# ALLEN v. ELWELL

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · December 30, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10253544

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** December 30, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10253544

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that official capacity claims constitute claims against governmental entity employing that official

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
DERRICK ALLEN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
) 1:19cv766
v. )
)
JENNIFER ELWELL, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Application to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis (the “Application”)(Docket Entry 1) filed
in conjunction with his pro se Complaint (Docket Entry 2). For the
reasons that follow, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s instant
Application for the limited purpose of recommending dismissal of
this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to
state a claim, pursuit of monetary relief against immune
defendants, and/or as frivolous due to untimeliness.
LEGAL STANDARD
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892
[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee
that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because
his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the
costs.” Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th
Cir. 1995) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Dispensing with filing fees, however, [is] not without its
problems. . . . In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis
d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining
relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.
FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004). To address this
concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that “the [C]ourt
shall dismiss the case at any time if the [C]ourt determines . . .
the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
As to the first of these grounds, “a complaint, containing as
it does both factual allegations and legal conclusions, is
frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “The word
‘frivolous’ is inherently elastic and not susceptible to
categorical definition. . . . The term’s capaciousness directs
lower courts to conduct a flexible analysis, in light of the
totality of the circumstances, of all factors bearing upon the
frivolity of a claim.” Nagy, 376 F.3d at 256–57 (some internal
quotation marks omitted). As concerns this case, an action fails
as frivolous when “it appear[s] on the face of the complaint . . .
that the applicable statute of limitations bars [the plaintiff’s
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claims] . . . .” Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70, 74 (4th Cir.
1983); see also Nasim, 64 F.3d at 955 (holding that courts may
anticipate defenses when conducting IFP review), 956 (“[T]he
[district] court found that [the plaintiff’s claim] was barred by
the applicable . . . statute of limitations. In these
circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that the action was frivolous . . . .”).
As to the second ground, a plaintiff “fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),
when the complaint does not “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis
added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely
consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to
relief.”’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). This standard
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Id. In other words, “the tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the

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elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id.!
The third ground for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B)
generally applies to situations in which doctrines established by
the United States Constitution or at common law immunize government
entities and/or government personnel from liability for damages.
See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984) (discussing eleventh-amendment immunity of states and state
officials); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (describing
interrelationship between 42 U.S.C. §$ 1983 and common-law immunity
doctrines); cf. Allen v. Burke, 690 F.2d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 1982)
(noting that, even where “damages are theoretically available under
[certain] statutes . . ., in some cases, immunity doctrines and
special defenses, available only to public officials, preclude or

' Although “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine
Twombly’s requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and
conclusions,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (dismissing pro se
complaint); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of
Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A pro se complaint
- . . ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ But even a pro se complainant must
plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than
the mere possibility of misconduct.’” (first quoting Erickson, 551
U.S. at 94; then quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).
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severely limit the damage remedy” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
BACKGROUND
Asserting claims under “42 U.S.C. § 1983” for “subject[ion] to
cruel and unusual punishment which violates [the] 8th [A]mendment”
(Docket Entry 2 at 5), and for violation of his rights under the
“5th, 6th, [and] 14th (section one) [A]mendment[s]” (id.), Plaintiff
initiated this action against ten defendants: (1) “Jennifer
Elwell” (“Defendant Elwell”); (2) “Mark Nelson” (“Defendant
Nelson”); (3) “Grant Gilliam (“Defendant Gilliam”); (4) “Cerelyn
Davis” (“Defendant Davis”); (5) “Durham Police Department;” (6)
“City [o]f Durham;” (7) “Freda Black” (“ADA Black”); (8) “Tracey
Cline” (“DA Cline”); (9) Durham County [D]istrict Attorney[’s]
Office” (the “Durham County DA’s Office”); and (10) “NC State
B[ureau] of Investigation[]” (the “NCSBI”). (Id. at 1-4.) The
Complaint states the following as the basis for asserting claims
under Section 1983:

SBI lab[or]atory [t]echicians wrote reports in a
misleading manner to benefit Durham County [p]rosecutors,
and did not explicitly or clearly communicate results to
defense.
Durham Police [D]epartment lodged [c]harge(s) [s]uch as
Statutory Sexual Offense, First [D]egree Murder[,] and
Felony Child [A]buse when the evidence was not sufficient
to lodge those charges which conduced [sic] [Plaintiff]
to being categorize[d] as a child murder [sic] and
rapist.
[ADA] Black and [DA] Cline were the Distr[ic]t Attorney
and/or Assistant [D]istrict [A]ttorney who prosecuted the
case and [sought] capital punishment ([t]he [d]eath
[p]enalty) against [Plaintiff] when the evidence was not
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sufficient to warrant a death sentence. Durham County
[DA’s O]ffice employed both [ADA] Black and [DA] Cline.
(Id. at 5 (parentheses in original).)
The Complaint’s “Statement of Claim” alleges the following:
[Plaintiff] was wrongfully imprisoned for crimes [he] did
not commit, [c]harges were lodged against [him] and the
government did not have the evidence or suspicion to
ch[a]rge and prosecute but instead attempted to cover up
the blunder at [Plaintiff’s] expense. [Plaintiff] was
wrongfully incarcerated for crimes [he] did not commit.
(Id. at 6.) The Complaint also states that Plaintiff sustained
injuries as a result of being “wrongfully charged with [o]ffenses
[he] did not commit[], and [was] imprisoned for a duration of 12
years and 7 months,” as well as that “due to the stigma that has
been attached to [Plaintiff’s] name[, he] ha[s] been subject[ed] to
hardship which is rife with misperception [sic], deceit and
neglect” (id.). As a result, the Complaint requests
“compensat[ion] for [] mental anguish and punitive damages in the
amount of $3,000,000.00.” (Id. at 7.) Finally, the Complaint
appends a complaint filed in the Superior Court Division of Durham
County on March 10, 2014 (see id. at 9), which alleges similar
claims against Defendant Elwell, Defendant Nelson, Defendant
Gilliam, Durham Police Department, the City of Durham, and ADA
Black (see id. at 9-49).

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DISCUSSION
I. The Durham Police Department
As an initial matter, the Durham Police Department does not
qualify as a proper defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a
claim for relief under Section 1983, Plaintiff must assert “that
[he was] deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed
under color of state law.” American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999).2 “In North Carolina, a
municipal agency is not an entity that may be sued. Furthermore,
under North Carolina law, a police department is not an independent
legal entity with the capacity to sue and be sued.” Baker v.
Durham Cty. S.W.A.T. Team, No. 1:14CV878, 2016 WL 2621972, at *4
(M.D.N.C. May 5, 2016) (unpublished) (internal citations and
bracket omitted), recommendation adopted, Baker v. Durham S.E.T.,
No. 1:14CV878, 2016 WL 3747615, at *1 (M.D.N.C. July 11, 2016)

2 Specifically, Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part,
that

[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress[.]
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
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(unpublished) (Osteen, C.J.). Because “the Durham Police
Department . . . lacks the capacity to be sued,” Baker, 2016 WL
2621972 at *4, all claims asserted against it should be dismissed.
II. The City of Durham and Official Capacity Claims against
Defendants Davis and Gilliam
Next, the Complaint seeks damages from the City of Durham
based on the premise that it controls the operations of the Durham
Police Department, where Defendants Davis and Gilliam work. (See
Docket Entry 2 at 11.) However, “a municipality cannot be held
liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words,
a municipality cannot be held liable under [Section] 1983 on a
respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (emphasis in original). “Only in cases
where the municipality causes the deprivation ‘through an official
policy or custom’ will liability attach.” Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d
463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215,
218 (4th Cir. 1999)). “Because [S]ection 1983 was not designed to
impose municipal liability under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, the ‘official policy’ requirement was ‘intended to
distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the
municipality, and thereby to make clear that municipal liability is
limited to action for which the municipality is actually
responsible.’” Riddick v. School Bd. of Portsmouth, 238 F.3d 518,

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523 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475
U.S. 469, 479 (1986)).
“To state a cause of action against a municipality, a section
1983 plaintiff must plead (1) the existence of an official policy
or custom; (2) that the policy or custom is fairly attributable to
the municipality; and (3) that the policy or custom proximately
caused the deprivation of a constitutional right.” Pettiford v.
City of Greensboro, 556 F. Supp. 2d 512, 530 (M.D.N.C. 2008). The
Complaint fails to assert factual information which would satisfy
any of these requirements (see Docket Entry 2 at 1-49), and
therefore, all claims asserted against the City of Durham should be
dismissed.
Any official capacity claims against Defendants Davis and
Gilliam similarly fail as a matter of law, given that the Complaint
alleges no facts showing that they violated Plaintiff’s rights
pursuant to a policy or custom of the City of Durham (Docket Entry
2 at 1-49), a requirement to establish such liability under Section
1983. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (setting standard for municipal
liability); Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 249 (4th Cir. 2006)
(explaining that official capacity claims constitute claims against
governmental entity employing that official). As such, the Court
should dismiss all official capacity damages claims against
Defendant Davis and Defendant Gilliam.

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III. The Durham County DA’s Office, the NCSBI, and Official
Capacity Claims against Defendant Elwell, Defendant Nelson,
ADA Black, and DA Cline
The Durham County DA’s Office and the NCSBI do not qualify as
“persons” amenable to suit under Section 1983. As “Congress did
not exercise its power to abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity when it enacted [Section] 1983,” Coffin v. South Carolina
Dep’t_ of Soc. Servs., 562 F. Supp. 579, 585 (D.S.C. 1983), “a State
is not a person within the meaning of § 1983,” Will v. Michigan
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). The same conclusion
applies “to States or governmental entities that are considered
arms of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes.” Id. at 70.
Both the Durham County DA’s Office and the NCSBI constitute
arms of the State of North Carolina, see N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-60
(“The State shall be divided into prosecutorial districts
.. . There shall be a district attorney for each prosecutorial
district . . . .”), 7A-61 (empowering district attorneys to
“prosecute in a timely manner in the name of the State all criminal
actions”), 7A-63 (providing for assistant district attorneys to aid
district attorneys), 7A-65 (establishing compensation for district
attorneys and assistant district attorneys); Green v. North
Carolina State Bureau Investigation Crime Lab, No. 3:1llcv69,
2011 WL 4074613, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 13, 2011) (unpublished)
(“[T]he [NC]SBI is not a ‘person’ under [Section] 1983.” . . . For
Eleventh Amendment purposes, the [NC]SBI is considered an arm of
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the State of North Carolina.”) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 70, 71).
Therefore, all claims asserted against the Durham County DA’s
Office and the NCSBI should be dismissed.
The Complaint also purports to assert official capacity claims
against Defendant Elwell, Defendant Nelson, ADA Black, and DA
Cline. (See Docket Entry 2 at 2-3.) Those claims fail for the
same reason that claims fail against the Durham County DA’s Office
and the NCSBI. Although “state officials literally are persons
[, ] a suit against a state official in his or her official
capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit
against the official’s office.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71. “Because a
state is not a ‘person’ under [Section] 1983, it follows that state
officials acting in their official capacities cannot be sued for
damages under the statute.” Wells v. Northam, No. 3:18CV00040,
2018 WL 2978026, at *2 (W.D. Va. June 13, 2018) (unpublished)
(citing Will, 491 U.S. at 71). The Complaint identifies
(i) Defendant Elwell as an “S[B]I [L]aboratory Technician,”
(ii) Defendant Nelson as an “SBI Lab [T]echnician,” and both
(iii) ADA Black and (iv) DA Cline as employees of the “Durham Co.
District Attorney[’s] Office.” (Docket Entry 2 at 2-4).
Accordingly, Defendant Elwell, Defendant Nelson, ADA Black, and DA
Cline qualify as state officials and, as such, no claim lies
against them under Section 1983 for damages in their official
capacities.
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IV. Individual Capacity Claims
The Complaint fails to allege any non-conclusory allegations
again Defendant Davis and/or DA Cline and appears to base their
liability solely upon the theory of respondeat superior. (See
Docket Entry 2 at 1-49.) However, theories of respondeat superior
or liability predicated solely on a defendant’s identity as a
supervisor do not exist under Section 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
677. “Instead, a successful individual capacity claim must allege
that the defendant was personally involved in the deprivation of
[Plaintiff]’s rights.” Bunting v. Cooper, Civ. Action No. 5:17-CT-
3098, 2017 WL 5639948, at *3 (E.D.N.C. May 23, 2017) (unpublished)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (citing Igbal, 556
U.S. at 676, and Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92). The Complaint lacks
any such allegations against Defendant Davis and/or DA Cline.
Further, the Complaint seeks damages from state court
prosecutors and fails to offer any factual allegations that would
suggest that either DA Cline or ADA Black acted outside of the
judicial phase of the criminal prosecution. (See Docket Entry 2 at
1-49.) The Supreme Court has held that “absolute immunity
appl[ies] with full force” to a prosecutor’s activities that remain
“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); see also
Polidi v. Bannon, 226 F. Supp. 3d 615, 620 (E.D. Va. Dec. 28, 2016)

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(“Prosecutors are absolutely immune from suits for money damages
for conduct in or connected with judicial proceedings.”).
In sum, no aspect of the Complaint’s Section 1983 claim(s)
against Defendant Davis, DA Cline, or ADA Black may proceed.
V. Statute of Limitations
As a final matter, the Complaint’s claims obviously fail due
to Plaintiff’s failure to allege them within the applicable statute
of limitations period. “The statute of limitations for all
[Section] 1983 claims is borrowed from the applicable state’s
statue of limitations for personal-injury actions . . . .” Tommy
Davis Const., Inc. v. Cape Fear Pub. Util. Auth., 807 F.3d 62, 66-
67 (4th Cir. 2015). “[Section] 1983 claims arising in North
Carolina are limited by the three-year period for personal injury
actions set forth in [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 1-52(5).” Id. at 67.
“The limitations period for a [Section] 1983 claim begins to run
when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action - in
other words, when it could have filed suit and obtained relief.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Where, however, the
action is one for ‘damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions
whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,’
the action is not cognizable until the conviction or sentence has
been rendered invalid.” Taylor v. Deaver, No. 5:11CV341, 2012 WL

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12905868, at *6 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 28, 2012) (unpublished) (quoting
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)).
Here, the Complaint bases its Section 1983 claims upon
“[c]harges [which] were lodged against [Plaintiff of which] the
government did not have the evidence . . . to ch[a]rge and
prosecute,” resulting in Plaintiff’s “wrongful[] incarcerat[ion]
for crimes [that he] did not commit.” (Docket Entry 2 at 6.) In
that regard, the Complaint alleges that “[Plaintiff] was charged
with [the crimes on] 02/09/1998,” and, further, that Plaintiff was
“imprisoned for the duration of 12 years and 7 months.” (Id.) In
the attached state court complaint, Plaintiff asserts that, “[o]n
August 26, 1999, [his a]lford plea was accepted and he was
sentenced . . . .” (Id. at 10.) Liberally construed, the
Complaint asserts that, upon his release from prison, Plaintiff’s
“conviction or sentence [was] rendered invalid,” Taylor, 2012 WL
12905868, at *6, and thus Plaintiff’s causes of action accrued in
March 2012, after which the limitations period would have run,
unimpeded, until it expired in March 2015. Therefore, Plaintiff
filed this action well outside of the limitation period and his
claims obviously fail on that ground as well.
CONCLUSION
The Durham Police Department, the Durham County DA’s Office,
and the NCSBI do not qualify as a proper defendants under Section
1983, the Complaint does not allege that a policy or custom of the
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City of Durham caused any constitutional deprivation by Defendant
Davis and Defendant Gilliam, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant
Elwell, Defendant Nelson, DA Cline, and ADA Black in their official
capacities constitute claims against the State, not a “person” as
required under Section 1983, the Complaint lacks non-conclusory
allegations against Defendant Davis and DA Cline, ADA Black and/or
DA Cline possess prosecutorial immunity, and Plaintiff obviously
failed to allege his claims within the applicable statute of
limitations period.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application for Leave
to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1) is GRANTED FOR THE
LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE COURT TO CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION
OF DISMISSAL.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed under Section
1915(e)(2)(B) for failing to state a claim, seeking monetary relief
from immune defendants, and/or frivolously bringing claims
obviously barred by the statute of limitations.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
December 30, 2019

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10253544. Public record. Not legal advice.
