# Reardon v. State of Mississippi

> District Court, N.D. Mississippi · June 28, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10245120

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Mississippi
- **Decided:** June 28, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10245120

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a sheriff’s department does not enjoy a separate legal existence apart from the county in which it operates and is therefore not subject to suit
- holding that in order to establish a Section 1983 claim, there must be “a deprivation of a right secured by federal law[.]”
- holding that law enforcement officers are entitled to qualified immunity “unless it is shown that, at the time of the incident, [the officer] violated a clearly established constitutional right.”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
OXFORD DIVISION

MATTHEW OLIVER REARDON

V. CAUSE NO. 3:22-CV-50-SA-JMV

LAFAYETTE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, et al.

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION
On April 6, 2022, Matthew Oliver Reardon initiated this civil action by filing his pro se
Complaint [1]. On July 19, 2022, Reardon filed his First Amended Complaint [30], wherein he
named the following Defendants: the State of Mississippi; Lafayette County, Mississippi;
Lafayette County Chancery Court; Communicare; Mississippi Department of Mental Health;
Lafayette County Sheriff’s Department; Joseph B. East; Dr. Sandy Rogers; Rachel Alcorn; Susan
Beard; Sherry Wall; Jeff Busby; and David O’Donnell. Now before the Court are various Motions
[46, 52, 84] that the Defendants have filed seeking dismissal of Reardon’s claims. Reardon has
also filed several Motions [60, 69, 71, 72, 81]. The Court is prepared to rule.
Relevant Background1
Including the attachments, Reardon’s pro se Complaint [30] is 74 pages in length. It
includes various allegations against the Defendants and, at times, is difficult to follow. With that
caveat, the Court will provide a brief background.
According to his Amended Complaint [30], Reardon was prosecuted in state court for
disorderly conduct and resisting arrest in November 2021. The charges arose from an incident
between Reardon and his ex-wife, Phyllis Liz Crowder. The case proceeded to trial, and Reardon

1 Much of the factual recitation set forth below is identical to the recitation set forth in the Court’s previous
Order and Memorandum Opinion [51].
was convicted. Although the theory is not completely clear, Reardon seemingly believes that the
charges were the result of a conspiracy against him.
After his conviction, Reardon apparently began appearing at the Lafayette County Clerk’s
Office, seeking documents and becoming agitated with Clerk’s Office employees. This seemingly
became a distraction—so much so that the Lafayette County Board Attorney, David O’Donnell,

emailed Reardon regarding the issue. O’Donnell’s email, dated December 3, 2021, provided in
pertinent part:
Finally, the clerks report that you have been verbally abusive toward
them and that the behavior seems to be increasing in frequency and
intensity. There is no need for behavior that disrupts court business
and decorum and, if it continues, the judges of the court may pursue
their options to address the behavior.

[30] at p. 21.
Reardon’s confrontation with the Clerk’s Office staff apparently reached a tipping point on
December 6, 2021. Reardon alleges that, on that date, he “discovered a ‘mysterious’ altering of
court records regarding assignment of judge in both of his filed and active matters in Lafayette
County Circuit Court.” Id. Reardon’s allegations continue:
75. Plaintiff proceeded to the Lafayette County Circuit Court
Circuit Clerk’s Office and began asking questions in to how
this could have happened and who would have been able to
change it, normal questions that should be expected of any
concerned citizen. Plaintiff feels he exhibited a calm, non-
confrontational approach to the questions he was asking,
fully documenting his interaction.

76. Circuit Court Clerk, Jeff Busby, got highly defensive when
plaintiff began asking questions and advised the other clerks
to not answer any of plaintiff’s questions.

77. After admitting he had never seen or heard of the such
happening, Busby gets on his cellphone and presumably
calls the Lafayette County Sheriff, Joey East, to report
Plaintiffs’ presence at Lafayette County Circuit Court.
78. At that point Plaintiff leaves the Circuit Clerks Office and
continues outside toward[] his vehicle. Around the same
time that Plaintiff got situated in his vehicle, Defendant East
pulls up initially blocking Plaintiff from reversing. Then
East parks next to plaintiff, and their conversation ensues[.]

79. Defendant East orders Plaintiff not to go back into Circuit
Court unless he has something to file because he was
“Disrupting their business”.

Id. at p. 22.
The following day, a Uniform Commitment Affidavit was filed against Reardon in the
Chancery Court of Lafayette County. The affidavit was completed by Rachel Alcorn, a “relative
and/or interested person, residing at Communicare.” Id. at 73. The affidavit marked the following
options as applicable to Reardon: “a recent attempt or threat to physically harm themselves or
others;” and “a failure and inability to provide necessary medical care to themselves as a result of
the impairment.” Id. Alcorn provided the following factual description regarding Reardon:
Go into public places recording people, parinoid [sic] and
dellusional [sic] provoking people with his minor child, not taking
meds and not getting medical help.

Id.
According to Reardon, after the affidavit was filed, “a writ to take plaintiff into custody
was immediately signed off on by Chancellor Lawrence Little.” Id. at p. 28. Reardon was in fact
taken into custody and contends that he was “sent to the Tupelo Crisis Center just up the hill from
the North Mississippi State Hospital where he sat deprived of his liberty from December 9, 2021
until December 23, 2021.” Id. at p. 23. He contends that the civil commitment proceedings against
him were unlawful. After his release, Reardon began appearing at the Lafayette County Circuit
Court and making calls to the Lafayette County Sheriff’s Department.
Next, Reardon explains that an additional affidavit was filed against him on February 9,
2022, by Susan Beard, another Communicare employee. According to Reardon, that affidavit
falsely claimed that he had “refused to attend a scheduled appointment.” Id. at p. 30. He was
apparently involuntarily committed to a mental institution for a period of 30 days as a result of the
affidavit (and subsequent writ).
Reardon contends that “[t]he fact that listed Defendants utilized involuntary commitment

TWICE over a span of approximately two months’ time when he never posed as a danger or threat
to himself of others further demonstrates an intentional, deliberate indifference shown to Plaintiff’s
Constitutional Rights far above and beyond that of plain negligence.” Id. at p. 35. He then asserts
a total of 17 different claims—some based on federal law and some based on state law—against
the multiple above-listed Defendants. The claims span from allegations of false arrest, unlawful
detention, violation of the right to free speech to tortious interference with business relations and
wrongful interference with familial relationships.
In a previous Order and Memorandum Opinion [51], the Court dismissed without prejudice
Reardon’s claims against the State of Mississippi and the Mississippi Department of Health based

upon Eleventh Amendment immunity.
On January 11, 2023, Lafayette County, the Lafayette County Sheriff’s Department, and
Lafayette County Sheriff Joseph B. East (collectively “the County Defendants”) jointly filed a
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [46], raising multiple bases for dismissal of Reardon’s
claims against them. Thereafter, on January 20, 2023, Communicare; Dr. Sandy Rogers; Rachel
Alcorn; and Susan Beard (collectively “the Communicare Defendants”) filed a joint Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings [52], requesting dismissal of all claims asserted against them. The
remaining Defendants, Jeff Busby (Lafayette County Circuit Clerk); Sherry Wall (Lafayette
County Chancery Clerk); and David O’Donnell (Lafayette County Board of Supervisors Attorney)
also seek dismissal of Reardon’s claims against them via a Motion to Dismiss [84]. Reardon has
also filed numerous Motions, some of which are not artfully titled: Sworn Declaration and Request
for Emergency Injunctive Relief with Stipulated Order for Protection [60]; Motion for Sanctions
[69]; Emergency Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order with Prayer for Injunction and
Protection [71]; Motion to Dismiss Claims [72]; and Motion for Order to Show Cause [81].

Standard
The County Defendants and the Communicare Defendants filed Motions for Judgment on
the Pleadings [46, 52], whereas the other Defendants seek dismissal via a Motion to Dismiss [84].
However, for purposes of the applicable standard, this is a distinction without a difference because
courts evaluate Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings under the same standard as a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing
Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 529 (5th Cir. 2004)).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id., 129 S. Ct. 1937.
Ultimately, the district court’s task “is to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a legally
cognizable claim that is plausible, not to evaluate the plaintiff’s likelihood of success.” In re
McCoy, 666 F.3d 924, 926 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank
PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010)). Therefore, the reviewing court must accept all well-
pleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lormand v.
U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232-33 (5th Cir. 2009). Still, this standard “demands more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.
Analysis and Discussion
As indicated above, there are numerous pending Motions. The Court will first address the
Defendants’ three separate Motions [46, 52, 84] and then turn to Reardon’s Motions [60, 69, 71,

72, 81].
I. Preliminary Issues
Before addressing the pending Motions, the Court will address multiple preliminary
matters.
First, the Court notes that, in addition to naming Lafayette County as a Defendant, Reardon
has named the Lafayette County Sheriff’s Department. See [30] at p. 10-11. The capacity of a
Sheriff’s Department to be sued is governed by state law. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b)(3). Although the
Mississippi Code authorizes suit against “[e]very municipality of this state[,]” it does not authorize
suit against a municipality’s police or sheriff’s department. MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-17-1(1);

Jackson v. City of Gulfport, 2017 WL 651956, *2 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 16, 2017). In other words, “a
[sheriff’s] department is not a separate legal entity that may be sued. Rather, it is an extension of
the city.” Id.; see also Brown v. Thompson, 927 So.2d 733, 737 (Miss. 2006) (holding that a
sheriff’s department does not enjoy a separate legal existence apart from the county in which it
operates and is therefore not subject to suit); Stovall v. City of Hattiesburg, 2010 WL 1908313, at
*1-2 (S.D. Miss. May 17, 2010) (dismissing the Hattiesburg Police Department as a defendant
because the City of Hattiesburg was the appropriate defendant).
Consistent with this well-settled authority, the Court finds that the Lafayette County
Sheriff’s Department lacks the capacity to be sued and is therefore not a proper Defendant. All
claims asserted against the Lafayette County Sheriff’s Department are hereby DISMISSED.
Next, the Court feels compelled to address an overarching issue with Reardon’s Amended
Complaint [30]. As indicated above, it spans a total of 74 pages in length (including attachments)—
some of which is difficult to follow. It is also noteworthy that this Amended Complaint [30] was
filed after the Court, acting sua sponte, entered an Order to Show Cause [7] wherein it noted

several deficiencies associated with Reardon’s original Complaint [1]. The Amended Complaint
[30] is the product of that Order [7], but, as noted above, it is undeniably convoluted and difficult
to follow.
Additionally concerning the Amended Complaint [30], it is worth noting that under each
separately asserted claim, Reardon includes form language and fails to specifically connect the
facts to the cause of action. For example, Count One of his Amended Complaint [30] states as
follows:
COUNT ONE – DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW

Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments – FALSE ARREST –
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Against Defendants Lafayette County Sheriff’s Department and East

127. The Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the
above paragraphs with the same force and effect as if fully
set out in specific detail herein.

128. Plaintiff suffered a loss of liberty, embarrassment,
humiliation, pain and suffering, mental and emotional
distress, among other injuries and damages.

129. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff seeks such compensatory and
punitive damages as a jury may reward, attorneys’ fees, and
any such other, different, and further relief which this Court
finds he is entitled.

[30] at p. 36.
The substantive source of relief is different for each separate claim, but Reardon includes
the exact same three paragraphs, without any additional explanation, under each claim. By doing
so, Reardon did not connect the preceding allegations in his Amended Complaint [30] (which span
over 35 pages) to the causes of action. In other words, he wholly failed to explain how the facts
support the individual claims. This fact makes analyzing his Amended Complaint [30] particularly
difficult, especially considering the extensive number of pages and the various topics which it

addresses.
Although noting these issues associated with the Amended Complaint [30], the Court
reiterates that it has already provided Reardon an opportunity to amend. The Court is also
cognizant that Reardon is proceeding pro se and therefore entitled to a liberal construction of his
pleadings. See Calhoun v. Hargrove, 312 F.3d 730, 733-34 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Taylor v.
Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002)) (“It is well-established that pro se
complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafter by lawyers.”)
(quotation marks omitted). However, this Court has previously emphasized that “wholesale
incorporation of prior counts, including the facts asserted in support of those counts, into

subsequent counts, themselves premised on other facts offered in support thereof, is, at best,
confusing and problematic.” Roberson v. McDonald Transit Assoc., Inc., 2016 WL 2991142, at *3
n. 4 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 20, 2016).
In an effort to balance these considerations, the Court will not dismiss Reardon’s Amended
Complaint [30] on a technical pleading ground but does note that Reardon’s failure to comply with
the applicable pleading requirements is, to use this Court’s prior words, confusing and problematic.
II. The Defendants’ Motions [46, 52, 84]
Having made that caveat, the Court will address each of Reardon’s claims and the
corresponding arguments for dismissal. As to the remaining Defendants, Reardon’s Amended
Complaint [30] sets forth the following claims:
1. Count One: Violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
right to be free from false arrest (pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983);

2. Counts Three and Four: Violation of First and Fourteenth
Amendment freedom of speech rights (pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983);

3. Count Five: Violation of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights (pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 242);

4. Count Six: Conspiracy to violate Fourteenth Amendment
rights (pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985);

5. Count Seven: Violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights
(pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983);

6. Count Eight: Violation of False Claims Act;

7. Count Nine: Violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
right to be free from false imprisonment (pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983);

8. Count Ten: False Imprisonment (state law);

9. Count Eleven: Wrongful interference with familial
relationships (state law);

10. Count Twelve: Tortious interference into business (state
law);

11. Counts Thirteen and Fourteen: Defamation of character
(state law);

12. Count Fifteen: Intentional infliction of emotional distress
(state law);

13. Count Sixteen: Negligent infliction of emotional distress
(state law); and

14. Count Seventeen: Neglect to Prevent (pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1986).
[30] at p. 36-44.2
A. Section 1983 Claims
Several of Reardon’s claims are asserted pursuant to Section 1983. The Court is cognizant
that some of these claims are asserted against municipalities and some are asserted against
individuals.

Of course, different standards are applicable to a Section 1983 claim against a municipality
and an individual capacity claim against a law enforcement officer. See Weeks v. Thompson, 2007
WL 316261, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 31, 2007) (“Municipal liability under section 1983 requires
proof of (1) a policymaker, (2) an official policy, and (3) a violation of constitutional rights whose
‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.”); Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that law enforcement officers are entitled to qualified immunity “unless it is shown that,
at the time of the incident, [the officer] violated a clearly established constitutional right.”).
Nevertheless, whether seeking to impose liability against a municipality or an individual officer, a
Section 1983 plaintiff must first allege that she has been deprived of a right secured by the United

States Constitution or federal law. Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 2004)
(holding that in order to establish a Section 1983 claim, there must be “a deprivation of a right
secured by federal law[.]”). If the plaintiff has not been deprived of a federal constitutional or
statutory right, there can be no viable Section 1983 claim. Id.
Remaining cognizant of those different standards, the Court will separately address each
of Reardon’s Section 1983 claims.
i. Count One
In Count One, Reardon asserts a false arrest claim. The claim is asserted against East and

2 Count Two was asserted only against the State of Mississippi and the Mississippi Department of Mental
Health. Since both of those entities have been dismissed, the Court will not address that Count.
the Lafayette County Sheriff’s Department. However, considering the Court’s ruling above that
the Sheriff’s Department is not a proper Defendant, this claim is now only against East.
“[A] warrantless arrest without probable cause is unconstitutional.” Magee v. Pike Cnty.,
2019 WL 7040627, at *6 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 20, 2019). “To prevail on a section 1983 false arrest
claim, the plaintiff must show that [the arresting officer] did not have probable cause to arrest

[him].” Id. (citing Haggerty v. Tex. S. Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 655 (5th Cir. 2004)). “Probable cause
exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge at the
moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed
or was committing an offense.” Id. (quoting Haggerty, 391 F.3d at 655-56; Glenn v. City of Tyler,
242 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 2001)).
Reardon’s claim is fundamentally flawed. Presumably, though it is not at all clear,
Reardon’s contention is that the false arrest occurred on December 7, 2021 when the Lafayette
County Sheriff’s Department took him into custody at the commencement of the involuntary
commitment proceedings. Assuming without deciding that this constituted an arrest, the deputies

were certainly authorized to take Reardon into custody. Reardon himself admits that the deputies
were acting pursuant to a writ to take him into custody that had been signed by Chancellor
Lawrence Little. Considering Reardon’s concession on that point, the Court cannot find that the
deputies lacked a legitimate basis to take him into custody.3
Ultimately, Reardon himself admits in his Amended Complaint [30] that he was taken into
custody pursuant to a writ signed by a Chancellor. See [30] at p. 28 (“Nonetheless in the early
afternoon on December 7, 2021 the affidavit is filed in Lafayette County Chancery Court and a

3 Additionally, it is not at all clear that Reardon even contends that East was present at the time these events
occurred, as his Amended Complaint simply refers to “Lafayette County Sheriff’s Deputies” being present.
[30] at p. 23.
writ to take plaintiff into custody was immediately signed off on by Chancellor Lawrence Little.”).
The Court simply cannot find that Reardon has stated a plausible false arrest claim under those
circumstances. Count One of Reardon’s Amended Complaint [30] is hereby DISMISSED.
ii. Counts Three and Four
Counts Three and Four of Reardon’s Amended Complaint [30] both, pursuant to Section

1983, allege a “violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments – FREEDOM OF SPEECH.”
Id. at p. 37. In Count Three, Reardon names East, Lafayette County, and the Lafayette County
Chancery Court as Defendants. In Count Four, he names “all named parties.” [30] at p. 37.
However, as noted above, the individual claims provide no factual explanation; therefore, it is
impossible to determine the difference between the two claims. The Court will analyze them
together.
Although not at all clear, the Court assumes that Reardon’s claims are based upon a First
Amendment retaliation theory. Presumably, the claims are based upon the following allegations in
the Amended Complaint [30]:

86. The first stated reason for commitment on the Affidavit
stated Plaintiff “Goes into public places recording people”.
This statement amounts to a blatant violation of Plaintiff’s
1st Amendment Right which protects recording in public
spaces. Plaintiff never went into public places to invade
privacy of others or with the sole purpose of “recording
people”. As a credentialed member of the press being an
independent investigative reporter/journalist, plaintiff would
gather content for stories through accurately documenting
his encounters through video or audio recording. More
importantly, documenting interaction also doubled as a way
for plaintiff to protect himself from the abominable lies,
untrue insinuations, and complete character assassinations
such as what transpired here. This statement alone amounts
to a violation of Plaintiff’s 1st Amendment Right[.]

[30] at p. 24.
Again, it is far from certain, but the Court presumes that Reardon’s contention is that his
exercise of his First Amendment rights served as the basis for the affidavit that was filed against
him.
“The First Amendment prohibits not only direct limits on individual speech but also
adverse governmental action against an individual in retaliation for the exercise of protected

speech activities.” Cass v. City of Abilene, 814 F.3d 721, 729 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Keenan v.
Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2002)). To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, the
plaintiff must show: “(1) he was engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) the defendant’s
actions caused him to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from
continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) the defendant’s adverse actions were substantially
motivated by the constitutionally protected conduct.” Id.
Reardon has not alleged sufficient facts to support such a claim. Assuming that Reardon’s
allegation that his conduct of recording events as they transpired was a protected activity, he has
not alleged any facts whatsoever to indicate that the Defendants’ execution of the affidavit

supporting his involuntary commitment were in any way motivated by his exercise of First
Amendment rights. The Fifth Circuit has previously provided the following explanation regarding
the causation prong: “In Keenan, we considered ‘a situation in which law enforcement officers
might have a motive to retaliate but there was also a ground to charge criminal conduct against the
citizen they disliked,’ and concluded that ‘in that situation, the objectives of law enforcement take
primacy over the citizen’s right to avoid retaliation.’” Id. (quoting Keenan, 290 F.3d at 261-62).
Although the Court recognizes that causation is typically a question for the jury, Reardon has
wholly failed to plead facts to connect his conduct to the commencement of involuntary
commitment proceedings.
Counts Three and Four of the Amended Complaint [30] are hereby DISMISSED.
iii. Count Seven
Reardon asserts that all Defendants should be held liable for “deprivation of due process”
in “[v]iolation of the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” [30] at p. 39.
Reardon’s failure to provide additional information to support this claim is fatal. The Amended

Complaint [30] provides no information as to whether the claim is based upon a deprivation of
procedural due process or substantive due process. Similarly, it is completely unclear which factual
allegations make up this claim.
While the Court has construed Reardon’s claims quite liberally, it is simply unrealistic to
analyze this claim at all. Count Seven is hereby DISMISSED.
iv. Count Nine
In Count Nine, Reardon alleges a Section 1983 claim based upon false imprisonment in
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Although this claim is styled as a separate
claim from Reardon’s false arrest claim, the same analytical framework applies. Recently, the Fifth

Circuit analyzed an unlawful arrest claim and false imprisonment claim under the same standard.
See Johnson v. City of San Antonio, 2023 WL 3019686, at *8 (5th Cir. Apr. 20, 2023) (citing
Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir. 2001)) (“To succeed on her unlawful arrest and false
imprisonment claims, Roberts must show that there was not even arguably probable cause for her
arrest.”).
This Court has already determined that Reardon failed to state a claim for false arrest based
upon the fact that it is unclear that he was ever arrested and, even assuming that he was, the deputies
were acting pursuant to a writ signed by a Chancellor. Reardon’s Section 1983 false imprisonment
claim fails for the same reasons. That claim is DISMISSED.
v. Additional Considerations
Having now determined that Reardon has failed to state plausible constitutional violations,
the Court need not go any further in analyzing his Section 1983 claims. But the Court notes that,
even if he had sufficiently alleged constitutional violations, his Amended Complaint [30] is still
deficient.

As to the municipal liability claims, “[a] plausible basis of municipal liability under Section
1983 requires a showing of both a constitutional violation and a municipal policy or custom to
which the constitutional violation is attributable.” Minor v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2020 WL
1877798, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 15, 2020) (citing Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978)). “The three elements of Section 1983
municipal liability are: (1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3)
which was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right.” Id. (quoting Pena v.
City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 621 (5th Cir. 2018)). Importantly, “[m]unicipal liability
does not attach solely because the municipality employed a tortfeasor.” Id. (citations omitted).

Setting aside the lack of allegations of a constitutional violation, Reardon has not alleged
the existence of any official policy. This would be fatal to his claims if they were not already
deficient.
Similarly, the individual actors would be entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified
immunity protects government employees from civil liability so long as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Williamson v. Nettleton Sch. Dist., 2021 WL 3698395, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 19,
2021) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Once an individual raises qualified immunity in
good faith, the burden shifts “to the plaintiff, who must rebut the defense by establishing that the
official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law.” Wrecker Works, LLC v.
City of Aberdeen, Miss., 2017 WL 5502945, at *8 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 14, 2017) (quoting Wolfe v.
Meziere, 566 F. App’x 353, 354 (5th Cir. 2014)). A plaintiff can only overcome qualified immunity
by showing “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right
was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Id. (quoting Allen v. Cisneros,

815 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2016)). “The clearly established law must be particularized to the facts
of the case.” Id. (citations omitted).
Here, once the individual actors raised qualified immunity, the burden shifted to Reardon
to point to clearly established law indicating that the individual actors’ conduct was unlawful.
Reardon has wholly failed to do so. Therefore, even if Reardon had alleged viable constitutional
claims, dismissal would still be warranted under the qualified immunity doctrine.
B. Other Federal Claims
Having resolved Reardon’s Section 1983 claims, the Court will move to his other theories
of liability under federal law.

i. Counts Five and Eight
In Count Five, Reardon alleges a “violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 242.” [30] at p. 38. In Count Eight, he alleges a “violation of [the] False
Claims Act.” Id. at p. 39.
However, in a subsequent filing, Reardon “requests this Court to allow Plaintiff to
withdraw all claims asserted under 18 U.S.C. 242 and the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3279 . . .
as their application is improper.” [72] at p. 1.
Recognizing Reardon’s admission that these claims are improper, the Court hereby
DISMISSES Counts Five and Eight.
ii. Count Six
In Count Six, Reardon alleges that East, Alcorn, Communicare, and the Lafayette County
Chancery Court should be held liable for “conspiracy to deprive rights” in “[v]iolation of the
Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985.” [30] at p. 38.
“To establish a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege: (1) a

conspiracy of two or more persons; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly,
any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person
is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States.” Mays v. TSI Staffing, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 738, 739-40 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (citing
Deubert v. Gulf Fed. Sav. Bank, 820 F.2d 754, 757 (5th Cir. 1987)). Importantly, the plaintiff
“must establish that the conspiracy was motivated by class-based animus.” Id. at 740 (citing
Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994)). “In this circuit, courts require an allegation
of a race-based conspiracy to present a claim under § 1985(3).” Imani v. City of Baton Rouge, 614

F. Supp. 3d 306, 375 (M.D. La. 2022) (quoting Horaist v. Doctor’s Hosp. of Opelousas, 255 F.3d
261, 270 (5th Cir. 2001)).
Reardon’s Amended Complaint [30] is completely devoid of alleged facts to support a
Section 1985(3) conspiracy claim. As an initial matter, it is certainly not clear that Reardon has
sufficiently alleged that the Defendants entered into any agreement to deprive him of any rights
whatsoever. But there can be no serious dispute that he has failed to allege any class-based animus.
Reardon’s discontent is seemingly based solely upon the involuntary commitment process. That is
insufficient as a matter of law for purposes of a Section 1985(3) claim. Count Six is hereby
DISMISSED.4
iii. Count Seventeen
Count Seventeen is asserted against O’Donnell, Wall, and Busby. The claim is styled as an
“action for neglect to prevent” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986.
“To state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986, ‘which provides a cause of action against

those who neglect or refuse to prevent wrongful acts permitted pursuant to a Section 1985
conspiracy,’ [the plaintiff] must set forth a valid claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985.” Goins v.
City of Sansom Park, 2015 WL 3953795, at *8 (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2015) (citing Pardue v. Jackson
Cray., Miss., 2015 WL 1867145, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 23, 2015). In other words, a valid Section
1986 claim presupposes Section 1985 conspiracy. See id. (“Because [the plaintiff] has failed to
state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, he cannot have stated a valid claim pursuant to section
1986.”).
The Court has previously dismissed Reardon’s Section 1985 conspiracy claim for failure
to state a claim. Consequently, his Section 1986 claim necessarily fails. Count Seventeen is hereby

DISMISSED.
C. State Law Claims
Reardon also asserts various state law claims. The Defendants raise multiple bases for
dismissal of each of them. Preliminary, they contend that Reardon failed to comply with the
Mississippi Tort Claims Act’s (“MTCA”) pre-suit notice requirements. The Court will address that

4 The Court briefly notes that Reardon did not specifically indicate that his Section 1985 conspiracy is
based upon subsection 1985(3). However, the other two subsections clearly do not apply. “Section 1985(1)
prohibits conspiracies to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat a federal officer from discharging his
duties or to injure him because of his lawful discharge of his duties. Section 1985(2) prohibits conspiracies
to deny any citizen equal protection of the laws or to injure a citizen for his efforts to ensure the rights of
others to equal protection.” Bryant v. Military Dep’t of Miss., 597 F.3d 678, 687 (5th Cir. 2010) (citations
and quotation marks omitted). The Court sees no need to address those subsections any further.
contention prior to turning to the substantive arguments associated with the claims.
i. MTCA’s Pre-suit Notice Requirements
“[I]n Mississippi Code Section 11-46-5(1), the Legislature waived [] immunity of the state
and its political subdivisions ‘from claims for money damages arising out of the torts of such
governmental entities and the torts of the employees while acting within the course and scope of

their employment[.]” Tallahatchie Gen. Hosp. v. Howe, 49 So.3d 86, 91 (Miss. 2010) (quoting
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-5(1)). The Legislature also included within the MTCA multiple
requirements, such as providing pre-suit notice, with which an individual must comply in order to
bring a claim. See id. at 11-46-11(1). In pertinent part, Section 11-46-11(1) provides:
After all procedures within a governmental entity have been
exhausted, any person having a claim for injury arising under the
provisions of this chapter against a governmental entity or its
employee shall proceed as he might in any action at law or in equity;
provided, however, that ninety (90) days prior to maintaining an
action thereon, such person shall file a notice of claim with the chief
executive officer of the governmental entity.

Id.
In addition, the MTCA provides specific requirements that must be satisfied for the pre-
suit notice to be proper:
Every notice of claim required by subsection (1) of this section shall
be in writing, and shall be delivered in person or by registered or
certified United States mail. Every notice of claim shall contain a
short and plain statement of the facts upon which the claim is based,
including the circumstances which brought about the injury, the
extent of the injury, the time and place the injury occurred, the
names of all persons known to be involved, the amount of money
damages sought and the resident of the persons making the claim at
the time of the injury and at the time of filing the notice.

Id. at § 11-46-11(2).
Reardon attached to his Amended Complaint [30] a letter directed to Sandy Rogers, the
Executive Director of Communicare. See [30] at p. 67-70. It is far from clear that the letter was
intended to constitute pre-suit notice under the MTCA, but if it was so intended, it is deficient. As
an initial matter, the letter specifically indicates that it was delivered “via email only.” Id. at p. 67.
This runs afoul of Section 11-46-11(2)’s requirement that the notice be delivered in person or by
registered or certified mail. Second, the letter fails to include an amount of money sought, and it

additionally, from a more overarching perspective, does not possess qualities to indicate it is
intended to be a pre-suit notice. Rather, it appears to be a letter of dissatisfaction with the State of
Mississippi’s mental health laws.5
To the extent Reardon’s state law claims are subject to the MTCA, they must be
DISMISSED for failure to comply with the statute’s pre-suit notice requirement.6
ii. Count Ten
Count Ten is a state law false imprisonment claim against East, Communicare, and the
Lafayette County Chancery Court.
“A plaintiff must prove two elements in order to succeed on a false-imprisonment claim:

(1) the detention of the plaintiff; and (2) the unlawfulness of such detention.” Serv. Cos. v. Estate
of Vaughn, 169 So.3d 875, 879 (Miss. 2015). Assuming without deciding that Reardon was being

5 In his Response [70], Reardon states that he delivered pre-suit notice to David O’Donnell in his capacity
as Lafayette County Board Attorney. He references an “affidavit/declaration of truth” that he avers was
delivered to O’Donnell. That document, which is essentially a twelve-page affidavit, expresses Reardon’s
dissatisfaction with the mental health laws but does not include an amount of money damages sought. Thus,
it is likewise deficient, even if it was properly delivered.
6 As indicated above, the MTCA only waives immunity for torts of governmental employees while acting
within the course and scope of their employment. See Tallahatchie Gen. Hosp., 49 So.3d at 91. “By
definition, a government employee is not acting within the course and scope of his employment if his
conduct constituted fraud, malice, libel, slander, defamation, or any criminal offense other than traffic
violations.” Brown v. Wilkinson Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept., 2017 WL 1479428, at *9 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 24, 2017)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, certain torts by definition fall outside the purview
of the MTCA, and Reardon’s failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirement is therefore not
dispositive as to those particular claims. The Court will address the merits of each of the state law claims
out of an abundance of caution.
taken into custody pursuant to the involuntary commitment process, he has not alleged any
plausible facts that would establish that the detention was unlawful. In fact, based upon a review
of the record as a whole, it appears that Reardon was properly taken into custody in accordance
with the applicable mental health laws. Count Ten of the Amended Complaint [30] must be
DISMISSED.

iii. Count Eleven
In Count Eleven, Reardon asserts against all Defendants a state law claim for “wrongful
interference with familial relationships.” [30] at p. 41.
In their Memorandum [47], the County Defendants assert that they are “unaware of any
recognized cause of action in Mississippi for ‘wrongful interference with familial relations’ or any
other cause of action of similar import.” [47] at p. 21. Despite filing a Response [70], Reardon did
not address that contention in his filing. The failure to do so constitutes an abandonment of that
claim. See Scott v. Spencer Gifts, LLC, 2015 WL 4205242, at *1 (N.D. Miss. July 10, 2015) (“In
their response, Plaintiffs have made no argument and offered no proof in support of their claims

of intentional infliction of emotional distress and failure to train or supervise, and thus the Court
finds these theories to be abandoned.”).
In addition to Reardon’s abandonment of the claim, the Court, like the County Defendants,
is unaware of such a cause of action under Mississippi law.
For these reasons, Count Eleven of Reardon’s Amended Complaint [30] fails on the merits
and must be DISMISSED.
iv. Count Twelve
In Count Twelve, Reardon alleges against East, Alcorn, and Communicare a claim for
“tortious interference into business.” [30] at p. 41. Presumably, he intended to assert a tortious
interference with business relations claim.
In order to prevail on a tortious interference with business relations claim, a plaintiff must
prove four elements:
(1) the acts were intentional and willful; (2) the acts were calculated
to damage the plaintiffs in their lawful business; (3) the acts were
done with the unlawful purpose of causing damage and loss without
right or justifiable cause on the part of the defendant (which
constitutes malice); and (4) actual loss and damage resulted.

PDN v. Loring, 843 So.2d 685, 688 (Miss. 2003).
Here, Reardon has not alleged that the Defendants had knowledge of any lawful business
in which he was engaged. It is also unclear what lawful business was actually damaged as a result
of the Defendants’ conduct. Reardon has not pled sufficient facts to support a tortious interference
with business relations claim. Count Twelve is therefore DISMISSED.
v. Counts Thirteen and Fourteen
In Counts Thirteen and Fourteen (which are identical), Reardon alleges that all Defendants
should be held liable for defamation of character.
To succeed on a defamation claim, a plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) a false and
defamatory statement; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault amounting to at
least negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) either actionability of the statement
irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication. Simmons
Law Group, P.A. v. Corp. Mgmt., Inc., 42 So.3 511, 517 (Miss. 2010).
Reardon has not plausibly pled such a claim. He fails to make clear which Defendant he
contends defamed him. The claim (or claims) is asserted against all Defendants, but there is no
explanation as to the statement he attributes to each Defendant, how such statements were
published, or any fault associated therewith. See Griffin v. HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc., 2015 WL
4041657, at *5 (N.D. Miss. July 1, 2015) (quintessential shotgun pleadings, subject to dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6), “contain several counts, each one incorporating by reference the allegations
of its predecessors” and “fail to distinguish between the actions of named defendants”).
Ultimately, Reardon has failed to plead a plausible defamation claim. Counts Thirteen and
Fourteen of the Amended Complaint [30] lack merit and must be DISMISSED.

vi. Counts Fifteen and Sixteen
In Count Fifteen, Reardon asserts a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
against East, Beard, Alcorn, Rogers, Communicare, and Lafayette County Chancery Court. In
Count Sixteen, he alleges negligent infliction of emotional distress against East, Beard, Alcorn,
Rogers, Communicate, and the Lafayette County Chancery Court.7
To prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must
establish the following:
(1) The defendant acted willfully or wantonly towards the plaintiff
by committing certain described actions; (2) the defendant’s acts are
ones which evoke outrage or revulsion in civilized society; (3) the
acts were directed at, or intended to cause harm to, the plaintiff; (4)
the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress as a direct result of
the acts of the defendant; and (5) such resulting emotional distress
was foreseeable from the intentional acts of the defendant.

Pointer v. Rite Aid Headquarters Corp., 327 So.3d 159, 170 (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Reardon has failed to plead plausible allegations to reach this threshold. He has not alleged
any actions which would evoke outrage or revulsion in a civilized society. And, again, he has not

7 The negligent infliction of emotional distress claim is certainly barred by the MTCA. See, e.g., Thomas v.
City of Laurel, Miss., 2021 WL 1148470, at *8 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 25, 2021) (“Therefore, the individual
Defendants may not be personally liable for those torts that fall within the scope of the MTCA — negligent
hiring/retention/supervision/training, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy[.]”)
(emphasis added).
even specified which facts outlined in the extensive facts section of his Amended Complaint [30]
are connected to which Defendant. See Griffin, 2015 WL 4041657 at *5. He has wholly failed to
plead a plausible emotional distress claim. Counts Fifteen and Sixteen must be DISMISSED.
III. Reardon’s Motions [60, 69, 71, 72, 81]
Reardon has made numerous filings, spanning a myriad of issues. For example, one filing

is styled as “Plaintiff’s Sworn Declaration and Request for Emergency Injunctive Relief with
Stipulated Order for Protection” [60]. This filing consists of twelve handwritten pages narrating
Reardon’s conflicts with law enforcement. It explains that he was, at least at that time, in custody
serving a one-year sentence on an aggravated stalking conviction out of Lafayette County. Reardon
ultimately concluded by requesting that this Court order his release from imprisonment. Reardon
did not comply with the requirements set forth in the Local Rules relating to request for emergency
relief. And even if he had done so, the reasons why such a request is improper before this Court
are numerous.
Another filing is styled as an “Emergency Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order with

Prayer for Injunction and Protection” [71]. This Motion [71] appears to essentially be a request for
reconsideration of the Court’s previous Order [51] dismissing the State of Mississippi and the
Mississippi Department of Mental Health as Defendants. Reardon requests reconsideration on the
basis that he did not receive notice of the original Motions [38, 43] and that he therefore did not
have an opportunity to respond. However, nothing in the filing indicates anything that would
change the outcome on that issue. Those entities are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Considering the fact that it has already determined Reardon has failed to state a plausible
claim, the Court sees no need to further address each of Reardon’s filings individually. They will
be DENIED AS MOOT.
IV. Further Explanation
Having found that all of Reardon’s claims lack merit, this lawsuit is due to be, and will be,
dismissed. In so doing, the Court reiterates that Reardon’s Amended Complaint [30] is far from a
model of clarity. In reaching its conclusion, the Court has attempted to decipher Reardon’s claims
to the greatest extent possible. With that being said, the Court has reviewed the Amended

Complaint [30] (and the entire record in full) and any arguments not addressed herein would not
have changed the outcome.
Finally, the Court notes that Reardon’s grievance appears to be based upon a belief that
Mississippi’s statutory scheme for involuntary commitment proceedings is flawed and perhaps
even unconstitutional. For instance, toward the beginning of his Amended Complaint [30], he
states that the lawsuit “is founded in principle and already settled case law surrounding deprivation
of liberty and the constitutionality of controversial state mental health laws.” [30] at p. 2. But while
Reardon might desire to have Mississippi’s statutory scheme stricken down, he did not, despite
asserting seventeen separate claims, request the same in the “Claims” section of the Amended

Complaint [30]. In other words, he never actually requested that relief.
As to the claims Reardon did assert, he has failed to allege sufficient facts which, taken as
true, would entitle him to relief.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants’ Motions [46, 52, 84] are GRANTED.
Reardon’s Motions [60, 69, 71, 72, 81] are DENIED AS MOOT. All claims asserted in Reardon’s
Amended Complaint [30] are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. This CASE is CLOSED.
SO ORDERED, this the 28th day of June, 2023.
/s/ Sharion Aycock
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10245120. Public record. Not legal advice.