# WOODS v. GUILFORD COUNTY DSS

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · November 13, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10253390

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** November 13, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10253390

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ZALONDA WOODS )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:19cv334
)
GUILFORD COUNTY DSS, et al., )
)
Defendant(s). )
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter comes before the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge on the Application to Proceed in District Court
Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (the “Application”) (Docket Entry
1) filed in conjunction with Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (Docket
Entry 2). The undersigned will grant the Application for the
limited purpose of recommending dismissal of this action under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failing to state a claim and as barred by
immunity doctrines.
LEGAL STANDARD
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892
[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee
that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because
his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the
costs.” Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th
Cir. 1995) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Dispensing with filing fees, however, [is] not without its
problems. . . . In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis
d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining
relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.
FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004). To address this
concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that “the [C]ourt
shall dismiss the case at any time if the [C]ourt determines . . .
the action . . .(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
As to the first ground, a plaintiff “fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), when
the complaint does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face,’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis
added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely
consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to
relief.”’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). This standard

“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Id. In other words, “the tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the

2
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id.!
The next ground for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B)
generally applies to situations in which doctrines established by
the United States Constitution or at common law immunize government
entities and/or government personnel from liability for damages.
See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984) (discussing eleventh-amendment immunity of states and state
officials); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (describing
interrelationship between 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and common-law immunity
doctrines); cf. Allen v. Burke, 690 F.2d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 1982)
(noting that, even where “damages are theoretically available under
[certain] statutes . . ., in some cases, immunity doctrines and
special defenses, available only to public officials, preclude or

' Although “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine
Twombly’s requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and
conclusions,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (dismissing pro se
complaint); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of
Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A pro se complaint
- . . ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ But even a pro se complainant must
plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than
the mere possibility of misconduct.’” (first quoting Erickson, 551
U.S. at 94; then quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).

severely limit the damage remedy” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
BACKGROUND
Asserting claims under the 4th, 6th, and 14th Amendments, “42
C.F.R. Part 489” and “HIPPA” (Docket Entry 2 at 2-3),2 Plaintiff
initiated this action against 22 defendants:
(1) “Guilford Co. DSS,” (2) “Guilford Co. Police Dept,” (3) “Moses
Cone Women’s Hospital” (“Defendant Hospital”), (4) “Judge Betty
Brown” (“Judge Brown”), (5) “Judge Jarrall Jones” (“Judge Jones”),
(6) “Guilford Co. G[ua]rdian [ad] litem program attorney office,”
(7) “Randleman Co. Schools,” (8) “Guilford Co. Schools,”
(9) “Heather Skeens,” (10) “Kim Miles” (“Defendant Miles”),
(11) “Sarah Fitzgerald” (“Defendant Fitzgerald”), (12) “Officer
Bowen,” (13) “Chief Wayne Scott,” (14) “Unknown Officer [1],”
(15) “Unknown Officer [2],” (16) “Unknown Officer Supervisor,”
(17) “Ashley Triplett,” (18) “Dr. Jacob Stinson,” (19) “Dr. John
Allagen,” (20) “Lisa Thompson,” (21) “Archdale Elementary School,”

and (22) “Gal Attorney Donna Michelle Wright” (“Attorney Wright”).
(Id. at 1-2.) In that regard, the Complaint alleges under its
“Statement of Claim” the following:

2 Under “Nature of Suit” on the Civil Cover Sheet (see Docket
Entry 3 at 1), Plaintiff checked and circled the box for “Amer.
w/Disabilities-Other” (see id.). The Complaint, however, makes no
allegations that Plaintiff suffers from any disability or that
Defendants otherwise discriminated against her based on any
disability. (See Docket Entry 2 at 1-4.)
4
4/2016 - seizure of Plaintiff’s 3 children w[as] unlawful
and violated the 4th and [14th] amendment rights of
Plaintiff by [D]SS and reps[;]
4/14/2016 - violation of [6th] amendment [ ] rights of
[P]laintiff was violated by Judge [] Brown and social
workers [Defendant] Miles and [Defendant] Fitzgerald[;]
3/25/2016 - violation of [Defendant H]ospital and
representatives in regards to 42 CFR Part 489 whereas
doctors put creating a case ahead of health and
stabilization of [Plaintiff;]
4/14/2016 - violation of due process rights of
[P]laintiff by Judge [] Brown and Judge [] Jones who did
not a[c]knowledge procedural safeguards to protect rights
which included 14[th amendment] rights[;]
3/25/2016 - police dept and representatives unlawfully
entered home and removed children to speak to social
workers and threatened [P]laintiff by sep[a]rating mother
from her children and placing oneself on door with hand
on gun and assisted in coer[c]ion of [P]laintiff[;]
[ ] Attorney [ ] Wright helped Randleman Co[.] schools
get a judge’s order after [P]laintiff expressed it
violated federal law[;]
Randleman Co. Schools representatives violated federal
law by allowing DSS representative to act as a parent
after objections from [P]laintiff whose rights were
intact[;]
Guilford Co[.] schools representatives did not demand to
see a warrant when they [ ] removed from their schools
juveniles of [P]laintiff[;]
[Defendant] Hospital violated federal rights that are
outlined in 42 CFR Part 489 and HIPAA rights as their
claims were not true and the information provided
exceeded the scope of a A/N/D investigation that they
started.
(Id. at 2-3.) Finally, the Complaint requests as relief “damages
. . . in the form of pain and suffering [ ] due to the unlawful
seizure of [Plaintiff’s] children by [Defendants] who took
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advantage of the situation and further violated [Plaintiff’s]
federal rights through the lack of due process.” (Id. at 4.)°
DISCUSSION
Presented in a conclusory and sometimes incoherent fashion,
the Complaint’s allegations apparently relate to events surrounding
the removal of Plaintiff’s children from her custody. (See
generally id. at 1-4.) Although the Court “cannot shoulder the
full burden of fashioning a viable complaint for a pro se
plaintiff,” Simon v. Shawnee Corr. Ctr., Civ. No. 13-521, 2013 WL
3463595, at *1 (S.D. Ill. July 9, 2013) (unpublished), based upon
the references in the Complaint to deprivation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights under the 4th, 6th, and 14th Amendments and
federal rights under “42 CFR Part 489” (Docket Entry 2 at 2-3), and
“HIPPA” (id. at 3), this action conceivably could fall under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 868 (4th Cir.

> The undersigned Magistrate Judge previously “deferr[ed]
ruling on [Plaintiff’s instant] Application [ ] and requir[ed her]
to file an amended complaint ... .” (Text Order dated Apr. 16,
2019; see also id. (setting deadline of May 17, 2019, for filing of
amended complaint) That Text Order advised Plaintiff that her
“Complaint consist [ed] of conclusory allegations,” that it
“lack[ed] sufficient supporting factual allegations to proceed,”
that it did “not include even conclusory allegations as to some
defendants and other purported defendants do not exist,” and that
judges enjoy absolute immunity for “actions taken in their judicial
capacity.” (Id. (internal parenthetical omitted) .) Despite the
opportunity “to file an amended complaint that contains properly
supported claims against proper defendants,” as well as a warning
that failure to do so “will result in dismissal” (id.), Plaintiff
did not file an amended complaint (see Docket Entries dated Apr.
16, 2019, to present).

1988) (explaining that courts must “construe [pro se complaints]
liberally to assert any and all legal claims that its factual
allegations can fairly be thought to support” (citing Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)). However, even liberally construed,
the Complaint fails to plead a viable Section 1983 claim.
Section 1983 Claim
As an initial matter, to state a claim for relief under
Section 1983, Plaintiff must allege factual matter showing “that
[she was] deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was
committed under color of state law.” American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999).4 Moreover, Plaintiff must
raise her Section 1983 claims “against a ‘person’” capable of
committing a violation of her constitutional rights. Conley v.
Ryan, 92 F. Supp. 3d 502, 519 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 13, 2015) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1983).

4 Specifically, Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part, that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress[.]
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
7
A. Judge Brown and Judge Jones
Turning to specific allegations against Defendants, the
Complaint appears to allege that both Judge Brown and Judge Jones
presided, as judges, over matters involving Plaintiff. (See Docket
Entry 2 at 2-3.) “Judges performing judicial acts within their
jurisdiction are entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability
claims,” In re Mills, 287 F. App’x. 273, 279 (4th Cir. 2008), “even
if such acts were allegedly done either maliciously or corruptly,”
King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354, 356 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). See also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S.
9, 11 (1991) (stating that “judicial immunity is an immunity from
suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages”). To determine
whether an action constitutes a “judicial act” protected by
judicial immunity, the Court must consider “whether the function is
one normally performed by a judge, and whether the parties dealt
with the judge in his or her judicial capacity.” King, 973 F.2d at
357. Thus, a plaintiff can overcome the judicial immunity bar only
if the judge’s “actions were non-judicial or the actions were
judicial but were taken without jurisdiction.” Evans v. Downey,
No. 1:15-CV-117, 2016 WL 3562102, at *2 (W.D. Ky. June 24, 2016)
(unpublished) (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13).
Here, the Complaint provides no information to suggest that
Judge Brown or Judge Jones acted in a non-judicial capacity or
otherwise lacked Jurisdiction in any actions challenged by

Plaintiff. (See Docket Entry 2 at 1-4.) The Complaint alleges
only that Judge Brown “violated [ 6th] amendment [] rights of
[P]laintiff” (id.), and that both Judge Brown and Judge Jones
“violat[ed ] due process rights of [P]laintiff” by “not
a[c]knowledg[ing] procedural safeguards to protect [Plaintiff’s
14th amendment] rights” (id.). Under these circumstances, both
Judge Brown and Judge Jones enjoy absolute judicial immunity from
Plaintiff’s damages claims. In addition, the Complaint’s
conclusory allegations of wrongdoing by Judge Brown and Judge Jones
lack “sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal
quotation marks omitted). As such, the Court should dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Brown and Judge Jones.
B. Randleman County Schools and Guilford County Police
Department
Neither Randleman County Schools nor Guilford County Police
Department exists and, therefore, neither constitutes a proper
legal entity capable of being sued. In addition, even if Plaintiff
had named an actual school system or law enforcement office, any
such entity likely would not qualify as a “person” under Section
1983. See, e.g., Wilson v. Marion Police Dep’t, No. 1:19cv53, 2019
WL 1028012, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 4, 2019) (unpublished) (finding
that, “police departments and sheriff’s departments lack the legal
capacity to be sued”), aff’d, 771 F. App’x 289 (4th Cir. June 24,
2019); McDaniel on behalf of A.M. v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Sch.,
9
No. 3:18cv127, 2018 WL 1863068, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 18, 2018)
(unpublished) (finding that defendant school system was “not a
distinct legal entity capable of being sued, nor [was] it a person
within the meaning of [Section] 1983” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Mobley v. Guilford Cty. Sheriff’s Office, No. 1:17cv115,
2017 WL 1409579, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 20, 2017) (unpublished)
(finding that “the Guilford County Sheriff’s Office [ ] does not
qualify as a legal entity capable of being sued under [Section]
1983”), recommendation adopted, slip. op. (M.D.N.C. May 24, 2017).
The Court therefore should dismiss all claims against Randleman
County Schools and Guilford County Police Department.
C. Defendant Hospital
Regarding Defendant Hospital, the Complaint appears to assert
a violation of federal rights under federal administrative
regulations and, in that regard, its claims must fail. “For
[ P]laintiff to bring a claim pursuant to [Section] 1983 to enforce
a federal law, the Court must discern whether that federal law
created a private individual right; the inquiry requires a
determination as to whether or not Congress intended to confer

individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries.” Shirley v. South
Carolina Family Ct., Civ. No. 9:10-2632, 2010 WL 5390123, at *3
(D.S.C. Nov. 30, 2010) (unpublished) (internal quotation marks
omitted), recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 5387606, at *1 (D.S.C.
Dec. 22, 2010) (unpublished). In this regard, the Complaint does
10
not show that a private cause of action exists under 42 C.F.R. §
489. (See Docket Entry 2 at 1-4.)
Further, the Complaint fails to provide sufficient allegations
to support any claim against Defendant Hospital, see Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678, alleging only that Defendant Hospital “put creating a
case ahead of health and stabilization of [Plaintiff]” (Docket
Entry 2 at 2), and made “claims [which] were not true and [ ]
information provided exceeded the scope of a A/N/D investigation
that they started” (id. at 3). Therefore, “even if this
[administrative] regulation and the statutory provision to which it
may be traced give rise to private substantive and procedural
rights, the [ C]omplaint lacks factual allegations that would
support a claim for violation of the right.” Bush v. Frazier,
2:18cv732, 2019 WL 3305145, at *11 (N.D. Ala. July 23, 2019)
(unpublished).
The Complaint also alleges that Defendant Hospital “violated
[Plaintiff’s] federal rights that are outlined [under] . . . HIPAA
. . . .” (Docket Entry 2 at 3.) However, “there is no private
cause of action under HIPAA.” Regan v. U.S. Dept. Of Veterans

Affairs, No. 5:11CV422, 2012 WL 4866360, at 2 n.3 (E.D.N.C. July
25, 2012) (unpublished) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d,
518 F. App’x 160 (4th Cir. 2013); see also id. (noting that,
although “HIPAA does provide for civil and criminal penalties, such
penalties can only be enforced by authorized state agencies or the
11
Secretary of Health and Human Services” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendant Hospital.
D. Guilford Co. DSS, Defendant Miles, Defendant Fitzgerald,
Attorney Wright, and Guilford Co. Schools
As to Guilford Co. DSS, Defendant Miles, Defendant Fitzgerald,
Attorney Wright, and Guilford Co. Schools, even permitting a
finding that any of the entities could qualify as proper for suit,
the Complaint inevitably fails to state a viable Section 1983
claim. Liberally construed, any such claims appear to rest on
theories that (i) Guilford Co. DSS “seiz[ed ]Plaintiff’s 3
children” (Docket Entry 2 at 2), (ii) Defendant Miles and Defendant
Fitzgerald “violat[ed] [] sixth amendment [] rights of [P]laintiff”
(id.), (iii) Attorney Wright “helped . . . get a judge’s order
after [P]laintiff expressed it violated federal law” (id. at 3),
and (iv) “Guilford Co[.] schools representatives did not demand to
see a warrant when [Plaintiff’s children] were removed from their
schools . . .” (id.). In this regard, the Complaint’s vague
assertions do not plausibly establish that Defendants unlawfully
deprived Plaintiff of her constitutional rights. The Complaint’s
allegations qualify as the type of conclusory “the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s],” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, that
fail to support a Section 1983 claim. As such, the Court should

12
dismiss all claims against Guilford Co. DSS, Defendant Miles,
Defendant Fitzgerald, Attorney Wright, and Guilford Co. Schools.
E. Remaining Defendants
Lastly, the Complaint fails to specifically assert any factual
allegations against Guilford County Guardian ad litem program
attorney’s office, Heather Skeens, Officer Bowen, Chief Wayne
Scott, Unknown Officer 1, Unknown Officer 2, Unknown Officer
Supervisor, Ashley Triplett, Dr. Jacob Stinson, Dr. John Allagen,
Lisa Thompson, and Archdale Elementary Schools (see Docket Entry 2
at 1-4), and, as such, its claims against these Defendants fail as
a matter of law. See Sain v. Quinn, No. 5:10CV505, 2011 WL
6780828, at * 1 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 27, 2011) (unpublished) (“[A] review
of the complaint reveals that [the defendants’ names] appear[] only
in the caption of the complaint. There are no specific factual
allegations against [the defendants]. [The p]laintiff has not
alleged in his complaint that [the defendants unlawfully deprived
the plaintiff of constitutional or other federal rights].
Therefore, [the] plaintiff’s claims fail against [the defendants]”
(citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)). Accordingly, this Court should

dismiss all claims against Guilford County Guardian ad litem
program attorney’s office, Heather Skeens, Officer Bowen, Chief
Wayne Scott, Unknown Officer 1, Unknown Officer 2, Unknown Officer
Supervisor, Ashley Triplett, Dr. Jacob Stinson, Dr. John Allagen,
Lisa Thompson, and Archdale Elementary Schools.
13
CONCLUSION
The Complaint fails to state a claim against any Defendant and
judicial immunity bars the purported claims against Judge Brown and
Judge Jones.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application (Docket
Entry 1) is GRANTED for the limited purpose of considering this
recommendation of dismissal.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed with prejudice
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), or alternatively

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), as to Judge Brown and
Judge Jones.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed
without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as to
all remaining Defendants.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
November 13, 2019

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10253390. Public record. Not legal advice.
