# Thompson v. Kijakazi

> District Court, W.D. Missouri · June 20, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10242830

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** June 20, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHWESTERN DIVISION

AMBER THOMPSON )
(o.b.o. L.R.D.), )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:22-cv-5078-NKL
)
KILOLO KIJAKAZI; )
Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant )
)

Plaintiff Amber Thompson, on behalf of her minor child L.R.D., seeks review of the denial
by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration of her application for Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”). Plaintiff1 argues reversal is required because the Commissioner
improperly evaluated the limitations caused by L.R.D.’s knee impairment, leading to an erroneous
conclusion that L.R.D. had a “less than marked” limitation to her ability to move about and
manipulate objects. For the reasons discussed in more detail below, the Commissioner’s decision
is AFFIRMED.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The ALJ’s Decision
As relevant to this appeal, L.R.D. has chronic pain in her right knee caused by
osteochondritis dissecans. Plaintiff claims that, as a result, L.R.D. became disabled on June 26,

1 The Court will refer to Ms. Thompson as “Plaintiff” in this Order.
2017.2 Because L.R.D. is a minor, the Commissioner uses a three-step sequential evaluation
process, rather than the traditional process used for adults. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a). At the first
step, the Commissioner must determine whether the child has engaged in substantial gainful
activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(b). If so, the child is not disabled; if not, the evaluation
continues. The second step asks whether the child has an impairment, or combination of

impairments, that is “severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(c). If not, disability is denied; if so, the
Commissioner moves to the third step. At step three, the Commissioner determines whether the
child has any impairment that meets, medically equals, or functionally equals a listed impairment.
20 C.F.R. § 416.924(d). Functional equivalence is unique to the childhood SSI analysis; it is not
part of the adult sequential evaluation, which instead includes the “residual functional capacity”
finding and consequent determination of a claimant’s ability to work.
To determine whether an impairment is “functionally equivalent” to a disability listing, the
Commissioner considers six “domains” of functioning. The Commissioner must find that a
claimant has a “marked” limitation in two of the six domains of functioning, or an extreme

limitation in one, to find functional equivalence. A marked limitation is one that “interferes
seriously with [a child’s] ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities.” 20
C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i). Here, the ALJ found that L.R.D. had only one marked limitation.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have found L.R.D. had a second, in the “moving about and
manipulating objects” domain. See Doc. 10, at 6–17.3

2 The alleged onset date was subsequently amended to December 23, 2019. Tr. 55.
3 The moving about and manipulating objects domain requires the Commissioner to “consider how
[a claimant] moves [her] body from one place to another and how [she] move[s] and manipulate[s]
things.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(j). It includes evaluating a claimant’s ability to “[s]everal different
kinds of actions,” including rising from a sitting to a standing position, balancing, bending,
In concluding that L.R.D. had a less than marked limitation in the moving about and
manipulating objects domain, the ALJ agreed that L.R.D.’s knee pain could reasonably be
expected to stem from her osteochondritis dissecans but discounted the degree to which L.R.D.’s
knee pain limited her ability to move. Tr. 30. Specifically, the ALJ pointed to the fact that L.R.D.’s
teachers reported that she had no limitation in her ability to move and noted that she shows normal

gross motor skills. The ALJ also pointed to various medical providers’ noting “essentially normal”
findings when examining L.R.D. Tr. 31. The ALJ also relied on the fact that there was no evidence
to support a finding that L.R.D. had a medical need for a wheelchair or other assistive device, and
that medical records indicated that L.R.D.’s knee condition was improving with physical therapy.
That said, as the ALJ noted, the pain would return when L.R.D. used her knee—including when
she walked. Tr. 31
B. Medical Records
On May 13, 2019, L.R.D. reported bilateral knee pain to her doctors. She had mild
tenderness over the patella, and her doctors ordered an x-ray. The x-ray of L.R.D.’s right knee
performed shortly thereafter showed osteochondritis dissecans. As a result, L.R.D. was prescribed

physical therapy; L.R.D. attended 19 physical therapy sessions between July 2019 and October
2019. She was once again referred to physical therapy in March 2020; however, due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, sessions could not resume until July 22, 2020.
L.R.D.’s knee pain continued, despite improvement with physical therapy. She told her
doctors that her knee pain was worse when she exerted herself. Tr. 466. As a result, one doctor
told L.R.D. “not to stress the right knee by extensive exertion.” Tr. 466. Several doctors noted

kneeling, crouching, walking, crawling, running, or negotiating terrain such as curbs, steps, or
hills. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(j)(1)(i)
some tenderness and discomfort in the right knee when L.R.D. put weight on it. Others noted no
or only minimal pain or discomfort in L.R.D.’s knee. In April 2021, when L.R.D. again
complained of knee pain, her doctor recommended “a course of nonweightbearing to see” if
L.R.D.’s osteochondritis dissecans would heal on its own. Tr. 753. While keeping weight off her
knee did alleviate her pain, and L.R.D. was anxious to get rid of her crutches, when she began

putting weight on her knee again, the pain returned. Tr. 749; Tr. 747–48. L.R.D. was once again
placed on crutches while doctors performed an MRI to determine whether surgery was necessary.
Tr. 748. Plaintiff testified that L.R.D. was nonweightbearing full time starting in April 2021, and
she relied on crutches or a wheelchair to get around. Tr. 59–61.
In August 2021, L.R.D. underwent surgery. The same day, L.R.D.’s doctors completed
paperwork to permit L.R.D. to obtain a handicap placard, valid for only 90 days. Tr. 322. One of
L.R.D.’s doctors certified that she could not walk 50 feet without stopping to rest because of her
knee condition because of a disabling condition. Following her surgery, L.R.D. returned to
physical therapy on August 10, 2021, where she reported pain, weakness, decreased range of

motion, impaired mobility, impaired ambulation, impaired balance/proprioception, and impaired
core stabilization and postural control. Tr. 1009. That said, she rated her pain when she presented
as a 0 out of 10, but noted that it could be as bad as an 8 out of 10. Tr. 1007–08.
II. STANDARD
The Court must affirm the Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits so long as
“there was no legal error” and “the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole.” Brown v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal citation omitted).
“Substantial evidence is ‘less than a preponderance but . . . enough that a reasonable mind would
find it adequate to support the ALJ’s conclusion.’” Milam v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 978, 983 (8th Cir.
2015) (quoting Jones v. Astrue, 619 F.3d 963, 968 (8th Cir. 2010)). The Court must consider
evidence that both supports and detracts from the ALJ’s decision. Id. But “as long as substantial
evidence in the record supports the Commissioner’s decision, [the Court] may not reverse it
because substantial evidence [also] exists in the record that would have supported a contrary
outcome, or because [the Court] would have decided the case differently.” Andrews v. Colvin, 791
F.3d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Ultimately, the Court must

“defer heavily to the findings and conclusions of the Social Security Administration.” Michel v.
Colvin, 640 F. App’x 585, 592 (8th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff makes several arguments to suggest that the ALJ erred in concluding L.R.D. had
a less than marked limitation in her ability to move about and manipulate objects. The Court must
therefore determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that L.R.D.’s
osteochondritis dissecans does not “interfere[] seriously with [her] ability to independently initiate,
sustain, or complete activities” in the domain of movement and manipulating objects. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.926a(e)(2)(i). Before doing so, however, the Court will address Plaintiff’s challenges to the
way the ALJ considered the opinion evidence in his decision.

A. Whether the ALJ’s Reliance on Consultative Examiners was Error
When evaluating the movement and manipulating objects domain, the ALJ found the
opinions of two consultative examiners persuasive, and ultimately adopted the same limitation as
the examiners. Tr. 32. Plaintiff argues this was error because the examiners’ opinions were
rendered before some of the evidence related to L.R.D.’s knee impairment was available;
specifically, additional imaging studies, records reflecting L.R.D.’s attempts to go
nonweightbearing to get her knee to heal, L.R.D.’s knee surgery, the physician’s statement
supporting L.R.D.’s post-surgery disability placard, and records from L.R.D.’s post-surgery
physical therapy all became part of the record after the August and December 2020 consultative
examiner reports. Tr. 106–107, 116–17 (examiner reports); Tr. 748, 753 (L.R.D.’s reliance on
crutches and periods of nonweightbearing); Tr. 322, 980, 1006–09 (post-surgery evidence).
An “ALJ does not automatically err by crediting a medical opinion that was rendered
without the benefit of a claimant’s full medical record.” Walker v. Kijakazi, No. 6:21-CV-3235-
NKL, 2022 WL 3036639, at *6 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 1, 2022). If the ALJ “conducts an independent

review of the evidence and takes into account portions of the record the consultant had not
considered,” the ALJ is allowed to rely on opinions that predate a complete record. Id. (citing
Kuikka v. Berryhill, No. 17-cv-374, 2018 WL 1342482, at *10 (D. Minn. Mar. 15, 2018). For
three reasons, the ALJ’s reliance on the consultative examiners was not reversible error. First, the
ALJ concluded, and the Court agrees, that the examiners’ opinions were consistent with the record,
which includes the later-submitted evidence. Second, the ALJ independently analyzed most of the
evidence that was gathered after the examiners rendered their opinions. Finally, these later-
submitted records do not undermine, or fundamentally differ from, the medical evidence available
to the consultative examiners such that the ALJ could not consider their impact without an

additional consultative examination.4
For example, Plaintiff notes that L.R.D. had additional imaging studies after the examiners’
opinions were rendered. But the ALJ discusses that evidence, and he noted that L.R.D.’s condition
was stable across all imaging studies, including those available to the consultative examiners. Tr.
30–32. Plaintiff does not explain how the additional imaging studies demonstrate L.R.D.’s
condition got worse or otherwise reflect “new” medical findings that would undermine the
examiners’ opinions or the ALJ’s reliance on them. Instead, Plaintiff just notes that the studies

4 While Plaintiff argues that the later-submitted evidence demonstrates that L.R.D.’s condition was
worsening, the Court disagrees; the medical records do not demonstrate L.R.D.’s knee injury at
any point got worse.
took place after the examiners’ reports were rendered, which is not enough. Plaintiff further argues
that the records demonstrating L.R.D.’s reliance on crutches or a wheelchair and L.R.D.’s surgery
were not available to the consultative examiners. But the ALJ discussed both L.R.D.’s attempts
to keep weight off her knee and her surgery. Tr. 32. As the Court will soon discuss, these efforts
do not reflect a worsening condition or that L.R.D. required the use of an assistive device; they

reflect attempts to treat L.R.D.’s underlying knee impairment. Here again, while these records
reflect additional treatment, given the ALJ’s explicit discussion and interpretation of these records,
it was not error to rely on the earlier-submitted consultative examiner opinions. The same is true
regarding L.R.D.’s disability placard and the records from post-surgery physical therapy. While
this evidence was not available to the consultative examiners, they do not undermine their
conclusions or otherwise indicate that an additional consultative examination should have been
ordered.
At bottom, there is no evidence that the ALJ improperly ignored any evidence submitted
after the consultative examiners rendered their opinions, nor is there any indication that the later-

filed medical records demonstrated substantial changes in L.R.D.’s functioning or condition, such
that the ALJ could not properly interpret the records without the help of an additional medical
expert. The consultative examiners were aware of L.R.D.’s diagnosis of osteochondritis dissecans,
and specifically knew that it sometimes caused L.R.D. pain. The consultative examiners were also
aware of the functional limitations that L.R.D. claimed, such as an inability to run or jump, and
that L.R.D. claimed that she needed a wheelchair to get around. The examiners simply concluded
that the limitations claimed by L.R.D. were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence.
While L.R.D.’s treatment continued, the later medical records do not undermine the consultative
examiners original conclusions such that ALJ could not properly consider them persuasive.5
B. Whether the ALJ Should Have Addressed Dr. Seagrave’s Physician
Statement as a Medical Opinion
After L.R.D. had surgery to address her knee pain, her doctor, Dr. Seagrave, submitted a
statement supporting L.R.D.’s application for a temporary disability placard for her car. Tr. 322.
In it, Dr. Seagrave certified that, due to a temporary disability, L.R.D. “cannot ambulate or walk
50 feet without stopping to rest due to a severe and disabling arthritic, neurological, orthopedic
condition, or other severe and disabling condition.” Tr. 322. The document was dated 8/5/2021
and it was valid for 90 days, until 11/3/2021. There is no evidence that Dr. Seagrave submitted an
additional statement after the first one expired, nor is there any indication that Dr. Seagrave had

previously submitted such a statement suggesting that L.R.D.’s knee pain constituted a disability
or limited her ability to walk prior to her surgery. The ALJ did not discuss this evidence at all.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have considered Dr. Seagrave’s statement a medical
opinion under the Commissioner’s regulations. A medical opinion is “a statement from a medical
source about what you can still do despite your impairment(s) and whether you have one or more
impairment-related limitations or restrictions[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a)(2). According to
Plaintiff, because the movement and manipulating objects domain includes the ability to walk, Dr.
Seagrave’s opinion that Plaintiff could not walk 50 feet without stopping for a break constitutes a
medical opinion. Doc. 10, at 13. If Dr. Seagrave’s statement is a medical opinion, as defined by

the Commissioner’s regulations, the ALJ would have been required to discuss its persuasiveness,

5 Plaintiff also notes that a document submitted by L.R.D.’s doctor to allow her to obtain a
temporary disability placard following her surgery and post-surgery physical therapy are among
the evidence submitted after the consultative examiners issued their opinions. The Court will
address this evidence separately.
including by explicitly evaluating the statement’s supportability and consistency. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c(b)(2). Not doing so, says Plaintiff, was legal error requiring remand. Doc. 10, at 15.
The Commissioner responds that Dr. Seagrave’s statement is not a medical opinion, but
instead is merely evidence that supported a decision made by another government agency—to give
L.R.D. a disability placard under Missouri law. If Dr. Seagrave’s statement is evidence, it is

governed by a different section of the Commissioner’s regulations, and the ALJ was not required
to explicitly analyze it. 20 C.F.R. § 416.904 (the Commissioner “will consider all of the supporting
evidence underlying the other governmental agency or nongovernmental entity’s decision that we
receive as evidence.”).
Dr. Seagrave’s statement is not a medical opinion. A medical opinion is “a statement from
a medical source about what you can still do despite your impairment(s) and whether you have
one or more impairment-related limitations or restrictions[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a)(2). Dr.
Seagrave did not opine how far L.R.D. can walk, or even link her inability to walk to a specific
impairment. Instead, Dr. Seagrave simply certified that L.R.D. was temporarily disabled under

Missouri law because she could not walk fifty feet without resting due to some condition. Plaintiff
cites no case that has considered such a statement a medical opinion under the relevant regulations,
and the Court is aware of none. Furthermore, because Dr. Seagrave did not submit his statement
until after L.R.D.’s surgery and because it is limited to only 90 days, nothing suggests that the
statement addresses L.R.D.’s underlying impairment—her osteochondritis dissecans—at all. For
that reason, while the ALJ was required to consider the statement as evidence pursuant to 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.904, there was no need to treat Dr. Seagrave’s statement as a medical opinion. And because
there is no indication that the ALJ ignored the evidence, it was not error that the ALJ did not
discuss the statement. Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Although required to
develop the record fully and fairly, an ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence
submitted. An ALJ’s failure to cite specific evidence does not indicate that such evidence
was not considered.” (internal citations omitted)).6
C. Whether Substantial Evidence Supported the ALJ’s Analysis of the Evidence
The Parties disagree whether substantial evidence in the record supports a determination

that L.R.D. has a less than marked impairment in her ability to move and manipulate objects. The
Court’s role when reviewing an ALJ’s evaluation of the evidence is narrow; the Court looks only
for legal error and to determine whether substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the
ALJ’s determination. Brown v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal citation
omitted). It does not matter whether substantial evidence also supports the outcome Plaintiff seeks,
and it does not matter whether the Court would have decided the case differently than the ALJ.
Andrews, 791 F.3d at 928. All it takes is enough evidence that “a reasonable mind would find it
adequate to support the ALJ’s conclusion.” Milam, 794 F.3d at 983 (quoting Jones, 619 F.3d at
968). Here, there is such evidence.7

6 The Court agrees with the Commissioner that even if the ALJ should have evaluated Dr.
Seagrave’s statement as an opinion, not doing so was harmless error. Dr. Seagrave’s statement
does not establish any specific limitation to L.R.D.’s ability to walk. The statement is not
supported by any narrative discussion or citation to any medical records; nor does it link L.R.D.’s
inability to walk 50 feet to any specific impairment. Dr. Seagrave’s statement—submitted to the
State of Missouri for a different (and temporary) disability determination—does not support
Plaintiff’s argument that she has a marked impairment in her ability to move and manipulate
objects.
7 The Parties dispute whether the regulations require that a claimant’s functional impairment must
last more than 12 months. Plaintiff appears to argue that only a claimant’s impairment—here
L.R.D.’s knee lesion—must last or be expected to last 12 months to establish a disability.
According to Plaintiff, the impact the impairment has on L.R.D.’s functioning is not subject to the
same requirement. The Commissioner disagrees, arguing that L.R.D.’s marked limitation must
last or be expected to last 12 months, too. Said differently, the Commissioner appears to argue
that even if L.R.D.’s condition functionally equaled a listing at the time of the ALJ’s decision, it
is not enough if that equivalency had not lasted 12 months at the time of the hearing. The Court
To begin, a reasonable mind could conclude that, based on L.R.D.’s medical records, she
experienced a less than marked limitation on her ability to move and manipulate objects. To find
a marked limitation, the ALJ had to conclude that L.R.D.’s knee impairment “interfere[d] seriously
with [L.R.D.’s] ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities.” 20 C.F.R. §
416.926a(e)(2)(i) (emphasis added). While L.R.D.’s medical records do regularly reflect that she

suffered from some knee pain, the records can reasonably be read as showing that the pain had
limited functional impact on her ability to move. For example, in May 2019, L.R.D. presented
with right knee pain, but she was not limping and had a normal range of motion. Tr. 387. In July
2019, L.R.D. was able to pass 4 of 7 elements of her functional assessment, which included
running, jumping, single leg stand, and hopping. Tr. 526. While she failed her squat test, it was
only because her heels lifted, and her therapist was “able to correct [L.R.D.’s failed lunge test] w/
cuing.” Id. There is no evidence attributing the failed tests to her knee pain. The only indication
of any impairment stemming from L.R.D.’s knee injury was minor pain occurring after her run
test. Id. Ultimately, the medical records note that “very little pain” was elicited during the exam.

Id.
Furthermore, in February 2020, L.R.D. could “comfortably transition from sitting to
standing;” was “ambulatory without signs of pain or distress;” and demonstrated the ability to walk
on her toes or heels without difficulty [and] without a limp.” Tr. 444–45. In October 2020, L.R.D.
was once again examined and found to have a full range of motion despite some knee pain. See
Tr. 757. In March 2020, L.R.D. was evaluated by her school for special education services. That
evaluation indicated that L.R.D.’s teachers and parents alike reported that L.R.D.’s gross motor

need not resolve this dispute, as, even if Plaintiff were correct, she would still not succeed on this
appeal.
skills are within normal age-appropriate limits. Tr. 217.8 In January 2021, L.R.D.’s doctors noted
that while she had right-knee tenderness and some discomfort in her right leg, she had a normal
range of motion, coordination, and gait, with no weakness. Tr. 737.
L.R.D. was also able to complete numerous physical therapy sessions, which required her
to put weight on and use her knee. E.g., Tr. 627; Tr. 630. For example, after one 45-minute

physical therapy session in September 2020, L.R.D.’s pain was at a 2. Tr. 639. And despite
reporting that she experiences leg pain when she sits or stands too long, even during physical
therapy sessions she typically only rated her pain level a 3 or 4 out of 10. See Tr. 629; Tr. 639; Tr.
641 (9/21/2020); Tr. 645–46 (9/24/2020). Sometimes, especially as physical therapy progressed,
L.R.D.’s pain was nonexistent, or as low as a 2 both starting and finishing her sessions. Tr. 651;
Tr. 654 (10/5/2020); Tr. 660–61 (10/15/2020); Tr. 778–79 (10/19/2020).
Plaintiff argues that L.R.D.’s knee condition was worsening, and so these records should
be less persuasive. But the medical records don’t support that L.R.D.’ knee condition was getting
worse. Plaintiff at least once reported to medical professionals that it was. Tr. 466 (August 2020).

But L.R.D.’s doctors noted that her lesion itself was stable. E.g., Tr. 755; Tr. 762–64. Plaintiff
points to the decision to put L.R.D. on crutches as a sign that her condition got worse. But, after
reviewing the records, L.R.D.’s doctors simply wanted to give L.R.D.’s lesion a chance to heal
without surgery. Tr. 753.9 After being nonweightbearing for six weeks, L.R.D.’s pain

8 Plaintiff argues that relying on this report is error, given it predates the worsening of L.R.D.’s
condition. Plaintiff cites no evidence that L.R.D.’s condition actually got worse. Accordingly, the
ALJ was within his authority to rely in part on the evaluation by L.R.D.’s teachers and parents of
her gross motor functions.
9 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in determining that L.R.D. had no medical need for crutches
or a wheelchair. The Court disagrees. As discussed, the record indicates that L.R.D.’s doctors put
her on crutches to keep weight off her knee to see if her lesion would heal, not because her
condition required the crutches to move around. While L.R.D. continued to use her crutches and
disappeared. Tr. 750. While L.R.D.’s pain came back after she stopped using her crutches, Tr.
992, there is no evidence that the pain or her ability to function got worse. Indeed, after L.R.D.
reported her pain returned, L.R.D.’s doctor noted the pain was mild and L.R.D. had a full range of
motion. Tr. 747 (6/8/2021). Finally, when L.R.D. reported to physical therapy after her knee
surgery, she reported her current knee pain at a 0, though she stated it could get as bad as an 8. Tr.

1011.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ selectively read L.R.D.’s medical records. Had the ALJ done
so, it could be grounds for reversal. See Walker, 2022 WL 3036639, at *7. But here, after
reviewing the medical records, the Court has found no evidence the ALJ selectively read them or
only considered the portions of the records that supported his decision. Plaintiff cites to various
medical records that document L.R.D.’s knee pain. Doc. 10, at 10–11. But, once again, those
records all reflect only mild tenderness and pain and some impact on L.R.D.’s ability to move;
they do not unequivocally demonstrate that the pain “seriously” impacted her ability to move
around. While those records might support a decision to find a marked limitation, they do not

foreclose the ALJ’s opposite conclusion. As discussed, nor is there any indication that the ALJ
ignored Dr. Seagrave’s Physician Statement supporting L.R.D.’s disability placard after her
surgery. See infra n.8. Considering the whole record, the ALJ’s conclusion—that, while L.R.D.

wheelchair, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that doing so was not medically
necessary. When specifying that a temporary disability placard was necessary for L.R.D., her
doctors had the opportunity to check a box indicating that L.R.D. “cannot ambulate or walk without
the use of, or assistance from, a brace, cane, crutch, another person, prosthetic device, wheelchair,
or other assistive device,” but they did not do so. See Tr. 322. Instead, her doctors indicated that
the placard was necessary only because L.R.D, could not walk 50 feet without stopping to rest due
to a severe and disabling condition.
certainly suffered from chronic pain in her right knee, it did not cause a marked limitation in her
ability to move—is supported by substantial evidence.10
IV. CONCLUSION
The Commissioner’s determination that L.R.D. is not disabled is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

s/ Nanette K. Laughrey Dated: 6/20/2023
NANETTE K. LAUGHREY
Jefferson City, Missouri
United States District Judge

10 The ALJ also credited a report from a teacher, completed on June 30, 2021, to support his
decision to find a less than marked limitation to L.R.D.’s ability to move and manipulate objects.
Tr. 31. Plaintiff argues this was error because the ALJ credited the opinion in one portion of the
opinion but discounted it in another because it was “generally unpersuasive as it [is] unsupported
by explanation, other than ‘reasons unknown’ or ‘reasons unclear.’” Tr. 33. Furthermore, Plaintiff
argues that this opinion was provided by a teacher who interacted with L.R.D. only over Zoom, so
it makes sense that he was not “aware” of any limitation. Doc. 11 (quoting Tr. 320). Even
assuming it was error to rely on this evidence, it was harmless. Even without that report, as
discussed throughout this Order, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10242830. Public record. Not legal advice.