# Cierpiot v. Faurecia Interior Systems Inc.

> District Court, W.D. Missouri · April 19, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10242425

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** April 19, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10242425

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding under the general preemption analysis the MHRA preempts common law claims of negligence and wrongful discharge asserted against an employer

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
LUCAS CIERPIOT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 4:22-cv-00090-RK
)
FAURECIA INTERIOR SYSTEMS INC., )
SPENCER WHITE, RENITA HIGGINS, )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
This civil lawsuit was removed from state court to federal court on February 11, 2021.
(Doc. 1.) Plaintiff Lucas Cierpiot asserts a claim of discrimination under the Missouri Human
Rights Act (“MHRA”) against Defendant Faurecia Interior Systems, Inc. (“FIS”) and a separate
tort claim for conversion against Defendants Spencer White and Renita Higgins. In their notice of
removal, Defendants argue this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 since
Defendants White and Higgins, who the parties appear to agree are otherwise non-diverse
defendants, were fraudulently joined. Specifically, Defendants assert Plaintiff’s tort claim against
Defendants White and Higgins is preempted by the MHRA. On March 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed a
motion to remand, arguing this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the conversion
claim is not preempted by the MHRA and therefore Defendants White and Higgins were not
fraudulently joined. (Doc. 12.) Plaintiff’s motion to remand is fully briefed. (Docs. 13, 15, 19.)
As explained below, the Court does not find Defendants sufficiently meet the high bar to
establish Defendants White and Higgins were fraudulently joined and, as a result, complete
diversity did not exist at the time of removal. Therefore, this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. 12) is GRANTED, and the case is remanded to
state court.
I. Background
From February 2019 through June 2020, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant FIS and
worked at Defendant FIS’s plant in Blue Springs, Missouri. (Doc. 1-2 at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff alleges
after he returned from approved medical leave and additional medical leave during which he called
the “absentee reporting line every single day,” he was told he had several “no-call/no-show” days
and was then escorted off the premises by Haley Brown. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 19, 20, 21.) After being
escorted off the premises, Plaintiff alleges Defendants White or Higgins (or both) “directed the
discarding and/or . . . discarded the entire contents of plaintiff’s employee locker No. 102.” (Id.
at ¶ 23.) Plaintiff alleges they “thr[ew] his belongings into the trash” including “original medical
records and documentation relating to the condition at issue in this case, valuable dishes as part of
a Set of Dishware, [and] a recently purchased Carhartt sweatshirt in excess of eighty five dollars.”
(Id. at ¶ 24.)
Plaintiff alleges Defendant FIS discriminated against him based on his medical condition
and surgery by failing to provide a requested accommodation and retaliated against him when he
spoke with the Senior Corporate Director of Safety, Spencer White, about his vision condition and
the impact of lasers he was tasked to work with despite his vision condition. Plaintiff specifically
alleges Defendant White gave Plaintiff “a printout from the internet for a benign laser that was
completely different than the lasers in use at the work station plaintiff was assigned to” and refused
to read medical documentation from Plaintiff’s eye surgeon explaining Plaintiff’s vulnerability to
lasers. (Id. ¶¶ 45-47, 50, 51.) Additionally, Plaintiff asserts on May 18, 2020, after clocking out
and ending his work day he was “summoned to Senior HR Executive Director Renita Higgins’s .
. . office” where “HR . . . alleged that plaintiff had accumulated four (4) attendance points” but
was not given supporting documentation. (Id. at ¶¶ 32-34.) Plaintiff alleges the meeting and
“notice of four points” were retaliatory and violated Defendant FIS’s own policies. (Id. at ¶ 36.)
Plaintiff also alleges on June 16, 2020, he was “falsely blamed” in an act of retaliation for a mistake
made by a co-worker and was “falsely and retroactively written-up in an act of retaliation by
supervisor Floyd Joy.” (Id. at ¶ 39.)
Finally, on June 28, 2020, “Justin Bond in human resources” informed Plaintiff he was
“terminated for points.” (Id. at ¶ 40.) Plaintiff alleges he never received a certified letter from
Defendant FIS regarding his termination despite being told he would and, in addition, was not paid
for an authorized sick day for June 25, 2020, in retaliation. (Id. at ¶¶ 40, 41, 42.)
II. Legal Standard
Defendants, who collectively invoke this Court’s jurisdiction, bear the burden of proving
that all prerequisites to jurisdiction are satisfied. Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590, 596
(8th Cir. 2002). “A defendant may remove a state law claim to federal court only if the action
originally could have been filed there.” In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 619 (8th
Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) requires an amount in controversy greater
than $75,000 and complete diversity of citizenship among the litigants. “Complete diversity of
citizenship exists where no defendant holds citizenship in the same state where any plaintiff holds
citizenship.” Prempro, 591 F.3d at 620 (citation omitted). Fraudulent joinder – the filing of a
“frivolous or illegitimate claim against a non-diverse defendant solely to prevent removal” – acts
as an exception to the complete diversity rule. Id. Stated differently, “a plaintiff cannot defeat a
defendant’s ‘right of removal’ by fraudulently joining a defendant who has ‘no real connection
with the controversy.’” Knudson v. Sys. Painters, Inc., 634 F.3d 968, 976 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted).
Whether a non-diverse party has been fraudulently joined such that the federal court may
nonetheless obtain subject matter jurisdiction depends on “whether there is arguably a reasonable
basis for predicting that the state law might impose liability based upon the facts involved.”
Wilkinson v. Shackelford, 478 F.3d 957, 963 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation marks
omitted). The Eighth Circuit has explained that the “reasonableness of the basis underlying the
state claim” is critical to this inquiry. Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 810 (8th Cir.
2003). In Filla, the Eighth Circuit explained the critical difference between circumstances in
which courts should find a non-diverse defendant was fraudulently joined and those in which they
should not: “Where applicable state precedent precludes the existence of a cause of action against
a defendant, joinder is fraudulent” but “if there is a ‘colorable’ cause of action – that is, if the state
law might impose liability on the resident defendant under the facts alleged [or, in other words, if
there exists a reasonable basis in fact and law supporting the claim] – then there is no fraudulent
joinder.” Id. (citations and footnote omitted); see also Hayes v. Rad Transport, Inc., No. 10-0787-
CV-W-ODS, 2010 WL 3807052, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 23, 2010) (noting, “[t]he Court’s task is
to determine whether the claim clearly lacks any basis – that is, if it is barred as a matter of law or
if it is based on facts that clearly provide no basis for liability”).
“By requiring the defendant to prove that the plaintiff’s claim against the non-diverse
defendant has no reasonable basis in law and fact, [courts] require the defendant to do more than
merely prove that the plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”
Knudson, 634 F.3d at 980. In the fraudulent-joinder analysis, the Court does not focus on the
artfulness of the plaintiff’s pleadings. Id. at 980 (citation omitted). That is because the reasonable
basis standard articulated in Filla is distinct from and less demanding than the Rule 12(b)(6)
plausibility standard. Id.; see also Hayes, 2010 WL 3807052 at *2 (“Where the sufficiency of the
complaint against the non-diverse defendant is questionable, ‘the better practice is for the federal
court not to decide the doubtful question . . . but simply to remand the case and leave the question
for the state courts to decide.’”) (quoting Filla, 336 F.3d at 810). Any doubts about the propriety
of removal or federal jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remand. Block v. Toyota Motor
Corp., 665 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 2011).
III. Discussion
At issue here is Plaintiff’s tort claim for conversion asserted against non-diverse
defendants, White and Higgins. If Plaintiff’s conversion claim against Defendants White and
Higgins is colorable, the complete-diversity requirement for purposes of federal subject matter
jurisdiction was not satisfied at the time of removal and the case must be remanded to state court.
On the other hand, if – as Defendants argue – Plaintiff’s conversion claim is preempted by the
MHRA, the fraudulent-joinder exception to complete diversity would apply and this Court would
otherwise have subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding incomplete diversity of parties.
The MHRA makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate on the basis of an employee’s
disability. § 213.070.1(3); see Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.055.1(1) (setting forth particular “unlawful
employment practice[s]”). In addition, § 213.070.2 states: “This chapter . . . shall provide the
exclusive remedy for any and all claims for injury or damages arising out of an employment
relationship.” In both their notice of removal and opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to remand,
Defendants argue under Missouri law the MHRA provides the “exclusive remedy” for Plaintiff’s
conversion claim against Defendants White and Higgins, pointing to § 213.070.2, RSMo.1 Thus,

1 To the extent the parties address the MHRA’s preemption of common law claims generally, the
Court finds such analysis misplaced here since the specific claim at issue is Plaintiff’s tort claim against a
co-employee rather than the employer itself. See T.F. v. BB St. Louis, LLC, No. 4:20-CV-1526 RLW, 2021
WL 494795, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 10, 2021) (recognizing “the Missouri Supreme Court [has] ruled that the
MHRA preempts common law claims against an employer . . . but the Missouri Supreme Court did not hold
that the statute preempts tort claims against a co-employee” and the court was unaware of any “Missouri
case holding tort claims against a co-employee . . . are preempted by the MHRA”); see also State ex rel.
Church & Dwight Co., Inc. v. Collins, 543 S.W.3d 22 (Mo. banc 2018) (holding under the general
preemption analysis the MHRA preempts common law claims of negligence and wrongful discharge
asserted against an employer); § 213.010(8)(c) (defining the term “employer” under the MHRA to
specifically exclude “[a]ny individual employed by an employer”). Rather, the critical inquiry is whether
the MHRA’s exclusive-remedy provision, § 213.070.2, applies to Plaintiff’s tort claim against co-
the critical inquiry is whether Plaintiff’s conversion claim against Defendants White and Higgins
“aris[es] out of an employment relationship.”
In their briefing, the parties primarily rely on two fraudulent-joinder cases from other
courts in this district: Van Alst v. Mo. CVS Pharmacy, LLC, No. 4:20-cv-00155-NKL, 2020 WL
2319882 (W.D. Mo. May 11, 2020), and Johnson v. Midwest Div.-RHB, LLC, No. 4:20-CV-00728-
BCW, 2021 WL 5541783 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 11, 2021). Plaintiff argues this case is like Van Alst and
unlike Johnson, and Defendants argue vice-versa.
In Van Alst, in addition to MHRA claims against her former employer, the plaintiff asserted
a tort claim for trespass to chattels against her former supervisor, a non-diverse defendant. 2020
WL 2319882, at *1. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged her former supervisor “caused the
belongings that [plaintiff] kept while she worked at CVS to be destroyed” and that the supervisor
did so “outside and beyond the scope of her employment with CVS.” Id. In arguing against
plaintiff’s motion to remand, CVS argued the plaintiff’s tort claim necessarily arose from her
employment with CVS for purposes of the exclusivity provision since the tort claim involved items
the plaintiff had kept while working at CVS and that “HR” had unlawfully disposed of those
personal items. Id. at *2.
Ultimately, however, the district court concluded “on the face of the petition, the Court
cannot say as a matter of law that the purported destruction of [plaintiff]’s personal property arose
from an employment relationship.” Id. Specifically, the district court reasoned: (1) “[t]he tort
claim against [plaintiff’s former supervisor] is not based on the facts underlying the MHRA
claims”; and (2) “[t]he petition does not establish that [the former supervisor]’s alleged conduct
was undertaken because of or in furtherance of either her or [plaintiff]’s relationship with CVS.”
Id. In fact, the district court recognized, plaintiff’s petition expressly alleged the former
supervisor’s conduct occurred “outside and beyond the scope of her employment with CVS,” an
allegation the district court concluded was “plausible” since the former supervisor could have
been, for example, motivated by personal animus or an intent to convert. Id. Ultimately, the
district court concluded the “factual issue” of whether the supervisor’s alleged conduct causing the
destruction of plaintiff’s personal property arose from an employment relationship meant
plaintiff’s tort claim was colorable and remand was appropriate since the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. Id. at *3.

employees White and Higgins.
Similarly, in Johnson, the plaintiff asserted a tort claim of conversion against a co-
employee who she alleged “destroyed or otherwise disposed of the personal property [plaintiff]
had left in her . . . office when she went on medical leave.” 2021 WL 5441783, at *4. In her
complaint, however, the plaintiff alleged the co-employee “engaged in the alleged tortious conduct
against [her] in the course and scope of [the co-employee]’s . . . employment.” Id. As a result, the
district court in Johnson distinguished the Van Alst case and held on the face of the complaint that
the Johnson plaintiff’s conversion claim against the non-diverse co-employee “ar[os]e from her
employment relationship . . . such that the MHRA provides the exclusive avenue through which
[plaintiff] may seek redress.” Id. Consequently, the district court found the non-diverse co-worker
was fraudulently joined and denied the plaintiff’s motion for remand. Id.
Although not cited by either party in this context, an earlier decision by another court in
this district further demonstrates the application of the exclusive-remedy provision in the MHRA.
In Huskey v. PetSmart, Inc., No. 18-00813-CV-W-NKL, 2019 WL 122873 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 7,
2019), in addition to MHRA claims brought against her employer, the plaintiff asserted a tort claim
against a non-diverse co-employee for civil conspiracy to violate her rights under the MHRA.
There, the district court found the civil conspiracy claim necessarily “ar[ose] from an ‘employment
relationship’” such that the MHRA’s exclusivity provision applied to the claim since the civil
conspiracy claim “concern[ed] what the statute defines as ‘unlawful employment practice[s].’” Id.
at *2-3.
Here, Plaintiff’s conversion claim against Defendants White and Higgins is not based on
the same facts that form the basis of his MHRA claim against Defendant FIS, and, unlike the
claims at issue in Huskey, does not on its face otherwise necessarily involve unlawful employment
practices as defined by the MHRA. Defendants’ argument that “on its face, Plaintiff’s conversion
claim alleges that [Defendants] White and Higgins were acting within the course and scope of their
employment” (Doc. 15 at 3) is not persuasive or supported by the record. To be sure, while
Plaintiff’s pro se petition2 does not allege Defendants White and/or Higgins were acting within the
course and scope of their employment when they discarded (or directed the discarding of)
Plaintiff’s personal items from his employee locker, neither does it allege Defendants White and/or
Higgins were acting outside the scope of their employment in doing so. Whether Defendants

2 Although Plaintiff filed the initial petition pro se, he is now represented by counsel.
White and Higgins are fraudulently joined, however, is an entirely different question from the
sufficiency of Plaintiff’s pro se pleadings to state a claim. Knudson, 634 F.3d at 980.
Without a specific allegation that Defendants White and/or Higgins were acting in the
course and scope of their employment when they committed the allegedly tortious act, Defendants
point to the circumstances surrounding this allegation to establish Plaintiff’s conversion claim
necessarily arises out of the employment relationship. For instance, Defendants point to the
closeness in time of the alleged tortious act by Defendants White and/or Higgins as following what
Plaintiff alleges was an act of retaliation by his employer – that is, Plaintiff’s being escorted off
the premises having been accused of having “had several days of no-call/no-show.” Plaintiff does
not allege that either Defendant White or Higgins were involved in that situation, however, and
instead alleges “Haley Brown” accused him of having several no-call/no-show days. Additionally,
it is not clear, for instance, at the time he was escorted off the premises whether he was terminated
in a manner that would or could otherwise require that his employee locker be cleaned out or
emptied. In fact, the petition alleges after he was escorted off the premises, Plaintiff “followed all
the proper channels in order to preserve his job and acquire the necessary medical documentation
to account for all absences” and indicates that Plaintiff subsequently returned to work. In a similar
vein, the Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s conversion claim
necessarily “arises from an employment relationship” since the items involved in the alleged
conversion were held in an employee locker and some of the items Plaintiff alleges were
unlawfully discarded include medical records and documentation that are relevant to Plaintiff’s
MHRA claim. Without something more, it is not clearly established or alleged that Defendants
White and/or Higgins were acting in the scope of their employment regarding the alleged tortious
behavior as opposed to acting, for instance, with a personal animus or an intent to unlawfully
convert Plaintiff’s possessions.
Accordingly, the Court concludes this case is more like Van Alst than Johnson in that the
petition does not demonstrate on its face Defendants White and/or Higgins were acting within the
scope of an employment relationship and, therefore, the Court cannot conclude Plaintiff’s tort
claim is barred by the MHRA’s exclusive remedy provision. Accordingly, the Court is not
convinced there is no reasonable basis for predicting that the state law might impose liability based
on the facts involved. Plaintiff’s conversion claim is not based on the facts underlying his MHRA
claim for retaliation and discrimination based on his disability. Where there is any doubt regarding
the sufficiency of the petition and the propriety of removal, “‘the better practice is for the federal
court not to decide the doubtful question . . . but simply to remand the case and leave the question
for the state courts to decide.’” Hayes, 2010 WL 3807052 at *2 (quoting Filla, 336 F.3d at 810).
Because it appears Plaintiff’s conversion claim against Defendants White and/or Higgins is
colorable, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in the instant case because Defendants White
and Higgins are non-diverse parties. Accordingly, the case must be remanded to state court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). Plaintiff’s motion to remand
(Doc. 12) is GRANTED and the case is remanded to state court. 3
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark
ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DATED: April 19, 2022

3 Prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s motion to remand, Defendants White and Higgins filed a motion
to dismiss Plaintiff’s conversion claim against them on the same ground – that this claim is preempted by
the MHRA. (Doc. 5.) Defendants’ motion to dismiss is fully briefed. (Docs. 6, 14.) (Defendants did not
file a reply in support of their motion to dismiss.) Because the Court finds it lacks subject matter jurisdiction
and must remand the case to state court, however, it does not take up Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10242425. Public record. Not legal advice.