# Williams v. Jacksonville Police Department

> District Court, E.D. North Carolina · December 3, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10251875

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** December 3, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10251875

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that false imprisonment claims address detention without legal process
- affirming district court’s dismissal of suit as frivolous where complaint “failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support [plaintiff’s] bare assertion”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
No. 7:21-CV-7-FL

ROLAND L. WILLIAMS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) MMEMORANDUM &
) RRECOMMENDATION
JACKSONVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, )
TIMOTHY CARR, KEVIN DOYLE, and )
STEPHANIE MOSER, )
)
Defendants. )

This pro se case is before the court for continued frivolity review pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the matter having been referred to the undersigned by the
Honorable Louise W. Flanagan, United States District Judge. For the reasons set
forth below, the court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed.
DISCUSSION
I. Background
Plaintiff applied for in forma pauperis (IFP) status and filed his original
complaint on January 20, 2021, naming certain individuals and entities as
defendants. (IFP Application [DE #1]; Prop. Compl. [DE #1-1].) On September 20,
2021, the court granted Plaintiff IFP status and ordered that Plaintiff file a
particularized complaint. (Order dated Sept. 20, 2021 [DE #6].) On October 4, 2021,
Plaintiff submitted a letter to the court, which the undersigned construes as
Plaintiff’s response to the order to particularize his complaint. (Letter [DE #7].)
III. Standard for Frivolity Review
Notwithstanding the prior determination that Plaintiff is entitled to IFP
status, the court is required to dismiss all or part of an action found to be frivolous or

malicious, which fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, or which seeks
money damages from a defendant immune from such recovery. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2);
, 434 F.3d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 2006). A case is frivolous if
it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. , 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989). Pro se complaints are entitled to a more liberal treatment than pleadings
drafted by lawyers. , 886 F.2d 721, 722–23 (4th Cir. 1989).
However, the court is not required to accept a pro se plaintiff’s contentions as true.

, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). The court is permitted to “pierce the
veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” , 490 U.S. at 327. In making the “inherently
elastic” frivolity determination, , 376 F.3d 252, 256–57 (4th Cir.
2004), the court may “apply common sense,”
, 64 F.3d 951, 954 (4th Cir. 1995).

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to give a
“short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. The statement must give a defendant fair notice of what the claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests. , 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007). “A plaintiff must offer more detail . . . than the bald statement that he
has a valid claim of some type against the defendant.” , 275 F.3d 391,
405 (4th Cir. 2001); , 886 F.2d at 723 (affirming district court’s
dismissal of suit as frivolous where complaint “failed to contain any factual
allegations tending to support [plaintiff’s] bare assertion”). The complaint must

contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” ,
550 U.S. at 570. While the court must read the complaint carefully to determine if
the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to support his claims, , 886 F.2d at 724,
the court is not required to act as the pro se plaintiff’s advocate or to parse through
volumes of documents or discursive arguments in an attempt to discern the plaintiff’s
unexpressed intent, , 716 F.3d 801, 805 (4th Cir. 2013).
IIII. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff asserts violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights by the Jacksonville, North Carolina, Police Department (“JPD”) and its officers
Timothy Carr and Kevin Doyle. (Prop. Compl.; Letter.) Plaintiff does not specify
whether he is suing the officers in their individual or official capacities. ( ) Plaintiff
also asserts that Onslow County Assistant District Attorney (ADA) Stephanie Moser
violated his constitutional rights. ( )

Although not explicitly invoked by Plaintiff, but given Plaintiff’s pro se status,
the undersigned construes Plaintiff’s claims for constitutional violations as being
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a cause of action for “the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws” by any person acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege facts to support the following findings: (1) that he has been deprived of a
federal right; and (2) that the person who deprived him of his federal right did so
under color of state law. , 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). “[P]rivate conduct,

no matter how discriminatory or wrongful,” is not actionable under § 1983.
, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (quoting , 457 U.S.
991, 1002 (1982)). In sum, § 1983 provides the legal basis for people to sue
government actors for violations of their constitutionally protected rights.
A. Jacksonville Police Department
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the Jacksonville Police Department.
A North Carolina municipal police department is not a legal entity capable of being

sued. , No. 7:17-CV-78-H, 2018 WL 1144976, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 2,
2018) (“By statute, the city or county is the legal entity which can sue and be sued,
not the sheriff’s department or police department of a county or city.”);
, No. 5:19-CV-302-FL, 2020 WL 1488560, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 2, 2020) (citing
), 2020 WL 1492810 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 26,
2020). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against the Jacksonville Police Department should be

dismissed.1

1 Had Plaintiff named the City of Jacksonville as a defendant, dismissal would
still be appropriate. To establish liability against a local government under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show that the alleged constitutional injury is attributable to an official
policy, procedure, or custom of the municipality.
, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Plaintiff fails to allege that any constitutional
violations were taken in furtherance of a city-wide policy or custom.
, No. 5:18-CT-3020-FL, 2019 WL 2864752, at *4 (E.D.N.C. July 2, 2019)
(dismissing claim where amended complaint failed to allege violation of
county-wide policy or custom). While Plaintiff alleges that two officers of
BB. Assistant District Attorney Moser
Prosecutors are absolutely immune from individual liability for acts taken in
carrying out their prosecutorial functions. , 424 U.S. 409, 431

(1976). Such activities include determining whether and when to initial criminal
proceedings and in prosecuting the case. at 430–31 (reasoning that the work of
the prosecutor would be impeded were prosecutors not absolutely immune for
activities “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process”).
The actions of ADA Moser of which Plaintiff complains concern conduct taken
during judicial proceedings. (Prop. Compl. at 7, 12.) Plaintiff alleges that during a
break in court proceedings, ADA Moser conspired with Officer Carr to deny Plaintiff

“a fair and an impartial jury trial” on July 1, 2019, by dismissing some criminal
charges which were pending against Plaintiff. ( at 12.) This is the very type of
function to which prosecutorial immunity was intended to apply. Plaintiff’s claims
against ADA Moser are, therefore, barred by prosecutorial immunity.
C. Individual Officers
As a preliminary point, Plaintiff has not specified whether he is seeking to sue

the officers in their official or individual capacities. An official capacity suit is
generally another way of pleading an action against the entity of which the officer is

Jacksonville’s municipal police department violated his Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights on particular dates, “[i]t is well settled that ‘isolated
incidents’ of unconstitutional conduct by subordinate employees are not sufficient to
establish a custom or practice for § 1983 purposes.” , 326 F.3d 463, 473
(4th Cir. 2003).
an agent. , 672 F.2d 403, 406 (4th Cir. 1982);
, 837 F. Supp. 137, 144 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (“A suit against a city official in
his official capacity is a suit against the city itself.”). To the extent Plaintiff seeks to

sue the officers in their official capacities, such claims should be dismissed for failure
to plead, pursuant to , 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978),
that the alleged constitutional violations were a product of an official policy,
procedure, or custom. , 672 F.2d at 406; note 1. To the extent
Plaintiff seeks to sue the officers in their individual capacities, such claims are
analyzed below.
Although not a model of clarity, Plaintiff’s proposed complaint purports to

assert § 1983 claims for (i) malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, (ii) failure to provide warnings in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, (iii) coercion of a confession in violation of the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination or the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, and
(iv) denial of the Sixth Amendment2 jury trial right.

2 Plaintiff states that his Fourth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated
on July 1, 2019. (Prop. Compl. at 11–12.) It is the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial clause,
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides a right to a jury
trial in criminal matters. , 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
1. Malicious Prosecution3
“A claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983 ‘is properly understood as a
Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure which incorporates certain

elements of the common law tort’ of malicious prosecution.” , 815 F.
App’x 735, 737 (4th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting
, 866 F.3d 546, 555 (4th Cir. 2017)). “To prevail on such a claim, ‘a plaintiff
must show that the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal
process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in
the plaintiff’s favor.’” , 815 F. App’x at 737 (quoting , 866 F.3d at
555).

Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim is deficient in two respects. First, it fails
to allege that he was seized pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause.
Second, it fails to allege the criminal proceedings have been terminated in his favor.
The opening sentence of Plaintiff’s proposed complaint states:
On January 10, 2017, a warrant was drafted for my arrest, for one count
of sale and delivery of rock cocaine; at which I was accused of selling to
a confidential reliable informant.

(Prop. Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff states he was arrested pursuant to this warrant in
approximately June 20174 (Prop. Compl. at 6) and that the charges connected to this

3 Plaintiff’s claim is analyzed under the malicious prosecution framework
rather than false imprisonment because Plaintiff states he was arrested pursuant to
a warrant. , 548 F. Supp. 2d 234, 237 (W.D. Va. 2008) (noting
that false imprisonment claims address detention without legal process).

4 The June 2017 approximation is based on Plaintiff’s statements that he was
advised of the existence of the warrant on February 12, 2017, by Officer Doyle; that
2017 warrant are “false charges” (Prop. Compl. at 10, 11 (“In September 2019, I
learned that the charges in which Detective Carr said he had on me were false”), 12
(“Nonetheless, back in mid-September, when I discovered that these charges were

false . . . .”)). However, Plaintiff never alleges that the charges were unsupported by
probable cause. He merely states in conclusory fashion that these charges were false.
Furthermore, Plaintiff never alleges that the criminal proceedings against him have
been terminated in his favor. (Prop. Compl.; Letter.) North Carolina judicial records,
of which this court may take judicial notice, reflect three felony drug charges pending
against one “Roland Lee Williams” in Onslow County, North Carolina,
https://www1.aoc.state.nc.us/www/calendars.Criminal.do?county=660&court=BTH&

defendant=Williams%2CR&start=0&navindex=0&fromcrimquery=yes&submit=Sea
rch (last visited Dec. 2, 2021). Plaintiff has failed to plead a plausible malicious
prosecution claim against the officers and this claim should therefore be dismissed.
2. Violations
Plaintiff claims that Officer Doyle and another JPD officer violated the Fifth
Amendmentwhen they spoke with Plaintiff in the front yard of his home on February

12, 2017, for “about twenty minutes” and did not provide warnings to
Plaintiff. (Prop. Compl. at 4–5.) According to Plaintiff’s version of events, the officers
parked in his front yard and asked a family member passing by to let Plaintiff (who

Plaintiff left North Carolina for approximately four months after February 12, 2017;
and that within a few days of returning to North Carolina, Plaintiff contacted JPD
and the local magistrate’s office in Onslow County, which resulted in confirmation of
the warrant and Plaintiff being arrested and detained for several days before being
released on bond. (Prop. Compl. at 5–6.)
was in a workshop in the rear of his home) know that they wished to speak with him.
( ) Then Plaintiff came to the front of his home and spoke with the officers for about
twenty minutes. ( )

There is no plausible interpretation of these facts that could meet the custody
requirement of . , 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (protective
warnings required whenever “a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way”); , 468
U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (custody for purposes of requires that a “suspect’s
freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest” (quoting
, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)) (internal quotation marks

omitted)); , 625 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2010) (test for
determining whether a person is in custody for purposes of is whether under
the totality of circumstances a reasonable person would believe he is in custody).
According to Plaintiff’s own version of the facts, he willingly spoke with officers in the
front yard of his home. He has alleged no facts from which it could be inferred that
his freedom of action was curtailed by the officers to a degree associated with a formal

arrest and this claim should therefore be dismissed as frivolous or for failure to state
a claim.
3. Coerced Confession
Plaintiff alleges that on July 5, 2019, Officer Carr coerced Plaintiff into signing
a written confession “to charges that [Plaintiff] was in court for on July 1, 2019.”
(Prop. Compl. at 11.) For purposes of frivolity review, the facts surrounding this
alleged confession are summarized as follows, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
After being arrested on the outstanding drug warrant in approximately June

2017, Plaintiff was appointed counsel and diligently appeared at each of his scheduled
court dates in state court. (Prop. Compl. at 6.) From the beginning of his case, Plaintiff
told his attorney that he wanted a jury trial. ( ) Plaintiff’s case continued through
the state court system. On July 1, 2019, Plaintiff appeared, with counsel, in Superior
Court in Onslow County. ( at 7.) Plaintiff was under the impression he would have
a jury trial that day, but that did not happen. ( ) Instead, Officer Carr, who was
present in court along with ADA Moser and Plaintiff’s attorney, told Plaintiff his

charges would be dismissed and asked Plaintiff, in the presence of Plaintiff’s attorney,
if Plaintiff wished to work as an informant for JPD. ( ) Officer Carr also told
Plaintiff it would be in Plaintiff’s interest to work as an informant because JPD had
additional criminal charges that could be brought against Plaintiff if Plaintiff chose
not to work as an informant. ( ) Officer Carr then gave Plaintiff a business card
with his telephone number, and Plaintiff’s attorney told Plaintiff that he could leave

court and he would later be advised of his next court date. ( at 8.)
Plaintiff left court and later telephoned his attorney to inquire about Officer
Carr’s statement that the drug charges would be dismissed. (Prop. Compl. at 8.)
Plaintiff’s attorney said he would look into this issue and report back to Plaintiff. ( )
Plaintiff also asked his attorney if he should call Officer Carr; Plaintiff’s attorney said
that decision was up to Plaintiff. ( ) Later that day, Plaintiff decided to call Officer
Carr and reached a receptionist at JPD who advised Plaintiff to call back the
following Monday morning. ( )
On July 5, 2019, Plaintiff spoke with Officer Carr via telephone, and the two

arranged to meet at an office park about a mile away from Plaintiff’s home. (Prop.
Compl. at 9.) Plaintiff drove to the meeting location and waited about fifteen minutes
before Officer Carr arrived in an unmarked car with another officer.5 ( ) Plaintiff
exited his car and approached this unmarked car; Officer Carr rolled down the
window and Plaintiff confirmed that it was Officer Carr. ( ) Officer Carr asked
Plaintiff to get in the front passenger seat of the unmarked car so they could “go[]
down the road to talk,” which Plaintiff did; the other officer sat in the rear passenger

area. ( ) Upon entering the car and closing the door, Officer Carr told Plaintiff they
were going to the police station to talk. ( ) They then drove to the JPD police station
and went to an interrogation room. ( )
Upon entering the interrogation room, Officer Carr and his partner became
more coercive and demanding. (Prop. Compl. at 9–10.) Specifically, Officer Carr began
to demand that Plaintiff identify or otherwise provide information about persons in

Plaintiff’s neighborhood who police believed were involved in drug dealing. ( )
Plaintiff declined to do so because he stated he did not associate with any drug dealers
in his neighborhood. ( ) Then, Officer Carr left the interrogation room for about ten
minutes and returned with a document that he told Plaintiff to sign. ( ) Plaintiff

5 It is unclear whether this other officer was Officer Doyle, or a different JPD
officer altogether. (Prop. Compl. at 9.)
perceived Officer Carr to be agitated and angry. ( ) Plaintiff examined the document
but found it difficult to read because he did not have his eyeglasses, which he told
Officer Carr. ( ) Officer Carr nevertheless persisted, telling Plaintiff not to worry

about reading the document because all it said was that Plaintiff was willing to go
back into the streets to sell drugs. ( ) Plaintiff, feeling threatened and that he had
no choice but to sign the document, signed the document. ( ) About five minutes
after signing the document, Officer Carr and his partner drove Plaintiff back to his
car and told Plaintiff that he needed to call them with some information or they would
arrest Plaintiff. ( at 11.)
Plaintiff alleges that the document he signed in the police station on July 5,

2019, was a written confession to the criminal charges that Plaintiff was in court for
on July 1, 2019. (Prop. Compl. at 11–12.) According to the timeline alleged by
Plaintiff, the charges that Plaintiff was in court for on July 1, 2019, were the drug
charges from 2017. In September 2019, Plaintiff’s attorney informed Plaintiff that he
had been indicted as a habitual felon in connection with the 2017 drug charges and
would need to appear in court. ( )

There are several problems with Plaintiff’s claim that Officer Carr coerced
Plaintiff into signing a written confession on July 5, 2019, in violation of the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. The right against self-incrimination is
implicated only when evidence is proffered during a criminal trial. ,
115 F.3d 1159, 1164–65 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc),
, 559 U.S. 34 (2010); , 920 F.3d 200, 205 (4th
Cir. 2019) (“Even with regard to statements made under circumstances that would
otherwise be viewed as coercive, the Self-Incrimination Clause is violated if those
statements are used in a criminal trial.”); , 395 F.3d 508, 513–14

(4th Cir. 2005) (noting the “section 1983 claim fails to state a claim [where it] does
not allege any action that violated [the] Fifth Amendment”). Here, Plaintiff has
not alleged that the document he signed on July 5, 2019, has been used against him
at trial. Nor has he even alleged that it is the basis of any criminal charge against
him. , 434 F.3d 1006, 1026–27 (7th Cir. 2006)
(holding that a confession obtained without warnings was sufficient to
trigger the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause because the confession

formed the basis for the commencement of the criminal prosecution). Accordingly,
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim based on the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.
Plaintiff has also invoked the Fourteenth Amendment in his proposed
complaint. (Prop. Compl. at 2; Letter at 2.) Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the
undersigned liberally construes this as a substantive due process claim based on the

allegedly coerced confession. , 395 F.3d at 513 n.3 (noting that in
, 538 U.S. 760 (2003), the Supreme Court “left open on remand the
question” of whether a plaintiff could pursue a substantive due process claim for a
coerced confession). Substantive due process claims based on police conduct must
meet the conscience-shocking standard articulated by the Supreme Court in
, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), and , 523 U.S. 833
(1998). , 538 U.S. at 774; , 395 F.3d at 513 n.3; , No.
3:19-CV-2491-JMC-PJG, 2021 WL 4597184, at *13 (D.S.C. June 2, 2021) (analyzing
a coerced confession substantive due process claim under the shocks-the-conscience

standard), 2021 WL 4398371 (D.S.C. Sept. 27,
2021). “[C]onduct deliberately intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any
government interest is the sort of official action mostly likely to rise to the conscience-
shocking level.” , 523 U.S. at 849; , 945 F.2d
716, 720 (4th Cir. 1991) (“[C]onduct which ‘amount[s] to a brutal and inhumane abuse
of official power literally shocking to the conscience’ violates the substantive
guarantees of the Due Process Clause” (second alteration in original) (citation

omitted) (quoting , 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980))).
Here, there is no plausible interpretation of the facts as alleged by Plaintiff
that would “shock the conscience” as required under existing precedent. Plaintiff
initiated contact with Officer Carr, willingly entered the car and walked into the
police station and up to the interrogation room, and then signed a document that he
had difficulty reading. Even assuming Officer Carr was agitated and angry with

Plaintiff and told Plaintiff to sign the document, that does not rise to the level of
conscience-shocking behavior. , 2021 WL 4597184, at *13 (allegations
that a coerced, false confession was obtained where police denied the plaintiff’s
request for his mother, ignored a request for an attorney, pulled a chair from
underneath the plaintiff causing him to fall, questioned the plaintiff for several hours,
and told the plaintiff he could only have an attorney if he signed the confession did
not rise to the level of conscience-shocking); ,
494 F. Supp. 3d 269, 282 (D. Md. 2020) (plaintiff adequately pleaded a substantive
due process violation based on fabrication of evidence where police fed plaintiff

information they wanted to hear and held plaintiff in custody for more than thirteen
hours).
4. Jury Trial Right
Plaintiff also alleges that Officer Carr, in conjunction with ADA Moser, denied
him the right to a jury trial on July 1, 2019, by dismissing the drug charges that were
pending against Plaintiff. (Prop. Compl. at 11–12.) This claim lacks an arguable basis
in law or fact. According to Plaintiff’s own version of the facts, those charges were

never dismissed. Furthermore, a prosecutor’s dismissal of charges cannot form the
basis of a Sixth Amendment jury trial violation. This claim should therefore be
dismissed.
CCONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s complaint
be dismissed as frivolous or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be
served on each of the parties or, if represented, their counsel. Each party shall have
until DDecember 17, 2021, to file written objections to the Memorandum and
Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review
(that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and
Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or
modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive
further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See,
eg, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting
modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b) (E.D.N.C. Dec. 2019).
A party that does not file written objections to the Memorandum and
Recommendation by the foregoing deadline will be giving up the right to review of the
Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described
above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the
Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, a party's
failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline may bar the party from
appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district
judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins, 766
F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).
This 3rd day of December 2021.

Dra toabe ack
KIMBERLY A. SWANK
United States Magistrate Judge

16

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10251875. Public record. Not legal advice.