# Yoder v. Saul

> District Court, W.D. Missouri · May 11, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10241515

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** May 11, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10241515

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that Eighth Circuit case law “does not preclude the ALJ’s reliance on a reviewing physician’s report at step four when the burden is on the claimant to establish an inability to do past relevant work”
- affirming ALJ’s decision that claimant who “worked for several years despite complaining of the pain she now claims is disabling” could perform past relevant work
- holding that “doctors’ observations of [claimant]’s mood and affect are relevant to the assessment of the severity of [claimant]’s symptoms”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION

VICKI LYNN YODER,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 19-00565-W- NKL-SSA

ANDREW M. SAUL,
Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.
ORDER
Plaintiff Vicki Lynn Yoder seeks review of the decision by the Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) that she was not disabled within the meaning of Title II of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. 401 et. Seq. For the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms the ALJ’s decision.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 9, 2017, Yoder filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits beginning June 1, 2011. Tr. 135. Because Yoder had acquired sufficient
quarters of coverage to remain insured through June 30, 2018 (the “date last insured”), she would
qualify for disability and disability insurance benefits only if she were to establish disability on or
before that date. Id.; Doc. 10, p. 2. At the time of the application, Yoder was 60 years old. The
basis of Yoder’s claim was osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, degenerative bone disease, arthritis of the
hands, bilateral knee replacement, bone spurs in the neck, chronic pain, depression, headaches,
high blood pressure, and sleep apnea. Tr. 32. Yoder explained the basis for her disability claim
as follows: “The pain in my, in my back and neck and shoulders just have gotten to the point of
where the pain is just unbearable and so then I have trouble sleeping, which then causes a rough
day, you know, at work with lack of sleep.” Tr. 39.
From 2014 to 2016, Yoder had a job in production for 30 hours a week (which she
described as “full time”) for two years, bottling, packaging, and performing heavy lifting. Tr. 36.
She states that she stopped working because she experienced too much pain from standing “on
[her] feet all the time” and from performing “a lot of repetitious” work with her hands. Tr. 35.
While thus employed, she would sew, crochet, cross-stitch, or perform other craft work for two to

four hours daily. Tr. 894, 897. She continued to perform the handiwork through the date of the
hearing before the ALJ, though she testified that “it’s getting more difficult” to use her hands. Tr.
42.
Yoder testified that, until 2011, she worked at a bowling alley that she co-owns with her
husband. Tr. 37-38. She stated that it had been two years since she worked. Tr. 35. However,
her medical records show that, through at least August 2017, Yoder spent weekends cooking or
working the counter at the bowling alley. Tr. 972. In June 2018, Yoder’s medical care provider
noted that Yoder reported “difficult[y]” using a gel medication for her arthritis because of “many
daily tasks that require handwashing” Tr. 985.

At the time of the hearing, Yoder claimed to drive up to ten miles running errands. She
also assisted a disabled neighbor with performing errands as required. Tr. 63; Doc. 10, p. 26. She
has no issues using the stairs so long as she is not carrying anything. She can throw laundry in the
machine and fold it, does some cooking, uses an iPad regularly, and, as aforementioned, performs
some handiwork.
Yoder claims to have depression that results in three bad days a week, and she takes
medication for depression that her primary care physician prescribed. Tr. 44, 46. However,
medical records show that she denied having any “[d]ifficulty doing work, taking care of things at
home, or getting along with others.” Tr. 539 (May 2017), 666 (March 2015). She indicated that
she can pay attention as long as needed, finish what she starts, follow written and spoken
instructions, get along “very well” with authority figures, get along with friends and family, and,
though she does not handle stress well, she “gets through” changes in routine. Tr. 158-60.
The ALJ found that Yoder had the following severe impairments: cervical and lumbar
degenerative disc disease; lumbar spinal facet pain syndrome; mild bilateral hip degenerative joint

disease; osteoporosis; osteoarthritis of multiple joints, including the hands, feet, and bilateral hips,
and status-post bilateral knee replacements. Tr. 14. Nonetheless, the ALJ concluded that Yoder
had the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of light work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(b), meaning that she “could frequently lift up to 10 pounds, occasionally lift up to 20
pounds, stand and/or walk for up to 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, and sit for up to 6 hours in an
8-hour workday.” Tr. 16. The ALJ then concluded that Yoder was capable of performing past
relevant work, including as a bowling alley manager, and therefore was not disabled during the
relevant period. Tr. 19.

II. STANDARD
The Court must affirm the Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits so long as
“there was no legal error” and “the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole.” Brown v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2016). “Substantial evidence is
less than a preponderance, but is enough so that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the ALJ’s conclusion.” Singh v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 2000). The Court must
consider both “evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s decision as well as evidence that

supports it.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “as long as substantial evidence
in the record supports the Commissioner’s decision, [the Court] may not reverse it because
substantial evidence also exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or
because [the Court] would have decided the case differently.” Andrews v. Colvin, 791 F.3d 923,
928 (8th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Court must “defer heavily to the findings and conclusions of the Social Security
Administration.” Michel v. Colvin, 640 F. App’x 585, 592 (8th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION
a. Whether the ALJ’s RFC as to Physical Limitations
Is Supported by Substantial Evidence
Yoder argues that the ALJ’s “selective adoption” at step four of portions of the opinion of
the non-examining, non-treating physician employed by the State was impermissible.
“Through step four of this analysis, the claimant has the burden of showing that she is
disabled.” Steed v. Astrue, 524 F.3d 872, 875 n.3 (8th Cir. 2008). Thus, the burden of “providing
medical evidence as to the existence and severity of an impairment” rests on the claimant. Kamann
v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 945, 950 (8th Cir. 2013).
In assessing the RFC, an ALJ may “consider the claimant’s subjective statements about his
capabilities.” Mabry v. Colvin, 815 F.3d 386, 390 (8th Cir. 2016). However, “[b]ecause a

claimant’s RFC is a medical question, an ALJ’s assessment of it must be supported by some
medical evidence of the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted). Nonetheless, the RFC assessment “is ultimately an administrative determination
reserved to the Commissioner.’” Winn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin, 894 F.3d 982, 987 (8th Cir.
2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The ALJ’s RFC assessment was based in part on the opinion of Dr. Spence, a non-
examining, non-treating State agency physician. Dr. Spence opined that Yoder could lift and/or
carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, stand and/or walk and also sit for 6 hours in
an 8-hour workday. Tr. 59-60. The ALJ found these aspects of Dr. Spence’s opinion “persuasive.”
Tr. [19]. Dr. Spence also opined that Yoder could occasionally climb ramps/stairs, balance, stoop,
and crawl, but could never climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds, to “prevent symptom exacerbation and
possible injury . . . .” Tr. 60. Dr. Spence further opined that, although Yoder’s gross
manipulation/handling is “[u]nlimited,” her fingering in both hands is “[l]imited,” explaining that

the purpose of the latter limitation is “to prevent symptom exacerbation and possible injury.”
Finally, Dr. Spence opined that Yoder should “avoid concentrated exposure” to vibration, fumes,
odors, dust, gases, poor ventilation, and hazards like unprotected heights and machinery. Tr. 60-
61. The ALJ found these non-exertional limitations unpersuasive because they “are not supported
by and are inconsistent with the entire medical record and the treatment findings . . . , as well as
the claimant’s testimony and reports regarding her ability to perform numerous activities of daily
living.” The ALJ gave examples of the inconsistency between Dr. Spence’s opinion regarding
Yoder’s non-exertional limitations and her activities, stating that “the opinion of Dr. Spence
limiting the claimant to only occasional fingering is inconsistent with the type of work she

performed in 2014 through 2016, three to five years after the alleged onset date,” and noting that
Yoder “indicated she takes her neighbor to appointments and the store as needed, prepares all
meals, and continues to knit, crochet, and sew.” Tr. 19.
Yoder argues that “[t]he ALJ is not permitted to pick and choose [from] the opinions of
record, adopting only those portions which would support a finding of non-disability.” For this
proposition, Yoder cites from within the Eighth Circuit one district court decision, Taylor v.
Barnhart, 333 F. Supp. 2d 846 (E.D. Mo. 2004). However, the thrust of the Taylor opinion on this
point is not that an ALJ cannot rely on some aspects of a report while disregarding others, but
rather, that the ALJ’s explanation for rejecting some evidence “must be set out in the decision.”
Id. at 856 (quoting Jones v. Chater, 65 F.3d 102, 104 (8th Cir. 1995)). Here, the ALJ explained
that her decision to reject portions of Dr. Spence’s opinion was based on medical records, including
treatment findings, as well as testimony and documentation concerning Yoder’s daily activities.
Thus, the Taylor holding concerning failure to explain the decision to discount a medical opinion
does not apply.

Yoder next argues that the ALJ’s rationale for rejecting the postural and environmental
limitations cannot withstand scrutiny. First, Yoder argues that, according to the ALJ herself, the
“part-time” knitting, crocheting, and sewing Yoder performed between 2014 and 2016 did not rise
to the level of substantial gainful activity, citing the ALJ’s ruling that Yoder did not engage in
substantial gainful activity between June 1, 2011 and the date last insured, despite the fact that she
worked approximately 30 hours per week between September 1, 2014 and January 22, 2016.
However, the ALJ’s finding that Yoder did not engage in substantial gainful activity is not
inconsistent with the finding concerning her fingering limitations. The fact that Yoder did not
work a full-time job in the relevant period does not reflect in any way on her capacity for fingering.

The ALJ’s conclusion that Yoder’s 30-hours a week bottling, packaging, and lifting objects and
the additional hours she spent on handiwork each day undermined Dr. Spence’s opinion regarding
her capacity to finger was reasonable in light of the evidence in the record.
Yoder further argues that the “the ability to cross stitch and knit for 2 to 4 hours daily is
not inconsistent with Dr. Spence’s opinion Yoder could occasionally finger,” and that Dr. Spence
was aware of Yoder’s activities when he issued his opinion regarding her limitations, and therefore
the ALJ erred in disregarding Dr. Spence’s opinions because of Yoder’s activities. However, the
ALJ relied not only on the handiwork, but also on the fact that Yoder had worked 30 hours a week
in a production job for approximately two years. Tr. 19. Yoder argues that the work Yoder
performed was just part-time, and therefore does not undermine Dr. Spence’s limitation to
occasional fingering. However, the fact that Yoder performed a production job for 30 hours a
week (work that Yoder characterized in the hearing as “full time,” Tr. 36), in combination with
Yoder’s reports of two to four hours of handiwork daily (Tr. 894, 897), is substantial evidence that
Yoder could do more than occasional fingering. See Henderson v. Colvin, No. C15-0081-CJW,

2016 WL 4599920, at *13 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 2, 2016) (finding that substantial evidence supported
ALJ’s finding that that claimant was able to frequently bilaterally handle and finger where she
would dust, sweep, fix lunch, do dishes daily, shop weekly, pay bills, count change, “work on
sewing and mak[e] bracelets” and also paint or draw daily “depending on hand and finger pains”).
The record also shows that Yoder plays games on an iPad “throughout the day” and
“occasionally . . . assist[s] a mentally challenged individual by providing transportation” to
medical appointments or to a grocery store. Tr. 211. As late as June 2017, she had multiple “busy
weekend[s] at the bowling alley . . . .” Tr. 910, 914, 918; see also Tr 912 (“Patient has busy
weekend ahead of her at bowling alley.”). In August 2017, even as she complained of joint pain

and swelling, she told her medical care providers that “[s]he owns a bowling alley with her husband
and she does a lot of work with cooking and at the counter.” Tr. 972; see Browning v. Sullivan,
958 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming ALJ’s decision that claimant who “worked for several
years despite complaining of the pain she now claims is disabling” could perform past relevant
work).
While she reported “morning stiffness lasting for > 2 hours” in June 2018, the bilateral
osteoarthritis was characterized as “mild.” Tr. 983-985. She discontinued gel medication for pain
at that time because of “many daily tasks that require handwashing” (Tr. 985)—which suggests
that she was working with her hands regularly. Thus, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
conclusion that Yoder was capable of performing work as a manager at least.
Yoder argues in the alternative that, after rejecting Dr. Spence’s opinions, “the ALJ should
have fulfilled her duty to develop the record fully and fairly and obtained some medical opinion
from an examining or treating physician as to Yoder’s functional limitations rather than relying on

his own interpretation of the medical evidence.” Doc. 10, p. 27. However, the Eighth Circuit has
expressly held that “there is no requirement that an RFC finding be supported by a specific medical
opinion.” Hensley v. Colvin, 829 F.3d 926, 932 (8th Cir. 2016). The ALJ’s decision regarding the
RFC was rendered at step four of the sequential evaluation process, where the burden was on
Yoder to establish an inability to do past relevant work, and the ALJ was permitted to rely on a
non-treating physician’s report alone. See Casey v. Astrue, 503 F.3d 687, 697 (8th Cir. 2007)
(noting that Eighth Circuit case law “does not preclude the ALJ’s reliance on a reviewing
physician’s report at step four when the burden is on the claimant to establish an inability to do
past relevant work”).

The decisions that Yoder cites in support of her argument to the contrary do not warrant
reversal. Nevland v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2000), concerned the ALJ’s task at step five,
when the burden shifts to the Commissioner. See id. at 857 (“In our circuit it is well settled law
that once a claimant demonstrates that he or she is unable to do past relevant work, the burden of
proof shifts to the Commissioner to prove, first that the claimant retains the residual functional
capacity to do other kinds of work, and, second that other work exists in substantial numbers in
the national economy that the claimant is able to do. It is also well settled law that it is the duty of
the ALJ to fully and fairly develop the record, even when, as in this case, the claimant is
represented by counsel.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In Combs v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d
642 (8th Cir. 2017), the Eighth Circuit found that the ALJ erred in interpreting ambiguous language
in treatment records so as to conclude that the claimant was not disabled. See id. at 647 (“Although
Combs’ medical providers consistently note in their treatment records that Combs has a normal
range of motion, they likewise consistently diagnose her with rheumatoid arthritis, prescribe
medications for ‘severe pain,’ and note ‘trigger point’ and ‘joint pain with’ range of motion. By

relying on his own interpretation of what ‘no acute distress’ and ‘normal movement of all
extremities’ meant in terms of Combs’ RFC, the ALJ failed to satisfy his duty to fully and fairly
develop the record.”).
In both Spackman v. Colvin, No. 14-CV-4125-NKL, 2015 WL 518564, at *4 (W.D. Mo.
Feb. 9, 2015), and Burchard v. Astrue, No. 08CV87SNLJ/LMB, 2009 WL 2836531, at *10 (E.D.
Mo. Aug. 28, 2009), the ALJ had found that the claimant was disabled at step five of the sequential
evaluation process, where the burden of proof shifts to the commissioner, and not at step four,
where the burden remains with the claimant. Moreover, in Spackman, the Court required the ALJ
to acquire additional medical opinions concerning the claimant’s functional capacity because the
medical evidence in the record was “inconclusive.” Spackman, 2015 WL 518564, at *4.1 Here,

in contrast, the ALJ’s RFC assessment was based on evidence concerning Yoder’s daily activities,
including her work at the bowling alley, as well as medical evidence—not just portions of Dr.
Spence’s opinion, but also the treatment records, which showed that many of Yoder’s symptoms
improved with treatment. Tr. 17-19. See Hensley, 628 F.3d at 995 (“In the absence of medical

1 The decisions in Spackman, 2015 WL 518564, at **2–4, and Burchard, 2009 WL 2836531, at
**16–17, are distinguishable for the additional reason that the ALJ in those cases discounted the
opinions of the treating physicians in their entirety, leaving insufficient evidence to support the
RFC assessment. Here, in contrast, Yoder, who bore the burden of establishing disability at step
four, did not present any treating physicians’ opinions concerning her capacity to work. The only
medical opinion in the record regarding Yoder’s physical limitations was that of Dr. Spence, and
the ALJ relied on it in part in assessing Yoder’s RFC.
opinion evidence, medical records prepared by the most relevant treating physicians can provide
affirmative medical evidence supporting the ALJ’s residual functional capacity findings.”)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
Yoder argues that her conditions deteriorated after Dr. Spence issued his opinion, so that,
“while on 2/1/16 Yoder continued to cross stitch and knit for 2-4 hours daily, by 5/8/17, she could

no longer perform these activities on a daily basis.” Doc. 10, p. 26 (citations omitted). However,
as an initial matter, such an argument cannot rescue Yoder’s claim for the period preceding May
2017. Moreover, Yoder’s statement in her application that she could do crafts, knitting, crocheting,
and sewing just one or two times a week (Tr. 158), and her husband’s contradictory statement that
she could do “[n]o sewing, knitting, painting, clay making, etc.,” are undercut by the evidence,
discussed above, that she was having “busy weekend[s] at the bowling alley,” “cooking” and
working “at the counter” through at least June 2017 and performing multiple tasks requiring hand
washing in June 2018. Given that the burden of proving disability was on Yoder, her arguments
do not warrant reversing the ALJ’s assessment of Yoder’s RFC.

b. Whether the ALJ‘s RFC as to Yoder’s Mental Impairments Is Supported by
Substantial Evidence
Yoder argues that the ALJ erred in failing to include her findings regarding Yoder’s mental
limitations in the RFC. However, Yoder does not suggest how the mild limitations that the ALJ
found in Yoder’s understanding, remembering, and applying information, interacting with others,
concentrating, persisting, maintaining a pace, and adapting or managing herself ought to have
changed the assessment of her RFC.
Yoder cites a purported error in the opinion of the non-examining expert Dr. Toll, an
agency psychologist, but Dr. Toll’s note of a “depression screen score of 6” is consistent with the
record. Tr. 551 (PHQ-2 Depression Screen Positive. Score: 6”). Moreover, Yoder does not
suggest how Yoder’s “moderate” depression ought to change either Dr. Toll’s assessment of
Yoder’s mental impairments as “non-severe” (Tr. 58) or the ALJ’s assessment of Yoder’s RFC.
Yoder “has the burden to establish h[er] RFC,” Mabry v. Colvin, 815 F.3d 386, 390 (8th Cir. 2016),
but she has not established that a more restrictive RFC was warranted here.
Yoder also complains that Dr. Toll relied on just a handful of records in rendering her

opinion. On reply, for the first time, Yoder cites to portions of the record that she claims support
mental restrictions.
[R]ecords on 7/19/11 show increased depression. (Tr. 791). Her mood was
concerned with a sad affect. (Tr. 792). She scored 12 on the PHQ-9 (moderate
depression). (Tr. 793). In addition to medication, Yoder was referred to mental
health to start counseling. (Tr. 794). On 5/17/12, Yoder scored 12 on the PHQ-9
(moderate depression). (Tr. 771). On 7/10/12, she scored 12 on the PHQ-9
(moderate depression). (Tr. 760) On 9/17/12, Paxil helped somewhat, but she still
felt down. (Tr. 740). She scored 12 on the PHQ-9 (moderate depression). Diagnoses
included depression. Paxil and Celexa were prescribed. (Tr. 742). Yoder called the
office of P. Romero, PA, on 11/16/12. She felt everything drove her crazy, and she
was biting her husband’s head off all the time. Celexa was working at first, and she
requested a dose increase, which was done. (Tr. 736).
Doc. 14, p. 10. Yoder argues that, “[h]ad Dr. Toll had the benefit of this additional evidence, Dr.
Toll would likely have found ‘moderate’ rather than ‘mild’ limitations.” However, this evidence
does not establish that Yoder, who was working at her bowling alley around the same time, and
who subsequently worked for two years in a 30-hour-a-week job in production, was limited by her
depression.
Yoder also argues that “Dr. Toll’s opinions are not substantial evidence to support the
ALJ’s decision.” Doc. 10, p. 29. However, the ALJ did not rely on Dr. Toll’s opinion alone; she
considered Plaintiff’s allegations and treatment records as well. Tr. 15. Yoder does not challenge
the ALJ’s statement that “[t]he limited mental status examinations in the record reveal the claimant
generally presented with mostly normal findings, including normal mood and affect.” Id. (citation
omitted); see Tr. 572 (“Mood: Euthymic” and “Affect Normal” in April 2017); Tr. 898 (“PSYCH-
Oriented to time and place appropriate mood and affect” in June 2017); Tr. 962 (“Psychiatric:
Appropriate mood and affect” in May 2018); Tr. 973 (“PSYCH-Oriented to time and place
appropriate mood and affect” in August 2017)). See Chesser v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 1161, 1167
(8th Cir. 2017) (holding that “doctors’ observations of [claimant]’s mood and affect are relevant
to the assessment of the severity of [claimant]’s symptoms”). Yoder received prescription drugs

for her depression not from a mental health specialist, but from her primary care physician. Tr. 46
Moreover, Plaintiff denied having any “[d]ifficulty doing work, taking care of things at
home, or getting along with others.” Tr. 539 (May 2017), 666 (March 2015). She indicated that
she can pay attention as long as needed, finish what she starts, follow written and spoken
instructions, and get along “very well” with authority figures, and though she does not handle
stress well, she “gets through” changes in routine. Tr. 158-60. Further, as discussed above, there
is evidence that Yoder spent multiple weekends through at least the summer of 2017 working the
counter and cooking at the bowling alley she co-owns with her husband—which suggests that
mental issues did not interfere with her ability to work. Thus, substantial evidence in the record

supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s mental impairments did not impact Yoder’s ability
to work.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the Court
affirms the ALJ’s decision.

s/ Nanette K. Laughrey
NANETTE K. LAUGHREY
United States District Judge

Dated: May 11, 2020
Jefferson City, Missouri

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10241515. Public record. Not legal advice.