison; Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. (“Maxim”) and its
alleged employee “Stacy Bowen” (“Bowen”); and various (known and
unknown) NCDPS employees. (Id., AI 2-10.) As relevant here, the
Amended Complaint alleges:
Plaintiff suffers from various mental issues and “present[s]
the same cognitive ability as an 8-year-old child” (id., @ 16).
(See, e.g., id., WII 14-16.) On June 14, 2016, Nurse Glover at
Piedmont Correctional Institution (“Piedmont”) performed a health
screening on Plaintiff, which identified the following issues:
“(a) history of inpatient mental health treatment (1-3 times),
(b) a current mental health complaint, (c) treatment for
depression, including antipsychotic prescription Risperdal, Valium
and Cogentin, (d) and a note from [his] mother stating [Plaintiff]
was schizophrenic.” (Id., 9 14.) On or about June 16, 2016, Julie
Zimmerman (“Zimmerman”), a defendant in this action (see id., 7 2),
conducted a mental health assessment on Plaintiff. (See id.,
7 15.) Zimmerman’s notes from this assessment reflect, inter alia,
that “[Plaintiff] reported that he had a psychiatric admission at
CaroMont in Gastonia shortly before his jail admission” (id.) and
“that [Plaintiff] required inpatient admission both times he had
previously been incarcerated, yet [Zimmerman ] inexplicably
recommended outpatient treatment for this incarceration term” (id.,
17). Between June 16, 2016, and June 21, 2016, Plaintiff took

two IQ tests, which returned scores of 63 and 67. (Id., 7 20.)
“Tt is believed that Mountain View had received Piedmont’s IQ test
results prior to [Plaintiff’s] transfer” to Mountain View (id.,
22), which apparently occurred on June 21, 2016 (see id., WII 19,
23.)
“On or about June 21, 2016,” Joseph Williams (“Williams”),
another defendant in this action (see id., @ 9), conducted an
outpatient examination (via telepsychiatry) on Plaintiff at
Piedmont, during which Williams, inter alia, “failfed] Lo
thoroughly discuss the inpatient treatments [Plaintiff] received.”
(Id., @ 19.) The final plan from this exam “[wa]ls for [Plaintiff]
to return in 6-8 weeks.” (Id.) Also “[o]n June 21, 2016, an
Intake health screen was conducted by Caison, who listed
‘outpatient only’ as the history of mental health treatment. She
stated that there was current mental health treatment but no mental
health complaint.” (Id., @{ 23.)°
The Amended Complaint then details various events on June 28,
2016 (id., 7 24), August 12, 2016 (id., 7 25), and August 15, 2016,
through August 22, 2016 (id., IT 26-39), none of which involve
Caison, Worldwide, or the Mountain View intake health screen (see
id., II 24-39). According to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s

2 In the records for a “health screen” at Piedmont on June 6,
2016, “inpatient treatment was listed, but current mental health
treatment/complaint was marked ‘no,’ and there were no other mental
health notes at this appointment.” (lId., J 21.)

Mountain View cellmate “raped and assaulted” him around August 12,
2016. (Id., ¶ 25.)
Although the reference to Caison’s health intake screening
constitutes the only allegation regarding Caison or Worldwide in
its “Factual Allegations” section (id. at 5 (emphasis and all-cap
font omitted)), the Amended Complaint mentions Caison and/or
Worldwide in two additional sections. First, in the “Parties”
section (id. at 1 (emphasis and all-cap font omitted)), the Amended
Complaint states:
Defendant Worldwide Staffing Resources, Inc.
(“Worldwide”) contracted with NCDPS to perform essential
state functions with regard to the prison system and as
to [] Plaintiff, and at all relevant times, was
responsible for ensuring that [] Plaintiff was safe and
receiving adequate care and treatment in accordance with
applicable legal standards. The rights violations at
issue in this case were carried out by Worldwide final
policymakers, and established Worldwide policies and
practices were a driving force behind the rights
violations at issue in this case.
Defendant Robin Caison, sued in her individual and
official capacity, is a citizen and resident of the State
of North Carolina and was at relevant times acting in the
course and scope of her employment with Worldwide, and
under color of state law. Caison is sued in her
individual and official capacity.
(Id., ¶¶ 7-8 (internal paragraph numbering omitted).)
Second, in its “First Cause of Action” section outlining its
Section 1983 claim (id. at 14 (emphasis and all-cap font omitted)),
the Amended Complaint asserts: “As to Maxim and Worldwide, the
constitutional violations described herein involved execution of
the entities’ official policies and custom. These policies and
6
customs were the moving force behind the constitutional violations.
[] Plaintiff specifically does not allege that Maxim and Worldwide
are liable merely via respondeat superior.” (Id., ¶ 54.)
In addition, in detailing its causes of action, the Amended
Complaint also lodges certain allegations against “Defendants.”
(See id., ¶¶ 49-77.) In particular, the Amended Complaint alleges:
“At the time of the incidents at issue, [] Plaintiff had
clearly established rights under the United States Constitution[]”
to, inter alia, “be free from cruel and unusual punishment,”
including “deliberate indifference to [either] a substantial risk
of serious harm” or his “medical needs.” (Id., ¶ 50.) “Defendants
violated these clearly established rights in the ways described in
summary form herein, and in ways that will be uncovered in
discovery and at trial.” (Id., ¶ 51.) “The unconstitutional
misconduct described herein was objectively unreasonable and was
undertaken intentionally, with malice and knowing disregard for
Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights.” (Id.,
¶ 52.) “As a direct and proximate result of the above

constitutional violations, [] Plaintiff suffered serious physical
and emotional injury.” (Id., ¶ 53.)
“Defendants each had personal involvement in the wrongs
enumerated in this Complaint in which they are named, through
personal direction and/or actual knowledge and acquiescence as
described herein.” (Id., ¶ 56.) “All of the Defendants conspired
7
with one another to deprive Plaintiff of his health, well-being and
peace of mind.” (Id., ¶ 57.)
According to the Amended Complaint:
[This] conspiracy included, but was not limited to:
a. Conspiracy to violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment Rights of Plaintiff in violation of the
Civil Rights Act, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1985;
b. Conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of his physical,
mental, and emotional health;
c. Conspiracy to harm Plaintiff as indicated
earlier in this Complaint;
d. Conspiracy to cover-up the sexual abuse and
assaults of Plaintiff’s cellmate.
Upon information and belief, all of the Defendants
had various incentives to participate in the conspiracy.
For example, all of the Defendants and their employees
are incentivized to carry out medical visits as quickly
as possible. For the contractors and their employees,
the quicker the medical visits are carried out, the more
profitable for the contractors. For NCDPS and their
employees, there are specific metrics in place to gauge
how many medical visits and sick call requests and
grievances are closed out. There is no mechanism in
place within NCDPS for inmates to challenge the adequacy
of medical care provided, so the only incentive
[ D]efendants have is to complete medical appointments as
quickly as possible, and to close sick calls and
grievances as quickly as possible. Due to this and other
reasons, [] Defendants acted in concert to coverup [sic]
the assaults on [] Plaintiff.
The above acts were committed by all of the
Defendants, acting under the color of state law and
authority and violated clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of Plaintiff of which a reasonable
person would have known.
(Id., ¶¶ 57-59 (internal paragraph numbering omitted); see also
id., ¶ 64 (“As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’
8
conspiracy to harm and/or cover-up such harm and/or deliberate
indifference and/or failure to protect Plaintiff, [Plaintiff]
suffered severe and permanent emotional distress and mental anguish
together with a total deprivation of his rights guaranteed by the
Constitution of the United States of America.”).)
Finally, the Amended Complaint states:
“Defendants have discriminated against Plaintiff, by excluding
him from participation in, or denying him the benefits of,
programs, activities and services for which Plaintiff is qualified,
or for which he would be qualified with reasonable accommodation to
his disability,” in violation of Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (the “ADA”). (Id., ¶ 69; see also id., ¶¶ 66, 68,
71.) “On information and belief, Defendants failed to provide
effective communication or provide comparable access to services,
benefits, activities, programs, or privileges, policies, regular
practices, and/or customs” (id., ¶ 73), in violation of certain ADA
regulations (see id., ¶¶ 71-72). Accordingly:
As a proximate result of Defendants’ violation of
Plaintiff’s rights under the ADA, Plaintiff has suffered
from discrimination, unequal treatment, exclusion
(including exclusion from Defendants’ services, benefits,
activities, programs, and privileges), violations of his
rights under the laws of the United States, loss of
dignity, frustration, humiliation, mental anguish,
depression, suicidal thoughts, emotional pain and
suffering, anxiety, trauma, embarrassment, and medical
expenses that have been incurred and will be incurred in
the future.
(Id., ¶ 74.)
9
III. Analysis
Although Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of the Motion
contends that his allegations “support §1983, §1985, and [ADA]
claims against Worldwide” (Docket Entry 65 at 3), it does not
address his Section 1985 and ADA claims in arguing for entry of
default judgment (see id. at 3-4). In any event, the Amended
Complaint fails to state viable Section 1985 and ADA claims against
Worldwide, thereby precluding entry of default judgment on those
claims, see, e.g., Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778,
780–81 (4th Cir. 2001).
Pursuant to Section 1985,
[i]f two or more persons . . . conspire . . ., for
the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly,
any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws . . . whereby another is injured in his person or
property, or deprived of having and exercising any right
or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party
so injured or deprived may have an action for the
recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or
deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Furthermore:
The law is well settled that to establish a
sufficient cause of action for “conspiracy to deny equal
protection of the laws” under section 1985(3), a
plaintiff must prove: (1) a conspiracy of two or more
persons, (2) who are motivated by a specific class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus to (3) deprive the
plaintiff of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the
law to all, (4) and which results in injury to the
plaintiff as (5) a consequence of an overt act committed
by the defendants in connection with the conspiracy.
10
Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1376 (4th Cir. 1995). Here, rather
than asserting “a specific class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus,” id., the Amended Complaint alleges that financial
considerations motivated Worldwide Defendants’ actions (see Docket
Entry 23, ¶ 58 (“Defendants and their employees are incentivized to
carry out medical visits as quickly as possible. For the
contractors and their employees, the quicker the medical visits are
carried out, the more profitable for the contractors. . . . Due to
this and other reasons, [] Defendants acted in concert to coverup
[sic] the assaults on [] Plaintiff.”)). Accordingly, the Amended
Complaint’s allegations cannot sustain a Section 1985 claim against
Worldwide.
In turn, Title II provides that, “[s]ubject to the provisions
of [Subchapter II of the ADA], no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (emphasis
added). As relevant here, the ADA defines “public entity” as “any

State or local government,” or “any department, agency, special
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or
local government.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A)-(B) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “By its plain language, this definition ‘does not
include private individuals or private entities,’” Wright v.
11
Carroll Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 1licv3103, 2013 WL 4525309, at *19
(D. Md. Aug. 26, 2013) (collecting cases), such as Worldwide
Defendants (see Docket Entry 23, FTI 7-8). See, e.g., City & Cty.
of S.F. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, _, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1773 (2015)
(“Only public entities are subject to Title II... .”); Smith v.
Glanz, 662 F. App’x 595, 597 (10th Cir. 2016) (explaining that
“only public entities, and not individual public employees, .. .
may be held liable under the ADA” and that “no individual .. . may
be held liable under Title II of the ADA”). The fact that, per the
Amended Complaint, Worldwide “contracted with NCDPS to perform
essential state functions with regard to the prison system and as
to [] Plaintiff” (Docket Entry 23, 9 7), does not change this
reality. See, e.g., Edison v. Douberly, 604 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th
Cir. 2010) (“A private contractor does not . . . become liable
under Title II [of the ADA] merely by contracting with the State to
provide governmental services, essential or otherwise.”); Wright,
2013 WL 4525309, at *19-20 (finding Title II inapplicable to
actions of private parties and collecting cases). Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Title II claim against Worldwide fails as a matter of
law.
The Amended Complaint’s “well-pleaded allegations of fact,”
Ryan, 253 F.3d at 780 (internal quotation marks omitted), likewise
fail to state a viable Section 1983 claim against Worldwide. In
that regard, the Memorandum in Support of the Motion asserts that

12

Worldwide violated Plaintiff’s clearly established Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment; to be free from deliberate
indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm; to be
free from state created danger; to bodily integrity; and
to adequate medical care and to be free from deliberate
indifference to medical needs.
(Docket Entry 65 at 4 (citing Docket Entry 23, ¶ 50).)
“It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in
prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to
scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Helling v. McKinney, 509
U.S. 25, 31 (1993). However, “a prison official cannot be found
liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane
conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
837 (1994).
As such,
[a]n inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim involves a
subjective component and an objective component.
“Specifically, Eighth Amendment analysis necessitates
inquiry as to whether the prison official acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind (subjective
component) and whether the deprivation suffered or injury
inflicted on the inmate was sufficiently serious
(objective component).” These requirements spring from
the text of the amendment itself; absent intentionality,
a condition imposed on an inmate cannot properly be
13
called “punishment,” and absent severity, such punishment
cannot be called “cruel and unusual.”
Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation
omitted).
Thus, “[t]he question under the Eighth Amendment is whether
prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a
prisoner to a sufficiently substantial ‘risk of serious damage to
his future health.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843. “To prove
deliberate indifference, plaintiffs must show that ‘the official
kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety.’” Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016)
(brackets in original) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837); see also
id. (“Put differently, the plaintiff must show that the official
was ‘aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and . . . dr[ew] th[at]
inference.’” (brackets, emphasis, and ellipsis in original)). In
the medical context, these elements of an eighth-amendment claim
require a plaintiff to establish that the defendants “acted with
‘deliberate indifference’ (subjective) to [his] ‘serious medical
needs’ (objective).” Iko, 535 F.3d at 241.3 A defendant displays
deliberate indifference where he possesses “actual knowledge of the
risk of harm to [an] inmate” and “also . . . recognize[s] that his

3 A medical need qualifies as serious if it “has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or . . . is so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity
for a doctor’s attention.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
14
actions [a]re insufficient to mitigate the risk of harm to the
inmate arising from his medical needs.” Id. (emphasis in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
“[D]eliberate indifference entails something more than mere
negligence, . . . [but] is satisfied by something less than acts or
omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge
that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “It requires
that a [defendant] actually know of and disregard an objectively
serious condition, medical need, or risk of harm.” De’lonta v.
Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 525 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted). A plaintiff can satisfy this standard by showing
“that a [defendant] knew of a substantial risk from the very fact
that the risk was obvious.” Scinto, 841 F.3d at 226 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
A plaintiff can also establish “a prima facie case of
deliberate indifference” where “‘a substantial risk of [serious
harm] was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly
noted by prison officials in the past, and the circumstances

suggest that the defendant-official . . . had been exposed to
information concerning the risk and thus must have known about
it.’” Id. (brackets and ellipsis in original) (quoting Parrish ex
rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004)). In
addition, “‘[f]ailure to respond to an inmate’s known medical needs

15
raises an inference [of] deliberate indifference to those needs.’”
Id. (brackets in original).
Here, the only allegation in the Amended Complaint specific to
Worldwide Defendants and their interactions with Plaintiff states,
in full: “On June 21, 2016, an Intake health screen was conducted
by Caison, who listed ‘outpatient only’ as the history of mental
health treatment. She stated that there was current mental health
treatment but no mental health complaint.” (Docket Entry 23,
¶ 23.) This allegation fails to establish that Caison “knew of and
disregarded an[y] excessive risk to [Plaintiff’s] health or
safety,” Scinto, 841 F.3d at 225 (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted), let alone a risk that Plaintiff would be
“brutally sexually assaulted” (Docket Entry 65 at 1) several weeks
later (see Docket Entry 23, ¶¶ 23-39). Thus, the Amended Complaint
fails to allege a plausible Section 1983 claim against Caison.
Further, notwithstanding the assertion that it “does not allege
that . . . Worldwide [is] liable merely via respondeat superior”
(id., ¶ 54), the Amended Complaint contains no independent

allegations of wrongful conduct by Worldwide regarding Plaintiff;
instead, any claim against Worldwide rests on Caison’s conduct.
(See generally Docket Entry 23.) Thus, because the Amended
Complaint fails to state a Section 1983 claim against Caison, it
likewise fails to state a Section 1983 claim against Worldwide.

16
In sum, “Plaintiff[’s Amended] Complaint does not contain
sufficient factual matter to state a claim for the relief
Plaintiff[] request[s].” Victoria Select, 2017 WL 5158684, at *5.
The Court should therefore deny the Motion. See id.;
accord Superior Performers, 2020 WL 6060978, at *7. Moreover,
because Plaintiff fails to allege viable claims against Worldwide,
the Court should dismiss Worldwide from this action. See Victoria
Select, 2017 WL 5158684, at *5; see also Eriline Co. S.A. v.
Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 655 n.10 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Where the face of
a complaint plainly fails to state a claim for relief, a district
court has no discretion but to dismiss it.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
CONCLUSION
The Amended Complaint does not state Section 1983, Section
1985, or ADA claims against Worldwide.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Motion (Docket Entry 64)
be denied and Plaintiff’s claims against Worldwide be dismissed
without prejudice.
This 22°7 day of February, 2021.
/s/_L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge

17

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10253707. Public record. Not legal advice.