# LINK v. SAUL

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · August 26, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10253556

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** August 26, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10253556

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing that “[n]o principle of administrative law or common sense requires [a court] to remand a case in quest of a perfect opinion [by an ALJ] unless there is reason to believe that the remand might lead to a different result”
- declining to “determine whether substantial evidence support[ed] the ALJ’s rejection of the [treating physician’s] assessment [issued after Plaintiff’s insured status for benefits expired,] because the [] assessment [wa]s not relevant”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
TINA OLIVER LINK, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:19CV662
)
ANDREW M. SAUL, )
Commissioner of Social )
Security,1 )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Tina Oliver Link, brought this action pursuant to
the Social Security Act (the “Act”) to obtain judicial review of a
final decision of Defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security,
denying Plaintiff’s claim for Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”). (Docket Entry 1.) Defendant has filed the certified
administrative record (Docket Entry 6 (cited herein as “Tr. __”)),
and both parties have moved for judgment (Docket Entries 9, 11, 12;
1 The United States Senate confirmed Andrew M. Saul as the Commissioner of
Social Security on June 4, 2019, and he took the oath of office on June 17, 2019.
Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Andrew M. Saul
substitutes for Nancy A. Berryhill as the Defendant in this suit. Neither the
Court nor the parties need take any further action to continue this suit by
reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
see also Docket Entry 13 (Defendant’s Memorandum)).2 For the
reasons that follow, the Court should enter judgment for Defendant.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff applied for DIB, alleging a disability onset date of
August 8, 2014. (Tr. 33, 206-10, 236.) Upon denial of that
application initially (Tr. 73-103, 122-30) and on reconsideration
(Tr. 104-20, 132-39), Plaintiff requested a hearing de novo before
an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) (Tr. 140-41). Plaintiff, her
attorney, and a vocational expert (“VE”) attended the hearing.
(Tr. 27-72.) The ALJ subsequently ruled that Plaintiff did not
qualify as disabled under the Act. (Tr. 7-19.) The Appeals
Council thereafter denied Plaintiff’s request for review (Tr. 1-6,
201-05), thereby making the ALJ’s ruling the Commissioner’s final
decision for purposes of judicial review.
In rendering that decision, the ALJ made the following
findings:
1. [Plaintiff] meets the insured status requirements of
the . . . Act through December 31, 2021.
2. [Plaintiff] has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since August 8, 2014, the alleged onset date.

2 Plaintiff originally filed a separate Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket
Entry 9) and a Memorandum of Law in Support (Docket Entry 10) and then re-filed
a combined Motion for Summary Judgment (see Docket Entry 11 at 2-3) and
Memorandum of Law in Support (see Docket Entry 11 at 1, 4-27).
2
3. [Plaintiff] has the following severe impairments:
degenerative disc disease, status post total left knee
arthroplasty, carpal tunnel syndrome of the right hand,
connective tissue disease with features of Lupus,
headaches post herpetic neuralgia, and left eye light
sensitivity with pain.

. . .
4. [Plaintiff] does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals
the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
. . .
5. . . . [Plaintiff] has the residual functional
capacity to perform light work . . . except she can
occasionally push and pull with the upper and lower
extremities; and she can occasionally handle and finger
with the right upper extremity, but no tasks should
involve small objects or that require visual precision –
defined as tasks that require use of fine motor skills to
finger objects that are smaller than one inch that need
to be placed in exact locations, such as electronic
circuit boards or other small electronic items that
require exact placement of parts. She can occasionally
climb ramps and stairs, but should never climb ladders,
ropes or scaffolds. She can frequently balance, stoop,
kneel, crouch and occasionally crawl. She can have no
exposure to unprotected heights, moving mechanical parts,
or hazardous work settings; and should avoid concentrated
exposure to bright lights, flashing lights, or outdoor
sunlight but should be allowed to wear sunglasses for
frequent exposure to work task [sic] indoors or under
indoor lighting. [Plaintiff] would be off task 10% of
the workday in addition to normal breaks due to pain and
side effects from medication.

. . .
6. [Plaintiff] is capable of performing past relevant
work as a Management Trainee and Health Club Membership
Salesperson. This work does not require the performance
of work-related activities precluded by [Plaintiff]’s
residual functional capacity.
3
. . .
7. [Plaintiff] has not been under a disability, as
defined in the . . . Act, from August 8, 2014, through
the date of this decision.
(Tr. 12-18 (bold font and internal parenthetical citations
omitted).)
II. DISCUSSION
Federal law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security
Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits.” Hines v.
Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). However, “the scope
of . . . review of [such a] decision . . . is extremely limited.”
Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff has
not established entitlement to relief under the extremely limited
review standard.
A. Standard of Review
“[C]ourts are not to try [a Social Security] case de novo.”
Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Instead, “a
reviewing court must uphold the factual findings of the ALJ
[underlying the denial of benefits] if they are supported by
substantial evidence and were reached through application of the
correct legal standard.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 561 (internal brackets
and quotation marks omitted).
“Substantial evidence means ‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
4
Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)). “It consists of
more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less
than a preponderance.” Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th
Cir. 2001) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). “If
there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the
case before a jury, then there is substantial evidence.” Hunter,
993 F.2d at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“In reviewing for substantial evidence, the [C]ourt should not
undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility
determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ, as
adopted by the Social Security Commissioner].” Mastro, 270 F.3d at
176 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). “Where
conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to
whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that
decision falls on the [Social Security Commissioner] (or the ALJ).”
Id. at 179 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The issue before
[the Court], therefore, is not whether [the claimant] is disabled,
but whether the ALJ’s finding that [the claimant] is not disabled
is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a
correct application of the relevant law.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d
585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).
When confronting that issue, the Court must take note that
“[a] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving
5
a disability,” Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981),
and that, in this context, “disability” means the “‘inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months,’” id.
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).3 “To regularize the
adjudicative process, the Social Security Administration [(‘SSA’)]
has . . . promulgated . . . detailed regulations incorporating
longstanding medical-vocational evaluation policies that take into
account a claimant’s age, education, and work experience in
addition to [the claimant’s] medical condition.” Id. “These
regulations establish a ‘sequential evaluation process’ to
determine whether a claimant is disabled.” Id. (internal citations
omitted).
This sequential evaluation process (“SEP”) has up to five
steps: “The claimant (1) must not be engaged in ‘substantial
gainful activity,’ i.e., currently working; and (2) must have a
‘severe’ impairment that (3) meets or exceeds the ‘listings’ of
specified impairments, or is otherwise incapacitating to the extent

3 The Act “comprises two disability benefits programs. [DIB] . . .
provides benefits to disabled persons who have contributed to the program while
employed. The Supplemental Security Income Program . . . provides benefits to
indigent disabled persons. The statutory definitions and the regulations . . .
for determining disability governing these two programs are, in all aspects
relevant here, substantively identical.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 n.1 (internal
citations omitted).
6
that the claimant does not possess the residual functional capacity
to (4) perform [the claimant’s] past work or (5) any other work.”
Albright v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d 473, 475 n.2
(4th Cir. 1999).4 A finding adverse to the claimant at any of
several points in the SEP forecloses an award and ends the inquiry.
For example, “[t]he first step determines whether the claimant is
engaged in ‘substantial gainful activity.’ If the claimant is
working, benefits are denied. The second step determines if the
claimant is ‘severely’ disabled. If not, benefits are denied.”
Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).
On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at
each of the first three steps, “the claimant is disabled.” Mastro,
270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and
two, but falters at step three, i.e., “[i]f a claimant’s impairment
is not sufficiently severe to equal or exceed a listed impairment,
the ALJ must assess the claimant’s [RFC].” Id. at 179.5 Step four

4 “Through the fourth step, the burden of production and proof is on the
claimant. If the claimant reaches step five, the burden shifts to the
[government] . . . .” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35 (internal citations omitted).
5 “RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the
claimant’s] limitations.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562 (noting that administrative
regulations require RFC to reflect claimant’s “ability to do sustained work-
related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and
continuing basis . . . [which] means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an
equivalent work schedule” (internal emphasis and quotation marks omitted)). The
RFC includes both a “physical exertional or strength limitation” that assesses
the claimant’s “ability to do sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy
work,” as well as “nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory, or skin
impairments).” Hall, 658 F.2d at 265. “RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only
after [the ALJ] considers all relevant evidence of a claimant’s impairments and
any related symptoms (e.g., pain).” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562-63.
7
then requires the ALJ to assess whether, based on that RFC, the
claimant can “perform past relevant work”; if so, the claimant
does not qualify as disabled. Id. at 179-80. However, if the
claimant establishes an inability to return to prior work, the
analysis proceeds to the fifth step, whereupon the ALJ must decide
“whether the claimant is able to perform other work considering
both [the RFC] and [the claimant’s] vocational capabilities (age,
education, and past work experience) to adjust to a new job.”
Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65. If, at this step, the government cannot
carry its “evidentiary burden of proving that [the claimant]
remains able to work other jobs available in the community,” the
claimant qualifies as disabled. Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.6
B. Assignments of Error
Plaintiff asserts that the Court should overturn the ALJ’s
finding of no disability on these grounds:
1) “[t]he ALJ failed to identify herpes zoster eye pain as a
symptom and as a severe impairment which ultimately developed into
post-herpetic and trigeminal neuralgia” (Docket Entry 11 at 17);

6 A claimant thus can qualify as disabled via two paths through the SEP.
The first path requires resolution of the questions at steps one, two, and three
in the claimant’s favor, whereas, on the second path, the claimant must prevail
at steps one, two, four, and five. Some short-hand judicial characterizations
of the SEP appear to gloss over the fact that an adverse finding against a
claimant on step three does not terminate the analysis. See, e.g., Hunter, 993
F.2d at 35 (“If the ALJ finds that a claimant has not satisfied any step of the
process, review does not proceed to the next step.”).
8
2) “[t]he ALJ set forth an RFC finding that was vague and
failed to account for Plaintiff’s severe impairments” (id. at 18);
3) “[t]he ALJ failed to present a logical connection between
the evidence of record and his conclusions as to Plaintiff’s RFC”
(id. at 20); and
4) “[t]he ALJ has failed to state the weight he has given to
Plaintiff’s various treating providers whose findings and opinions
appear in the record” (id. at 21).
Defendant contends otherwise and seeks affirmance of the ALJ’s
decision. (See Docket Entry 13 at 10-25.)
1. Herpes Zoster Eye Pain
In Plaintiff’s first assignment of error, she maintains that
“[t]he ALJ failed to identify herpes zoster eye pain as a symptom
and as a severe impairment which ultimately developed into post-
herpetic and trigeminal neuralgia.” (Docket Entry 11 at 17.)
According to Plaintiff, “[t]he zoster virus was the trigger for
Plaintiff’s post-herpetic neuralgia; the neuralgia affected the
trigeminal nerve and became the etiology for Plaintiff’s []
symptoms” of “severe pain, severe light sensitivity, nausea,
vomiting, headaches and [] decreased corrected vision.” (Id.)
Plaintiff additionally faults the ALJ for “fail[ing] to discuss any
of the procedures [Plaintiff underwent] in an attempt to diminish
or relieve her symptoms; he merely stated that ‘the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of [Plaintiff’s] symptoms [we]re
9
not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record’ without specifically citing such evidence,
as well as ignoring the evidence favorable to Plaintiff.” (Id.
(quoting Tr. 16).) Plaintiff’s contentions miss the mark.
As an initial matter, the ALJ found both “headaches post
herpetic neuralgia” and “left eye light sensitivity with pain” as
severe impairments at step two of the SEP (Tr. 12), thus
acknowledging both the headache component and the eye pain/light
sensitivity components of Plaintiff’s post-herpetic neuralgia. In
light of this, Plaintiff’s argument that “[t]he ALJ failed to
identify herpes zoster eye pain as a symptom and as a severe
impairment” (Docket Entry 11 at 17 (emphasis added)) essentially
amounts to a complaint over the ALJ’s word choice rather than an
assertion of error in failing to identify any severe impairments.
Moreover, the ALJ properly found Plaintiff’s herpes zoster
(shingles) a non-severe impairment (see Tr. 12-13), because her
active outbreak of shingles in August 2014 cleared within a few
months (see Tr. 476-85) and thus did not last for 12 months as
required for a severe impairment under the regulations, see 20
C.F.R. § 404.1509.
Plaintiff additionally faults the ALJ for “fail[ing] to
discuss any of the procedures [Plaintiff underwent] in an attempt
to diminish or relieve her [post-herpetic neuralgia] symptoms,”
including “various ganglion nerve blocks, of both a chemical and an

10
operative nature,” and “an ablation procedure (in effect, burning
the nerve tissue to prevent it from sending pain impulses), all of
which did not effectively diminish the pain.” (Docket Entry 11 at
17.) The ALJ’s discussion of the record evidence relating to
Plaintiff’s post-herpetic neuralgia included the following:
[Plaintiff] has alleged that she is unable to work due
to[, inter alia,] . . . vision problems[ and] headaches.
In her Function Report, [Plaintiff] . . . reported having
pain due to shingles and sensitivity to light. . . . Due
to shingles, [Plaintiff] stated that she has vision
problems and needs to constantly wear sunglasses because
of pain and light sensitivity in her eyes. She rated the
pain in her eyes an 8 out of 10 despite pain medication.
. . . She testified that her pain level also affects her
ability to concentrate and focus.
. . .
Progress notes from November 2015 show that [Plaintiff]
was treated for reported head pain due to herpetic
neuralgia of the right upper forehead. However, physical
exam findings note that [Plaintiff] was in no acute
distress with normal musculoskeletal and neurological
findings. . . . Opthalmology findings indicated no
diminished or blurred vision.
At the internal medicine consultative examination in
February 2016 with Dr. Everett Bolz, [Plaintiff]
presented with sunglasses and appeared uncomfortable
sitting for the examination due to the lights. Eye
examination was normal and vision testing showed 20/50 in
the right eye and 20/30 in the left.

(Tr. 16 (internal citations omitted).)
Although that discussion did not specifically include the
ganglion blocks and ablation procedure Plaintiff underwent (see
id.; see also Tr. 426-45, 464-75), “‘there is no rigid requirement
that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his
11
decision,’” Reid v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861, 865
(4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211
(llth Cir. 2005)). Moreover, the ALJ indicated that he
“careful[ly] consider[ed ] the entire record” (see Tr. 15 (bold
font omitted)), and “[t]he Court is entitled to rely on th[at]
representation[] absent a compelling reason to the contrary,”
Hunter v. Colvin, No. 1:10CV401, 2013 WL 2122575, at *4 (M.D.N.C.
May 15, 2013) (unpublished) (Webster, M.J.) (citing Grubby v.
Astrue, No. 1:09CV364, 2010 WL 5553677, *6 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 18, 2010)
(unpublished) (in turn citing Rappaport v. Sullivan, 942 F.2d 1320,
1323 (8th Cir. 1991))), recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C.
June 18, 2013) (Eagles, J.). Plaintiff has provided no such
compelling reason. (See Docket Entry 11 at 17.)
Furthermore, as the above-quoted discussion makes clear, the
ALJ expressly acknowledged Plaintiff’s complaints of eye pain,
headaches, and light sensitivity, as well as her alleged need to
take pain medication and wear sunglasses indoors (see Tr. 16), and
the ALJ accommodated those complaints in the RFC by including
restrictions to no tasks involving visual precision, no
concentrated exposure to bright lights, flashing lights, and
outdoor sunlight, and an allowance to wear sunglasses indoors
(see Tr. 15). As such, Plaintiff has not shown how remand for an
express discussion of the ganglion blocks and ablation procedure
would lead to a different outcome in her case. See generally
12

Fisher v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1989) (observing
that “[n]o principle of administrative law or common sense requires
[a court] to remand a case in quest of a perfect opinion [by an
ALJ] unless there is reason to believe that the remand might lead
to a different result”).
Simply put, Plaintiff’s first assignment of error fails as a
matter of law.
2. RFC7
Plaintiff next asserts that “[t]he ALJ set forth an RFC
finding that was vague and failed to account for Plaintiff’s severe
impairments” (Docket Entry 11 at 18), as well as that “[t]he ALJ
failed to present a logical connection between the evidence of
record and his conclusions as to Plaintiff’s RFC” (id. at 20).
Plaintiff’s arguments fall short.
RFC measures the most a claimant can do despite any physical
and mental limitations. Hines, 453 F.3d at 562; 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1545(a). An ALJ must determine a claimant’s exertional and
non-exertional capacity only after considering all of a claimant’s
impairments, as well as any related symptoms, including pain. See
Hines, 453 F.3d at 562–63; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(b). The ALJ then
must match the claimant’s exertional abilities to an appropriate

7 As Plaintiff’s second and third assignments of error both challenge the
ALJ’s RFC (see Docket Entry 11 at 18, 20), this Recommendation will discuss them
together.
13
level of work (i.e., sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very
heavy). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. Any non-exertional limitations
may further restrict a claimant’s ability to perform jobs within an
exertional level. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569a(c). An ALJ need not
discuss every piece of evidence in making an RFC determination.
See Reid, 769 F.3d at 865 (citing Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211).
However, “the ALJ must both identify evidence that supports his [or
her] conclusion and build an accurate and logical bridge from that
evidence to [that] conclusion.” Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686,
694 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal emphasis, quotation marks, and
brackets omitted).
a. Vagueness/Inadequacy of RFC
Plaintiff first attacks the ALJ’s inclusion of restrictions to
frequent kneeling and crouching in the RFC, arguing that such
restrictions “fail[] to consider” the opinion of Plaintiff’s
treating orthopedic surgeon, Dr. James Melvin, that, “[d]ue to the
knee replacement, [Plaintiff] will have discomfort sitting for long
periods of time with the knee flexed, running, kneeling, crawling
and squatting.” (Docket Entry 11 at 18 (referencing Tr. 15, and
quoting Tr. 907).) Plaintiff’s argument glosses over the fact that
Dr. Melvin offered that opinion on July 3, 2013 (see Tr. 906-07),
over a year prior to Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date and
prior to her left knee arthroscopy and debridement of scar tissue
and adhesions in April 2014 (see Tr. 965-66). Moreover, even prior
14
to Plaintiff’s 2014 arthroscopy, Dr. Melvin did not restrict
Plaintiff to occasional (or less than frequent) kneeling and
squatting; rather, he opined only that Plaintiff would experience
“discomfort” with such activities. (Tr. 907.) Plaintiff has not
shown how the ALJ’s restriction to frequent (as opposed to
constant) kneeling and crouching conflicts with Dr. Melvin’s
opinion.
Next, Plaintiff contends that, although the ALJ restricted
Plaintiff from “concentrated exposure to bright lights, flashing
lights, or outdoor sunlight” (Tr. 15), “[t]he ALJ made no effort to
define what constitutes ‘bright lights’ at the hearing or in his
decision.” (Docket Entry 11 at 18.) According to Plaintiff, “a
‘bright’ light may be a 60 watt bulb, a 40 watt bulb, or even
less,” and “[i]t is unknown whether the past relevant jobs that the
ALJ found Plaintiff could perform involved ‘bright’ lighting or
some other level of lighting.” (Id. at 19.) Those contentions
falter for two reasons.
First, despite representation by counsel at the hearing,
Plaintiff objected neither to the purported vagueness of the ALJ’s
bright lights restriction in the dispositive hypothetical question
(see Tr. 54-57), nor to the VE’s testimony that an individual
restricted from concentrated exposure to bright lights, flashing
lights, or outdoor sunlight could nonetheless perform Plaintiff’s
past relevant work as a Management Trainee and Health Club
15
Membership Salesperson (see Tr. 57-67). As a result, Plaintiff has
waived, in this Court, any challenge to the ALJ’s bright lights
restriction and to the ALJ’s adoption of the VE’s testimony that
Plaintiff’s former work as a Management Trainee and a Health Club
Membership Salesperson could accommodate the ALJ’s bright lights
restriction. See Stepinski v. Astrue, No. CA 11–183, 2012 WL
3866678, at *9–10 (D.R.I. Aug. 6, 2012) (unpublished) (“The [c]ourt
views unfavorably the silence of [the p]laintiff’s counsel at the
hearing regarding the omission about which he now complains.
Reversal and remand . . . would encourage other counsel to remain
silent in similar circumstances. This [c]ourt is disinclined to
provide such an incentive[ ] . . . [and] finds that [the p]laintiff
waived this issue by failing to raise it before the ALJ.” (internal
citations omitted)), recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 3863812
(D.R.I. Sept. 5, 2012) (unpublished).
Second, even if Plaintiff had not waived this argument,
consideration of the entire exchange between the ALJ and the VE at
the hearing makes clear what the ALJ meant by his bright lights
restriction. During the ALJ’s questioning of the VE, the ALJ
elaborated on his bright lights restriction by explaining that
“[w]ork tasks indoors or under indoor lighting c[ould] be
accommodated with sunglasses” (Tr. 55). Thus, as the Commissioner
argues, “[t]he context [] made clear that ordinary ‘indoor
lighting’ was acceptable (with sunglasses).” (Docket Entry 13 at
16
13.) Moreover, the VE expressed no confusion over the meaning of
the ALJ’s bright lights restriction. (See Tr. 54-67.)
Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ’s preclusion in the
RFC of “tasks [that] involve small objects or that require visual
precision,” which the ALJ further defined as “‘tasks that require
use of fine motor skills to finger objects that are smaller than
one inch that need to be placed in exact locations, such as
electronic circuit boards or other smaller electronic items that
require exact placement of parts.’” (Docket Entry 11 at 19
(quoting Tr. 15).) According to Plaintiff, “the ALJ failed to take
into account the necessity of being able to read normal print,
which is considerably smaller than one inch.” (Id.) More
specifically, Plaintiff points out that the job descriptions in the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) for Plaintiff’s prior
work as a Management Trainee and Health Club Membership Salesperson
reflect that both jobs require reading of job-related materials.
(Id. at 19-20 (referencing DOT, No. 189.167-018 (Management
Trainee), 1991 WL 671497 (G.P.O. 4th ed. rev. 1991), DOT, No.
293.357-022 (Membership Solicitor), 1991 WL 672580).) Plaintiff
emphasizes that the VE defined visual precision as “something like
small lines or thin lines, small wording” (Tr. 63), and that the
ALJ’s preclusion of tasks involving visual precision “would not
allow for ‘small lines or thin lines, small wording’ as such things

17
are smaller than the one inch definition.” (Docket Entry 11 at
20.)
Despite Plaintiff’s acknowledgment that the ALJ’s small
objects/visual precision restriction “seem[ed] to relate more to
the use of fine motor skills than [the] ability to see the objects”
(id. at 19), Plaintiff nonetheless attempts to convert the ALJ’s
restriction into one precluding the reading of normal-sized print
(id. at 19-20). That attempt fails for two reasons.
First, and most critically, the ALJ did not find that
Plaintiff had a medically determinable vision impairment at step
two of the SEP (see Tr. 12-13), and found at step three that
Plaintiff “d[id] not meet Listing 2.02 for Impairment of Visual
Acuity because her remaining vision in the better eye after best
correction [wa]s not 20/200 or less” (Tr. 14). The ALJ further
noted during his discussion of the RFC that, in February 2016,
Plaintiff’s vision had tested at 20/50 in the right eye and 20/30
in the left eye (Tr. 16; see also Tr. 407). Thus, the ALJ’s
decision as a whole provides no support for Plaintiff’s contention
that the ALJ intended the small objects/visual precision
restriction to preclude Plaintiff from reading normal-sized print.
Second, the following exchange between Plaintiff’s counsel,
the VE, and the ALJ makes clear that the ALJ intended the small
objects/visual precision restriction as a limitation on Plaintiff’s
ability to engage in the precise placement of small objects:
18
[Plaintiff’s counsel:] Visual precision, how do you
define visual precision in answering the [ALJ]’s
question?
[VE:] The ability to see precise objects, such as
like thin lines or smaller wording.
[Plaintiff’s counsel:] Well, you’re kind of defining
the term by using its own term itself. What is precise?
[VE:] Such as something like small lines or thin
lines, small wording.
[Plaintiff’s counsel:] Wouldn’t you agree that
different people can have different interpretations of
what constitutes visual precision?
[VE:] That’s possible.
[Plaintiff’s counsel:] Wouldn’t you agree that
different people would have different definitions of what
constitutes a small object?
[VE:] Yes, that’s possible as well.
[ALJ:] All right, point well taken. So let me provide
a little definition then if will help then [sic].
Because I agree that my wording was probably not precise
in terms of size or details and that was vague wording.
. . .
So when I say no tasks involving small objects or that
require visual precision, I specifically mean tasks that
require fine motor skills to finger objects that are
smaller than one inch, that would need to be placed onto
– or into exact locations, such as electronic circuit
boards or other small electronic items, that require
exact placement of parts. So what I envision here is –
when I talk about small objects and visual precision is
being able to see and manipulate small things that have
to be placed exactly in a particular location in order
for the object to work or for the task to be properly
completed.
19
(Tr. 63-64 (emphasis added).) Thus, even though the VE initially
defined visual precision to mean the ability to see “precise
objects, such as like thin lines or smaller wording” (Tr. 63
(emphasis added)), the ALJ then refined his definition to make
clear that he intended to convey a restriction on Plaintiff’s
ability to engage in fine finger movements to place objects smaller
than one inch in exact locations (see Tr. 63-64) and the VE
indicated that Plaintiff’s prior work as a Management Trainee and
Health Club Membership Salesperson remained available (see Tr. 64).
b. Logical Bridge Between Evidence and RFC
Plaintiff’s second attack on the RFC concerns the ALJ’s
alleged “fail[ure] to present a logical connection between the
evidence of record and his conclusions as to Plaintiff’s RFC.”
(Docket Entry 11 at 20.) In that regard, Plaintiff observes that
“the ALJ listed a multitude of limitations in his RFC, yet he
failed to identify evidence in the record supporting the small
objects/visual precision requirement, the frequent balance, stoop,
kneel, crouch and occasionally crawl requirements, the avoidance of
concentrated exposure to bright lights requirements, the allowance
for sunglasses requirements [sic] for indoor work tasks or under
indoor lighting, or the off-task requirement.” (Id. at 20-21
(internal citation omitted).) Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments,
the ALJ sufficiently identified evidence in the record supporting

20
the limitations in the RFC to permit meaningful judicial review by
this Court.
Regarding the small objects/visual precision restriction, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from severe carpal tunnel
syndrome of the right hand at step two of the SEP (see Tr. 12), and
then, in support of the RFC, discussed that “Dr. Bolz noted a
fracture deformity of the right wrist” and “4/5 grip strength,” as
well as that “an ultrasound of the bilateral hands” showed a
“moderate probability of median entrapment on the right hand” (Tr.
16). Those findings also explain why the ALJ included limitations
to occasional handling and fingering with the right upper extremity
in the RFC. (See Tr. 15.)
Concerning the ALJ’s postural limitations, the ALJ
acknowledged Plaintiff’s indication on a Function Report that she
had “problems with [] squatting, bending, . . . [and] kneeling”
(Tr. 16; see also Tr. 263), found that Plaintiff’s degenerative
disc disease and status post total left knee arthroplasty
constituted severe impairments at step two (see Tr. 12), and
pointed out in support of the RFC that “[f]indings from an
examination in April 2015 show[ed] that [Plaintiff] had mild
degenerative changes in the spine” (Tr. 16 (citing Tr. 391)), but
that, although Plaintiff had “reduced range of motion in the spine
and knee[s], [] all other findings were within normal limits” (id.
(citing Tr. 406-11)). Moreover, the ALJ afforded “little probative
21
weight” to the state agency medical consultants (Tr. 18) who found
Plaintiff capable of medium work without any postural limitations
(see Tr. 83-84, 114-15), noting that the consultants “neither
examined [Plaintiff] nor based their opinions on the most recent
evidence of record, which support[ed] further limitations” (Tr.
18). In further support of the postural limitations, the ALJ
accorded “only partial weight” to the opinion of Dr. Bolz that
Plaintiff “[wa]s moderately severely impaired in performing certain
postural activities,” finding that such an opinion “d[id] not give
specific functional limitations.” (Tr. 17; see also Tr. 410.)
The ALJ also supplied a logical bridge between the record
evidence and his preclusion of concentrated exposure to bright
lights, flashing lights, and outdoor sunlight and his allowance to
wear sunglasses for work under indoor lighting (see Tr. 15). The
ALJ recognized Plaintiff’s statements that she had “pain due to
shingles and sensitivity to light,” that she “needs to constantly
wear sunglasses because of pain and light sensitivity in her eyes,”
and that “[s]he rated the pain in her eyes an 8 out of 10 despite
pain medication.” (Tr. 16; see also Tr. 43-44, 46, 49, 262.)
However, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements about her symptoms
“not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record” (Tr. 16) and further noted that “the
evidence suggest[ed] that [Plaintiff]’s symptoms m[ight] not be
accurately reported and m[ight] not exist at the level of severity
22
assumed by her testimony” (Tr. 17). Nevertheless, “[t]o account
for [Plaintiff’s] allegations of pain and other symptoms,” the ALJ
precluded Plaintiff from “concentrated exposure to bright lights,
flashing lights, or outdoor sunlight” and “allowed [Plaintiff] to
wear sunglasses for frequent exposure to work task[s] indoors or
under indoor lighting.” (Id.)
The ALJ also adequately explained the RFC’s allowance for
Plaintiff to remain off-task for up to 10 percent of the workday in
addition to normal breaks (see Tr. 15). Consistent with that
allowance, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s non-severe mental
impairments resulted in only mild limitation of Plaintiff’s ability
to maintain concentration, persistence, or pace at step two of the
SEP. (See Tr. 13.) Moreover, the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s
testimony that she suffered “fatigue from her medications” and
“that her pain level also affect[ed] her ability to concentrate and
focus” (Tr. 16), but found Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms []
not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record” (id.). However, the ALJ stated that he
“view[ed] the evidence in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff]”
(Tr. 18), and included the off-task allowance to accommodate
Plaintiff’s alleged “pain and side effects from medication” (Tr.
17).

23
In sum, Plaintiff’s second and third issues on review do not
warrant reversal or remand.
3. Opinion Evidence
In Plaintiff’s final assignment of error, she asserts that
“[t]he ALJ has failed to state the weight he has given to
Plaintiff’s various treating providers whose findings and opinions
appear in the record.” (Docket Entry 11 at 21.) In that regard,
Plaintiff faults the ALJ for according great weight to consultative
psychological examiner Dr. Patrick C. Quinn (id. (citing Tr. 17)),
and for failing to discuss and/or weigh the opinions and findings
of Dr. Melvin, Dr. Gary T. Raflo, Dr. Landirs Shaun Williams, Dr.
Jason A. Ravanbahkt, Dr. Robert B. Wilson II, Dr. Joshua A.
Rheinbolt, Dr. Brian K. Cain, and Dr. Bolz (id. at 21-22 (citing
Tr. 410, 906-07, 1784)). Plaintiff’s arguments do not establish an
entitlement to relief.
The treating source rule generally requires an ALJ to give
controlling weight to the opinion of a treating source regarding
the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairment. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(2) (“[T]reating sources . . . provide a detailed,
longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s] medical impairment(s) and
may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot
be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from
reports of individual examinations, such as consultative
examinations or brief hospitalizations.”). The rule also
24
recognizes, however, that not all treating sources or treating
source opinions merit the same deference. The nature and extent of
each treatment relationship appreciably tempers the weight an ALJ
affords an opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(ii). Moreover,
as subsections (2) through (4) of the rule detail, a treating
source’s opinion, like all medical opinions, deserves deference
only if well-supported by medical signs and laboratory findings and
consistent with the other substantial evidence of record. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(4). “[I]f a physician’s opinion is not
supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other
substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less
weight.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 590 (emphasis added). Finally,
statements from medical sources (and even treating sources) that a
claimant qualifies as disabled or cannot work do not constitute
“medical opinions as described in [§ 404.1527(a)(1)], but are,
instead, opinions on issues reserved for the Commissioner” and do
not warrant controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).8
Consultative examiners (such as Drs. Quinn and Bolz) do not
constitute treating sources under the regulations, see 20 C.F.R.

8 For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, the Commissioner has
significantly amended the regulations governing opinion evidence. The new
regulations provide that ALJs “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary
weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s), including those from your medical sources.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. As Plaintiff filed her claims prior to March 27, 2017
(see Tr. 10), this Recommendation has analyzed Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the
treating physician rule set out above.
25
§ 404.1527(c)(2), and thus their opinions, as a general
proposition, do not warrant controlling weight, Turberville v.
Colvin, No. 1:11CV262, 2014 WL 1671582, at *6 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 23,
2014) (unpublished) (Auld, M.J.), recommendation adopted, slip op.
(M.D.N.C. May 15, 2014) (Eagles, J.). However, the ALJ must
nevertheless evaluate consultative opinions using the factors
outlined in the regulations, and expressly indicate and explain the
weight he or she affords to such opinions. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c) (“Regardless of its source, [the ALJ] will evaluate
every medical opinion [he or she] receive[s]” and where an opinion
does not warrant controlling weight, the ALJ must “consider all of
the . . . factors [in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6)] in deciding
the weight [to] give to any medical opinion.”).
a. Dr. Quinn
Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s decision to afford “great
weight” to the opinions of consultative psychological examiner Dr.
Quinn (Tr. 17) “when so many of [Plaintiff]’s limitations are
physical in nature.” (Docket Entry 11 at 21 (emphasis added).) In
that regard, Plaintiff points out that Dr. Quinn lacked the
qualifications “to give an opinion as to [Plaintiff]’s exertional
capacity, her postural abilities, her manipulation abilities, her
visual perception, her nerve-related pain issues, her environmental
issues, or her need for sunglasses in the workplace.” (Id.)
According to Plaintiff, Dr. Quinn “gave an opinion as to
26
Plaintiff’s mental state (without performing any formal mental
status testing), and her [sic] opinion has virtually no bearing on
[] Plaintiff’s overall functional abilities.” (Id.)
The ALJ did not err in his consideration of Dr. Quinn’s
opinions, because the ALJ did not rely upon Dr. Quinn’s opinions to
formulate Plaintiff’s physical RFC; rather, the ALJ credited Dr.
Quinn’s opinion that Plaintiff’s mental impairments would not
“prevent her from tolerating the stress and pressure associated
with day-to-day [work] or similar activity” (Tr. 17; see also Tr.
401) and accordingly found that Plaintiff’s depression and anxiety
constituted non-severe impairments that “d[id] not cause more than
minimal limitation in [her] ability to perform basic mental work
activities” (Tr. 13). Moreover, Dr. Quinn’s report directly
contradicts Plaintiff’s argument that Dr. Quinn “gave an opinion as
to Plaintiff’s mental state (without performing any formal mental
status testing)” (Docket Entry 11 at 21), as the report contains
both a “Narrative Mental Status” (Tr. 397) and individual findings
for orientation (see Tr. 398), immediate retention and recall (see
id.), recent memory (see id.), remote memory (see Tr. 399), fund of
information (see id.), calculations (see id.), abstract reasoning
(see Tr. 399-400), and insight (see Tr. 400).
b. Dr. Melvin
With regard to Dr. Melvin, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s
failure to “discuss what weight he gave to the opinions of Dr.
27

Melvin . . . and the limitations and prognosis he set forth” ina
letter to Plaintiff’s counsel dated July 3, 2013. (Docket Entry 11
at 21 (citing Tr. 906-07).) In the letter, Dr. Melvin estimated
that, as of July 2013, Plaintiff “ha[d] a 40[ percent] disability
to the left lower extremity,” noted that her left knee showed signs
of “developing early patellar clunk syndrome,” indicated that she
“very well m[ight] need arthroscopic debridement of scar tissue,”
and opined that she would have “discomfort sitting for long periods
of time with [her left] knee flexed, running, kneeling, crawling,
and squatting.” (Tr. 907 (emphasis added).) Dr. Melvin noted that
Plaintiff had a “slight gait impairment,” and that he could not
predict whether her mild to moderate knee pain would improve with
time. (Id. (emphasis added).) Dr. Melvin further recommended that
Plaintiff pursue “an active, healthy lifestyle.” (Id.)
The ALJ did not discuss Dr. Melvin’s July 2013 letter in his
decision. (See Tr. 12-18.) However, the ALJ’s omission, if error
at all, amounts to at most harmless error, see generally Fisher,
869 F.2d at 1057, because Dr. Melvin offered that opinion over a
year prior to Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date and during
a time period subsequent to Plaintiff’s total knee replacement in
October 2012 but prior to her left knee arthroscopy in April 2014
which, as Dr. Melvin predicted (see Tr. 907), involved debridement
of scar tissue and adhesions from the total knee replacement
(see Tr. 965-66). As the Commissioner points out (see Docket Entry
28

13 at 22), Dr. Melvin released Plaintiff to return to work without
restrictions on May 19, 2014, less than one month after her
debridement procedure (see Tr. 984). Under such circumstances,
Plaintiff has not shown that remand for an express discussion by
the ALJ of Dr. Melvin’s July 2013 letter would have resulted in
additional, material restrictions in the RFC or an otherwise more
favorable outcome in her case. See Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d
650, 655 (4th Cir. 2005) (declining to “determine whether
substantial evidence support[ed] the ALJ’s rejection of the
[treating physician’s] assessment [issued after Plaintiff’s insured
status for benefits expired,] because the [] assessment [wa]s not
relevant”); Gordon v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 235-36 (4th Cir.
1984) (requiring ALJs to “explain[] the weight . . . given to
obviously probative exhibits” (emphasis added)); Rivera v. Colvin,
No. 5:11CV569, 2013 WL 2433515, at *4 (E.D.N.C. June 4, 2013)
(unpublished) (deeming treating physician’s opinion not probative
to determining whether plaintiff qualified as disabled under her
current application for benefits, because opinion pre-dated the
plaintiff’s disability onset date and addressed injuries that had
improved); Ambrose v. Astrue, 2:11CV683, 2013 WL 1308981 *12 (E.D.
Va. Mar. 28, 2013) (unpublished) (holding that ALJ’s failure to
explain weight given to treating physician’s opinion qualified as
harmless error where opinion (issued two years after the

29
plaintiff’s date last insured) remained “[in]consistent with the
record during the relevant period”).
c. Drs. Raflo and Rheinbolt
Dr. Raflo, an opthalmologist, treated Plaintiff immediately
after her alleged disability onset date for the approximately two-
and-a-half-month-period Plaintiff had an active herpes zoster
(shingles) infection in her right eye. (See Tr. 476-85.) By the
end of that period, Dr. Raflo noted that Plaintiff’s right eye
“look[ed] good” and recommended that Plaintiff see her primary care
physician for headaches and/or post-herpetic pain. (Tr. 485.) Dr.
Raflo did not offer an opinion regarding the impact of Plaintiff’s
zoster infection on her functional abilities (see Tr. 476-85), and
the record does not reflect any subsequent treatment by Dr. Raflo.
The ALJ’s decision does not specifically reference Dr. Raflo’s
treatment (see Tr. 12-18); however, that omission constitutes, at
most, harmless error, see generally Fisher, 869 F.2d at 1057. As
discussed above in connection with Plaintiff’s first issue on
review, her active zoster infection did not meet the 12-month
durational requirement for a severe impairment, see 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1509, and thus the ALJ properly focused his discussion on
Plaintiff’s treatment for the post-herpetic neuralgia symptoms
caused by the zoster infection. As with Dr. Melvin, Plaintiff has

30
thus not shown that an express discussion by the ALJ of Dr. Raflo’s
treatment would result in a more favorable outcome for Plaintiff.
So far as the record reflects, Dr. Rheinbolt, also an
opthalmologist, treated Plaintiff two times on March 15, 2017 (see
Tr. 1679-81), and September 18, 2017 (see Tr. 642-44). On March
15, 2017, Plaintiff complained of blurry vision, sticky eyes, and
light sensitivity, but denied eye pain. (See Tr. 1679.) Dr.
Rheinbolt tested Plaintiff’s vision in the right eye at 20/80 and
in the left eye at 20/100 (see Tr. 1680), and prescribed Valtrex as
well as the use of artificial tears (see Tr. 1681). Approximately
six months later, Dr. Rheinbolt noted Plaintiff’s vision had
improved to 20/30 on the right and 20/40 on the left (see Tr. 643)
and continued to prescribe Valtrex (see Tr. 642). In neither
record did Dr. Rheinbolt note that Plaintiff wore sunglasses or
recommend that Plaintiff wear them. (See Tr. 642-44, 1679-81.)
As an initial matter, doubt exists as to whether Dr.
Rheinbolt, having treated Plaintiff on only two occasions,
qualifies as a treating physician. see 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527 (c) (2) (1) (“Generally, the longer a treating source has
treated [a claimant] and the more times [a claimant] have been seen
by a treating source, the more weight [the ALJ] will give to the
source’s medical opinion. When the treating source has seen [a
claimant] a number of times and long enough to have obtained a
longitudinal picture of [the claimant’s] impairment, [the ALJ] will
31

give the source’s opinion more weight than [the ALJ] would give it
if it were from a nontreating source.” (emphasis added)). Whether
properly considered as a treating physician nor not, Dr. Rheinbolt
did not offer any opinions as to the effect of Plaintiff’s eye
impairments on her physical functioning and thus Plaintiff merely
challenges the ALJ’s failure to discuss Dr. Rheinbolt’s two
treatment records. Given the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s
“headaches post herpetic neuralgia” and “left eye light sensitivity
with pain” qualified as severe impairments (Tr. 12), and his
preclusion of concentrated exposure to bright lights, flashing
lights, or outdoor sunlight, as well as an allowance to wear
sunglasses indoors on the job in the RFC (see Tr. 15), Plaintiff
has not established that remand to require the ALJ to discuss Dr.
Rheinbolt’s treatment records would have a material impact on
Plaintiff’s case.
d. Drs. Williams, Ravanbahkt, and Wilson
Plaintiff objects to the ALJ’s failure to “reference any of
the pain management doctors . . . who saw Plaintiff” and the
omission of any “discussion in the record as to any of the
findings, treatment, procedures performed, or course of care of any
of these physicians.” (Docket Entry 11 at 21.) According to
Plaintiff, “[i]n a case where the primary medical impairment taking
Plaintiff out of, and keeping Plaintiff from performing, her last

32
job, is post-herpetic neuralgia and trigeminal neuralgia caused by
the zoster virus, with resulting photosensitivity, severe eye pain,
nausea, vomiting, and headaches, it is difficult to understand why
no reference is made to these physicians or any of their findings
and opinions.” (Id. at 21-22.)
As discussed in connection with Plaintiff’s first assignment
of error, “‘there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically
refer to every piece of evidence in his decision,’” Reid, 769 F.3d
at 865 (quoting Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211), and, as the ALJ indicated
that he “careful[ly] consider[ed ] the entire record” (see Tr. 15
(bold font omitted)}), “[t]he Court is entitled to rely on th[at]
representation[] absent a compelling reason to the contrary,”
Hunter, 2013 WL 2122575, at *4. Again, Plaintiff has not presented
any such compelling reason. (See Docket Entry 11 at 21-22.)
Furthermore, the ALJ expressly acknowledged Plaintiff’s complaints
of eye pain, headaches, and light sensitivity, as well as her
alleged need to take pain medication and wear sunglasses indoors
(see Tr. 16), and accommodated those complaints in the RFC (see Tr.
15). Plaintiff has simply not shown that remanding this matter for
an express discussion by the ALJ of Plaintiff’s pain management
procedures would lead to a different result in her DIB claim. See
generally Fisher, 869 F.2d at 1057.

33

e. Dr. Cain
Plaintiff additionally challenges the ALJ’s “fail[ure] to
signify what weight, if any, he gave to the opinion of [Plaintiff’s
primary care physician,] Dr. [] Cain, who, after filling out
[Plaintiff]’s disability paperwork, gave an assessment; ‘Currently
she is severely limited in her ability to do much of anything
beyond her [activities of daily living] as exertion does exacerbate
her post-herpetic neuralgia.’” (Docket Entry 11 at 22 (quoting Tr.
1784).) The ALJ’s failure to mention or weigh Dr. Cain’s above-
quoted statement (see Tr. 12-18) does not constitute reversible
error. As the Commissioner argues:
If one looks more closely at Dr. Cain’s statements, [] he
is simply reporting what Plaintiff subjectively stated to
him. Dr. Cain explains that Plaintiff “states” she
cannot perform activities: Plaintiff “states that she has
very limited ability to do much throughout the day. She
states that even attempting light housework results in
severe headaches” (Tr. 1785, emphasis supplied).
Otherwise, Dr. Cain largely notes Plaintiff’s diagnoses,
and then concludes by again noting that Plaintiff
“states” she is “limited in her ability to do day-to-day
activities,” which has resulted in significant sadness
[(Id.)]. These notations from Dr. Cain, therefore, are
not true medical opinions; rather, they are a recitation
of what Dr. Cain has been told by Plaintiff. As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
aptly explained, the mere memorialization of a patient’s
subjective complaints by a physician does not
“transform[] his observations into ‘clinical evidence.’
If this were true, it would completely vitiate any notion
of objective clinical medical evidence.” Craig, 76 F.3d
34
at 590 n.2. “There is nothing objective” about a doctor
saying, without more, “I observed my patient telling me
she was in pain.” Id.
(Docket Entry 13 at 24 (underscoring added).)
f. Dr. Bolz
Lastly, Plaintiff criticizes the ALJ for “fail[ing] to state
what weight he gives to Dr. Bolz’[s] opinion that ‘[Plaintiff]’s
ability to perform work-related activities such as bending,
stooping, lifting, walking, crawling, squatting, carrying,
traveling, and pushing and pulling heavy objects appears to be at
least moderately severely impaired due to the sum of [Dr. Bolz’s]
findings described [in his report].’” (Docket Entry 11 at 22
(quoting Tr. 410).) Plaintiff’s argument inexplicably overlooks
the fact that the ALJ expressly accorded “partial weight” to Dr.
Bolz’s opinion in question, finding the opinion “vague[]” and
noting that the opinion lacked “specific functional limitations.”
(Tr. 17.)
In short, as Plaintiff has not shown reversible error in the
ALJ’s consideration of the opinion evidence of record, Plaintiff’s
fourth and final assignment of error misses the mark.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has not established grounds for relief.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner’s decision
finding no disability be affirmed, that Plaintiff’s Motion for
35
Summary Judgment (Docket Entry 9; Docket Entry 11 at 2-3) be
denied, that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
(Docket Entry 12) be granted, and that judgment be entered
dismissing this action.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
August 26, 2020

36

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10253556. Public record. Not legal advice.