# ANDREWS v. KECK-THOMAS

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · May 11, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10253445

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** May 11, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10253445

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “[j]udges are absolutely immune from suit” for money damages arising from their judicial acts, even if such acts took “place ex parte and without notice or a hearing” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- discussing eleventh- amendment immunity of states and state officials
- noting that, even where “damages are theoretically available under [certain] statutes . . ., in some cases, immunity doctrines and special defenses, available only to public officials, preclude or severely limit the damage remedy” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- stating that “judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
TYRONE ANDREWS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:19cv1173
)
BRANDI KECK THOMAS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Application
for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1), filed in
conjunction with his pro se Complaint (Docket Entry 2), Motion for
Preliminary Injunction (Docket Entry 3), and Supplement (Docket
Entry 4). The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application for the
limited purpose of recommending dismissal of this action under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) for seeking relief from immune
defendants. As a result, the Court should deny Plaintiff’s Motion
as moot.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892
[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee
that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because
his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the
costs.” Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th
Cir. 1995) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Dispensing with filing fees, however, [is] not without its
problems . . . . In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis
d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining
relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.
FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004). To address this
concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that “the [C]ourt
shall dismiss the case at any time if the [C]ourt determines . . .
the action . . .(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This
ground for dismissal generally applies to situations in which
doctrines established by the United States Constitution or at
common law immunize government entities and/or government personnel
from liability for damages. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (discussing eleventh-
amendment immunity of states and state officials); Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547 (1967) (describing interrelationship between 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and common-law immunity doctrines, such as judicial,
legislative, and prosecutorial immunity); cf. Allen v. Burke, 690

F.2d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 1982) (noting that, even where “damages are
theoretically available under [certain] statutes . . ., in some
cases, immunity doctrines and special defenses, available only to
public officials, preclude or severely limit the damage remedy”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
2
INTRODUCTION
Asserting claims under “42 U.S.C. § 1983,” Plaintiff initiated
this action against “Brandi Keck Thomas” (“Magistrate Thomas”) and
“James T. Bryan, III” (“Judge Bryan”). (Docket Entry 2 at 1.) The
Complaint alleges in relevant part that
[t]his deprivation of constitutional rights occurred on
or about November 21 and November 27. . .[,] 2019
. . . . On the 21st, [Magistrate] Thomas was given
[Plaintiff’s] . . . rental receipts which showed rent
paid up until December 2019. [Magistrate Thomas] ruled
that [Plaintiff] did not owe rent and said [he] had to
pay court costs which [Plaintiff] objected to since [he]
was not there by evidence for non[-]payment, lateness,
nor destruction of property. After obtaining the Order
a few days later and reading [Magistrate Thomas’s] side
notes, [Plaintiff] believe[s] that [Magistrate Thomas]
talked with [an attorney for Plaintiff’s landlord] before
the hearing was held. . . . [Plaintiff] appealed to stop
the court costs[s] and [to] get monies owed to [him] from
[the landlord] for advance payments.
Next, on appeal with [Judge] Bryan[,] during preliminary
hearing and after reviewing the magistrate order and
mentioning [Plaintiff’s] poverty and seeing [that
Plaintiff was] a black male[, Judge Bryan] decided to
rule that [Plaintiff] must pay [rent for] the month[s] of
November and December[,] which was paid[. F]inally[,]
Judge Bryan mentioned several times [that] if [Plaintiff
did] not pay the monies by December 2, 2019, [Plaintiff]
w[ould] be removed from the property.
. . . Magistrate Thomas [] rule[d] in another black male
case on Plaintiff’s hearing date . . . that [the
defendant] had sixty days to remove [h]is trailer from
[the plaintiff’s] property. . . . This is normal with
all rulings with black males in Chatham County courts.
Finally, there are only two blacks employed with the
Chatham County [c]ourts[,] not counting maintenance
contractors that clean the building.
(Id. at 3.) Further, the Complaint indicates that, “Plaintiff
prays for temporary injunction and court cost[s] against the
3
defendants and for such other relief as the Court may deem just and
proper under the circumstances.” (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff also provides allegations regarding this matter in
his Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Docket Entry 3), to include
that he “was discriminated [against] because of his race[,] black[,
and his] gender by the Defendants. Plaintiff and no other [b]lack
male should have a decision made with bias and/or prejudice.” (Id.
at 4; see also id. (referring to “discrimination based on
[r]ace”).)
Additionally, Plaintiff included a “Supplement” (Docket Entry
4 at 1-6), in which he “[e]nclosed . . . [his] receipts that
Chatham County, NC [Small Claims] and District Court had at the
time any discussions were made” (id. at 1), which were “submitted
to solidify [his] claim against the Defendants and future
supplement of Chatham County Sheriff’s Office” (id.). Along with
the referenced “receipts,” (id. at 2-4), the Supplement also
includes a “Writ of Possession Real Property” concerning
Plaintiff’s summary ejectment matter (id. at 5), and a Notice of
Eviction (id. at 6), issued from the Chatham County Sheriff’s

Office to Plaintiff.
The Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims and
should further deny the request for preliminary injunctive relief
as moot.

4
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, the Complaint alleges that Magistrate
Thomas and Judge Bryan presided, as judges, over Plaintiff’s
summary ejectment matter. (See Docket Entry 2 at 2-4; see also
Docket Entry 3 at 2-4.) “Judges performing judicial acts within
their jurisdiction are entitled to absolute immunity from civil
liability claims,” In re Mills, 287 F. App’x. 273, 279 (4th Cir.
2008) (emphasis added), “even if such acts were allegedly done
either maliciously or corruptly,” King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354, 356
(Ath Cir. 1992) (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
See also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (stating that
“judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate
assessment of damages”). To determine whether an action
constitutes a “judicial act” protected by judicial immunity, the
Court must consider “whether the function is one normally performed
by a judge, and whether the parties dealt with the judge in his or
her judicial capacity.” King, 973 F.2d at 357. Thus, a plaintiff
can overcome the judicial immunity bar only if the judge’s “actions
were non-judicial or the actions were judicial but were taken
without jurisdiction.” Evans v. Downey, No. 1:15-CV-117, 2016 WL
3562102, at *2 (W.D. Ky. June 24, 2016) (unpublished) (citing
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13).
Here, the Complaint does not allege that either Magistrate
Thomas or Judge Bryan acted in a non-judicial capacity or lacked

Jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s case. (See Docket Entry 2 at 2-4.)
To the contrary, the Complaint specifically asserts that, “at all
times mentioned herein, the Defendants were acting within the
course and scope of their office, employment, service, and
authority as a member of the North Carolina Judicial Department.”
(Id. at 2.) Further, the actions Plaintiff challenges - conducting
hearings, issuing orders, and the like - all qualify as judicial.
See King, 973 F.2d at 357. In addition, even though Plaintiff
alleges that Magistrate Thomas and Judge Bryan deprived Plaintiff
of his constitutional rights, judicial immunity still applies. See
id. at 356 (ruling that judicial immunity precludes liability even
for malicious or corrupt actions); see also Mikhail v. Kahn, 991 F.
Supp. 2d 596, 660 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (holding that “[j]udges are
absolutely immune from suit” for money damages arising from their
judicial acts, even if such acts took “place ex parte and without
notice or a hearing” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly, Magistrate Thomas and Judge Bryan enjoy absolute
judicial immunity from Plaintiff’s damages claims.
Moreover, this immunity extends to Plaintiff’s request for
injunctive relief (whether brought in connection with individual
capacity or official capacity claims). See Clay v. Osteen, No.
1:10CV399, 2010 WL 4116882, at *3-4 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 19, 2010)
(unpublished) (analyzing judicial immunity doctrine in monetary
damages and injunctive relief contexts), recommendation adopted,

slip op. (M.D.N.C. Nov. 17, 2010); see also, e.g., Pearson v.
District Att’y Billy W., No. 5:16-CT-3182, 2017 WL 5163368, at *5
(E.D.N.C. June 26, 2017) (unpublished) (“[J]udges have absolute
immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial
actions. Not only are judge[s] immune from claims for monetary
damages, they are immune from requests for injunctive relief.”
(citations omitted)), report and recommendation adopted sub nom.
Pearson v. West, No. 5:16-CT-3182, 2017 WL 5163235 (E.D.N.C. Nov.
7, 2017) (unpublished).
Finally, any official capacity claim for damages against
Magistrate Thomas and Judge Bryan would fail as a matter of law
because the State of North Carolina employs them, see N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 7A-3 (bringing all court operations under control of
state), 7A-130 (establishing district courts), 7A-132 (providing
for district court judges and magistrates), 7A-170 (establishing a
magistrate as an officer of the district court). “[A] suit against
a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit
against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s
office.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70

(1989). “Because a state is not a ‘person’ under [Section] 1983,
it follows that state officials acting in their official capacities
cannot be sued for damages under the statute.” Wells v. Northam,
No. 3:18CV00040, 2018 WL 2978026, at *2 (W.D. Va. June 13, 2018)
(unpublished) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 71).
7
In sum, the Court should dismiss the Complaint’s Section 1983
claims against Magistrate Thomas and Judge Bryan.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has demonstrated eligibility for proceeding in forma
pauperis; however, the Court should dismiss his Complaint under
Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) for seeking monetary relief from immune
defendants.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application for Leave
to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1) is GRANTED FOR THE
LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE COURT TO CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION

OF DISMISSAL.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction (Docket Entry 3) be denied as moot.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
May 11, 2020

8

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10253445. Public record. Not legal advice.
