# WATSON v. ENGLAND

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · February 5, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10253700

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** February 5, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10253700

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Frickson to undermine [the] requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and conclusions” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- explaining that if a “complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with 10 a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief” (internal quotation marks omitted)

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
TRAVIS L. WATSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:19cv945
)
OFFICER ENGLAND,1 et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge for a recommendation on the “Motion by Defendants
England, M. Johnson and Coleman to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
and Amended Complaint (Doc. Nos. 2 and 4) in Part with Prejudice”
(Docket Entry 16) (the “Motion”). For the reasons that follow, the
Court should grant in part and deny in part the Motion.
BACKGROUND
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Travis L. Watson (the
“Plaintiff”), an inmate with the North Carolina Department of
Public Safety, commenced this action against Officer England,
1 Plaintiff originally identified “Officer England” as
“Officer English” (see, e.g., Docket Entry 2 at 1), but
subsequently filed a “Notice of Correction” (Docket Entry 4 at 1),
docketed as an “Amended Complaint” (see Docket Entry dated Jan. 23,
2020), clarifying that Plaintiff “is suing Officer England” rather
than “Officer English” (Docket Entry 4 at 1). [For legibility
reasons, this Opinion uses standardized capitalization and spelling
in all quotations from the parties’ materials. In addition,
citations herein to Docket Entry pages utilize the CM/ECF footer’s
pagination.]
Officer M. Johnson, and Officer Coleman (collectively, the
“Defendants”) for their alleged violation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights during Plaintiff’s pretrial detention at the
Guilford County Detention Center. (See Docket Entry 2 (the
“Complaint”) at 1-12.) According to the Complaint:
Plaintiff was intentionally, deliberately, and
maliciously denied the right to due process by [Officer]
Engl[and] and [Officer] Johnson, who were at the time
classification officers at the Guilford County Detention
Center. Plaintiff was unlawfully imprisoned, as a
pretrial detainee, in Administrative Segregation for 90
days by the mentioned officials without notice for or
reason or any written findings presented, immediately
after he had completed a 20-day segregation stint for a
rule violation. It was Plaintiff’s first rule violation
and no one had been caused any harm. After the
completion of the 20-day segregation stint, these
officials named above did arbitrarily abuse their
authority by placing Plaintiff on permanent
Administrative Segregation, not to protect inmates or
employees from danger but to overpunish Plaintiff with an
extensive segregation without due process which
constitutes false imprisonment. This was an unnecessary
infliction of pain and punishment which was not used to
maintain order and was disproportionate to the infraction
committed. Under the Due Process Clause, pretrial
detainees cannot be punished. Plaintiff completed [the]
20-day segregation on 2-22-17 and was immediately
transferred to another segregation unit (5E) for an
additional 90 days until he was transferred to prison on
5-22-17 for unknown reasons. Officer Coleman was
responsible for transferring Plaintiff to Administrative
Segregation.
(Id. at 12.)
The Complaint’s only other allegation regarding Defendants
states that Officer Johnson and Officer England “did act in their
official capacities being employees of the Guilford County
2
Detention Center and thereby acted under the color of state law.
Officer Coleman is/was also an employee of the same.” (Id. at 4.)
Defendants move to entirely dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against
Officer Coleman, as well as to dismiss Plaintiff’s official-
capacity claims against Officer England and Officer Johnson. (See
Docket Entry 16.) In particular, Defendants maintain that
“Plaintiff’s claims against [Officer] Coleman should be dismissed
because they are not plausible on their face in view of the facts
alleged in the Complaint.” (Id. at 1.) Defendants further assert
that Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims “should be dismissed
because Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants acted
pursuant to any official policy or custom which inflicted injury.”
(Id. at 2.)2
In response, Plaintiff filed a “Reply to Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss” (Docket Entry 22 (the “Response”) at 1), which solely
addresses Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claim against Officer
Coleman. (See id. at 1-4.) In relevant part, the Response
asserts:
In this case, [] Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee being
detained in the Guilford County Jail (GCJ) pending trial.
[Officer] Coleman is a classification officer at the GCJ
as admitted[3] by [] Defendants and so he would know that
2 The Motion also argues that “Plaintiff’s State Law claims
against Defendants, if any, should be dismissed.” (Id.) The
Complaint contains no state-law claims (see generally Docket Entry
2), mooting this aspect of the Motion.
3 The Complaint identifies Officer England and Officer
(continued...)
3
[] Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee and he would know
that [] Plaintiff had just finished a 20-day segregation
stint for a rule infraction which was [] Plaintiff’s
first rule infraction. [Officer] Coleman would have
access to and a knowledge of Plaintiff’s rule infraction
to know that [] Plaintiff posed no danger to staff or
other inmates to warrant [Officer] Coleman placing []
Plaintiff in a segregation unit “permanently,” as he did
tell [] Plaintiff. . . . As stated, [Officer] Coleman is
a classification officer at the GCJ who has access to the
same information, as to inmates at the GCJ, that
[Officer] England and [Officer] Johnson have access to.
And so, before [Officer] Coleman was designated to
transport [] Plaintiff to further lockup, he had the same
knowledge as to Plaintiff’s segregation infraction and
status that the other Defendants had. [Officer] Coleman
knew that no legitimate justification had been
established to warrant Plaintiff being placed in
segregation permanently and yet he carried out the
act. . . . The fact that [] Defendants (including
[Officer] Coleman) acted outside of proper due process to
continue to imprison [] Plaintiff after his 20-day
segregation stint, implies that their actions were
arbitrary.
[Officer] Coleman is not entitled to qualified
immunity because, as discussed, he acted outside of the
procedural protections of due process. . . . [Officer]
Coleman is a classification officer, versed in these
type[s] of matters and daily situations dealing with
inmates, and he should know that these rights are
established.
For the foregoing reasons, [] Plaintiff asks the
Court to consider [Officer] Coleman’s knowledge as a GCJ
classification officer. [Officer] Coleman has
contributed to the violation of [] Plaintiff’s rights, by
being the actual and direct hand that placed [] Plaintiff
under the illegal restriction. [Officer] Coleman has a
3(...continued)
Johnson by “Job or Title” as “Classification” officers (Docket
Entry 2 at 2), but neither provides a description of Officer
Coleman’s job/title (see id. at 3) nor elsewhere identifies him as
a classification officer (see generally Docket Entry 2). However,
Defendants filed an answer admitting “that [Officer] Coleman was a
Detention Classification Officer” (Docket Entry 18 at 2).
4
duty to be in tune with these things and should have
known that his actions were prejudicing []
Plaintiff... .
(Id. at 2-3.)
Defendants reply that the Response improperly attempts to
alter the Complaint’s allegations against Officer Coleman. (See
Docket Entry 23 at 2-4.) Accordingly, Defendants assert that such
allegations “should be disregarded by thle] Court.” (Id. at 4.)
DISCUSSION
I. Relevant Standards
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to
Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the
“Rules”). (See Docket Entry 16 at 1.) In reviewing a Rule
12 (b) (6) motion, the Court must “accept the facts alleged in the
complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.” Coleman v. Maryland Ct. of App., 626 F.3d 187, 189
(4th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom., Coleman v. Court of App. of Md.,
566 U.S. 30 (2012). The Court must also “draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, a pro se complaint
must “be liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Nevertheless, the Court “will not accept legal conclusions couched

as facts or unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or
arguments.” United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am.,
Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 455 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5
(4th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Frickson to undermine [the]
requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and
conclusions” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court can
also “put aside any naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement.” SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d
412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015), as _ amended _on reh’g in part (Oct. 29,
2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To avoid Rule 12(b) (6) dismissal, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual allegations “to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). To qualify as plausible, a claim needs sufficient factual
content to support a reasonable inference of the defendant’s
liability for the alleged misconduct. Id. “Where a complaint
pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s
liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). This standard “demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. In other

words, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id. Moreover, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint” cannot “survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Francis v.
Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009). “At bottom,
determining whether a complaint states . . . a plausible claim for
relief . . . will ‘be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
II. Analysis
A. Officer Coleman

Defendants first move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against
Officer Coleman on the ground that “they are not plausible on their
face in view of the facts alleged in the Complaint.” (Docket Entry
16 at 1.) In regards to Officer Coleman, the Complaint asserts
simply that “[he] was responsible for transferring Plaintiff to
Administrative Segregation.” (Docket Entry 2 at 12.) This lone
assertion fails to support a reasonable inference that Officer
Coleman violated Plaintiff’s due process rights. As such, the
Complaint fails to state a viable claim against Officer Coleman.
See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
7
Plaintiff attempts to overcome this deficiency by adding
various allegations regarding Officer Coleman in his Response.
(See Docket Entry 22 at 1-3.) However, “[a plaintiff] is bound by
the allegations contained in [hi]s complaint and cannot, through
the use of motion briefs, amend the complaint,” Zachair, Ltd. v.
Driggs, 965 F. Supp. 741, 748 n.4 (D. Md. 1997), aff’d, 141 F.3d
1162 (4th Cir. 1998). See, e.g., Morgan Distrib. Co., Inc. v.
Unidynamic Corp., 868 F.2d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[I]t is
axiomatic that a complaint may not be amended by the briefs in
opposition to a motion to dismiss. To hold otherwise would mean
that a party could unilaterally amend a complaint at will, even
without filing an amendment, and simply by raising a point in a
brief.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also Days v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 318cv440, 2019 WL 8619628,
at *2 (W.D.N.C. June 4, 2019) (“In order to amend their complaint,
[the p]laintiffs may not simply add allegations to their already
existing complaint as they have done here. Rather, they must
submit a proposed amended complaint that contains all claims they
intend to bring in this action against all [the d]efendants they

intend to sue. That is, [the p]laintiffs may not amend their
complaint in piecemeal fashion.” (emphasis omitted)). Accordingly,
Plaintiff cannot stave off dismissal through the Response’s new
allegations against Officer Coleman.

8
Moreover, Plaintiff’s new allegations fail to state a viable
claim. The Response alleges that “[Officer] Coleman is a
classification officer .. .andso he would know that [] Plaintiff
was a pretrial detainee and he would know that [] Plaintiff had
just finished a 20-day segregation stint” for his first rule
infraction. (Docket Entry 22 at 2 (emphasis added).) The Response
further maintains that “[Officer] Coleman would have access to and
a_knowledge of Plaintiff’s rule infraction to know that []
Plaintiff posed no danger to staff or other inmates to warrant
[Officer] Coleman placing [] Plaintiff in a segregation unit
‘permanently,’ as he did tell [] Plaintiff.” (Id. (emphasis
added) .) The Response further alleges that, as a classification
officer, Officer Coleman “has access to the same information...
that [Officer] England and [Officer] Johnson have access to. And
so, before [Officer] Coleman was designated to transport []
Plaintiff to further lockup, he had the same knowledge as to
Plaintiff’s segregation infraction and status that the other
Defendants had.” (Id. (emphasis added) .) Thus, the Response
asserts, “[Officer] Coleman knew that no legitimate justification
had been established to warrant Plaintiff being placed in
segregation permanently and yet he carried out the act.” (Id.)
In sum, the Response maintains that, through his position,
Officer Coleman could obtain information regarding Plaintiff’s
disciplinary history and status. (See id. at 2-3.) Because

Officer Coleman allegedly “has access to the same information” (id.
at 2) as the officers who “plac[ed] Plaintiff on permanent
Administrative Segregation” (Docket Entry 2 at 12), Plaintiff
contends that “[Officer] Coleman knew that no legitimate
justification had been established to warrant Plaintiff being
placed in segregation permanently and yet he carried out the act”
(Docket Entry 22 at 2). At best, however, Plaintiff’s allegations
raise “the mere possibility of misconduct,” and thus cannot
“survive [Defendants’] Rule 12(b)(6) motion,” Francis, 588 F.3d at
193.
In other words, on the facts (improperly) alleged in the
Response, the Court could conclude that Officer Coleman possibly
utilized his “access to . . . information[] as to inmates at the
[Greensboro Detention Center]” to learn about Plaintiff’s
disciplinary history and status “before [Officer] Coleman was
designated to transport [] Plaintiff to further lockup.” (Docket
Entry 22 at 2.) However, the Court also must conclude that it
remains equally possible that Officer Coleman did not avail himself
of this information before his “designat[ion] to transport []

Plaintiff to further lockup.” (Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiff fails
to “nudge[ his] claims [against Officer Coleman] across the line
from conceivable to plausible,” necessitating their dismissal.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (explaining
that if a “complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with
10
a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
B. Official Capacity Claims
Defendants further move to dismiss Plaintiff’s official-
capacity claims against Officer England and Officer Johnson. (See
Docket Entry 16 at 2.) Under Section 1983, official-capacity
liability occurs only if “execution of a government’s policy or
custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 121
(1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Relevant here, “an
official’s discretionary acts, exercised in carrying out official
duties, do not necessarily represent official policy.” Perdue v.
Harrison, No. 1:17cv403, 2017 WL 4804363, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 24,
2017). “Rather, the official must have ‘final authority’ over
government policy with respect to the action in question to trigger

official capacity liability.” Id. (certain internal quotation
marks omitted). The Complaint contains no allegations that Officer
England and Officer Johnson either acted pursuant to any Greensboro
Detention Center policy or possessed “final authority” over any
such custom or policy. (See generally Docket Entry 2.)
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ official-capacity claims against Officer
England and Officer Johnson fail as a matter of law.
11
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim against Officer
Coleman and further fails to allege that Defendants acted pursuant
to any official policy.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Motion (Docket Entry 16)
be granted in part and denied in part as follows: Plaintiff’s
claims against Officer Coleman and his official-capacity claims
against Officer England and Officer Johnson should be dismissed
without prejudice.4
This 5th day of February, 2021.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge

4 Defendants ask the Court to dismiss the relevant claims
with prejudice. (See id. at 1-2.) However, as a general matter,
“where a defect in the complaint is curable, the court should grant
the dismissal without prejudice.” Misel v. Green Tree Servicing,
LLC, 782 F. Supp. 2d 171, 178 (E.D.N.C. 2011). Because Plaintiff
could potentially cure his pleading deficiencies, dismissal without
prejudice remains appropriate here.
12

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10253700. Public record. Not legal advice.