# WATSON v. MOORE

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · February 4, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10253649

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** February 4, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10253649

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine Twombly’s requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and conclusions” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- explaining that “[m]ere conclusory allegations and bare denials” or the nonmoving party’s “self-serving allegations unsupported by any corroborating evidence” cannot defeat summary judgment

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
TRAVIS L. WATSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:19cv931
)
SGT. MOORE, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge for a recommendation on the “Motion by Defendant
Sergeant Moore to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice”
(Docket Entry 9) (the “Motion”).1 For the reasons that follow, the
Court should grant the Motion.
BACKGROUND
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Travis L. Watson (the
“Plaintiff”), an inmate with the North Carolina Department of
Public Safety (the “NCDPS”), commenced this action against Sergeant
Moore (the “Defendant”) for his alleged violation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights during Plaintiff’s pretrial detention at the

1 For legibility reasons, this Opinion uses standardized
capitalization in all quotations from the parties’ materials.
Guilford County Jail (the “GCJ”). (See Docket Entry 2 (the
“Complaint”) at 1-13.)2 According to the Complaint:
“Plaintiff ha[d] been clinically diagnosed with anxiety,
depression, and personality disorder prior to th[e] event” at
issue. (Id. at 5.) At 5:30 p.m. on January 2, 2017,
Plaintiff asked to see a nurse about anxiety and
depression. While waiting, [Defendant] approached
Plaintiff and accused him of an earlier improper act and
stated [that Defendant] ha[d] to put [Plaintiff] on
suicide watch because [Defendant wa]s about to go home
for the day and if anything happened to Plaintiff it
would be on [Defendant]. At no time did Plaintiff say
anything to any officer or nurse about harming himself or
others. Plaintiff complied reluctantly with
[Defendant’s] orders. Plaintiff was immediately taken to
a suicide cell and stripped naked at [Defendant’s]
command.
(Id. at 13.)
Plaintiff was “watched for 7 days until he demanded to know
why he was being treated as such. A psychologist was sent to talk
to Plaintiff in order to determine if Plaintiff needed further
watch[ing].” (Id. at 12.) The psychologist indicated “that she
did not see in the records why Plaintiff was on a suicide watch.
After leaving, she returned and notified Plaintiff that he had been
put in the cell by [Defendant] because of an alleged rule
violation.” (Id.) The psychologist “then ordered that Plaintiff
be released from the suicide watch and his clothes were returned on
[January 9, 2017].” (Id.)
2 Citations herein to Docket Entry pages utilize the CM/ECF
footer’s pagination.
2
Although the Complaint indicates that Plaintiff did not file
a grievance “concerning the facts relating to th[e C]omplaint” (id.
at 7), it also states that Plaintiff did file “Grievance No:
2017/2,” which “claim[ed],” in relevant part, “unlawful suicide
watch for 7 days as a pretrial [detainee]” (id.). The Complaint
elaborates:
For reasons unknown, as a pretrial detainee
Plaintiff was transferred to prison after this event.
When he was returned he filed request for grievance to
address this issue but request was ignored. However in
July of 2017 Plaintiff did file grievance and referred to
this event in the complaint (Grievance No: 2017/2).
(Id. at 8.)
Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on the
grounds, inter alia, that “Plaintiff failed to exhaust his
Administrative Remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act.”
(Docket Entry 9 at 1.) In support of this assertion, Defendant
provided Grievance No: 2017/2, which describes the nature of
Plaintiff’s “grievance/problem” as:
I was intentionally, deliberately, and maliciously
denied my rights of Due Process by [Sheriff] B.J. Barnes
and staff at [the GCJ]. I was unlawfully held in
segregation for 90 days without a hearing (2/22/17 to
5/22/17) after completing a 20-day segregation stint for
(1) one guilty infraction. Again I was denied Due
Process, being sent to [sic] process into the custody and
control of the [NCDPS] for 26 days without judgement and
commitment (5/22/17 to 5/30/17 and 6/22/17 to 7/10/17).
(Docket Entry 11-1 at 1.)
3
In response, Plaintiff concedes that Grievance 2017/2 does not
cover the events at issue in the Complaint. (See Docket Entry 15
at 1.) More specifically, Plaintiff states:
After review, there has in fact been an error.
Plaintiff did not focus on the issue in this civil
complaint when he filed Grievance No: 2017/2 on July 25,
2017 at the [GCJ]. This assertion by [] Plaintiff was
not intended to mislead the Court. In the matter of
exhaustion, Plaintiff was subjected to [Defendant’s]
actions on or about 1-2-17 to 1-9-17. Before []
Plaintiff could file any grievance on this matter, he was
unlawfully transferred, by GCJ officials, to a state
prison. The record will support that on 5-22-17[,
]Plaintiff was abruptly transferred from the GCJ to
Craven Correctional Institution (CCI) . . . . And so
. . . Plaintiff was precluded from exhausting
administrative remedies because he had no access to the
rendered grievance procedure. As admitted by Officer
Diehl in his/her affidavit,[3 ]Plaintiff was transferred
back to the GCJ on 5-30-17, until June 22, 2017. During
the month of June of 2017, [] Plaintiff did in fact file
a complaint with [a GCJ official, Captain J.L. Rollins].
This complaint was filed by way of Guilford County
Sheriff’s Detention Bureau Form. In the Complaint,
Plaintiff notified Cpt. J.L. Rollins of 3 issues:
1) That on 5-22-17 he had been illegally sent to prison,
2) That from 2-22-17 to 5-22-17 he had been illegally
imprisoned in segregation, and 3) That he had been
illegally imprisoned as a suicide [risk] for 7 days.
Plaintiff requested a formal grievance to address these
issues. [Cpt.] J.L. Rollins and any other official
failed to respond to Plaintiff’s complaint and request
and instead, on June 22, 2017[, ]Plaintiff was again
illegally transferred from the GCJ to the prison (CCI),
where administrative remedies were again
3 In support of the Motion, Defendant submitted an affidavit
from Officer M. Diehl detailing the dates of Plaintiff’s detention
at the GCJ and providing all of Plaintiff’s “Grievance Forms at the
[GCJ]” (Docket Entry 11, ¶ 4) for the duration of his detention
there. (See id., ¶¶ 2-4; see also Docket Entry 11-1.) Defendant
also submitted an affidavit from Captain Z. Sellars detailing and
attaching the GCJ’s grievance procedures. (See Docket Entries 12,
12-1.)
4
unavailable. . .. Officer Diehl and Cpt. 4 Sellars, who
both offer affidavits addressing the grievance procedure
and two filed grievances by [] Plaintiff, have neglected
to address the fact that [] Plaintiff did file a
complaint by way of request form to Cpt. J.L. Rollins,
the request being contained in the request form records
mentioned by Officer Diehl in the affidavit. []
Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to allow the
complaint filed to [Cpt. Rollins], who also reviews
grievance complaints, to serve as proof of exhaustion
since [Cpt. Rollins] did not respond to the complaint and
request. In the alternative, [] Plaintiff respectfully
asks that this matter be excused from exhaustion because
of the actions by GCJ officials to illegally send him to
prison (as the record will support) on 5-22-17 and 6-22-
17, thereby rendering administrative remedies unavailable
to [] Plaintiff. . . . It is only by GCJ officials[’]
action and inaction that has caused this matter not to be
properly channeled through the grievance procedure.
(Id. at 1-3.)
DISCUSSION
I. Relevant Standards
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to
Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the
“Rules”). (See Docket Entry 9 at 1.) To avoid such dismissal, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations “to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft □□
Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To qualify as plausible, a
claim needs sufficient factual content to support a reasonable
inference of the defendant’s liability for the alleged misconduct.
Id. Facts that remain “‘merely consistent with’” liability fail to
establish a plausible claim for relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 557). However, the complaint need not contain detailed
factual recitations, as long as it provides “the defendant fair
notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and ellipsis
omitted).
In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept the
facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Coleman v. Maryland Ct. of
App., 626 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom., Coleman v.
Court of App. of Md., 566 U.S. 30 (2012). The Court must also
“draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” E.I.
du_Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440
(4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, a
pro se complaint must “be liberally construed” and “held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Nevertheless, the Court “will not accept legal conclusions
couched as facts or unwarranted inferences, unreasonable
conclusions, or arguments.” United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda
Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 455 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d
298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to

undermine Twombly’s requirement that a pleading contain more than
labels and conclusions” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “At
bottom, determining whether a complaint states . . . a plausible
claim for relief . . . will ‘be a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.’” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir.
2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
Furthermore, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “tests the sufficiency of
a complaint,” but “does not resolve contests surrounding the facts,
the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.”
Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.
1992) (emphasis added). Thus, “claims lacking merit may be dealt
with through summary judgment under Rule 56” rather than through a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506,
514 (2002). Nevertheless, dismissal remains “appropriate when the
face of the complaint clearly reveals the existence of a
meritorious affirmative defense.” Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem,
85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996).

Further, in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a court
evaluates the complaint in its entirety, as well as documents
attached or incorporated into the complaint.” E.I. du Pont, 637
F.3d at 448. The Court may also consider documents “attached to
the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the
complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l Hosp., 572
7
F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). Generally, a “court cannot go
beyond these documents” without “convert[ing] the motion into one
for summary judgment.” E.I. du Pont, 637 F.3d at 448.
As such, if “matters outside the pleadings are presented to
and not excluded by the [C]ourt, the [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion must be
treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(d). In turn, under Rule 56, “[t]he [C]ourt shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine
dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The
movant bears the burden of establishing the absence of such
dispute. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Moreover,
[w]here, as here, the movant seeks summary judgment
on an affirmative defense, [he] must conclusively
establish all essential elements of that defense. When
the defendant has produced sufficient evidence in support
of [hi]s affirmative defense, the burden of production
shifts to the plaintiff to come forward with specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Ray Commc’ns, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 673 F.3d 294,
299 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
8
Additionally, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly
preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248. Moreover, “the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs,
conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a
motion for summary judgment.” Lewis v. Eagleton, No. 4:08cv2800,
2010 WL 755636, at *5 (D.S.C. Feb. 26, 2010) (citing Baber v.
Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992)),
aff’d, 404 F. App’x 740 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Pronin v.
Johnson, 628 F. App’x 160, 161 (4th Cir. 2015) (explaining that
“[m]ere conclusory allegations and bare denials” or the nonmoving
party’s “self-serving allegations unsupported by any corroborating
evidence” cannot defeat summary judgment). Finally, factual
allegations in a complaint or court filing constitute evidence for
summary judgment purposes only if sworn or otherwise made under
penalty of perjury. See Reeves v. Hubbard, No. 1:08cv721, 2011 WL
4499099, at *5 n.14 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 27, 2011), recommendation
adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Nov. 21, 2011).
II. Exhaustion Requirement
As relevant here, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, as
amended (the “PLRA”), provides that “[n]o action shall be brought
with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title,
or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,
prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
This “exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about
prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or
particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or
some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
The defendant bears the burden of establishing that a prisoner
failed to exhaust administrative remedies. See Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 216 (2007) (“We conclude that failure to exhaust is an
affirmative defense under the PLRA, and that inmates are not
required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their
complaints.”).
Nevertheless, the “exhaustion of administrative remedies under
the PLRA is a question of law to be determined by the judge.”
Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 782 (3d Cir. 2010); see also
Lee v. Willey, 789 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[A]ll . . . of
the circuits that have considered the issue agree that judges may
resolve factual disputes relevant to the exhaustion issue without
the participation of a jury.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
A prisoner satisfies the PLRA exhaustion requirement when he “ha[s]

utilized all available remedies ‘in accordance with the applicable
procedural rules,’ so that prison officials have been given an
opportunity to address the claims administratively.” Moore v.
Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)). Thus, the relevant jail’s grievance
10
procedures determine the steps that a prisoner must take to meet
his exhaustion obligations. See id. at 726.
Per Grievance 2017/2, an individual “must file the grievance
within three days from the date [he] discovered or reasonably
should have discovered the incident giving rise to the complaint
and was able to file the grievance.” (Docket Entry 11-1 at 1.)
That requirement accords with the GCJ grievance procedures that
Captain Sellars provided. (See Docket Entry 12-1 at 1 (“The inmate
must file the grievance within three (3) days from the date of the
incident, the discovery of the incident, when they reasonably
should have discovered the incident, giving rise to the complaint,
or within three (3) days of receipt of a response to an inmate
request form [detailing the inmate’s compliance with the GCJ’s
informal resolution process, specifying the relevant grievance, and
requesting a grievance form].”).)
III. Analysis
As a preliminary matter, Defendant relies on materials outside

the Complaint in support of his Motion. (See, e.g., Docket Entry
10 at 6-7.) Accordingly, the Motion more properly constitutes a
request for summary judgment than for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). The distinction between Rule 12(b)(6) and
Rule 56 motions has little bearing on the outcome of this case,
however, because (i) the Court can properly consider Grievance
2017/2 in resolving the Motion under Rule 12(b)(6), see Philips,
11
572 F.3d at 180, and, in any event, (ii) the parties agree on the
relevant facts (see, e.g., Docket Entry 10 at 6-7; Docket Entry 11,
¶ 2; Docket Entry 15 at 1-3.) In this regard, the record reflects
the following:4
No later than January 9, 2017, GCJ officials released
Plaintiff from suicide watch. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 2 at 12-13
(alleging that Plaintiff remained on suicide watch from January 2,
2017, to January 9, 2017); Docket Entry 11, ¶ 2 (averring that
“Plaintiff was on Suicide Watch from December 31, 2016 until
January 5, 2017”).) Plaintiff alleges that, on January 9, 2017, a
psychologist informed Plaintiff that Defendant had placed him on
suicide watch “because of an alleged rule violation.” (Docket
Entry 2 at 12.) According to Plaintiff, the psychologist “then
ordered that Plaintiff be released from the suicide watch and his
clothes were returned on [January 9, 2017].” (Id.) On May 22,
2017, NCDPS officials transferred Plaintiff from the GCJ to another
NCDPS facility, where he remained until May 30, 2017, at which
point he transferred back to the GCJ, where he remained until June
22, 2017. (See Docket Entry 11, ¶ 2; Docket Entry 15 at 1-2.)

In July 2017, Plaintiff filed Grievance 2017/2, which does not
address the suicide watch incident. (See Docket Entry 11-1 at 1.)

4 It bears noting that neither Plaintiff’s Complaint nor his
response to the Motion constitutes evidence for summary judgment
purposes, as he did not submit them under penalty of perjury (see
Docket Entries 2, 15). See Reeves, 2011 WL 4499099, at *5 n.14.
12
Plaintiff maintains, however, that during June 2017, he filed a
complaint with a GCJ official, Captain J.L. Rollins, reporting the
suicide watch incident and requesting a grievance form. (See
Docket Entry 15 at 2.)5 Per Plaintiff, neither Captain Rollins nor
any other GCJ official responded to that June 2017 complaint.
(See id.) Plaintiff asks the Court to either allow that alleged
June 2017 complaint “to serve as proof of exhaustion” or,
alternatively, to “excuse[]” this matter “from exhaustion because
of the actions by GCJ officials to illegally send him to prison
. . . on [May 22, 2017,] and [June 22, 2017], thereby rendering
administrative remedies unavailable to [him].” (Id. at 2-3.)
In sum, the record reflects that Plaintiff failed to file a
grievance, as required, regarding the suicide watch incident. The
record further shows that, although Plaintiff knew by at least
January 9, 2017, of “the incident giving rise to the complaint”
(Docket Entry 11-1 at 1), he did not attempt to pursue a grievance

5 As Plaintiff suggests, the GCJ grievance process begins
with an informal resolution process in which an inmate alerts GCJ
officials to a complaint, which GCJ officials “shall attempt [to]
remedy for the inmate.” (Docket Entry 12-1 at 1.) If the GCJ
official “is unable to provide a satisfactory remedy for the
complaint, the officer or employee shall issue a request form to
the inmate. Only if the inmate has satisfied the above
requirements and is unsatisfied with the resolution of that request
or complaint, then the inmate can request a grievance form” by
“submit[ting] an Inmate Request Form requesting a grievance form,
stating the matter to be grieved, and detailing how the inmate has
complied with the foregoing requirements.” (Id.) “If proper, the
inmate will then be issued a Grievance Form,” which he “must fully
complete” within three days. (Id.)
13
regarding the suicide watch until, at the earliest, June 2017, even
though he remained at the GCJ until May 22, 2017 (see Docket Entry
15 at 1-3). Thus, the record establishes that Plaintiff neither
initiated the informal resolution process nor “file[d a] grievance
within three days from the date [he] discovered or reasonably
should have discovered the incident giving rise to the
[C]omplaint,” as the GCJ’s grievance policy requires. (Docket
Entry 11-1 at 1.) Plaintiff therefore failed to exhaust
administrative remedies before filing suit, necessitating dismissal
of his Complaint. See, e.g., Germain v. Shearin, 653 F. App’x 231,
234 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Given that [the plaintiff] failed to his
[sic] exhaust his claims, dismissal is mandatory.”).6

6 In addition, as Plaintiff concedes, his official-capacity
claim against Defendant lacks merit. (See Docket Entry 15 at 7.)
Under Section 1983, official-capacity liability occurs only if
“execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” Collins v. City
of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 121 (1992) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Relevant here, “an official’s discretionary acts,
exercised in carrying out official duties, do not necessarily
represent official policy.” Perdue v. Harrison, No. 1:17cv403,
2017 WL 4804363, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 24, 2017). “Rather, the
official must have ‘final authority’ over government policy with
respect to the action in question to trigger official capacity
liability.” Id. (certain internal quotation marks omitted). The
Complaint contains no allegations that Defendant either acted
pursuant to any GCJ policy or possessed “final authority” over any
such custom or policy. (See generally Docket Entry 2.)
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ official-capacity claim against Defendant
fails as a matter of law.
Finally, Defendant moves to dismiss “Plaintiff’s State Law
claims . . ., if any.” (Docket Entry 9 at 2.) The Complaint does
(continued...)
14
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
filing suit.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Motion (Docket Entry 9)
be granted and this action be dismissed without prejudice for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
This 4th day of February, 2021.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge

6(...continued)
not raise any such claims (see generally Docket Entry 2), mooting
such request.
15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10253649. Public record. Not legal advice.